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{{Short description|1937–1945 war between China and Japan}} | |||
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{{Infobox Military Conflict | |||
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2020}} | |||
|conflict = Second Sino-Japanese War | |||
{{Infobox military conflict | |||
|partof = the ] of ] (from 1941) | |||
| conflict = Second Sino-Japanese War | |||
|image = ] | |||
| partof = the ] and the ] | |||
|caption = Map showing the extent of Japanese control in 1940. | |||
| image = {{Multiple image |total_width=300 |border=infobox |perrow=2/2/2 | |||
|date = July 7, 1937 – September 9, 1945 (minor fighting since 1931) | |||
| image1 = Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces in Battle of Shanghai 1937.jpg | |||
|place = China | |||
| image2 = Eighth Route Army fighting on Futuyu Great Wall, 1938.jpg | |||
|casus = ] | |||
| image3 = US equipped Chinese Army in India marching.jpg | |||
|territory = | |||
| image4 = Nanking bodies 1937.jpg | |||
|result = ] of all Japanese forces in mainland China (excluding Manchuria) and ] to ] with other ] and Chinese victory in World War II, ROC reclaimed and took control of ] and ] (]) | |||
| image5 = 轟炸重慶.jpg | |||
|combatant1 = <center>{{flagicon|Republic of China|size=30px}}<br>]<sup>1 </sup><br>with ]</center> | |||
| image6 = Wuhan 1938.jpg | |||
<small> | |||
| footer = Clockwise: {{flatlist|class=inline| | |||
*{{flagicon|USSR}} ] | |||
* Japanese landing forces in gas masks during the ] | |||
*{{flagicon|United States}} ]</small> | |||
* ] forces on the ] | |||
|combatant2 = <center>{{flagicon|Empire of Japan|size=30px}}<br>]<br> | |||
* ] victims on the ] shore | |||
with ]</center> | |||
* Chinese machine gun nest at the ] | |||
<small/small> | |||
* Japanese ] in the ] | |||
(], ], ], ], | |||
* ] marching in ] | |||
<br>], ]...)</small/small> | |||
}} | |||
| commander1 = {{flagicon|ROC}} ''']'''<br> | |||
{{flagicon|ROC}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|ROC}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|ROC}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|ROC}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|ROC}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|ROC}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|ROC}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|ROC}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|ROC}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|United States|1912}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|United States|1912}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|United States|1912}} ]<br> | |||
| commander2 = {{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ''']'''<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ]<br> | |||
| strength1 = 5,600,000<br>3,600 Soviets(1937-40)<br>900 US aircraft (1942-45)<ref>Taylor, Jay, The Generalissimo, p.645.</ref> | |||
| strength2 = 3,900,000<ref>Chung Wu Taipei "History of the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945)" 1972 | |||
pp 535</ref> <br> 900,000 Chinese collaborators<ref>Jowett, Phillip, Rays of the Rising Sun, p.72.</ref> | |||
| casualties1 = Nationalist - 1,320,000 KIA, 1,797,000 WIA, 120,000 MIA, and 17,000,000 civilans dead <ref>Clodfelter, Michael "Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference", Vol. 2, pp. 956.</ref><br>Communist - 500,000 ]. | |||
| casualties2 =Japanese estimates- 396,000 dead in total<br>1937-1941: 185,647 dead, 520,000 wounded, and 430,000 sick; 1941-1945: 202,958 dead; another 54,000 dead after war's end.<ref>Dower, John "War Without Mercy", pp. 297.</ref><br> | |||
Nationalist Chinese estimates: 1.77 million deaths, 1.9 million wounded<ref>Chung Wu Taipei "History of the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945)" 1972 pp 565</ref> | |||
| notes = <sup>1 </sup> ] led a Chinese ] that included ], ] and ]. | |||
}} | }} | ||
| date = 7 July 1937{{snd}}2 September 1945 ({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|7 July 1937|2 September 1945}}) | |||
{{FixBunching|mid}} | |||
| place = {{hlist | ] | ] | ] }} | |||
{{Campaignbox Second Sino-Japanese War}} | |||
| territory = China recovers territories lost to Japan since the ] | |||
{{FixBunching|mid}} | |||
| result = Chinese victory | |||
| combatant1 = {{bdl |wrap= | |||
; {{flagicon|Nationalist government}} {{normal|]}} | |||
: {{flagicon image|Naval Jack of the Republic of China.svg}} ] | |||
: {{flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party (Pre-1996).svg}} ] | |||
}} | |||
| combatant2 = {{bdl |wrap= | |||
; {{normal|{{flagcountry|Empire of Japan}}}} | |||
: {{flagicon|Manchukuo}} ] | |||
: {{flagicon|Mengjiang}} ] | |||
: {{flag|Wang Jingwei regime|1943}} | |||
}} | |||
| commander1 = {{plainlist| | |||
* {{flagdeco|Republic of China (1912–1949)}} ] | |||
* {{flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party (Pre-1996).svg}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Republic of China (1912–1949)|army}} ] | |||
}} | |||
| commander2 = {{plainlist| | |||
* {{flagdeco|Empire of Japan|army}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Empire of Japan|army}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Empire of Japan|army}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Empire of Japan|army}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Empire of Japan|army}} ]{{Natural Causes}} | |||
* {{flagdeco|Empire of Japan|army}} ] | |||
* {{flagdeco|Empire of Japan|army}} ]}} | |||
| strength1 = 14 million total{{udl |wrap= | |||
; Nationalists | |||
: 1.7 million (1937) | |||
: 2.6 million (1939){{sfn|Hsiung|1992|p=171}} | |||
: 5.7 million (1945)<ref name="Horner2003">{{cite book |first=David Murray |last=Horner |title=The Second World War: The Pacific |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DShPzguQ64UC&pg=PA14 |access-date=6 March 2011 |date=24 July 2003 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-0-415-96845-4 |pages=14–15}}</ref> | |||
; Communists | |||
: 640,000 (1937)<ref name="China's Bitter Victory">{{cite book |last=Hsiung |first=James C. |title=China's Bitter Victory |year=1992 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-56324-246-5 |page=79}}</ref> | |||
: 166,700 (1938)<ref name="八路军·表册">{{cite book |publisher=中国人民解放军历史资料丛书编审委员会 |script-title=zh:八路军·表册 |year=1994 |isbn=978-7-506-52290-8 |page=3 |language=zh}}</ref> | |||
: 488,744 (1940)<ref>丁星, 《新四军初期的四个支队—新四军组织沿革简介(2)》【J】, 铁军, 2007年第2期, 38–40页</ref> | |||
: 1.2 million (1945){{sfn|Hsiung|1992}} | |||
}} | |||
| strength2 = 4.1 million total{{sfn|Hsu|p=535}}{{udl |wrap= | |||
; Japan | |||
: 600,000 (1937)<ref>{{cite book |last1=Black |first1=Jeremy |title=Avoiding Armageddon: From the Great Wall to the Fall of France, 1918–40 |year=2012 |isbn=978-1-4411-2387-9 |page=171 |publisher=A&C Black}}</ref> | |||
: 1,015,000 (1939)<ref name="RKKA General Staff"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160425061436/http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1001032 |date=25 April 2016 }}. Retrieved 17 April 2016</ref> | |||
: 1,124,900{{efn|name=1937B}}<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160311073745/http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/AJRP2.nsf/530e35f7e2ae7707ca2571e3001a112d/e7daa03b9084ad56ca257209000a85f7?OpenDocument |date=11 March 2016 }} Retrieved 11 March 2016</ref> | |||
; Puppet states | |||
: 900,000–1,006,086 (1945){{sfn|Jowett|page=72}}<ref name=統計>{{cite book |last=Liu |first=Tinghua |author-mask=Liu Tinghua (刘庭华) |script-title=zh:中国抗日战争与第二次世界大战系年要录·统计荟萃 1931–1945 |year=1995 |publisher=Haichao chubanshe |isbn=7-80054-595-4 |pages=312−314 |language=zh}}</ref> | |||
}} | |||
| casualties1 = {{udl |wrap= | |||
; Official Nationalist data | |||
: 1,319,958 killed | |||
: 1,761,335 wounded | |||
: 130,116 missing | |||
: 3,211,409 total{{sfn|Hsu}}<ref name=Clodfelter>Clodfelter, Micheal "Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference", Vol. 2, pp. 956. Includes civilians who died due to famine and other environmental disasters caused by the war. Only includes the 'regular' Chinese army; does NOT include guerrillas and does not include Chinese casualties in Manchuria or Burma.</ref> | |||
; Year-by-year loss statistic<ref>國史館檔案史料文物查詢系統,抗戰期間陸軍動員人數統計表,典藏號:008-010701-00015-046 </ref> | |||
: Combat losses :<br>1,319,358 killed<br>1,759,715 wounded<br>116,593 missing<br>3,195,666 total | |||
: Other losses{{efn|Deaths from illness, dismissals, and desertions}} : 10,322,934 | |||
; Postwar investigations<ref>國史館檔案史料文物查詢系統,民國二十六年七月至三十四年八月止抗戰軍事損失統計表(陸軍部門),典藏號:008-010701-00015-052 </ref><ref>國史館檔案史料文物查詢系統,中日戰爭損失統計(三),典藏號:020-010116-0004 </ref> | |||
]: | |||
: Army :<br>1,357,222 killed<br>1,735,969 wounded<br>298,233 missing<br>3,391,424 total{{efn|Including losses : | |||
*In guerilla fighting | |||
