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For the encoding unification of the Chinese language, see Han unification.

There is also a specific Chinese reunification of 1928.

Chinese (re)unification (simplified Chinese: 中国统一; traditional Chinese: 中國統一; pinyin: Zhōngguó tǒngyī) is a goal of Chinese nationalism that refers to the reunification of all of Greater China under a single political entity. After Hong Kong and Macau were reunited with mainland China under the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China, the only outstanding goal for advocates of Chinese reunification is the reunification of the mainland and Taiwan (and the islands of the Pescadores, Kinmen, Matsu), which has been administered by the Republic of China since 1945.

The idea of reunification is controversial, as is the term itself, with varying and sometimes conflicting definitions. It is supported by the government of the People's Republic of China and to different degrees in Taiwan by the Kuomintang, the People First Party, and the New Party, known collectively as the Pan-blue coalition. It is opposed to varying degrees by the Democratic Progressive Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, known collectively as the Pan-green coalition. Opponents of reunification sometimes refer to Chinese reunification as "Chinese expansionism" or "annexation by China". They object to the term "reunification" as it implies that Taiwan is intrinsically part of China. Within the political scene of Taiwan, reunification versus independence defines the political spectrum with the caveat that much of the support for either bloc is unrelated to the reunification versus independence issue and that most people in Taiwan are in the middle of the spectrum.

Development

The concept of One China has been part of the Chinese political orthodoxy since ancient times. Often, if one claimed to be the Emperor of China with the Mandate of Heaven, then all other regimes within the country were either considered rebel or tributary. Accordingly, from the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 until the mid-1970s the concept of reunification was not the main subject of discourse between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China; each formally envisioned a military takeover of one by the other. The Kuomintang (KMT) believed that they would, probably with American help, one day retake the mainland while Mao Zedong's communist regime would collapse in a popular uprising and the Nationalist forces would be welcomed back. The Communist Party of China considered the Republic of China to have been made defunct by the newly-established People's Republic of China and thus regarded the ROC a renegade entity to be eliminated for the sake of reunification. The concept of reunification replaced the concept of liberation by the PRC in 1979 as it embarked, after the death of Mao, on economic reforms and pursued a more pragmatic and less ideological foreign policy. In Taiwan, the possibility of retaking the mainland became increasingly remote in the late 1970s, particularly after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and United States in 1980 and the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975.

With the end of authoritarian rule in the 1980s and the shift in power within the KMT away from the Mainlanders who accompanied Chiang to Taiwan, the KMT began to move away from the ideology of Chinese reunification. In 1991, President Lee Teng-hui announced that his government no longer disputed the rule of the Communists on the mainland, leading to semi-official peace talks (under what would be termed as the "1992 consensus") between the two sides. The PRC broke off these talks in 1999 when President Lee proposed in an interview to deal with the PRC on a "special state-to-state" basis.

Until the mid-1990s, supporters of Chinese reunification on Taiwan were also bitterly opposed to the Communist Party of China. Since the mid-1990s there has been a considerable warming of relations between the Communist Party and supporters of Chinese reunification as the pro-Taiwan independence bloc in Taiwan has come to power as their common enemy. This has brought about the accusation that reunification supporters are attempting to sell out Taiwan. The response of reunification supporters is that closer ties with mainland China, especially economic ones, are in the interest of Taiwan.

After the presidential elections of 2000, which brought the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party's candidate Chen Shui-bian to power, the Kuomintang, faced with defections to the People First Party, expelled Lee Teng-hui and his supporters and reoriented the party back towards reunification. At the same time, the People's Republic of China shifted its efforts at reunification away from military threats (which it has not renounced but which it has de-emphasized) towards economic incentives designed to encourage Taiwanese businesses to invest in the mainland and aiming to create a pro-Beijing bloc within the Taiwanese electorate.

Within Taiwan, supporters of reunification generally do not assert that the Republic of China should be the sole Chinese government. They tend to see "China" as a larger cultural entity divided by the Chinese Civil War into separate states or governments within the country. In addition, supporters of reunification also do not oppose localization of culture or a Taiwanese identity but rather see the Taiwanese identity as one piece of a broader Chinese identity rather than as a separate cultural identity. What supporters of Chinese reunification do oppose is desinicization or the effort to create a Taiwanese identity that is separate from the Chinese one.

