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The Chinese government response to COVID-19 started in December of 2019 after a cluster of patients in Wuhan, Hubei Providence begin to experience shortness of breath and fever. A public notice on the outbreak occurred on 31 December. Shortly thereafter, the World Health Organization was informed of the outbreak, and in January the first quarantines began in Wuhan. Specialty hospitals were created to care for the high numbers of new patients.

China's response to the Wuhan coronavirus outbreak was criticised for prioritising information that might be unfavorable for local officials over public safety. Observers have attributed this to censorship institutional structure of the country's press and Internet. China's leader Xi Jinping's crackdown on independent oversight left senior officials with inaccurate information on the outbreak.

The China COVID-19 cover-up refers to the efforts of the Government of China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to hide information about the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the origins of SARS-CoV-2. Since the beginning of the pandemic, the Chinese government has made efforts to clamp down on discussion and reporting about it, fund and control further research into the virus's origins, and promote fringe theories about the virus. The Chinese government has stated that no cover-up regarding the COVID-19 outbreak has taken place.

National response

The first person known to have fallen ill due to the new virus was in Wuhan on 1 December 2019. A public notice on the outbreak was released by Wuhan health authority on 31 December; the initial notice informed Wuhan residents that there was no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the virus, that the disease is preventable and controllable, and that people can wear masks when going out. WHO was informed of the outbreak on the same day. On 7 January 2020, the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee discussed COVID-19 prevention and control.

The Wuhan government, which announced a number of new measures such as cancelling the Chinese New Year celebrations, in addition to measures such as checking the temperature of passengers at transport terminals first introduced on 14 January. A quarantine was announced on 23 January 2020 stopping travel in and out of Wuhan. A group tasked with the prevention and control of the COVID-19 pandemic was established on 26 January, led by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. The leading group decided to extend the Spring Festival holiday to contain the outbreak.

China Customs started requiring that all passengers entering and exiting China fill in an extra health declaration form from 26 January. The health declaration form was mentioned in China's Frontier Health and Quarantine Law, granting the customs rights to require it if needed. On 27 January, the General Office of the State Council of China, declared a nationwide extension on the New Year holiday and the postponement of the coming spring semester. The office extended the previously scheduled public holiday from 30 January, to 2 February, while it said school openings for the spring semester would be announced in the future.

Hong Kong's Chief Executive Carrie Lam declared an emergency at a press conference on 25 January, saying the government would close primary and secondary schools for two more weeks on top of the previously scheduled New Year holiday, pushing the date for school reopening to 17 February. Macau closed several museums and libraries, and prolonged the New Year holiday break to 11 February for higher education institutions and 10 February for others.

On 1 February 2020, Xinhua News reported that China's Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) had "asked procuratorates nationwide to fully play their role to create a favourable judicial environment in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic." This included severe punishments for those found guilty of dereliction of duty and the withholding of information for officials. Tougher charges were proscribed for commercial criminal activities such as increasing prices, profiteering along with the "production and sale of fake and shoddy protective equipment and medicines." Prosecuting actions against patients who deliberately spread the infection or refuse examination or compulsory isolation along with threats of violence against medical personnel were also urged. The statement also included urging to prosecute those found fabricating and spreading COVID-19-related information and also stressed "harshly punishing the illegal hunting of wildlife under state protection, as well as improving inspection and quarantine measures for fresh food and meat products."

Quarantine

On 23 January 2020, a quarantine on travel in and out of Wuhan was imposed in an effort to stop the spread of the virus out of Wuhan. Flights, trains, public buses, the metro system, and long-distance coaches were suspended indefinitely. Large-scale gatherings and group tours were also suspended. By 24 January 2020, a total of 15 cities in Hubei, including Wuhan, were placed under similar quarantine measures.

Before the quarantine began, some in Wuhan questioned the reliability of the figures from the Chinese government as well as the government response, with some calling for quarantine, and a post also showed sick people and three dead bodies covered in white sheets on the floor of a hospital on 24 January, although many such posts in Weibo about the epidemic have since been deleted. Due to quarantine measures, Wuhan residents rushed to stockpile essential goods, food, and fuel; prices rose significantly. 5,000,000 people left Wuhan, with 9,000,000 left in the city. The city of Shantou in Guangdong declared a partial lockdown on 26 January, though this was reversed two hours later. Local authorities in Beijing and several other major cities, including Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, announced on the same day that these cities will not impose a lockdown similar to those in Hubei province.

By 6 February 2020, a total of four Zhejiang cities—Wenzhou, Hangzhou, Ningbo, and Taizhou—were under the "passport" system, allowing only one person per household to leave their home every two days. These restrictions apply to over 30 million people.

Speciality hospitals

A speciality hospital named Huoshenshan Hospital has been constructed as a countermeasure against the outbreak and to better quarantine the patients. Wuhan City government had demanded that a state-owned enterprise construct such a hospital "at the fastest speed" comparable to that of the SARS outbreak in 2003. Upon opening, the speciality hospital had 1,000 beds and took up 30,000 square metres. The hospital is modelled after the Xiaotangshan Hospital [zh], which was fabricated for the SARS outbreak of 2003, itself built in only seven days.

On 24 January 2020, the authority announced that they would convert an empty building in Huangzhou District, Huanggang to a 1,000-bed hospital named Dabie Mountain Regional Medical Centre. Works began the next day by 500 personnel and the building began accepting patients on 28 January 2020 at 10:30 pm. In Wuhan, authorities seized dormitories, offices and hospitals to create more beds for patients. On 25 January authorities announced plans for Leishenshan Hospital, a second speciality hospital, with a capacity of 1,600 beds; operations are scheduled to start by 6 February. The hospital opened on 8 February.

By 16 February 2020, 217 teams of a total of 25,633 medical workers from across China went to Wuhan and other cities in Hubei to help open up more facilities and treat patients. A total of 14 temporary hospitals were constructed in China in total, but all were reported to have closed after the crisis was determined be under control on 10 March 2020.

Censorship and police responses

The early response by city authorities was criticised as prioritising a control of information that might be unfavorable for local officials over public safety, and China was also criticised for cover-ups and downplaying the initial discovery and severity of the outbreak. By the time China had informed the WHO of the new coronavirus on 31 December 2019, The New York Times reported that the government was still keeping "its own citizens in the dark". Observers have attributed this to the censorship institutional structure of the country's press and Internet, exacerbated by China's paramount leader Xi Jinping's crackdown on independent oversight such as journalism and social media that left senior officials with inaccurate information on the outbreak and "contributed to a prolonged period of inaction that allowed the virus to spread".