*In the ], ], and ]}} | |||
: Air Force :<br>721 officers and 11,028 NCOs and privates killed<br>842 officers and 1,446 NCOs and privates wounded<br>14,037 total | |||
: Navy :<br>403 officers and 2,000 NCOs and privates killed<br>67 officers wounded<br>2,470 total | |||
: Whole armed forces :<br>1,371,374 killed<br>1,738,324 wounded<br>298,233 missing<br>3,407,931 total | |||
Air Defense Service :<br>1,042 killed<br>1,271 wounded<br>2,313 total | |||
; Other losses<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://m.fx361.com/news/2018/0803/15534080.html |title=抗日战争时期国民党军队逃兵人数考 |date=2018 |access-date=2025-01-09}}</ref> | |||
Losses of wounded and sick in hospitals directly administered by the Nationalist Government : | |||
: Wounded soldiers :<br>45,710 dead<br>123,017 crippled<br>274,671 deserted<br>443,398 total | |||
: Sick soldiers :<br>422,479 dead<br>191,644 crippled<br>323,436 deserted<br>937,559 total | |||
: Total :<br>468,189 dead<br>314,661 crippled<br>598,107 deserted<br>1,380,957 total | |||
Estimated number of deserters in the war : 5.894-5.971 million | |||
; Other Nationalist estimates | |||
: 3–4 million+ dead and missing | |||
: 500,000 captured{{sfn|Rummel|1991|loc=Table 6A}} | |||
: 3.2–10 million+ total{{sfn|Rummel|1991|loc=Table 5A}} | |||
; Official Communist data | |||
: 160,603 dead | |||
: 290,467 wounded | |||
: 87,208 missing | |||
: 45,989 POWs | |||
: 584,267 total<ref>Meng Guoxiang & Zhang Qinyuan, 1995. "关于抗日战争中我国军民伤亡数字问题".</ref> | |||
; Other Communist estimates | |||
: 446,740 total{{sfn|Rummel|1991|loc=Table 5A}} | |||
; Total | |||
: 3.8–10.6 million+ casualties{{efn|name=1937B}} | |||
: 1 million+ captured{{sfn|Rummel|1991|loc=Table 6A}} | |||
: 266,800–1,000,000 POWs dead{{sfn|Rummel|1991|loc=Table 6A}} | |||
}} | |||
| casualties2 = {{udl |wrap= | |||
; Japanese medical data | |||
: 455,700<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180916100524/http://www.zephyr.dti.ne.jp/~kj8899/chidorigafuchi.jpg |date=16 September 2018}} Retrieved 10 March 2016</ref>–700,000 <ref name="Yomiuri Shimbun">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uKodAQAAMAAJ |script-title=ja:戦争:中国侵略 |trans-title=War: Invasion of China |publisher=Yomiuri Shimbun |language=ja |page=186 |year=1983 |access-date=16 January 2017}}</ref>{{efn|This number does not include Japanese killed by Chinese forces in the Burma campaign and does not include Japanese killed in Manchuria.}}military dead (excluding Northeast China and Burma) | |||
; According to the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare in 1977<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/659371274 |title=日本军队的伤亡统计(3)假的靖国神社数据?|access-date=2025-01-09}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/659434218 |title=日本军队的伤亡统计(4)日军在关内的死亡统计历史 |access-date=2025-01-09}}</ref>{{efn| Including deaths after the war}} | |||
: In China (excluding Northeast China) : 465,700 deaths (including 23,500 at sea) | |||
: In Northeast China : 245,400 deaths | |||
; Number of POWs according to Yasuji Okamura's diary in May 1946<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.krzzjn.com/show-607-40104.html |title=抗战期间被俘虏的日军?|access-date=2025-01-09}}</ref>{{efn|name=postwar|Excluding more than 1 million who were disarmed following the surrender of Japan}} | |||
: Repatriated by the Nationalists :<br>1,212 army personnel<br>40 navy personnel<br>106 merchants and civilians | |||
: Repatriated by the Communists : about 300 POWs | |||
: Deaths in Kuomintang POW camps : more than 200 POWs | |||
: Total : at least 1,858 captured | |||
; According to He Yingqin<ref>He Yingqin, "Eight Year Sino-Japanese War"</ref> | |||
: 1,934,820 wounded and missing | |||
: 22,293+ captured{{efn|name=postwar}} | |||
: 2.5 million+ total casualties{{efn|name=1937B}} | |||
; Puppet state forces | |||
: 288,140–574,560 dead | |||
: 742,000 wounded | |||
: Middle estimate: 960,000 dead and wounded{{sfn|Rummel|1991|loc=Table 5A}} | |||
; Total | |||
: 3.0–3.6 million casualties{{efn|name=1937B|After July 1937; excluding Manchuria and Burma}}{{efn|Including casualties of Japanese puppet forces. The combined toll is most likely around 3,500,000: 2.5 million Japanese, per their own records, and 1 million collaborators.}} | |||
}} | |||
| casualties3 = 15<ref>Ho Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953, Harvard University Press, 1953. p. 252</ref>–22<ref name=Clodfelter /> million total casualties | |||
| notes = {{notelist}} | |||
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Second Sino-Japanese War}} | |||
{{Campaignbox Pacific War}} | {{Campaignbox Pacific War}} | ||
{{Japanese colonial campaigns}} | |||
{{FixBunching|end}} | |||
{{Campaignbox World War II}} | |||
{{ChineseText}} | |||
}} | |||
{{Infobox Chinese | |||
| s = 抗日战争 | |||
| t = 抗日戰爭 | |||
| p = kàng rì zhàn zhēng | |||
| bpmf = ㄎㄤˋ ㄖˋ ㄓㄢˋ ㄓㄥ | |||
| altname = Alternative name | |||
| s2 = 抗战 | |||
| t2 = 抗戰 | |||
| p2 = kàng zhàn | |||
| s3 = 八年抗战 | |||
| t3 = 八年抗戰 | |||
| p3 = bā nián kàng zhàn | |||
| s4 = 十四年抗战 | |||
| t4 = 十四年抗戰 | |||
| p4 = shí sì nián kàng zhàn | |||
| t5 = 第二次中日戰爭 | |||
| s5 = 第二次中日战争 | |||
| p5 = dì èr cì zhōng rì zhàn zhēng | |||
| t6 = (日本)侵華戰爭 | |||
| s6 = (日本)侵华战争 | |||
| p6 = (rì běn) qīn huá zhàn zhēng | |||
| kanji = {{unbulleted list|支那事変|日支戦争|日中戦争}} | |||
| kunrei = {{unbulleted list|Sina zihen|Nissi sensou|Nittyuu sensou}} | |||
| hiragana = {{unbulleted list|しなじへん|にっしせんそう|にっちゅうせんそう}} | |||
| katakana = {{unbulleted list|シナジヘン|ニッシセンソウ|ニッチュウセンソウ}} | |||
| romaji = {{unbulleted list|Shina jihen|Nisshi sensō|Nicchū sensō}} | |||
}} | |||
The '''Second Sino-Japanese War''' was fought between the ] and the ] between 1937 and 1945, following a period of war localized to ] that started in 1931.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Carter |first1=James |date=20 September 2023 |title=The Origins of World War II in Asia |url=https://thechinaproject.com/2023/09/20/the-origins-of-world-war-ii-in-asia/ |access-date=13 July 2024 |website=The China Project}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=China's War with Japan |url=https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/chinas-war-japan |access-date=13 July 2024 |website=Faculty of History, University of Oxford}}</ref> It is considered part of ], and often regarded as the beginning of World War II in Asia. It was the largest Asian war in the 20th century<ref>{{Citation |last=Bix |first=Herbert P. |title=The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility |journal=Journal of Japanese Studies |volume=18 |issue=2 |pages=295–363 |year=1992 |doi=10.2307/132824 |jstor=132824 |issn=0095-6848}}</ref> and has been described as "the Asian Holocaust", in reference to the scale of ] against Chinese civilians.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|p=171}}<ref>{{cite news |last1=Todd |first1=Douglas |title=Douglas Todd: Lest we overlook the 'Asian Holocaust' |url=https://vancouversun.com/news/metro/douglas-todd-lest-we-overlook-the-asian-holocaust |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210709184534/https://vancouversun.com/news/metro/douglas-todd-lest-we-overlook-the-asian-holocaust |archive-date=9 July 2021 |access-date=2 July 2021 |work=Vancouver Sun}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Kang |first1=K. |date=4 August 1995 |title=Breaking Silence: Exhibit on 'Forgotten Holocaust' Focuses on Japanese War Crimes |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-08-04-me-31301-story.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220119212048/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-08-04-me-31301-story.html |archive-date=19 January 2022 |access-date=2 July 2021 |work=Los Angeles Times}}</ref> It is known in China as the '''War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression''' ({{zh|t=抗日戰爭|s=抗日战争}}). | |||
On 18 September 1931, the Japanese staged the ], a ] event fabricated to justify their ] and establishment of the puppet state of ]. This is sometimes marked as the beginning of the war.<ref name="Hotta2007">{{cite book |last=Hotta |first=E. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Kih_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 |title=Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931–1945 |date=25 December 2007 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-0-230-60992-1 |page=40}}</ref><ref name="Paine2012">{{cite book |last=Paine |first=S. C. M. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bAYgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |title=The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949 |date=20 August 2012 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-56087-0 |page=123 |access-date=28 November 2017}}</ref> From 1931 to 1937, China and Japan engaged in skirmishes, including ] and in Northern China. Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces, respectively led by ] and ], had fought each other in the ] since 1927. In late 1933, Chiang Kai-shek ] the Chinese Communists in an attempt to finally destroy them, forcing the Communists into the ], resulting in the Communists losing around 90% of their men. As a Japanese invasion became imminent, Chiang still refused to form a united front before he was ] to form the ] in late 1936 in order to resist the Japanese invasion together. | |||
