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| |LawsApplied=U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 13981. | |LawsApplied=U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 13981. | ||
| }} | }} | ||
| ''For more information on decisions of the ] Court that include the issues of ] and ], see ] and ] | |||
| '''''United States v. Morrison''''', {{ussc|529|598|]}} is a ] decision that examined the limits of Congress's power to make laws under the ] and the ] of the Constitution. | '''''United States v. Morrison''''', {{ussc|529|598|]}} is a ] decision that examined the limits of Congress's power to make laws under the ] and the ] of the Constitution. | ||
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| ===Commerce Clause=== | ===Commerce Clause=== | ||
| In striking down VAWA as exceeding Congress' power under the ], the majority applied '']'' (]), a case that invalidated a federal criminal statute enacted using the Commerce Clause power. There as in ''Morrison'', the court stressed the "enumerated powers" that limit federal power. The ''Lopez'' court stated that Congress may regulate (1) use of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the "instrumentalities" (for example, vehicles) used in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Because VAWA's civil remedy concededly did not regulate the first or second categories, the ''Morrison'' court analyzed its validity under the third. The majority concluded that an act of violence such as those that VAWA was meant to remedy had only an "attenuated" |
In striking down VAWA as exceeding Congress' power under the ], the majority applied '']'' (]), a case that invalidated a federal criminal statute enacted using the Commerce Clause power. There as in ''Morrison'', the court stressed the "enumerated powers" that limit federal power. The ''Lopez'' court stated that Congress may regulate (1) use of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the "instrumentalities" (for example, vehicles) used in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Because VAWA's civil remedy concededly did not regulate the first or second categories, the ''Morrison'' court analyzed its validity under the third. The majority concluded that an act of violence such as those that VAWA was meant to remedy had only an "attenuated" effect, not a substantial one, on interstate commerce. The government, however, argued that in the aggregate, these acts did have a substantial effect; for this proposition it relied on '']'', which held that Congress could regulate an individual act that lacked a substantial effect on interstate commerce if, when aggregated, acts of that sort had the required relation to interstate commerce. The majority, once again relying on ''Lopez'', replied that the aggregation principle of ''Wickard'' applied only to "economic" activity. Because, the court claimed, the violence VAWA was meant to prevent was "noneconomic" activity in that the economic effect was indirect, rather than direct, it could not properly be federally regulated in the aggregate. | ||
| The Court explained that the need to distinguish between economic activities that directly and those that indirectly affect interstate commerce was due to "the concern that we expressed in ''Lopez'' that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority." Referring to ''Lopez'', the Court said: "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur." The majority further stated, "t is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign." Justice Thomas's concurring opinion also expressed the concern that "Congress appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce." | |||
| ''Lopez'' was a precedent of major importance to the outcome of ''Morrison'', with regard to interpretation of the Commerce Clause.<ref>Quotes in the rest of this subsection are from the summary of ''Lopez'' mentioned in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion of the Court for ''Morrison''.</ref> The ''Lopez'' Court interpreted the aggregation principle mentioned in '']'' as applying only if the economic effect was direct, as opposed to criminal acts with indirect economic consequences.<ref>such as the Gun Free School Zone law of 1990 (Lopez), or the Violence Against Women Act (Morrison, based on Lopez)</ref> The Court's concern was to create a distinction "between what is truly national and what is truly local." Rehnquist, quoting from '']'' (]), said that the scope of the interstate commerce power: | |||
| {{cquote|must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.}} | |||
| ===Equal Protection Clause=== | ===Equal Protection Clause=== | ||