A group of eight medical personnel, including Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist from Wuhan Central Hospital who in late December posted warnings on a new coronavirus strain akin to SARS, were taken into custody by Wuhan police and threatened with prosecution for "spreading rumours" for likening it to SARS. Li Wenliang later died of the disease on 7 February, and was widely hailed as a whistleblower in China, but some of the trending hashtags on Weibo such as "Wuhan government owes Dr Li Wenliang an apology" and "We want freedom of speech" were blocked. His death widespread public anger in the aftermath, in what has been described as "one of the biggest outpourings of online criticism of the government in years," was not a topic that was permitted for coverage.

On 20 January, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping made his first public remark on the outbreak and spoke of "the need for the timely release of information". One day later, the CPC Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, the most powerful political organ in China overseeing legal enforcement and the police, wrote "self-deception will only make the epidemic worse and turn a natural disaster that was controllable into a man-made disaster at great cost," and "only openness can minimise panic to the greatest extent." The commission then added, "anyone who deliberately delays and hides the reporting of cases out of self-interest will be nailed on a pillar of shame for eternity." Xi Jinping later also instructed authorities "to strengthen the guidance of public opinions", language which some viewed as a call for censorship after social media users became increasingly critical and angry at the government. On 30 January, China's Supreme Court, delivered a rare rebuke against the country's police forces, calling the "unreasonably harsh crackdown on online rumours" as undermining public trust.

As part of the central government's "bifurcated approach to diffuse discontent", citizens were permitted to criticise local officials so long as they did not "question the basic legitimacy of the party". The Cyberspace Administration (CAC) declared its intent to foster a "good online atmosphere," with CAC notices sent to video platforms encouraging them to "not to push any negative story, and not to conduct non-official livestreaming on the virus." Censorship has been observed being applied on news articles and social media posts deemed to hold negative tones about COVID-19 and the governmental response, including posts mocking Xi Jinping for not visiting areas of the epidemic, an article that predicted negative effects of the epidemic on the economy, and calls to remove local government officials. While censorship had been briefly relaxed giving a "window of about two weeks in which Chinese journalists were able to publish hard-hitting stories exposing the mishandling of the novel coronavirus by officials", since then private news outlets were reportedly required to use "planned and controlled publicity" with the authorities' consent.

Approval of Chinese responses

China's response to the virus, in comparison to the 2003 SARS outbreak, has been praised by some foreign leaders and analysts. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres stated on February that it was clear "there is a massive effort that is made by China in order to contain the disease and avoid its propagation" and added the effort was "remarkable". U.S. President Trump thanked Chinese leader Xi Jinping "on behalf of the American People" on 24 January on Twitter, stating that "China has been working very hard to contain Coronavirus. The United States greatly appreciates their efforts and transparency." Germany's health minister Jens Spahn, in an interview on Bloomberg TV, said with comparison to the Chinese response to SARS in 2003: "There's a big difference to SARS. We have a much more transparent China. The action of China is much more effective in the first days already." He also praised the international co-operation and communication in dealing with the virus. In a letter to Xi, Singaporean president Halimah Yacob applauded China's "swift, decisive and comprehensive measures" in safeguarding the health of the Chinese people, while prime minister Lee Hsien Loong remarked of "China's firm and decisive response" in communities affected by the virus. Similar sentiments were expressed by Russian president Vladimir Putin.

At a Sunday mass at St. Peter's Square in Vatican City on 26 January, Pope Francis praised "the great commitment by the Chinese community that has already been put in place to combat the epidemic" and commenced a closing prayer for "the people who are sick because of the virus that has spread through China". Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates defended the nation's COVID-19 response amidst criticism from the Trump administration, saying "China did a lot of things right at the beginning" and that "they got to zero" with "an effective lockdown".

Papers from academic journals and publishers such as Science Magazine, Nature, The Lancet, and Karger have regarded China's measures to contain COVID-19 in its own country to be effective. A study in March published in Science Magazine concluded that the Wuhan travel ban and national emergency response there may have prevented more than 700,000 COVID-19 cases outside the city.

Mainland China

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Safeguarding 2020 Chunyun

Chunyun, known to host the world's largest human migration, is a 40-day period when people return home to spend the Chinese New Year with their families. In 2020, it started on 10 January and was to end on 18 February. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, the government estimated 3 billion trips to be made during the period.

On 9 January, Wan Xiangdong, the Chief Pilot of the Civil Aviation Administration, said that the agency would keep a close watch on the outbreak and strengthen ties with the health authorities. Li Wenxin, the Deputy general manager of China Railway said that the railway authorities were paying attention to the situation and making sure to prevent the spread of the epidemic through the railway stations and trains and safeguard the health and safety of passengers. Wang Yang, the Chief Engineer of the Ministry of Transport said that the ministry would carry disinfection monitoring and protection measures out in areas with heavy passenger traffic including transport hubs, passenger stations, and cargo terminal factory stations.

On 22 January, as the COVID-19 outbreak escalated, Li Bin, the deputy president of NHC warned that Chunyun might speed the transmission of the new virus up. Li repeated the government's previous advice to stay away from Wuhan. George F. Gao, the Director of the Chinese CDC, also stated at the conference that the virus can transmit between humans and there were also cases of community-acquired infections. The Chinese health officials also promised to take strict measures to stop the virus from spreading and release information as soon as possible.

Epidemic control efforts

The NHC with the approval of the State Council announced 2019-nCoV-associated pneumonia as Category B Infectious Diseases with control measures of Class A infectious diseases as stipulated in The Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases. From 20 January, the NHC will publish daily data on confirmed and suspected cases in all provinces of the country (Including during the Spring Festival) until no longer necessary. On 20 January, NHC set up a working group up to deal with pneumonia caused by novel coronavirus infection. On 28 January, NHC sent seven supervision teams to seven provinces and cities in Beijing, Hebei, Shanghai, Henan, Hunan, Guangdong, and Sichuan to supervise the epidemic control measures in the areas. China normally makes 10 million face masks

. Delivery drones, artificial intelligence, and facial recognition systems has also been used to help fight the epidemic.

In February 2020, Major General Chen Wei, virologist and medical doctor of the Chinese army, and her team were sent to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in order to develop a vaccine against COVID-19.