The full-scale war began on 7 July 1937 with the ] near Beijing, which prompted a full-scale Japanese invasion of the rest of China. The Japanese captured the capital of ] in 1937 and perpetrated the ]. After failing to stop the Japanese capture of ] in 1938, then China's de facto capital at the time, the ] relocated to ] in the Chinese interior. After the ], Soviet aid bolstered the ] and ]. By 1939, after Chinese victories at ] and with Japan's lines of communications stretched deep into the interior, the war reached a stalemate. The Japanese were unable to defeat ] forces in ], who waged a campaign of sabotage and ]. In November 1939, Chinese nationalist forces ], and in August 1940, communist forces launched the ] in central China. | |||
In December 1941, Japan launched a surprise ] and declared war on the United States. The US increased its aid to China under the ], becoming its main financial and military supporter. With ] cut off, the ] airlifted material over ]. In 1944, Japan launched ], the invasion of ] and ]. In 1945, the ] resumed ] and completed the ] linking India to China. China launched large counteroffensives in South China and repulsed a ] and ]. | |||
Japan formally ] on 2 September 1945, following the ], ] and subsequent invasions of ] and ]. The war resulted in the deaths of around 20 million people, mostly Chinese civilians. China was recognized as one of the ], regained all territories lost, and became one of the ] of the ].{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=}}<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HymSg_Pp7X0C&pg=PA223 |title=The New York Times Living History: World War II, 1942–1945: The Allied Counteroffensive |last=Brinkley |first=Douglas |isbn=978-0-8050-7247-1 |year=2003 |publisher=Macmillan |access-date=2 September 2015}}</ref> The Chinese Civil War resumed in 1946, ending with a communist victory and the ] in 1949. | |||
The '''Second Sino-Japanese War''' (July 7, 1937 – September 9, 1945) was a ] fought between the ] and the ]. From 1937 to 1941, China fought Japan with some economic help from ] (see ]), the ] (1937–1940) and the ] (see ]). After the ], the war merged into the greater conflict of ] as a major front of what is broadly known as the ]. The Second Sino-Japanese War was the largest ]n war in the ].<ref>{{Citation |last=Bix |first=Herbert P. |title=The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility |journal=Journal of Japanese Studies |volume=18 |issue=2 |year=1992 |pages=295–363 |doi=10.2307/132824 }}.</ref> It also made up more than 50% of the casualties in the Pacific War if the 1937-1941 period is taken into account. | |||
==Names== | |||
Although the two countries had fought intermittently since 1931, ] started in earnest in 1937 and ended only with the ] in 1945. The war was the result of a decades-long Japanese ] policy aiming to dominate China politically and militarily and to secure its vast raw material reserves and other economic resources, particularly food and labor. At the same time, the rising tide of ] and notions of ] stoked the coals of war. Before 1937, China and Japan fought in small, localized engagements, so-called "incidents". Yet the two sides, for a variety of reasons, refrained from fighting a total war. In 1931, the ] by Japan's ] followed the ]. The last of these incidents was the ] of 1937, marking the beginning of total war between the two countries.<ref>China did not declare war on Japan ''de jure'' until December 1941, for fear of alienating the Western powers in Asia. Once Japan broadened the conflict, China was free to officially declare war on Japan.</ref> | |||
In China, the war is most commonly known as the "War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression" ({{lang-zh|t=抗日戰爭|s=抗日战争}}), and shortened to "Resistance against Japanese Aggression" ({{zhi|c=抗日}}) or the "War of Resistance" ({{zhi|s=抗战|t=抗戰}}). It was also called the "Eight Years' War of Resistance" ({{zhi|s=八年抗战|t=八年抗戰}}), but in 2017 the ] issued a directive stating that textbooks were to refer to the war as the "Fourteen Years' War of Resistance" ({{zhi|s=十四年抗战|t=十四年抗戰}}), reflecting a focus on the broader conflict with Japan going back to the 1931 ].<ref>{{cite web|last=Cain|first=Sian|date=2017-01-13|title=China rewrites history books to extend Sino-Japanese war by six years|url=http://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/jan/13/china-rewrites-history-books-to-extend-sino-japanese-war-by-six-years|access-date=2021-05-04|website=the Guardian|language=en|archive-date=25 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210525000904/https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/jan/13/china-rewrites-history-books-to-extend-sino-japanese-war-by-six-years|url-status=live}}</ref> According to historian ], historians in China are unhappy with the blanket revision, and (despite sustained tensions) the Republic of China did not consider itself to be in an ongoing war with Japan over these six years.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Mitter|first=Rana|title=China's Good War: how World War II is shaping a new nationalism|publisher=Belknap Press|year=2020}}</ref>{{request quotation|date=January 2022|reason=A context is needed, as China was not officially at war until 1941.}} It is also referred to as part of the "Global Anti-Fascist War". | |||
In contemporary Japan, the name "Japan–China War" ({{langx|ja|日中戦争|translit=Nitchū Sensō}}) is most commonly used because of its perceived objectivity. When the invasion of ] began in earnest in July 1937 near ], the ] used "The North China Incident" ({{langx|ja|北支事變/華北事變|translit=Hokushi Jihen/Kahoku Jihen|label=none}}), and with the outbreak of the ] the following month, it was changed to "The China Incident" ({{langx|ja|支那事變|translit=] Jihen|label=none}}). | |||
==Nomenclature== | |||
] ], Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater from 1942-1945.]] | |||
In China, the war is most commonly known as the War of Resistance Against Japan ({{zh | |||
|t=抗日戰爭 | |||
|s=抗日战争}}), and also known as the Eight Years' War of Resistance({{zh | |||
|t=八年抗戰 | |||
|s=八年抗战}}), simply War of Resistance ({{zh | |||
|t=抗戰 | |||
|s=抗战}}), or Second Sino-Japanese War ({{zh | |||
|t=第二次中日戰爭 | |||
|s=第二次中日战争}}). | |||
The word "incident" ({{langx|ja|事變|translit=jihen|label=none}}) was used by Japan, as neither country had made a formal ]. From the Japanese perspective, localizing these conflicts was beneficial in preventing intervention from other countries, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, which were its primary source of petroleum and steel respectively. A formal expression of these conflicts would potentially lead to an American embargo in accordance with the ].<ref name=en>Jerald A. Combs. {{dead link|date=January 2016}}. ''Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy'', 2002</ref> In addition, due to China's fractured political status, Japan often claimed that China was no longer a recognizable political entity on which war could be declared.<ref>Rea, George Bronson. ''The Case for Manchoukuo''. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935. Pp 164.</ref> | |||
In Japan, the name {{nihongo| Japan-China War|日中戰爭|Nitchū Sensō}} is most commonly used because of its perceived objectivity. In Japan today, it is written as 日中戦争 in shinjitai. When the war began in July 1937 near ], the ] used The North China Incident({{lang|ja-Hani|華北事變}}, ''Kahoku Jihen''), and with the outbreak of the ] the following month, it was changed to The China Incident ({{lang|ja-Hani|支那事變}}, ''] Jihen''). | |||
===Other names=== | |||
The word ''incident'' ({{lang|ja-Hani|事變}}, ''jihen'') was used by Japan, as neither country had made a formal ]. Japan wanted to avoid intervention by other countries, particularly the ] and the ], which were her primary source of petroleum; the United States was also her biggest supplier of ]. ] ] would have been forced to impose an ] on Japan in observance of the American ] had the fighting been formally escalated to "general war". | |||
In ], the invasion of China became a crusade ({{langx|ja|聖戦|translit=seisen|label=none}}), the first step of the "eight corners of the world under one roof" slogan ({{langx|ja|八紘一宇|translit=]|label=none}}). In 1940, Japanese prime minister ] launched the ]. When both sides formally declared war in December 1941, the name was replaced by "Greater East Asia War" ({{langx|ja|大東亞戰爭|translit=Daitōa Sensō|label=none}}). | |||