Current proposals

The People's Republic of China officially asserts itself to be the sole legitimate government of China, and that Taiwan is a part of China. It has proposed reunification with Taiwan under the principle of "One Country, Two Systems", as has been done for both Hong Kong and Macau though neither of these are true democracies like Taiwan. According to the proposal outlined by President Jiang Zemin in 1995, Taiwan would also be permitted to keep its armed forces and to send a representative to be the "number two leader" in the PRC central government. Thus, under this proposal, the Republic of China would be made fully defunct. However, changes in the political situation in Taiwan has led the PRC to take a more flexible stance.

Rarely do reunification supporters in Taiwan advocate the position that the Republic of China is the sole and legitimate government of all of China. Proposals among reunification supporters in Taiwan have varied, with more extreme supporters in Taiwan such as Li Ao advocating "One Country, Two Systems" while more moderate supporters arguing to uphold the status quo until the mainland democratizes and industrializes to the same level as Taiwan. In the 2000 presidential election, independent candidate James Soong proposed a European Union-style relation with the mainland (this was echoed by Hsu Hsin-liang in 2004) along with a non-aggression pact. In the 2004 presidential election, Lien Chan proposed a confederation-style relationship (though he later moderated his stance amid a tight race). Beijing objected to the plan claiming that Taiwan, being part of China already, is not a state and therefore could not form a federation with the PRC. Proposals for reunification are not actively floated in Taiwan and the issue remains moot since President Chen Shui-bian has refused to acquiesce to Beijing's chief demand for restarting talks, namely the acknowledgement of the One-China Policy.

Under the administration of Hu Jintao, reunification under "one country, two systems" lost emphasis amid the reality of a DPP presidency in Taiwan lasting until at least 2008 when President Chen leaves office. Instead, the emphasis shifted to co-opting the political opponents of the DPP administration in Taiwan to counter the threat of Taiwan independence. A series of high-profile visits in 2005 to mainland China by the leaders of the three pan-blue coalition parties was seen as an implicit recognition of the status quo by the PRC government. Notably, Kuomintang Chairman Lien Chan's trip was marked by unedited coverage of his speeches and tours (and some added positive commentary) by the government-controlled media and meetings with high level officials including Hu Jintao. Similar treatment (though marked with less historical significance and media attention) was given during subsequent visits by PFP Chairman James Soong and New Party Chairman Yok Mu-ming. The Communists and the Pan-Blue Coalition parties emphasized their common ground in renewed negotiations under the alleged 1992 consensus, opening the three links, and opposing Taiwan independence.

The PRC passed an Anti-Secession Law shortly before Lien's trip. While the Pan-Green Coalition held mass rallies to protest the codification of using "non-peaceful means" to counter Taiwan independence, the Pan-Blue Coalition was largely silent. The language of the Anti-Secession Law was clearly directed at the independence supporters in Taiwan (termed "'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces" in the law) and designed to be somewhat amicable for Pan-Blue Coalition. It did not explicitly declare Taiwan to be part of the People's Republic of China but instead used the term "China" on its own, allowing flexibility in its definition. It made repeated emphasis of "promoting peaceful national reunification" but left out the concept of "one country, two systems" and called for negotiations in "steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities" in recognition of the concept of eventual rather than immediate reunification.

Reactions from the two sides

Mainland China

The consensus on the mainland seems to support for the reunification by all means necessary, as much a matter of national pride as for economical, geopolitical reasons. Therefore, the method by which reunification is achieved becomes less relevant. On one hand, as predicted by most analysts, Beijing will go to great costs to defeat a declaration of Taiwan independence, even if it means international isolation or economic destruction as the issue has been ingrained into the concept of Chinese nationalism. On the other hand, Beijing also understands keenly that a "peaceful unification" is in the best interest of the chinese nation. As a result, it has spared no effort to promote cross-strait economic and cultural exchange, hoping increased connection and interdependency will eventually bring about political integration. However, Beijing's initiatives were generally met with frosty reception by the independence-leaning DPP government in Taiwan.