In late March, the government severely restricted international travel, limiting the number of flights to the country and denying entry to foreigners with previously issued visas and residence permits. The government also took steps to discourage Chinese people from returning from overseas. These restrictions were partially relaxed in September, then made stricter again in November.

The end of March saw a new Hubei-style lockdown implemented in Jia County, Henan. The lockdown was in response to a confirmed case of coronavirus by a woman who received treatment at a hospital where three doctors have now tested positive for the COVID-19, despite showing no symptoms.

In June 2020, following an outbreak in Beijing tied to Xinfadi Wholesale Market, the Chinese government suspended meat imports from specific facilities in Germany and the United States that had also seen outbreaks.

China's response to the pandemic has allowed residents to live a more normal life compared to people in many other countries; in January 2021 The New York Times labeled China "one of the safest places in the world" amid the pandemic.

Financial supports and tax reduction

On 1 February, the People's Bank of China and other five departments jointly issued the notice on further strengthening financial support for the prevention and control of the epidemic of pneumonia caused by novel coronavirus infection, stating that relevant financial services will be further strengthened during the period affected by the epidemic. For those who are temporarily affected by the epidemic and facing difficulties, the document requires financial institutions to tilt their credit policies appropriately, flexibly adjust their loan repayment arrangements and reasonably postpone the repayment period. Those overdue due to inconvenient repayment during the epidemic period shall not be included in the record of credit investigation and breach of trust.

On 30 January, the Ministry of Finance and NHC issued a notice on the financial guarantee policy for the prevention and control of the new type of pneumonia. The Central Government shall grant a subsidy of 300 yuan per person per day to those who are in direct contact with the cases to be investigated or confirmed who are involved in the diagnosis, treatment, nursing, hospital infection control, case specimen collection, and pathogen detection. For other medical personnel and epidemic prevention workers who take part in epidemic prevention and control, the Central Financial Department shall subsidize them at a rate of 200 yuan per person per day.

The Ministry of Finance, the General Administration of Customs and the General Administration of Taxation issued a joint announcement that from 1 January to 31 March 2020, more preferential import tax policies will be implemented for imported materials used for epidemic prevention and control.

Communist Party Politburo's leadership

Meetings on coronavirus outbreak

On 20 January, Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping ordered that great attention should be paid to prevention and control of the epidemic. The CCP also vowed to guide people's opinions with intensive publicity strategies and interpretations of current policies to ensure social stability. Premier Li Keqiang urged relevant ministries and localities to take a highly responsible attitude towards the People's health and resolutely prevent the spread of the epidemic. Premier Li Keqiang also called a meeting of the State Council's Executive Meeting and deployed the work of epidemic prevention and control.

On 21 January, Premier Li urged protection and encouraged the health care workers. The National Healthcare Security Administration decided to adopt a special reimbursement policy for confirmed patients and temporarily bring relevant drugs and medical services into the reimbursement scope of medical insurance. On 22 January, Vice Premier Sun Chunlan went to Wuhan to inspect the prevention and control of the epidemic.

On 26 January, the first meeting of the Central Leading Group for the Response to the Epidemic of Pneumonia Caused by 2019-nCoV infection prioritized the provision of urgently needed medical and health forces, protective clothing and face masks for prevention and control in Hubei Province and Wuhan and attached importance to the transport of daily necessities for residents and relief supplies to Hubei. It urged the local governments to enhance epidemic control including cancelling meetings and events, strictly quarantining confirmed and suspected infection cases, extending the Chinese New Year holiday and supporting online office and teaching. The Central Government promised to crack down on hoarding and profiteering in materials for disease prevention and control. Public Finance at all levels should fully guarantee such funds as prevention and control of epidemic situations and treatment of the patients.

Xi Jinping's absence

On 27 January, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, entrusted by Party general secretary Xi Jinping according to the state Xinhua News Agency arrived in Wuhan to inspect and guide the epidemic prevention and control work. According to The Wall Street Journal, the appointment of Li who is considered a technocrat surprised some observers, given that he had been sidelined in recent years as Xi concentrated power and cultivated a populist ideological image. Some suggest that Xi was more at risk to the political fallout of the COVID-19 while Li could be a convenient political scapegoat. Li's visit to Wuhan earned high popularity on Chinese social media. Xi Jinping said that he personally commanded the fight against the COVID-19 outbreak when meeting with WHO director general in Beijing on 28 January, but according to a report by The Guardian, he has not made any public presence since then, whilst social media posts mocking Xi's absence were promptly deleted by the censors.

Xi's first public appearance during the outbreak was at a residential community in Chaoyang, Beijing on 10 February. Xinhua posted photos of Xi wearing a mask and said that the aim of Xi's visit was to learn about the situation of epidemic prevision and control at the grassroots level. It was his first time to interact with the people since the outbreak after he paid a short visit to Yunnan during 19–21 January as a tradition that China's leaders observed to visit the smaller towns and villages before the Spring Festival. He was said to chair a meeting on 3 February by the state media, but no pictures or videos were released. Xi also met Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the first foreign leader to visit China since the COVID-19 outbreak on 5 February.

On 15 February, Qiushi, the CCP's main theoretical magazine, documented a 7 January order by Xi Jinping regarding the COVID-19 outbreak at a Politburo Standing Committee meeting, 13 days before the public was aware of the outbreak's severity. This appeared to reveal that Xi knew about and was directing the response to the virus on 7 January and raised important questions about whether it was the Central Government that dithered over the response, allowing the virus to spread across the country and eventually the world. However, Homare Endo, director of the Global Institute for China Studies, said a record of the same meeting released beforehand shows there was no mention of the epidemic. She said this indicated that Xi was forced to make "additions" retrospectively because of the public's anger over the death of Dr. Li Wenliang, who was arrested by the Wuhan police for early warning of an epidemic.

On 10 March, Xi Jinping visited Wuhan, over one month after Premier Li Keqiang's visit.

Administrative supervision

Since the outbreak of the epidemic, a number of government officials have been publicly held accountable for their dereliction of duty in the epidemic prevention in 6 provinces.

On 29 January, Director of Huanggang MHC Tang Zhihong failed to tell the capacity of the local hospitals including how many patients that they could handle, how many could be hospitalized and how many patients could be tested each day when asked about these questions despite being an administrator of the local hospitals. A day later, the Party Committee of Huanggang proposed a removal of Tang from the post. On 1 February, according to the Mayor of Huanggang named Qui Lixin, the city authority disciplined 337 of its officials and removed 6 cadres who caused disadvantages to the epidemic prevention.