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| The majority then reaffirmed this state action doctrine, and specifically reaffirmed the results reached in '']'' (]) and the '']'' (1883), both decided fifteen years after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in ]. In the ''Civil Rights Cases'', the Court had held that the Equal Protection Clause applied only to acts done by states, not to those done by private individuals; because the Civil Rights Act of 1875 applied to racial discrimination in private establishments, the Court said, it exceeded congressional power under ] of the Fourteenth Amendment. In ''Harris'', the Court had ruled that the Clause did not apply to a prison lynching, since the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit private criminal acts. | The majority then reaffirmed this state action doctrine, and specifically reaffirmed the results reached in '']'' (]) and the '']'' (1883), both decided fifteen years after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in ]. In the ''Civil Rights Cases'', the Court had held that the Equal Protection Clause applied only to acts done by states, not to those done by private individuals; because the Civil Rights Act of 1875 applied to racial discrimination in private establishments, the Court said, it exceeded congressional power under ] of the Fourteenth Amendment. In ''Harris'', the Court had ruled that the Clause did not apply to a prison lynching, since the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit private criminal acts. | ||
| In response to the government's argument that VAWA was intended to correct the states' systemic gender bias in enforcing their own crime laws, the Court briefly intimated that such a correction of unequal enforcement of the laws might not qualify as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. It suggested that the ''Civil Rights Cases'' dealt with a situation similar to the one which faced the Court in ''Morrison''. For the law which the ''Civil Rights Cases'' invalidated, the ''Morrison'' Court said, was meant to remedy a situation in which "here were state laws on the books bespeaking equality of treatment, but in the administration of these laws there was discrimination against newly freed slaves." | |||
| Breyer said that "neither Harris nor the Civil Rights Cases considered" unequal enforcement of state laws, and that such "discriminatory conduct" was done by state actors. Therefore, Breyer concluded that VAWA laws aimed at private actors were "remedial" legislation allowed by '']'' (]). Rehnquist countered that the same issue was dealt with in the ''Civil Rights Cases'' precedent, as | |||
| {{cquote|There were state laws on the books bespeaking equality of treatment, but in the administration of these laws there was discrimination against newly freed slaves.<ref>This quote is not from the holding of ''Civil Rights Cases'', but is rather Rehnquist's interpretation of events surrounding it based upon his reading of statements made by 19th century Republicans Garfield, Sumner and Lynch who supported civil rights bills</ref>}} | |||
| ⚫ | The Court, however, said that even if it accepted the government's argument that unequal enforcement of the laws constituted state action in ''Morrison'' but not in the ''Civil Rights Cases'', VAWA was still unconstitutional. For this argument the Court relied on '']'' (]), which held that only congressional remedies which showed "congruence and proportionality" to the wrongs they sought to redress or deter were constitutional under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. VAWA's civil remedy, the ''Morrison'' Court said, was aimed at private actors who broke state laws, instead of at state actors who failed to enforce those laws. According to the majority, this fact made VAWA's civil remedy lacking in "congruence and proportionality" to the wrong it sought to correct. | ||
| The Court's major premise was that the holding of ''Civil Rights Cases'' defined the issues before it as state inaction to which the Equal Protection Clause did not apply, a definition that was accepted even by dissenting justices. Rehnquist's minor premise was that unequal enforcement of state laws<ref>Rehnquist quoted 19th century Rep. Garfield as saying: | |||
| :The chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are unequal, but that even where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal protection under them. | |||
| Rehnquist quoted 19th century Radical Republican Sen. Sumner as saying: | |||
| :The Legislature of South Carolina has passed a law giving precisely the rights contained in your ‘supplementary civil rights bill.’ But such a law remains a dead letter on her statute-books, because the State courts, comprised largely of those whom the Senator wishes to obtain amnesty for, refuse to enforce it.</ref> was among the issues decided by the ''Civil Rights Cases'' Court. The implied conclusion is that the ''Civil Rights Cases'' definition of state inaction applies to unequal enforcement of state laws, and that the Equal Protection Clause doesn't apply to such unequal enforcement. | |||
| ⚫ | |||
| ''Boerne'' was a precedent of major importance to the outcome of ''Morrison'' with regard to interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. The ''Boerne'' Court<ref>Quotes in the rest of this subsection are from ''Boerne'' unless otherwise indicated.</ref> had sought to "limit congressional power" to make a "substantive change" to the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, on the theory that Congress "has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." Because of the ''Boerne'' "congruence and proportionality" requirement, Congress could no longer exceed the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. This congruence requirement replaced the previous theory advanced in '']'' that the Equal Protection Clause is "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for and nature of legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees." Before the 1997 ''Boerne'' decision, ''Katzenbach v. Morgan'' was widely interpreted as allowing Congress to go beyond, but not fall short of, the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.<ref>Chen, Jim. , | |||