Although the Japanese government still uses the term "China Incident" in formal documents,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Linebarger|first=Paul M. A.|date=May 1941|title=The Status of the China Incident|jstor=1022596|journal=American Academy of Political and Social Science|publisher=Sage |volume=215|pages=36–43|doi=10.1177/000271624121500106|s2cid=144915586}}</ref> the word '']'' is considered derogatory by China and therefore the media in Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like "The Japan–China Incident" ({{langx|ja|日華事變/日支事變|translit=Nikka Jiken/Nisshi Jiken|label=none}}), which were used by media as early as the 1930s. | |||
In ] however, the invasion of China became a "]" (''seisen''), the first step of the '']'' (eight corners of the world under one roof). In 1940, ] ] launched the ]. When both sides formally declared war in December 1941, the name was replaced by '']'' ({{lang|ja-Hani|大東亞戰爭}}, ''Daitōa Sensō''). | |||
The name "Second Sino-Japanese War" is not commonly used in Japan as the China it fought a war against in 1894 to 1895 was led by the ], and thus is called the Qing-Japanese War ({{langx|ja|日清戦争|translit=Nisshin–Sensō|label=none}}), rather than the ]. | |||
Although the Japanese government still uses the term "China Incident" in formal documents, because the word ] is considered a derogatory word by China, the media in Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like The Japan-China Incident ({{lang|ja-Hani|日華事變}} , {{lang|ja-Hani|日支事變}} , which were used by media even in the 1930s. | |||
Another term for the second war between Japan and China is the "Japanese invasion of China", a term used mainly in foreign and Chinese narratives.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.lermuseum.org/interwar-years-1919-1938/japanese-invasion-of-china-7-july-1937 | title=Japanese Invasion of China: 7 July 1937}}</ref> | |||
In addition, the name ''Second Sino-Japanese War'' is not usually used in Japan, as the ] ({{lang|ja-Hani|日清戦争}}, ''Nisshin-Sensō''), between Japan and the ] in 1894 is not regarded to have obvious direct linkage to the second, between Japan and the ]. | |||
==Background== | ==Background== | ||
{{main|China–Japan relations}} | |||
The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the ] of 1894-95, in which China, then under the ], was defeated by Japan and was forced to cede ] to her, and to recognize the independence of Korea in the ]. The Qing Dynasty was on the brink of collapse from internal revolts and foreign ], while Japan had emerged as a ] through its effective measures of ]<ref>Wilson, Dick, When Tigers Fight: The story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945, p.5</ref>. The ] was founded in 1912, following the ] which overthrew the Qing Dynasty. However, the nascent Republic was even weaker than its predecessor due to the predominance of Chinese ]s. Unifying the nation and repelling imperialism seemed a very remote possibility.<ref>Wilson, Dick, p.4</ref> Some warlords even aligned themselves with various foreign powers in an effort to wipe each other out. For example, the warlord ] of ] openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance.<ref name="Foreign News: Revenge?-TIME-MAGAZINE">{{cite news | |||
|title=Foreign News: Revenge? | |||
|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,727322,00.html | |||
|publisher=] | |||
|date=13 August 1923}}</ref> | |||
The origins of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the ] (1894–1895), in which China, then under the rule of the Qing dynasty, was defeated by Japan and forced to cede ] and recognize the full and complete independence of ] in the ]. Japan also annexed the ], which Japan claims were uninhabited, in early 1895 as a result of its victory at the end of the war. Japan had also attempted to annex the ] following the war, though was forced to return it to China following the ] by France, Germany, and Russia.<ref name="Economist-2012-12-empty-space">{{cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/christmas/21568696-behind-row-over-bunch-pacific-rocks-lies-sad-magical-history-okinawa-narrative |title=The Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands: Narrative of an empty space |newspaper=] |date=22 December 2012 |issue=Christmas Specials 2012 |location=London |issn=0013-0613 |access-date=26 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140226002234/http://www.economist.com/news/christmas/21568696-behind-row-over-bunch-pacific-rocks-lies-sad-magical-history-okinawa-narrative |archive-date=26 February 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historytoday.com/joyman-lee/senkakudiaoyu-islands-conflict|title=Senkaku/Diaoyu: Islands of Conflict|work=History Today|access-date=13 August 2016|archive-date=1 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190201151322/https://www.historytoday.com/joyman-lee/senkakudiaoyu-islands-conflict|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139|title=How uninhabited islands soured China-Japan ties |work=BBC|access-date=13 August 2016|date=10 November 2014|archive-date=8 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191108101023/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139|url-status=live}}</ref> The Qing dynasty was on the brink of collapse due to internal revolts and the imposition of the ], while Japan had emerged as a ] through its efforts to modernize.{{sfn|Wilson|page=5}} In 1905, Japan successfully defeated the ] in the ], gaining ] and southern ] and establishing a ] over Korea. | |||
In 1915, Japan issued the '']'' to extort further political and commercial privilege from China.<ref>Hoyt, Edwin P., Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, p.45</ref> Following ], Japan acquired the ]'s ] in ]<ref>Palmer and Colton, A History of Modern World, p.725</ref>(Shantung), leading to nationwide anti-Japanese ] in China, but China under the ] remained fragmented and unable to resist foreign incursions.<ref>Taylor, Jay, p.33</ref> To unite China and eradicate regional warlords, the ] (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) in ] launched the ] of 1926-28.<ref>Taylor, Jay, p.57</ref> The Kuomintang's ] (NRA) swept through China until it was checked in Shandong, where Beiyang warlord ], backed by the Japanese, attempted to stop the NRA's advance. This battle culminated in the ] of 1928 in which the National Revolutionary Army and the ] were engaged in a short conflict that resulted in Kuomintang's withdrawal from Jinan.<ref>Taylor, Jay, p.79, p.82</ref> In the same year, Zhang Zuolin was ] when he became less willing to cooperate with Japan.<ref>Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol.1, p.121</ref> Afterwards Zhang's son ] quickly took over control of Manchuria, and despite strong Japanese lobbying efforts to continue the resistance against the KMT, he shortly ] to the Kuomintang government under ], which resulted in the nominal unification of China at the end of 1928.<ref>Taylor, Jay, p.83</ref> | |||
===Warlords in the Republic of China=== | |||
However in 1930, a large scale ] broke out between warlords who fought in alliance with Kuomintang during the Northern Expedition and central government under Chiang. In addition, the ]s (CCP, or Communist Party of China) revolted against the central government following a ] by the KMT in 1927. Therefore the Chinese central government diverted much attention into fighting these civil wars and followed a policy of "first internal pacification before external resistance"({{zh icon}}:{{lang|zh-Hant| 攘外必先安内}}). | |||
{{Main|1911 Revolution|Warlord Era}} | |||
In 1911, factions of the Qing Army uprose against the government, staging a ] that swept across China's southern provinces.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Liew |first1=Kit Siong |title=Struggle for democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Chinese revolution |last2=Sung Chiao-jen |date=1971 |publisher=Univ. of California Pr |isbn=978-0-520-01760-3 |location=Berkeley }}</ref> The Qing responded by appointing ], commander of the loyalist ], as temporary prime minister in order to subdue the revolution.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Nihart |first1=F. B. |last2=Powell |first2=Ralph L. |date=1955 |title=The Rise of Military Power in Modern China, 1895–1912. |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1983349 |journal=Military Affairs |volume=19 |issue=2 |pages=105 |doi=10.2307/1983349 |jstor=1983349 |issn=0026-3931}}</ref> Yuan, wanting to remain in power, compromised with the revolutionaries, and agreed to abolish the monarchy and establish a new republican government, under the condition he be appointed president of China. The new ] of China was proclaimed in March 1912, after which Yuan Shikai began to amass power for himself. In 1913, the parliamentary political leader ]; it is generally believed Yuan Shikai ordered the assassination.<ref>{{Cite web |title=谁是刺杀宋教仁的幕后元凶?_资讯_凤凰网 |url=https://news.ifeng.com/history/zl/xz/jinmanlou/200903/0330_5763_1083398.shtml |access-date=2023-07-30 |website=news.ifeng.com}}</ref> Yuan Shikai then forced the parliament to pass a bill to strengthen the power of the president and sought to ], becoming the new emperor of China. | |||