On 2 February, Zhang Cong, Party Secretary of Xuanhua, Hebei was admonished. Zhang Guoqing, Deputy Party Secretary of Xuanhua and Guo Xiaoyi, the political commissar of the local police were given disciplinary actions by the Party. On the same day, February, Xiangshui, Jiangsu reported three cases of misconduct. The cases were associated with illegal disclosure of personal data and dereliction of duty. Party secretary, Zhang Changyue and deputy director Gu Bing of the Zhangji Health Center and the director of the Xiangshui CDC were removed or disciplined.

Tang Hu, the director of the Health Bureau of the Nanhu New District in Yueyang, Hunan Province was suspended. Cai Junfeng, the deputy director of the Lengshuijiang Municipal Committee and Yang Wen, the deputy director of the municipal government office are suspended. He Yong, the deputy secretary of the Gutang Party Committee and township chief was suspended.

On 4 February, Zhang Qin, the vice president of the Hubei Red Cross, was removed from his post while Gao Qin and Chen Bo of the Hubei Red Cross were given a warning. The deputy director of the Wuhan Municipal Bureau of Statistics, Xia Guohua was also removed from his post. The Secretary and Director of the Leading Party Group of the Wuhan Municipal Development and Reform Commission, the Secretary and Director of the Leading Party Group of the Wuhan Municipal Bureau of Statistics, Meng Wukang and the deputy director of the General Office of the Wuhan Municipal Government, Huang Zhitong are admonished.

National mourning

On 3 April, the Chinese government declared 4 April, the Qingming Festival of 2020, a national day of mourning for those who lost their lives in the COVID-19 pandemic. At 10 a.m., people were asked to observe three minutes of silence while sirens and vehicle horns blasted out. Chinese flags were flown at half-mast across the country and at embassies overseas. All public entertainment were halted for the day.

Other government activities

Results from the 2020 Chinese census were delayed, which commentators speculated might be related to changes in migration patterns due to the pandemic.

The government has delayed issuing passports (with some exceptions) in order to decrease international travel in and out of China, to reduce the risk of COVID-19, especially COVID-19 variants, entering the country and causing outbreaks.

In August 2021, the government evacuated more than 5,000 people from the border district of Jiegao, Ruili, Yunnan, to the nearby city of Mangshi. Due to its location on the border with Myanmar, Jiegao had seen a number of COVID-19 cases, and it was locked down for months before the evacuation. The government also installed barbed wire, surveillance cameras, and security personnel to deter unauthorized border crossings that could spread COVID-19, and, according to an official, deported thousands of undocumented residents in the area.

Propaganda

Statements issued by Xi Jinping on 3 February declared the need for an emphasis by state media on "telling the moving stories of how on the front line are preventing and fighting the virus" as a priority of coverage, while top official Zhang Xiaoguo said that his department would "treat propaganda regarding the control and prevention measures of the virus as its top priority". For instance, state media organisations People's Daily and Global Times, along with deputy director of information Zhao Lijian from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been observed to be publishing effusive praise on Beijing's response to the epidemic, such as extensive coverage of the accelerated construction of the new hospitals in Wuhan (which Zhao said was completed in 16 hours), the lock down of Wuhan with its population of 11 million, and the "unprecedented" quarantine of Hubei province. Though such efforts had a questionable effect on the epidemic, as the new hospitals were operating at under half-capacity due to shortages of beds and medical resources while the lock down of Wuhan came too late to be effective as millions had left, the Financial Times and others noted that such widely publicised actions were a "PR coup" showing that the "overbearing, centralized government" of China was particularly suited to dealing with the outbreak, creating the impression as if Beijing had directly intervened at Xi Jinping's request.

Observers have warned that while "admiration of the front-line medical workers is widespread and sincere," the state media should also be highlighting the reality that many of those workers "lack protective gear" and that over 3000 have been infected since the outbreak so that media attention may bring them public support to obtain some much needed equipment. The New York Times has noted that such government propaganda attempts to control the narrative has been viewed with distrust among the younger individuals, who unlike older people depend less on state media and instead have sought "firsthand info and in-depth media studies concerning the epidemic on the web", suggesting that the central government was out of touch with the younger population.

Outlets such as Politico and Foreign Policy have reported that China's efforts to send aid to virus-stricken countries are part of a propaganda push for global influence. The European Union's diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has fought back against propaganda highlighting China's role in providing medical supplies to Italy, pointing out that France and Germany combined had provided more masks to Italy than China. The EEAS also noted that China's "state media and government officials promote not proven theories about the origin of Covid-19" while China state media coverage highlighted "displays of gratitude by some European leaders in response to Chinese aid". China has been accused of opportunitism during the pandemic, alongside their donations and exports of faulty medical equipment to EU nations hardest hit by the virus, as their disinformation campaign "reputedly bid to denigrate Europe's responses to cast its own in a more favorable light", such as on 12 April 2020 when the Chinese embassy in Paris published an article titled "Restoring distorted facts – Observations of a Chinese diplomat posted to Paris" claiming that careworkers in Western nursing homes had abandoned their jobs leaving residents to die. The EEAS had toned down their report by omitting details of China's state sponsored disinformation campaign, which in turn led to allegations that the EEAS had bowed to pressure from China, as China reportedly threatened to withhold the shipment of medical supplies if the original report was released.

Censorship and police responses

A pneumonia cluster of unknown cause was observed on 26 December and treated by the doctor Zhang Jixian in Hubei Provincial Hospital, who informed the Wuhan Jianghan CDC on 27 December. The early response by city authorities was accused of prioritising a control of information on the outbreak. A group of eight medical personnel, including Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist from Wuhan Central Hospital, who in late December posted warnings on a new coronavirus strain akin to SARS, were warned by Wuhan police for "spreading rumours" for likening it to SARS.

不使用"无法治愈""致命"等标题，防止引起社会恐慌。
Do not use "incurable", "fatal" or similar headlines to avoid causing societal panic.