| ''Washington and Lee Law Review'' (Fall 2002). Retrieved ].</ref> | |||
| The holding of ''Boerne'' said that only the Court could interprete the Constitution in order to maintain the "traditional separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary." Also, ''Boerne''<ref>Kennedy's opinion for the Court, City of Boerne v. Flores</ref> relied on states' rights arguments<ref>Democrats and conservative Republicans argued that the proposed Amendment would give Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas | |||
| of state responsibility, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the Constitution. Typifying these views, Republican Representative Robert Hale of New York labeled the Amendment “an utter departure from every principle ever dreamed of by the men who framed our Constitution,” id., at 1063, and warned that under it “all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedures … may be overridden, may be repealed or abolished, and the law of Congress established instead.” Ibid. Senator William Stewart of Nevada likewise stated the Amendment would permit “Congress to legislate fully upon all subjects affecting life, liberty, and property,” such that “there would not be much left for the State Legislatures,” and would thereby “work an entire change in our form of government.” - City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court - These opinions were remarks by 19th century "Democrats and conservative Republicans" with reference to an early draft of the Fourteenth Amendment that were quoted by Kennedy</ref> based on "enumerated powers." The intent of ''Boerne'' was to prevent "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority." | |||
| ==Critiques of ''Morrison''== | ==Critiques of ''Morrison''== | ||
| The ''United States v. Morrison'' decision was seen by both the Court and the press as part of the Rehnquist Court's series of ] or ] decisions.<ref>Rehnquist's opinion, United States v. Morrison; No Winners in Rape Lawsuit, Brooke A. Masters, The Washington Post, May 19, 2000; Violence Against Coherence, Ann Coulter, Townhall.com, May 19, 2000; In Who's Best Interests? Not the States, Peter M. Shane, The Washington Post, May 21, 2000</ref> Feminist ] agreed with the |
The ''United States v. Morrison'' decision was seen by both the Court and the press as part of the Rehnquist Court's series of ] or ] decisions.<ref>Rehnquist's opinion, United States v. Morrison; No Winners in Rape Lawsuit, Brooke A. Masters, The Washington Post, May 19, 2000; Violence Against Coherence, Ann Coulter, Townhall.com, May 19, 2000; In Who's Best Interests? Not the States, Peter M. Shane, The Washington Post, May 21, 2000</ref> Feminist ] agreed with the courts that Congress had overstepped its bounds by invoking the Commerce Clause: "The price of upholding VAWA's civil rights remedy is an unconstitutional grant of unlimited power to Congress, power that will not always be used wisely or with regard to individual rights. We need to combat sexual violence without making a federal case of it."<ref>Kaminer, Wendy. "," ''American Prospect'' (]). Retrieved ]. Kaminer's article also stated: | ||
| :"Try the common sense test: When you think of a rape in a college dormitory, do you think about interstate commerce? As the Fourth Circuit noted in Brzonkala, the relationship between sexual violence and interstate commerce is rather attenuated....Do you want Congress to enjoy unrestricted regulatory power over you? (Do you want your divorce in federal court? Do you want Congress making local zoning decisions for your town?) The Supreme Court in Lopez rightly held that the Commerce Clause is not a grant of general police power....This standard does not unduly limit congressional power, including the power to prohibit discrimination. It does not invalidate the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Segregation in hotels and restaurants, on transportation systems, and in the workplace involved commercial activities with clear and substantial effects upon interstate commerce."</ref> | :"Try the common sense test: When you think of a rape in a college dormitory, do you think about interstate commerce? As the Fourth Circuit noted in Brzonkala, the relationship between sexual violence and interstate commerce is rather attenuated....Do you want Congress to enjoy unrestricted regulatory power over you? (Do you want your divorce in federal court? Do you want Congress making local zoning decisions for your town?) The Supreme Court in Lopez rightly held that the Commerce Clause is not a grant of general police power....This standard does not unduly limit congressional power, including the power to prohibit discrimination. It does not invalidate the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Segregation in hotels and restaurants, on transportation systems, and in the workplace involved commercial activities with clear and substantial effects upon interstate commerce."</ref> | ||