==Course of the war== | |||
===Invasion of Manchuria, interventions in China=== | |||
] entering ] during the ].]]] ] announced the ] policy of resistance against Japan at ] on July 10, 1937, three days after the ].]] | |||
However, there was little support for an imperial restoration among the general population, and protests and demonstrations soon broke out across the country. Yuan's attempts at restoring the monarchy triggered the ], and Yuan Shikai was overthrown after only a few months. In the aftermath of Shikai's death in June 1916, control of China fell into the hands of the Beiyang Army leadership. The Beiyang government was a civilian government in name, but in practice it was a ]<ref>《时局未宁之内阁问题》, 《满洲报》1922年7月27日, "论说"</ref> with a different warlord controlling each province of the country. China was reduced to a fractured state. As a result, China's prosperity began to wither and its economy declined. This instability presented an opportunity for nationalistic politicians in Japan to press for territorial expansion.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.shehui.pku.edu.cn/upload/editor/file/20191007/20191007171957_7532.pdf|title=北洋军阀时期中华民族共同体的构建路径与效应分析|website=shehui.pku.edu.cn|language=zh}}</ref> | |||
The situation in China provided an easy opportunity for Japan to further its goals. Japan saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials, a market for her manufactured goods (now excluded from many Western countries by ] era ]s), and as a protective ] against the ] in ]. Japan ] Manchuria outright after the ] (九一八事變) in September 1931. After five months of fighting, the ] of ] was established in 1932, with the last emperor of China, ], installed as a puppet ruler. Militarily too weak to directly challenge Japan, China appealed to the ] for help. The League's investigation was published as the ], condemning Japan for its incursion into Manchuria, and causing Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations entirely. ] being the predominant policy of the day, no country was willing to take action against Japan beyond tepid censure. | |||
===Twenty-One Demands=== | |||
Incessant fighting followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese troops fought a short war in the ]. This battle resulted in the ] of ], which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an ] to defeat the anti-Japanese ] that arose from widespread outrage over the policy of nonresistance to Japan. | |||
{{Main|Twenty-One Demands}} | |||
In 1915, Japan issued the ] to extort further political and commercial privilege from China, which was accepted by the regime of Yuan Shikai.<ref>Hoyt, Edwin P., Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, p. 45</ref> Following ], Japan acquired the ]'s ] in ] province,<ref>Palmer and Colton, A History of Modern World, p. 725</ref> leading to nationwide anti-Japanese ] in China. The country remained fragmented under the ] and was unable to resist foreign incursions.{{sfn|Taylor|page=33}} For the purpose of unifying China and defeating the regional warlords, the ] (KMT) in ] launched the ] from 1926 to 1928 with limited assistance from the ].{{sfn|Taylor|page=57}} | |||
In 1933, the Japanese ] region, the ] taking place in its aftermath, giving Japan control of ] province as well as a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. Here the Japanese aim was to create another buffer region, this time between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government in ]. | |||
===Jinan incident=== | |||
Japan increasingly used internal conflict in China to reduce the strength of her fractious opponents. This was precipitated by the fact that even years after the ], the political power of the Nationalist government was limited to just the area of the ]. Other sections of China were essentially in the hands of local Chinese warlords. Japan sought various ] and helped them establish governments friendly to Japan. This policy was called the ''Specialization'' of ] ({{zh|c=華北特殊化|p=húaběitèshūhùa}}), more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were ], ], ], ], and ]. | |||
{{Main|Jinan incident}} | |||
The ] (NRA) formed by the Kuomintang swept through southern and central China until it was checked in Shandong, where confrontations with the Japanese garrison escalated into armed conflict. The conflicts were collectively known as the Jinan incident of 1928, during which time the Japanese military killed several Chinese officials and fired artillery shells into Jinan. According to the investigation results of the Association of the Families of the Victims of the Jinan massacre, it showed that 6,123 Chinese civilians were killed and 1,701 injured.<ref>Zhen Jiali, ''Ji Nan Can An (Jinan Massacre)'' (China University of Political Science and Law Press, 1987), pp. 238.</ref> Relations between the Chinese Nationalist government and Japan severely worsened as a result of the Jinan incident.{{sfn|Taylor|page=79}}{{sfn|Taylor|page=82}} | |||
This Japanese policy was most effective in the area of what is now ] and Hebei. In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the ], which forbade the KMT from conducting party operations in Hebei. In the same year, the ] was signed expelling the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935 the Chinese government had essentially abandoned northern China. In its place, the Japanese-backed ] and the ] were established. There in the empty space of Chahar the ] (蒙古軍政府) was formed on May 12, 1936, Japan providing all necessary military and economic aid. Afterwards Chinese volunteer forces continued to resist Japanese aggression in ], and ]. | |||
=== |
===Reunification of China (1928)=== | ||
{{Main|Northeast Flag Replacement}} | |||
]. More than 5000 civilians died during the first two days of air raids in 1939<ref>Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the making of modern Japan, 2001, p.364</ref>]] | |||
As the National Revolutionary Army approached Beijing, Zhang Zuolin decided to retreat back to Manchuria, before he was ] by the Kwantung Army in 1928.<ref>Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 121</ref> His son, ], took over as the leader of the Fengtian clique in Manchuria. Later in the same year, Zhang declared his allegiance to the Nationalist government in Nanjing under ], and consequently, China was nominally reunified under one government.{{sfn|Taylor|page=83}} | |||
Most historians place the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937 at the ], when a crucial access point to ] was assaulted by the ] (IJA). Because the Chinese defenders were the poorly equipped infantry divisions of the former ], the Japanese easily ]. | |||
===1929 Sino-Soviet war=== | |||
The ] (GHQ) in Tokyo were initially reluctant to escalate the conflict into full scale war, being content with the victories achieved in northern China following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. However, the KMT central government determined that the "breaking point" of Japanese aggression had been reached and ] quickly mobilized the central government army and ] under his direct command to attack the ] in Shanghai on August 13, 1937, which led to the ]. The IJA had to mobilize over 200,000 troops, coupled with numerous naval vessels and aircraft to capture Shanghai after more than three months of intense fighting, with casualties far exceeding initial expectations.<ref>Fu Jing-hui, An Introduction of Chinese and Foreign History of War, 2003, p.109 - 111</ref> | |||
{{Main|Sino-Soviet conflict (1929)}} | |||
The July–November 1929 conflict over the ] (CER) further increased the tensions in the Northeast that led to the ] and eventually the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Soviet ] victory over Xueliang's forces not only reasserted Soviet control over the CER in Manchuria but revealed Chinese military weaknesses that Japanese Kwantung Army officers were quick to note.<ref>Michael M. Walker, ''The 1929 Sino-Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew'' (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), p. 290.</ref> | |||
Building on the hard won victory in Shanghai, the IJA captured the KMT capital city of ] (Nanking) and ] by the end of 1937, in campaigns involving approximately 350,000 Japanese soldiers, and considerably more Chinese. Historians estimate up to 300,000 Chinese were ]ed in the ] (also known as the "Rape of Nanking"), after the ] on December 13, 1937, while some Japanese ] the existence of a massacre. | |||