By the time China had informed the World Health Organization of the new coronavirus on 31 December 2019, Nicholas Kristof commented that the government was still keeping its own citizens in the dark in an opinion published on The New York Times. While by a number of measures, China's initial handling of the crisis was an improvement in relation to the SARS response in 2003, local officials in Wuhan covered up and downplayed the initial discovery and severity of this outbreak. This has been attributed to the censorship institutional structure of the country's press and Internet, with Jude Blanchette of the Center for Strategic and International Studies quoted stating "under Xi Jinping, the inclination to suppress has become endemic and, in this case, contributed to a prolonged period of inaction that allowed the virus to spread". William Summers, a Yale University professor of medicine, told Undark Magazine though that such silencing and downplaying tactics are not unique to China, and seems to be standard operating procedure worldwide.

On 20 January, Xi Jinping made his first public remark on the outbreak and spoke of the need for the timely release of information. Chinese premier Li Keqiang also urged efforts to prevent and control the epidemic. One day later, the CPC Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, the most powerful political organ in China overseeing legal enforcement and the police, wrote "self-deception will only make the epidemic worse and turn a natural disaster that was controllable into a man-made disaster at great cost," and "only openness can minimise panic to the greatest extent." The commission then added, "anyone who deliberately delays and hides the reporting of cases out of self-interest will be nailed on a pillar of shame for eternity." Also on the same day, Xi Jinping instructed authorities to strengthen the guidance of public opinions, language which some view as a call for censorship after commentators on social media became increasingly pointedly critical and angry at the government due to the epidemic. Some view this as contradictory to the calls for openness that the central government had already declared.

As part of the central government's bifurcated approach to diffuse discontent, while the propaganda machinery was going into "overdrive...to protect reputation", citizens were permitted to criticise local officials so long as they did not question the basic legitimacy of the party. The Cyberspace Administration (CAC) declared its intent to foster a good online atmosphere, with CAC notices sent to video platforms encouraging them to not to push any negative story, and not to conduct non-official livestreaming on the virus. Censorship has been observed being applied on news articles and social media posts deemed to hold negative tones about the COVID-19 and the governmental response, including posts mocking Xi Jinping for not visiting areas of the epidemic, an article that predicted negative effects of the epidemic on the economy, and calls to remove local government officials. Chinese citizens have reportedly used innovative methods to avoid censorship to express anger about how government officials have handled the initial outbreak response, such as using the word 'Trump' to refer to Xi Jinping, or 'Chernobyl' to refer to the outbreak as a whole. Younger individuals have also been creating digital archives of media concerning the epidemic – which is prone to deletion by censors – and posting them on the exterior web. While censorship had been briefly relaxed giving a "window of about two weeks in which Chinese journalists were able to publish hard-hitting stories exposing the mishandling of the novel coronavirus by officials", since then private news outlets were reportedly required to use "planned and controlled publicity" with the authorities' consent.

On 30 January, China's Supreme Court delivered a rare rebuke against the country's police forces, calling the "unreasonably harsh crackdown on online rumours" as undermining public trust. In what has been called a "highly unusual criticism" by observers, supreme court judge Tang Xinghua said that if police had been lenient against rumours and allowed the public to have taken heed of them, an earlier adoption of "measures like wearing masks, strictly disinfecting and avoiding wildlife markets" might have been useful in countering the spread of the epidemic. Human Rights Watch reported that "there is considerable misinformation on Chinese social media and authorities have legitimate reasons to counter false information that can cause public panic," but also noted censorship by the authorities on social media posted by families of infected people who were potentially seeking help as well as by people living in cordoned cities who were documenting their daily lives amidst the lockdown.

Journalists in China have worked to publish information about the outbreak. The government initially allowed greater leeway than usual to reporters investigating the crisis, but then cracked down with greater censorship than usual. On 12 March, ten Tibetans were arrested for breaching control measures meant to prevent the spread of the virus. Dolma Kyab, a Tibetan writer and teacher, told Radio Free Asia that "the Chinese government is only using coronavirus as a convenient excuse to infringe on the human rights of Tibetans".

The New York Times later reported that "authorities issued strict commands on the content and tone of news coverage, directed paid trolls to inundate social media with party-line blather and deployed security forces to muzzle unsanctioned voices."

On 19 February 2020, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced the revoking of the press credentials of three Wall Street Journal reporters based in Beijing, accusing the Wall Street Journal of failing to apologize for publishing articles which the Foreign Ministry said slandered the Chinese government's response to the COVID-19 outbreak, and failing to investigate and deal with those responsible.

Response to whistleblowers

On 18 December 2019, Ai Fen, director of the emergency department of Central Hospital of Wuhan came into contact with an unusual pulmonary infection from a delivery person of Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. On 27 December, she received a second patient with similar symptoms, but who had no link to the wet market. In the afternoon of 30 December, upon seeing the words "SARS coronavirus, pseudomonas aeruginosa", Ai immediately reported to the hospital's public health department and infection department. She circled the word "SARS", and took an image of it and forwarded it to another doctor in Wuhan. From there it spread throughout medical circles in Wuhan, and reached Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist at the hospital. On the afternoon of the same day, Li sent a warning to former classmates over WeChat which was reposted widely. In an interview with Renwu magazine, Ai said she was reprimanded after alerting her superiors and colleagues of the SARS-like virus in December. Li Wenliang would later be canonised on the internet as a heroic whistleblower, and Ai would be lauded as the one who provided the whistle.

On 1 January, eight people were summoned for talks by Wuhan police for their claim that there were SARS cases in Wuhan. Li Wenliang said he didn't know whether he was one of them or not. According to Wang Gaofei, Weibo's CEO, the eight people are all doctors at Wuhan hospitals who "are still fighting at the frontline". The Supreme Court defended these doctors and pointed out in a WeChat article on 28 January, delay and opacity in public information are the root of fake news and the information that is mostly factual and not subjectively malicious and causes no objectively severe consequences should be tolerated. On 29 January, the eight doctors were also praised by Zeng Guang, Chief Scientist at China CDC. Hu Xijin, the editor of the Global Times, complained about the local governments' low tolerance of differing online opinions and believed this weakened checks-and-balances of government powers through news media.

Death of Li Wenliang

After Li Wenliang was warned by Wuhan police, the doctor was diagnosed with the COVID-19 infection and died from it on 7 February 2020. He was said to be dead on the evening of 6 February, although the hospital said that he was still under emergency treatment. People speculated that authorities were trying to censor the news. After his death, people mourned his death and criticized the government. some of the trending hashtags on Weibo such as "Wuhan government owes Dr. Li Wenliang an apology" and "We want freedom of speech" became trending topics on Weibo until the posts were deleted by censors. While media outlets were allowed to report his death, the nature of the doctor's censorship which produced widespread public anger in the aftermath, in what has been described as "one of the biggest outpourings of online criticism of the government in years," was not a topic that was permitted for coverage.