| Law Professor Peter Shane said that the attorneys general of 36 states had endorsed the VAWA, and that the endorsement "exposes one of the more bizarre aspects of the Supreme Court's recent activism on behalf of state sovereignty: From the states' point of view, this campaign is often pointless and sometimes counterproductive."<ref> | Law Professor Peter Shane said that the attorneys general of 36 states had endorsed the VAWA, and Shane argued that the endorsement "exposes one of the more bizarre aspects of the Supreme Court's recent activism on behalf of state sovereignty: From the states' point of view, this campaign is often pointless and sometimes counterproductive."<ref> | ||
| Shane, Peter. "," ''Washington Post'' (]). Also see Mauro, Tony. "States' Rights Triumph in Supreme Court Kimel Decision, Oral VAWA Argument," ''Legal Intelligencer'' (]); Greenhouse, Linda. "Justices Cool to Law Protecting Women," ''New York Times'', (])</ref> According to Shane, the 36 attorneys general called the Violence Against Women Act "a particularly appropriate remedy for the harm caused by gender-motivated violence." | Shane, Peter. "," ''Washington Post'' (]). Also see Mauro, Tony. "States' Rights Triumph in Supreme Court Kimel Decision, Oral VAWA Argument," ''Legal Intelligencer'' (]); Greenhouse, Linda. "Justices Cool to Law Protecting Women," ''New York Times'', (])</ref> According to Shane, the 36 attorneys general called the Violence Against Women Act "a particularly appropriate remedy for the harm caused by gender-motivated violence." | ||
| The '']'' came out in favor of the ''Morrison'' decision: "The court got it right. If Congress could federalize rape and assault, it's hard to think of anything it couldn't."<ref>''Washington Post'', , (]). Retrieved ].</ref> An editorial by columnist ] agreed with the Court's arguments, and said of Congress: "their theory was that they could usurp the traditional police powers of the states."<ref>Coulter, Ann. "," ''Townhall.com'' (]). Retrieved ].</ref> | The '']'' came out in favor of the ''Morrison'' decision: "The court got it right. If Congress could federalize rape and assault, it's hard to think of anything it couldn't."<ref>''Washington Post'', , (]). Retrieved ].</ref> An editorial by columnist ] agreed with the Court's arguments, and said of Congress: "their theory was that they could usurp the traditional police powers of the states."<ref>Coulter, Ann. "," ''Townhall.com'' (]). Retrieved ].</ref> | ||
| == Background on Rehnquist== | |||
| {{Main|William Rehnquist}} | |||
| Rehnquist's views on the state action doctrine date back at least as far as a memo he wrote as a clerk for Justice Jackson. The memo was about a ''Terry v. Adams'' lawsuit regarding Southern attempts to keep blacks from voting in a "private" primary. Rehnquist wrote, "the constitution restrains them from effecting this dislike through state action but it most assuredly did not appoint the Court as a sociological watchdog to rear up every time private discrimination raises its admittedly ugly head. To the extent that this decision advances the frontier of state action and ‘social gain,’ it pushes back the frontier of freedom of association and majority rule."<ref>Charles Lane, '''', Stanford Magazine (July/August 2005)</ref> | |||
| Rehnquist's views on the issue of states' rights date back at least as far as a 1957 article he wrote for ''U. S. News and World Report'', in which he asserted that Court clerks have a "liberal" bias about "expansion of federal power at the expense of State power."<ref>The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution, Tinsley E. Yarbrough, pages 2-5</ref> | |||
| ==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
Revision as of 19:12, 18 February 2007
2000 United States Supreme Court case| United States v. Antonio J. Morrison and Christy Brzonkala v. Antonio J. Morrison | |
|---|---|
 Supreme Court of the United States | |
| Argued January 11, 2000 Decided May 15, 2000 | |
| Full case name | United States v. Antonio J. Morrison et al. and Christy Brzonkala v. Antonio J. Morrison et al. |
| Docket nos. | 99-5 99-29 |
| Citations | 529 U.S. 598 (more) |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999). |
| Holding | |
| The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, is unconstitutional as exceeding congressional power under the Commerce Clause and under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas |
| Concurrence | Thomas |
| Dissent | Souter, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer |
| Dissent | Breyer, joined by Stevens, Souter (Points 1 and 2 only), Ginsburg (Points 1 and 2 only) |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 13981. | |
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) is a United States Supreme Court decision that examined the limits of Congress's power to make laws under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
History
In 1994, the United States Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which contained a provision at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 for a federal civil remedy to victims of gender-based violence, even when no criminal charges were filed.