The Soviet Red Army performance also stunned the Japanese. Manchuria was central to Japan's East Asia policy. Both the 1921 and 1927 Imperial Eastern Region Conferences reconfirmed Japan's commitment to be the dominant power in the Northeast. The 1929 Red Army victory shook that policy to the core and reopened the Manchurian problem. By 1930, the Kwantung Army realized they faced a Red Army that was only growing stronger. The time to act was drawing near and Japanese plans to conquer the Northeast were accelerated.<ref>Michael M. Walker, ''The 1929 Sino-Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew'' (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), pp. 290–291.</ref> | |||
At the start of 1938, the Headquarters in Tokyo still hoped to limit the scope of the conflict to occupying areas around Shanghai, Nanjing and most of northern China. They thought this would preserve strength for an anticipated showdown with the ], but by now the Japanese government and GHQ had effectively lost control of the Japanese army in China. With many victories achieved, Japanese field generals ] and finally met with defeat at ]. Afterwards the IJA had to change its strategy and deploy almost all of its armies in the attack on the city of ], which by now was the political, economic and military center of China, in hopes of destroying the fighting strength of the ] (NRA) and forcing the KMT government to negotiate for peace.<ref>Ray Huang, Chiang Kai-shek Diary from a Macro History Perspective, 1994, p.168</ref> But after the Japanese ] on October 27, 1938, the KMT was forced to retreat to ] (Chungking) to set up a provisional capital, with Chiang Kai-shek still refusing to negotiate unless Japan agreed to withdraw to her pre-1937 borders. | |||
===Chinese Communist Party=== | |||
With Japanese casualties and costs mounting, the Imperial General Headquarters decided to retaliate by ordering the air force of the ] and the ] to launch the war's first ] on civilian targets in the ] and nearly every major city in unoccupied China, leaving millions dead, injured and homeless. | |||
In 1930, the ] broke out across China, involving regional commanders who had fought in alliance with the Kuomintang during the Northern Expedition, and the Nanjing government under Chiang. The ] (CCP) previously fought openly against the Nanjing government after the ], and they continued to expand during this protracted civil war. The Kuomintang government in Nanjing decided to focus their efforts on suppressing the Chinese Communists through the ], following the policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" ({{lang-zh|c=攘外必先安內|links=no}}). | |||
After the defeat of the ] by the Nationalists, the Communists retreated on the ] to ].<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=34}} The Nationalist government ordered local warlords to continue the campaign against the Communists rather than focus on the Japanese threat.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=34}} A December 1936 coup by two Nationalist Generals, the ], forced Chiang Kai-shek to accept a United Front with the Communists to oppose Japan.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=34}} | |||
From the beginning of 1939 the war entered a new phase with the unprecedented defeat of the Japanese at ] and ]. These favorable outcomes encouraged the Chinese to launch its first large-scale ] against the IJA in early 1940. However, due to her low military-industrial capacity and limited experience in ], the NRA was defeated in this offensive. Afterwards Chiang could not risk any more all-out offensive campaigns given the poorly-trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within the Kuomintang and in China in general. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped men in the ] and was at times at the mercy of his generals, who maintained a high degree of autonomy from the central KMT government. | |||
==Invasion of Manchuria and Northern China== | |||
From 1940 on the Japanese encountered tremendous difficulties in administering and garrisoning the seized territories, and tried to solve its occupation problems by implementing a strategy of creating friendly ] favorable to Japanese interests in the territories conquered, the most prominent being the ] headed by former KMT premier ]. However, the ] committed by the Japanese army, as well as Japanese refusal to delegate any real power, left them very unpopular and largely ineffective. The only success the Japanese had was the ability to recruit a large ] to maintain public security in the occupied areas. | |||
{{Further|Japanese invasion of Manchuria}} | |||
] during the ]]] | |||
The internecine warfare in China provided excellent opportunities for Japan, which saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials, a market for its manufactured goods (now excluded from the markets of many Western countries as a result of ]-era ]s), and a protective ] against the Soviet Union in ]. As a result, the Japanese Army was widely prevalent in Manchuria immediately following the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, where Japan gained significant territory in Manchuria. As a result of their strengthened position, by 1915 Japan had negotiated a significant amount of economic privilege in the region by pressuring ], the president of the Republic of China at the time. With a widened range of economic privileges in Manchuria, Japan began focusing on developing and protecting matters of economic interests. This included railroads, businesses, natural resources, and a general control of the territory. With its influence growing, the Japanese Army began to justify its presence by stating that it was simply protecting its own economic interests. However militarists in the Japanese Army began pushing for an expansion of influence, leading to the Japanese Army assassinating the warlord of Manchuria, ]. This was done with hopes that it would start a crisis that would allow Japan to expand their power and influence in the region. When this was not as successful as they desired, {{citation needed|date=November 2018}} Japan then decided to invade Manchuria outright after the ] in September 1931. Japanese soldiers set off a bomb on the Southern Manchurian Railroad in order to provoke an opportunity to act in "self defense" and invade outright. Japan charged that its rights in Manchuria, which had been established as a result of its victory in 1905 at the end of the ], had been systematically violated and there were "more than 120 cases of infringement of rights and interests, interference with business, boycott of Japanese goods, unreasonable taxation, detention of individuals, confiscation of properties, eviction, demand for cessation of business, assault and battery, and the oppression of Korean residents".<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225142637/http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/144/144chap1.html |date=25 February 2021 }} Japanese monograph No. 144</ref> | |||
By 1941 Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China and ], but ] fighting continued in these occupied areas. Japan had suffered tremendous casualties from unexpectedly stubborn Chinese resistance, and neither side could make any swift progress in a manner resembling the ] and Western Europe to ]. | |||
After five months of fighting, Japan established the puppet state of ] in 1932, and installed the last Emperor of China, ], as its puppet ruler. Militarily too weak to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the ] for help. The League's investigation led to the publication of the ], condemning Japan for its incursion into Manchuria, causing Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. No country took action against Japan beyond tepid censure. From 1931 until summer 1937, the Nationalist Army under Chiang Kai-shek did little to oppose Japanese encroachment into China.<ref name="Crean">{{Cite book |last=Crean |first=Jeffrey |title=The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History |year=2024 |publisher=Bloomsbury |isbn=978-1-350-23394-2 |series=New Approaches to International History series |location=London}}</ref>{{rp|69}} | |||
====Use of chemical and bacteriological weapons==== | |||
].]] | |||
Despite Article 23 of the ], article V of the Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare,<ref></ref> article 171 of the ] | |||
and a resolution adopted by the ] on May 14, 1938, condemning the use of poison gas by the ], the ] frequently used chemical weapons during the war. | |||
] | |||