A group of Chinese academics including Xu Zhangrun of Tsinghua University signed an open letter calling for the central government to issue an apology to Dr. Li and to protect freedom of speech. Professor Zhou Lian of Renmin University has observed that the epidemic has "allowed more people to see the institutional factors behind the outbreak and the importance of freedom of speech". After attempts to discourage the discussion on Dr. Li's death further escalated online anger, the central government has been accused of reportedly attempting to co-opt the incident by "cast Dr. Li's death as the nation's sacrifice – meaning, the Chinese Communist Party's own". The Financial Times considered it possible that Li's story may turn out to fit a historical archetype in China where an incorruptible Confucian scholar who speaks truth to the emperor is persecuted and ultimately dies for his honesty.

Later in March, Wuhan police apologised to Li Wenliang's family after National Supervisory Commission admitted the conduct of local officials is inadequate and praised the whistleblower's effort on raising public awareness.

Zhang Ouya's criticism

In January, Zhang Ouya, the Chief Journalist of Hubei Daily called for the removal of the current leaders of Hubei and Wuhan on Weibo. But, he was asked to remove his post and the newspaper that he worked for apologized to the Wuhan authorities, promising that they will publish only positive content from now on. Mayor Zhou of Wuhan said to the state media "As a local government, I could not disclose information until I get information and authorization which was not understood at the time." His argument which hinted at the Central Government's responsibility, was refuted by China CDC. Chief Scientist Zeng Guang said to Chinese tabloid The Global Times that what the scientists said was "often only part of their decision-making" and praised the eight whistleblowers who were warned by the Wuhan authorities before the epidemic.

Alleged undercounting of cases and deaths

On 1 April, two United States officials said that China had deliberately concealed its cases and deaths according to a report by United States Intelligence Community. The officials asked not to be identified because the report is secret, and declined to detail its contents. The sources stated that the Chinese central government does not know the extent of the outbreak because lower-level officials reported falsified statistics to avoid losing their positions. The CIA is currently investigating in China to assess the COVID-19 totals.

During the pandemic, no reports of cases of the COVID-19 in Xinjiang prisons or of conditions in the Xinjiang re-education camps emerged. Anna Hayes of Australia's James Cook University expressed concern about possible spread in the camps.

As of late March, users of the social-media site Sina Weibo widely shared an undated photograph showing long lines at the Hankou funeral home in Wuhan. According to Caixin Global, the Hankou funeral home was operating 19 hours a day. Caixin also reported that there were a number of people who died with COVID-19 symptoms but were not tested and were thus excluded from the official case-tally. Some patients died of other diseases due to a lack of proper treatment when hospitals were overwhelmed dealing with those who had the COVID-19. Some social-media users have used the numbers of urns returned to families and the number of cremations conducted in Wuhan to estimate a death toll in Wuhan of about 42,000 or 46,800, compared to an official toll of 2,548 people attributed to the virus in Wuhan as of 27 March. There were 13,856 cremations in Wuhan in the fourth quarter of 2019, according to Bloomberg calculations based on data from the city's civil-affairs agency. That was 2,419 lower than in the fourth quarter of 2018.

Health experts, United States intelligence officials, British scientists, and British government officials have expressed doubts about the accuracy of the figures provided by the Chinese government relating to the epidemic, raising concerns that the Beijing government has deliberately under-reported the extent of infections and deaths. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang reported on 24 March 2020 that the spread of domestically transmitted epidemic has essentially stopped and the outbreak has been controlled in China.

Asymptomatic cases (people who tested positive but did not develop symptoms) were not counted as confirmed cases before 1 March.

On 17 April 2020 the Wuhan government revised the number of COVID-19 deaths, accounting for deaths that occurred at home that went previously unreported, as well as for the subtraction of deaths that were previously double-counted by different hospitals, resulting in a net increase of 1,290 reported deaths in the city.

Blood samples taken by the Chinese CDC from a random sampling of 34,000 Wuhan citizens one month after the virus first wave was contained showed 4.43% of people had antibodies which would equate to almost 500,000 infections. In the wider Hubei area 0.44% of those sampled were positive for antibodies, while of 12,000 nationally representative samples taken only two recorded positive results.

Investigations of origins of the virus

The central government has imposed restrictions on the publication of academic research regarding the origins of the COVID-19. The directive issued by the Ministry of Education's science and technology department stated that "academic papers about tracing the origin of the virus must be strictly and tightly managed", requiring that such papers be vetted by a State Council task force. A Chinese researcher who spoke on condition of anonymity due to fear of retaliation said "I think it is a coordinated effort from (the) Chinese government to control (the) narrative, and paint it as if the outbreak did not originate in China. And I don't think they will really tolerate any objective study to investigate the origination of this disease." The researcher said that such a move would obstruct important scientific research. Yanzhong Huang, a senior fellow for global health at the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations, said "it is no surprise that the government seeks to control related scientific research so that the findings do not challenge its own narrative on the origin of the virus and the government response to the crisis".

After interviewing virologist Shi Zhengli who had investigated bat coronaviruses including the latest one, journalist Gao Yu said "We learned later her institute finished gene-sequencing and related tests as early as January 2 but was muzzled." Shi said that Yanyi Wang, Director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, had ordered staff not to disclose information on the disease arguing that "inappropriate and inaccurate information was causing 'general panic'". Furthermore, Wang directed that "The National Health Commission 'unequivocally requires that any tests, clinical data, test results, conclusions related to the epidemic shall not be posted on social media platforms, nor shall be disclosed to any media outlets including government official media, nor shall be disclosed to partner institutions'".

The broad scientific consensus holds that SARS-CoV-2 originated in bats. A member of Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBRA) in the UK, tasked with dealing with crisis, has said that while British government intelligence does not dispute that the virus has a zoonotic origin, it also does not discount the idea of a leak from a Wuhan laboratory, saying that "Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is that laboratory in Wuhan" (the Wuhan Institute of Virology). On 15 April 2020, US President Donald Trump announced that the US government was investigating whether the virus spread from the laboratory.