Taiwan

Chinese reunification is often viewed as being the ideology of the Mainlanders who are living in Taiwan. The proportion of Mainlanders who support reunification when compared to the native Taiwanese is much higher. The parties which do advocate a stance more sympathetic towards reunification often command considerable support for reasons that have nothing to do with cross-strait relations. Furthermore, even strong supporters of reunification often have deep reservations about its timing and nature.

Throughout much of the last decade, polls consistently suggest that 70% to 80% of all Taiwanese support maintaining the status quo; although the definition of the status quo is an area of intense debate. Immediate reunification is currently a distant notion in Taiwan supported by only about 10% of Taiwanese residents and endorsed by none of the major political parties. The People First Party officially advocates that Taiwan should maintain the status quo. The Kuomintang has been consistently defending the sovereignty of Republic of China. They ofen claim that there is one China, that is the Republic of China. Although those two parties and the New Party have often been viewed as supporters of Chinese reunification, in most cases they are so in a traditional sense only. Their main difference with the pan-green coalition is that they believe Taiwan should identify itself culturally with China, and opposes what it views as a switching of national identities. This makes them more sympathetic to the concept of reunification in the future. "One Country, Two Systems" has support only among 6-7% of Taiwanese. The main argument for this is the belief that Taiwan, a small island, ultimately cannot compete with the mainland, and hence will benefit the most by reunifying as early as possible.

Polls in Taiwan have been criticized as being biased and inaccurate, as well as being influenced by threats from the PRC. After the October 10, 2004 speech by President Chen, polls showed as little as 5% support for reunification, with 60% support for maintaining the status quo and 65% opposition to the founding of a Republic of Taiwan in 2008 (the projected date for completion of the 2006 constitutional reforms proposed by President Chen in his speech). An independent opinion poll conducted by United Daily News shortly after in November 2004 indicated that the support for the status quo was 36%, 21% are in favor of immediate independence, only 6% supported the idea of rapid reunification with China.

See also

• Chinese nationalism
• Federal Republic of China
• Legal status of Taiwan
• Political status of Taiwan
• Political parties in the Republic of China
• Zhonghua Minzu
• Taiwanese nationalism
• Taiwanese independence

References

1. Eventual Independence Splits Views In Taiwan

External links

• Cross-Strait Relations between China and Taiwan collection of documents and articles.

v t e Chinese Civil War
Principal belligerents and campaigns Nationalist Party / National Government ( National Revolutionary Army) → Constitutional ROC Government (ROC Armed Forces) → Republic of China on Taiwan Communist Party / Soviet Republic ( Red Army) → Liberated Area ( 8th Route Army, New Fourth Army, etc. → People's Liberation Army) →  People's Republic of China
Pre-1945 Post-1945 1923 Sun–Joffe Manifesto 1924 First United Front 1926 Canton Coup 1927–1949 Chinese Communist Revolution 1927 Nanking incident Shanghai Commune Shanghai massacre Nanjing–Wuhan split 715 Incident Little Long March Nanchang uprising Autumn Harvest Uprising Guangzhou Uprising 1930–1934 Encirclement campaigns 1931–1934 Chinese Soviet Republic 1933–1934 Fujian People's Government 1934–1936 Long March 1936 Xi'an Incident 1937–1946 Second United Front (Wartime perception of the Chinese Communists) 1941 New Fourth Army incident 1944 Dixie Mission 1945 Chongqing Negotiations Double Tenth Agreement Retrocession of Taiwan 1946 Jiaochangkou Incident Peiping rape case 1945–1947 Marshall Mission 1945–1949 Operation Beleaguer 1947 Yu Zisan Incident 1948 SS Kiangya incident Liaoshen campaign 1948–1949 Huaihai campaign Pingjin campaign 1949 Taiping Steamer Incident Yangtze River Crossing campaign Amethyst Incident ROC Government retreat to Taiwan PRC incorporation of Xinjiang 1949–1953 Bombing of Shanghai 1950 Hainan Island campaign Wanshan Archipelago Campaign 1950–1958 Kuomintang Islamic insurgency 1961–1972 Project National Glory

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• China
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