That fall, at Virginia Tech, freshman student Christy Brzonkala was allegedly assaulted and repeatedly raped by Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, members of the school's football team. During the school-conducted hearing on her complaint, Morrison admitted having sexual contact with her despite the fact that she had twice told him "no." College proceedings failed to punish Crawford, but initially punished Morrison with a suspension (punishment later struck down by the administration). A state grand jury did not find sufficient evidence, in its opinion, to charge either man with a crime. Brzonkala then filed suit under the Violence Against Women Act.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia held Congress lacked authority to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13981. A three judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed 2-1. The Fourth Circuit reheard en banc and reversed the panel, upholding the district court.
The Supreme Court affirmed in a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that Congress lacked authority, under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact the law.
Rationale
- See also: article about the Rehnquist Court for more about cases from this era.
United States v. Morrison invalidated a section of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 which gave victims of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court, although program funding remains unaffected. Congress enacted this private civil remedy because of statistical evidence that states did not prosecute crimes against women as often as crimes against men. The Court majority ruled that VAWA exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
Commerce Clause
In striking down VAWA as exceeding Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, the majority applied United States v. Lopez (1995), a case that invalidated a federal criminal statute enacted using the Commerce Clause power. There as in Morrison, the court stressed the "enumerated powers" that limit federal power. The Lopez court stated that Congress may regulate (1) use of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the "instrumentalities" (for example, vehicles) used in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Because VAWA's civil remedy concededly did not regulate the first or second categories, the Morrison court analyzed its validity under the third. The majority concluded that an act of violence such as those that VAWA was meant to remedy had only an "attenuated" effect, not a substantial one, on interstate commerce. The government, however, argued that in the aggregate, these acts did have a substantial effect; for this proposition it relied on Wickard v. Filburn, which held that Congress could regulate an individual act that lacked a substantial effect on interstate commerce if, when aggregated, acts of that sort had the required relation to interstate commerce. The majority, once again relying on Lopez, replied that the aggregation principle of Wickard applied only to "economic" activity. Because, the court claimed, the violence VAWA was meant to prevent was "noneconomic" activity in that the economic effect was indirect, rather than direct, it could not properly be federally regulated in the aggregate.
The Court explained that the need to distinguish between economic activities that directly and those that indirectly affect interstate commerce was due to "the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority." Referring to Lopez, the Court said: "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur." The majority further stated, "t is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign." Justice Thomas's concurring opinion also expressed the concern that "Congress appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce."
Equal Protection Clause
The Court discussed the government's view that there was a "pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated violence." This bias, the government argued, deprived women of the equal protection of the laws. The private civil remedy of VAWA was meant to redress "both the States' bias and deter future instances of discrimination in the state courts."
The Court responded that the Fourteenth Amendment "place certain limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct." Among these limitations, the "foremost," the Court said, was the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action – i.e., action by state governments – and not private conduct.
The majority then reaffirmed this state action doctrine, and specifically reaffirmed the results reached in United States v. Harris (1883) and the Civil Rights Cases (1883), both decided fifteen years after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in 1868. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court had held that the Equal Protection Clause applied only to acts done by states, not to those done by private individuals; because the Civil Rights Act of 1875 applied to racial discrimination in private establishments, the Court said, it exceeded congressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Harris, the Court had ruled that the Clause did not apply to a prison lynching, since the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit private criminal acts.