Reactions to government response

The exodus from Wuhan before the lockdown resulted in angry responses on Sina Weibo from the residents in the other cities who are concerned that it could result in the spreading of the novel coronavirus to their cities. Some in Wuhan are concerned with the availability of provisions and especially medical supplies during the lockdown.

The World Health Organization called the Wuhan lockdown unprecedented and said that it showed how committed that the authorities are to contain a viral breakout. Later, the WHO clarified that the move was not a recommendation that it made and that the authorities had to wait and see how effective it was. The WHO separately stated that the possibility of locking an entire city down, as was in this case, was new to science.

The CSI 300 Index, an aggregate measure of the top 300 stocks in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, dropped almost 3% on 23 January 2020, the biggest single-day loss in almost 9 months after the Wuhan lockdown was announced as the investors that are spooked by the drastic measure sought a safe haven for their investments.

The lockdown caused panic in the city of Wuhan and many expressed concern about the city's ability to cope with the outbreak. A medical historian named Howard Markel argued that the Chinese government "may now be overreacting, imposing an unjustifiable burden on the population" and said that "incremental restrictions, enforced steadily and transparently tended to work far better than draconian measures." Others such as Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases defended the intent behind the lockdowns, citing that the lockdowns bought the world a "delay to essentially prepare better." A mathematical epidemiologist named Gerardo Chowell of Georgia State University stated that based on mathematical modelling, "containment strategies implemented in China are successfully reducing transmission."

Response from the science community

On 29 January, the Ministry of Science and Technology issued a notice, urging the scientists "to write their papers on the land of the motherland, to use the results to fight the epidemic" and the scientists should not focus on publishing their papers until the epidemic prevention and control task is completed. Duowei News believed this was aimed to respond to the academic conflict between Zhang Yongzhen's group from Fudan University which published the first genomic sequence of 2019-nCoV and the Gao Shan group from Nankai University which published an analysis on the sequence without authorization from Zhang. Before the notice, Nankai and Fudan, two of China's top universities had a fight over the alleged academic misconduct related to the analysis published by the Gao Shan group.

On 30 January, Wang Liming, a neuroscientist from Zhejiang University expressed anger on a Weibo post about George F. Gao's latest NEJM article. Wang believed that the article indicated that the Chinese CDC had clear evidence of human-to-human transmission in early January and kept it secret until three weeks later. Although the post was soon deleted, China CDC came under the spotlight. China CDC had to respond on the next day that the research was a retrospective analysis of the 425 cases reported to CDC on 23 January. Jennifer Zeis of NEJM's media Relations Department told The Paper, a Chinese newspaper that it took only two days to publish the article, but she refused to give further details.

The journal Nature reported at least 54 English-language papers about the new coronavirus in China were published by 30 January. Zuofeng Zhang, a public health expert from UCLA interviewed by the mainland China-based magazine Intellectual, asked why the published data were not used in epidemic control even before their publication.

The Chinese government has funded research on the origin of COVID-19, but has also restricted this research. In 2021, a WHO-led international mission traveled to China to investigate the origins of COVID-19; the Chinese government granted them permission to arrive after initially blocking them due to visa issues.

Pandemic review

On 18 January 2021, an interim report from the independent panel on the world's response to the pandemic led by Helen Clark and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf criticised the local and national health authorities in China for not applying public health measures more forcefully to control the initial outbreak in January 2020.

Vaccination

In July 2020, the Chinese government granted an emergency use authorization for COVID-19 vaccines developed by Sinovac Biotech and China National Biotech Group. The government also approved a vaccine developed by CanSino Biologics for use in the military. By mid-December, authorities said that over one million vaccine doses had been administered to over 650,000 people (the vaccines require two doses), with "no serious adverse reactions". By December, plans were in place to vaccinate more widely, beginning with high-risk groups. The vaccine rollout has been delayed by limited supplies and vaccine hesitancy.

As of February 2021 China had provided vaccines to 53 developing countries and vaccine exports to 22 countries. Foreign Minister Wang Yi criticized developed countries for hoarding vaccines and urged the international community to "promote fair and equitable distribution of vaccines".

In June 2021, China reached one billion of domestically produced vaccine doses administered, representing more than one third of the global total at that point in time. This is about 74 doses per 100 population, a similar rate to many European countries. In June 2021, China was administrating nearly 60% of worldwide vaccinations.

COVID-19 origin cover-up

Cover-up of the initial Wuhan outbreak

As COVID-19 began spreading within China between December 2019 - February 2020, Chinese authorities prevented doctors and laboratories from sharing information about the outbreak, including admonishing frontline healthcare professionals and perceived whistleblowers, most notably, Li Wenliang. By 27 December 2019, the local government knew there was an outbreak of pneumonia. At least one healthcare worker had already been infected, which, under international healthcare regulations, requires a country to report an outbreak to the World Health Organization (WHO), as it is considered proof of person-to-person spread. However, China did not report the outbreak to the WHO at that time. Instead, the WHO noticed a media report of the outbreak on 31 December. On 3 January, when China acknowledged the outbreak to the WHO, it called it "viral pneumonia of unknown cause", even though they had the complete genetic sequence at that time. It also said that there was no evidence of human-to-human transmission, even though 20 cases had already been confirmed among medical workers.

Release of the genetic sequence

By 27 December 2019, a lab called Vision Medicals had most of the sequence of the new virus. On 2 January 2020, Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) decoded the entire sequence. By 5 January, two more labs had obtained the sequence, including the Shanghai Public Clinical Health Center led by Zhang Yongzhen, who submitted the sequence to the United States government's GenBank database. On 11 January, Zhang's lab published the sequence on virological.org. Three people stated that this angered the Chinese CDC, and the Shanghai government temporarily closed Zhang's lab. Zhang said that the closure was not retaliation for publishing the genome, but instead was to improve the lab's biosafety protocols. On 24 January the lab was accredited to research the novel coronavirus. On 12 January, the WIV and the other labs released their sequences.

Silencing of medical workers

Li Wenliang was an ophthalmologist at Wuhan Central Hospital. On 30 December 2019, he had seen seven cases of a virus he thought looked like SARS. He sent a message to fellow doctors in a chat group warning them to wear protective clothing to avoid infection. He and seven other doctors were later told to come to the Public Security Bureau and told to sign a letter. The letter accused them of "making false comments" that would "disturb the social order". Wang Guangbao, who is a Chinese surgeon and science writer, later said that by 1 January, people in medical circles thought that a SARS-like virus might be spreading, but the police warning discouraged them from talking openly about it. Wenliang later died of the virus, and China later apologized to his family and overturned the warning in the letter.