According to historians ] and Seiya Matsuno, the chemical weapons were authorized by specific orders given by ] ] himself, transmitted by the ]. For example, the Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions during the ] from August to October 1938.<ref>Y. Yoshimi and S. Matsuno, ''Dokugasusen Kankei Shiryō II (Materials on poison gas warfare), Kaisetsu, Hōkan 2, Jugonen Sensō Gokuhi Shiryōshu'', 1997, p.27-29</ref> They were also used during the ]. Those orders were transmitted either by ] or General ].<ref>Yoshimi and Matsuno, ''idem'', ], Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001, p.360-364</ref> | |||
Incessant fighting followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese troops fought the ] battle. This resulted in the demilitarization of ], which forbade the Chinese to deploy troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an ] to pacify the ] that arose from widespread outrage over the policy of non-resistance to Japan. On 15 April 1932, the ] led by the Communists declared war on Japan.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Iriye |first1=Akira |title=The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific |publisher=Routledge |year=1987 |jstor=j.ctv9zckzn.9 }}</ref> | |||
]s provided by ]'s ] were also profusely used. For example, in 1940, the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force bombed ] with ]s carrying the ].<ref>''Japan triggered bubonic plague outbreak, doctor claims'', , http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/wwii.html, A time-line of World War II, Scaruffi Piero. Prince ] and ] received a special screening by ] of a film showing imperial planes loading germ bombs for bubonic dissemination over Ningbo in 1940. (Daniel Barenblatt, ''A Plague upon Humanity'', 2004, p.32.) All these weapons were experimented with on humans before being used in the field.</ref> During the ] the accused, such as Major General Kiyashi Kawashima, testified that, in 1941, some 40 members of Unit 731 air-dropped ]-contaminated fleas on ]. These attacks caused epidemic plague outbreaks.<ref>Daniel Barenblatt, ''A Plague upon Humanity'', 2004, pages 220–221.</ref> | |||
In 1933, the Japanese ] region. The ] established in its aftermath, gave Japan control of ], as well as a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beijing-Tianjin region. Japan aimed to create another buffer zone between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing. | |||
====Ethnic Minorities==== | |||
=====Muslim ] against Japan===== | |||
] attempted to reach out to ethnic minorities to rally to their side, but only succeeded with certain ], ], ], and ] elements. Their attempt to get the Muslim ] on their side failed, as many Chinese NRA Generals such as ], ], ], and ] were Hui and fought against the Japanese army. The Japanese attempted to approach ] however were unsuccessful in making any agreement with him.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=wBghTPOPA8KclgewttnDAQ&ct=result&id=WltwAAAAMAAJ&dq=japanese+approached+ma+bufang&q=ma+bufang|title=China's inner Asian frontier: photographs of the Wulsin expedition to northwest China in 1923 : from the archives of the Peabody Museum, Harvard University, and the National Geographic Society|author=Frederick Roelker Wulsin, Mary Ellen Alonso, Joseph Fletcher, Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, National Geographic Society (U.S.), Peabody Museum of Salem, Pacific Asia Museum|year=1979|publisher=The Museum : distributed by Harvard University Press|location=|page=50|isbn=0674119681|pages=108|accessdate=2010-6-28}}</ref> Ma Bufang ended up supported the anti Japanese Imam ], who prayed for the destruction of the Japanese.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=MJzB6wrz6Q4C&dq=ma+fuxiang+defence&q=uxiang#v=snippet&q=ma%20bufang%20%20full%20supporters%20of%20hu&f=false|title=Intellectuals in the modern Islamic world: transmission, transformation, communication|author=Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, Yasushi Kosugi|year=2006|publisher=Taylor & Francis|location=|page=261|isbn=00415368359|pages=375|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
Japan increasingly exploited China's internal conflicts to reduce the strength of its fractious opponents. Even years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government was limited to just the area of the ]. Other sections of China were essentially in the hands of local Chinese warlords. Japan sought various ] and helped them establish governments friendly to Japan. This policy was called the ''Specialization'' of ] ({{zhi|c=華北特殊化|p=huáběitèshūhùa}}), more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were ], ], ], ], and Shandong. | |||
Even before the war began, the Chinese Muslim General ] was fighting and severely mauling the Japanese army in Manchuria before 1937. The Japanese officer ] approached him in an attempt to make him defect. He pretended to defect to the Japanese, then used the money they give him to rebuild his army, and fought them again, leading a guerilla campaign in ].<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=riDT0BxwpMAC&pg=PA307&dq=battle+of+suiyuan+ma&hl=en&ei=sF6VTOKrD4O0lQf067GoCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=battle%20of%20suiyuan%20ma&f=false|title=Inside Asia - 1942 War Edition|author=John Gunther|year=2007|publisher=READ BOOKS|location=|isbn=1406715328|page=307|pages=668|accessdate=2010-6-28}}</ref> | |||
This Japanese policy was most effective in the area of what is now ] and Hebei. In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the ], which forbade the KMT to conduct party operations in Hebei. In the same year, the ] was signed expelling the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935 the Chinese government had essentially abandoned northern China. In its place, the Japanese-backed ] and the ] were established. There in the empty space of Chahar the ] was formed on 12 May 1936. Japan provided all the necessary military and economic aid. Afterwards Chinese volunteer forces continued to resist Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and ]. | |||
The Japanese themselves noted that Chiang Kaishek relied upon Muslim Generals like Ma Zhanshan and Bai Chongxi during the war.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://www.google.com/search?tbs=bks%3A1&tbo=1&q=ma+chan-shan+muslim&btnG=Search+Books#sclient=psy&hl=en&tbo=1&tbs=bks%3A1&source=hp&q=More+recently%2C+during+the+Manchurian+Incident%2C+General+Ma+Chan-shan+won+world-wide+fame%2C+and+in+the+current+China+Incident+General+Chiang+Kai-shek+has+been+relying+upon+the+services+of+General+Pai+Chung-hsi%2C+the+leader+of+the+&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai=&pbx=1&fp=207a1c3c62b92b94|title=Contemporary Japan: a review of Far Eastern affairs, Volume 7|author=Nihon Gaiji Kyōkai|year=1938|publisher=The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan.|location=|isbn=|page=|pages=|accessdate=2010-6-28}}</ref> | |||
Some Chinese historians believe the 18 September 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria marks the start of the War of Resistance.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Mitter |first=Rana |title=China's good war: how World War II is shaping a new nationalism |year=2020 |publisher=The Belknap Press of ] |isbn=978-0-674-98426-4 |location=Cambridge, MA |pages=90–94}}</ref> Although not the conventional Western view, British historian ] describes this Chinese trend of historical analysis as "perfectly reasonable".<ref name=":2" /> In 2017, the Chinese government officially announced that it would adopt this view.<ref name=":2" /> Under this interpretation, the 1931–1937 period is viewed as the "partial" war, while 1937–1945 is a period of "total" war.<ref name=":2" /> This view of a fourteen-year war has political significance because it provides more recognition for the role of northeast China in the War of Resistance.<ref name=":2" /> | |||
The Japanese planned to invade ] from Suiyuan in 1939 and create a Hui puppet state. The next year in 1940, the Japanese were defeated militarily by the Kuomintang Muslim General ], who caused the plan to collapse. Ma Hongbin's Hui muslim troops launched further attacks against Japan in the ].<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=mpqApZWrJyIC&dq=battle+of+suiyuan+ma&q=suiyuan#v=onepage&q=ma%20hongbin%20japanese%20plot&f=false|title=Frontier passages: ethnopolitics and the rise of Chinese communism, 1921-1945|author=Xiaoyuan Liu|year=2004|publisher=Stanford University Press|location=|page=131|isbn=0804749604|pages=240|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> Muslim Generals ] and Ma Hongbin defended west Suiyuan, especially in the ] in 1940. Ma Hongbin commanded the 81st corps and had heavy casualties, but eventually repulsed the Japanese and defeated them.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Bk3VAAAAMAAJ&q=Ma-Hung-kwei&dq=Ma-Hung-kwei&hl=en&ei=96-VTNLGD4GClAeC35GjCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CEQQ6AEwBQ|title=The China monthly, Volumes 3-5|author=George Barry O'Toole, Jên-yü Tsʻai|year=1941|publisher=The China monthly incorporated.|location=|page=|isbn=|pages=|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