In response to the government's argument that VAWA was intended to correct the states' systemic gender bias in enforcing their own crime laws, the Court briefly intimated that such a correction of unequal enforcement of the laws might not qualify as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. It suggested that the Civil Rights Cases dealt with a situation similar to the one which faced the Court in Morrison. For the law which the Civil Rights Cases invalidated, the Morrison Court said, was meant to remedy a situation in which "here were state laws on the books bespeaking equality of treatment, but in the administration of these laws there was discrimination against newly freed slaves."
The Court, however, said that even if it accepted the government's argument that unequal enforcement of the laws constituted state action in Morrison but not in the Civil Rights Cases, VAWA was still unconstitutional. For this argument the Court relied on City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), which held that only congressional remedies which showed "congruence and proportionality" to the wrongs they sought to redress or deter were constitutional under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. VAWA's civil remedy, the Morrison Court said, was aimed at private actors who broke state laws, instead of at state actors who failed to enforce those laws. According to the majority, this fact made VAWA's civil remedy lacking in "congruence and proportionality" to the wrong it sought to correct.
Critiques of Morrison
The United States v. Morrison decision was seen by both the Court and the press as part of the Rehnquist Court's series of federalism or states' rights decisions. Feminist Wendy Kaminer agreed with the courts that Congress had overstepped its bounds by invoking the Commerce Clause: "The price of upholding VAWA's civil rights remedy is an unconstitutional grant of unlimited power to Congress, power that will not always be used wisely or with regard to individual rights. We need to combat sexual violence without making a federal case of it."
Law Professor Peter Shane said that the attorneys general of 36 states had endorsed the VAWA, and Shane argued that the endorsement "exposes one of the more bizarre aspects of the Supreme Court's recent activism on behalf of state sovereignty: From the states' point of view, this campaign is often pointless and sometimes counterproductive." According to Shane, the 36 attorneys general called the Violence Against Women Act "a particularly appropriate remedy for the harm caused by gender-motivated violence."
The Washington Post came out in favor of the Morrison decision: "The court got it right. If Congress could federalize rape and assault, it's hard to think of anything it couldn't." An editorial by columnist Ann Coulter agreed with the Court's arguments, and said of Congress: "their theory was that they could usurp the traditional police powers of the states."
Notes
- United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
- Taylor, Stuart. "Court to Congress: You can't regulate everything by Stuart Taylor Jr.," National Journal (1999-03-13). Retrieved 2007-02-13.
- Rehnquist's opinion, United States v. Morrison; No Winners in Rape Lawsuit, Brooke A. Masters, The Washington Post, May 19, 2000; Violence Against Coherence, Ann Coulter, Townhall.com, May 19, 2000; In Who's Best Interests? Not the States, Peter M. Shane, The Washington Post, May 21, 2000
- Kaminer, Wendy. "Sexual Congress," American Prospect (2000-02-14). Retrieved 2007-02-13. Kaminer's article also stated:
- "Try the common sense test: When you think of a rape in a college dormitory, do you think about interstate commerce? As the Fourth Circuit noted in Brzonkala, the relationship between sexual violence and interstate commerce is rather attenuated....Do you want Congress to enjoy unrestricted regulatory power over you? (Do you want your divorce in federal court? Do you want Congress making local zoning decisions for your town?) The Supreme Court in Lopez rightly held that the Commerce Clause is not a grant of general police power....This standard does not unduly limit congressional power, including the power to prohibit discrimination. It does not invalidate the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Segregation in hotels and restaurants, on transportation systems, and in the workplace involved commercial activities with clear and substantial effects upon interstate commerce."
- Shane, Peter. "In Who's Best Interests? Not the States," Washington Post (2000-05-21). Also see Mauro, Tony. "States' Rights Triumph in Supreme Court Kimel Decision, Oral VAWA Argument," Legal Intelligencer (2000-01-12); Greenhouse, Linda. "Justices Cool to Law Protecting Women," New York Times, (2000-01-12)
- Washington Post, Editorial: States’ Business, (2000-05-16). Retrieved 2007-02-13.
- Coulter, Ann. "Violence against coherence," Townhall.com (2000-05-19). Retrieved 2007-02-13.