A nurse said that by early January, doctors and nurses had noticed that they too were getting sick. Hospital administrators made long calls to the City Government and Health Commission. However, medical personnel were not allowed to wear protective gear, because it would cause panic. Health and governance experts place much of the blame on higher-level officials, as local authorities in China can be punished for reporting bad news.

Arrest or disappearance of citizen journalists

As of December 2020, around a year after the outbreak, at least 47 journalists were currently in detention in China for their reporting on the initial coronavirus outbreak.

Chinese citizen journalist Chen Qiushi started reporting on the outbreak from Wuhan on 23 January 2020. He disappeared on 6 February. On 24 September, a friend said he had been found. He was being supervised by "a certain government department", but would not face prosecution for the moment because he had not contacted opposition groups.

Fang Bin is a Chinese citizen journalist who broadcast images of Wuhan during the outbreak several times on social media. He was arrested several times during February 2020. The last arrest was on 9 February, and as of September 2020, he had not been seen in public since.

Li Zehua was reporting on the outbreak from Wuhan in February 2020. On 26 February, he was caught by the authorities after livestreaming part of the chase. On 22 April, he returned to social media with a brief statement in which he quoted a proverb that the human mind was "prone to err." A friend said he may have been told by authorities to make the statement.

Another citizen journalist, Zhang Zhan, stopped sharing information on social media in May 2020. On 28 December, she was sentenced to 4 years in prison. According to one of her attorneys, she was convicted of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble".

Doubts on official statistics

Timothy P.H. Lin and his collaborators said in May 2020 that there are doubts on some statistics from China (i.e. death tallies) because of alleged political censorship; however, come to the conclusion that due to the lack of any known deaths of Hong Kong or Taiwan residents in Mainland China, which would be newsworthy, that the official numbers do not form a particularly large discrepancy from the actual death numbers.

Actions that inhibit research on the origin of COVID-19

Two universities in China published and then removed pages saying that papers about COVID-19 needed extra scrutiny before publication, in what British newspaper The Guardian suggested might be "part of a wider attempt to control the narrative surrounding the pandemic". A preprint from the American Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center stated that scientists in China published and then took down COVID-19 sequences; some scientists said that this suggested "China has something to hide about the origins of the pandemic", but others countered that the information was later republished. David Robertson, a virologist from the University of Glasgow UK, said he thinks the Chinese Communist Party wants the origin of SARS-CoV-2 to be a location outside of China.

Control of domestic research

In January 2020, Chinese biomechanics researcher Botao Xiao released a paper saying that the virus probably came from a lab leak. He withdrew the paper after Chinese officials insisted that no lab accident had taken place. In February 2021, the head of an international WHO team investigating the origins of COVID-19 said the disease is “extremely unlikely” to have come from a laboratory.

According to CNN, Fudan University in China published a document describing how research into COVID-19 should be vetted. All research needs approval, and research into its origin needs extra scrutiny, with the document stating that "academic papers about tracing the origin of the virus must be strictly and tightly managed." After CNN contacted the China Education ministry's science and technology department about the notice, it was taken down. A Chinese researcher, who insisted on anonymity for fear of retaliation, said he thought the document was part of a "coordinated attempt to control the narrative" about the virus. According to The Guardian, which also described the episode, research on other medical topics is not subject to similar scrutiny.

On 30 December 2020, the Associated Press reported that China was still controlling domestic research into the virus under direct orders from Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping. Researchers who are authorized to investigate the virus often work closely with the military, and their research must be approved by a task force under the management of China's State Council. An order by the State Council, marked "not to be made public", said that scientific publication should be orchestrated like "a game of chess", and people who do not comply shall be held accountable.

Actions against foreign research

The World Health Organization investigation into the source of COVID-19 was delayed over a year by negotiations over the arrangements. When the WHO-convened study was conducted during 14 January – 10 February 2021, the Chinese authorities only provided limited access. The Chinese authorities did not share a specific list of early cases with the international team. Instead, this information was shared with a Chinese team. The Chinese team then gave the international team a summary. With the line-by-line list of individual cases, the team could have contacted each person and tried to determine where they might have become infected. Members of the WHO team have reiterated that the Chinese team "was and still is reluctant to share raw data (for instance, on the 174 cases identified in December 2019), citing concerns over patient confidentiality".

China has closed access to an abandoned mine shaft which once contained bats who were infected by RaTG13, the closest known viral relative of COVID-19. Two researchers managed to get samples from the shaft, but their samples were confiscated. Three teams from the Associated Press were followed by Chinese security agents.

In June 2021, a researcher at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center found 13 genome sequences that were deleted from the Sequence Read Archive following a request by researchers at Wuhan University. They were originally published by a Chinese researcher and represent samples collected near the start of the pandemic. The sequences are more distantly related to bats than the active variants of COVID-19. Researchers do not believe this finding supports either a natural or lab origin.

China has refused to allow an independent investigation into the Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Disputes with other countries over proposed inquiries

After the Australian government called for an independent inquiry into the origins of COVID-19, Chinese ambassador Cheng Jingye said that Australia was treading a "dangerous path". Shortly afterwards, the Chinese government banned beef imports from Australia's four biggest abattoirs. It also put a tariff of over 80% on Australian barley and informally banned imports of Australian coal. The Chinese government later agreed to an inquiry. An article in The Economist speculated that an inquiry "might reveal China doing more to suppress information about early infections than to quash the outbreak itself".

On 25 August 2021, a US intelligence review of the source of covid was pending. China warned of a "counterattack" against any country that "baselessly accuses China" of being responsible for the origin of COVID-19.

Refusal to cooperate with second phase of WHO investigation

On 15 July 2021, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said that the COVID-19 lab leak hypothesis had been prematurely discarded by the World Health Organization. He proposed a second phase of WHO investigation, which he said should take a closer look at the lab leak idea, and asked China to be "transparent" and release relevant data. On 22 July 2021, Zeng Yixin of China's National Health Commission (NHC) said that China would not cooperate with the second phase, denouncing it as "shocking" and "arrogant". The United States criticised China's position on the follow-up origin probe as "irresponsible" and "dangerous". Science journalist Jon Cohen said that " relative openness to collaboration during the joint mission seems to have evaporated".

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