==1937: Full-scale invasion of China== | |||
] (Islamic Holy War) was declared to be obligatory and as sacred for all Chinese Muslims against Japan.<ref name="Masumi">{{cite web|url=http://science-islam.net/article.php3?id_article=676&lang=fr|title=The completion of the idea of dual loyalty towards China and Islam |last=Masumi|first=Matsumoto|publisher=|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=MJzB6wrz6Q4C&dq=ma+fuxiang+defence&q=jihad+japan#v=snippet&q=jihad%20japan%20sacred%20muslims%20china&f=false|title=Intellectuals in the modern Islamic world: transmission, transformation, communication|author=Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, Yasushi Kosugi|year=2006|publisher=Taylor & Francis|location=|page=135, 336|isbn=00415368359|pages=375|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
{{Main|Marco Polo Bridge Incident}} | |||
] announced the ] policy of resistance against Japan at ] on 10 July 1937, three days after the ].]] | |||
On the night of 7 July 1937, Chinese and Japanese troops exchanged fire in the vicinity of the ] about 16 km from Beijing.<ref name=":022">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |title=The Cold War in East Asia |date=2018 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-138-65179-1 |location=Abingdon, Oxon}}</ref>{{Rp|page=29}} The initial confused and sporadic skirmishing soon escalated into a ]. | |||
The Japanese mistakenly through that they could justify their invasion with the excuse that they would liberate muslims and give them self determination. Chinese Muslims rejected the Japanese excuse and published anti Japanese material.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=MJzB6wrz6Q4C&dq=ma+fuxiang+defence&q=jihad+japan#v=snippet&q=islamic%20reformers%20japan%20aggression%20excuses&f=false|title=Intellectuals in the modern Islamic world: transmission, transformation, communication|author=Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, Yasushi Kosugi|year=2006|publisher=Taylor & Francis|location=|page=134|isbn=00415368359|pages=375|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for ] and had little military-industrial strength, no ], and few ].<ref>{{cite web |last=L |first=Klemen |date=1999–2000 |title=Chinese Nationalist Armour in World War II |url=https://warfare.gq/dutcheastindies/china_armour.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110321233313/http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/china_armour.html |archive-date=21 March 2011 |work=Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941–1942}}</ref> | |||
The Yuehua, a Chinese Muslim publication, quoted the ] and ] to justify submitting to ] as the leader of China, and as justification for Jihad in the war against Japan.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=MJzB6wrz6Q4C&dq=ma+fuxiang+defence&q=jiang#v=onepage&q=jiang%20jieshi%20submit&f=false|title=Intellectuals in the modern Islamic world: transmission, transformation, communication|author=Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, Yasushi Kosugi|year=2006|publisher=Taylor & Francis|location=|page=135, 336|isbn=00415368359|pages=375|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
Within the first year of full-scale war, Japanese forces obtained victories in most major Chinese cities.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=29}} | |||
Xue Wenbo, a Muslim Hui Chengda School member wrote the: "Song of the Hui with an anti-Japanese determination".<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=MJzB6wrz6Q4C&pg=PA135&dq=china+jihad+japan+xue+chengda&hl=en&ei=Ny-VTPmSKML_lgfw-fCoCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CC4Q6AEwAA#v=snippet&q=chengda%20wrote%20a%20verse%20song%20hui%20japanese&f=false|title=Intellectuals in the modern Islamic world: transmission, transformation, communication|author=Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, Yasushi Kosugi|year=2006|publisher=Taylor & Francis|location=|page=135|isbn=00415368359|pages=375|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
A Chinese Muslim Imam, ], was instrumental in his support of the war. When Japan invaded China in 1937, Hu Songshan ordered that the ] be saluted during morning prayer, along with an exhortation to nationalism. He invoked Quranic authority to urge sacrifice against Japan. A prayer was written by him in ] and ] which prayed to Allah for the defeat of the Japanese and support of the Kuomintang Chinese government.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=90CN0vtxdY0C&pg=PA167&lpg=PA167&dq=ma+fuxiang+our+party&source=bl&ots=gMwLItF3rt&sig=Y4eKstUC_TGgOelKv60xxJb-J2I&hl=en&ei=968WTL_0DYKBlAecxOCjDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Oh%20God!%20Help%20our%20government%20and%20nation&f=false|title=Familiar strangers: a history of Muslims in Northwest China|author=Jonathan Neaman Lipman|year=2004|publisher=University of Washington Press|location=Seattle|page=200|isbn=9050295976446|pages=266|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
===Battle of Beiping–Tianjin=== | |||
Hu Songshan also ordered and that all Imams in Ningxia preach Chinese nationalism. The Muslim General ] assisted him in this order, making nationalism required at every mosque. Hu Songshan led the ], the Chinese Muslim Brotherhood, which became a Chinese nationalist, patriotic organization, stressing education and independence of the individual.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=lSxYAAAAMAAJ&q=hu+songshan&dq=hu+songshan&hl=en&ei=96sbTOKQHoOBlAe5wsWsCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CEoQ6AEwCA|title=Papers from the Conference on Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance, Banff, August 20–24, 1987, Volume 3|author=|year=1987|publisher=|location=|page=30|isbn=|pages=254|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=NyhtAAAAMAAJ&q=hu+songshan&dq=hu+songshan&hl=en&ei=96sbTOKQHoOBlAe5wsWsCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAQ|title=Devout societies vs. impious states?: transmitting Islamic learning in Russia, Central Asia and China, through the twentieth century : proceedings of an international colloquium held in the Carré des Sciences, French Ministry of Research, Paris, November 12–13, 2001|author=Stéphane A. Dudoignon|year=2004|publisher=Schwarz.|location=|page=69|isbn=3879973148|pages=282|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=90CN0vtxdY0C&pg=PA167&lpg=PA167&dq=ma+fuxiang+our+party&source=bl&ots=gMwLItF3rt&sig=Y4eKstUC_TGgOelKv60xxJb-J2I&hl=en&ei=968WTL_0DYKBlAecxOCjDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAA#v=snippet&q=prayers%20salute%20flag%20national%20pride&f=false|title=Familiar strangers: a history of Muslims in Northwest China|author=Jonathan Neaman Lipman|year=2004|publisher=University of Washington Press|location=Seattle|page=210|isbn=9050295976446|pages=266|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
{{Main|Battle of Beiping–Tianjin}} | |||
On 11 July, in accordance with the Goso conference, the ] authorized the deployment of an ] from the ], two combined brigades from the ] and an air regiment composed of 18 squadrons as reinforcements to Northern China. By 20 July, total Japanese military strength in the Beijing-Tianjin area exceeded 180,000 personnel. | |||
], a Chinese Muslim General of the ], spread anti-Japanese propaganda in ] and pledged his support to the ] during the war. Westerners reported that the Tungans (Chinese Muslims) were anti-Japanese, and under their rule, areas were covered with "most of the stock anti-Japanese slogans from China proper", while Ma made "Resistance to Japanese Imperialism" part of his governing doctrine.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=ma+hushan&source=bl&ots=KzhNeXbjkT&sig=raCQibpp88Cf8Unpi8k-7jcQM-k&hl=en&ei=xCcqTPnrCoGBlAfV5rzmAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CCIQ6AEwBQ#v=snippet&q=anti%20japanese%20slogans&f=false|title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949|author=Andrew D. W. Forbes|year=1986|publisher=CUP Archive|location=Cambridge, England|isbn=9780521255141|page=130|pages=|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
The Japanese gave Sung and his troops "free passage" before moving in to pacify resistance in areas surrounding Beijing (then Beiping) and Tianjin. After 24 days of combat, the Chinese 29th Army was forced to withdraw. The Japanese captured Beijing and the ] at Tianjin on 29 and 30 July respectively, thus concluding the Beijing-Tianjin campaign. By August 1937, Japan had occupied Beijing and Tianjin.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=29}} | |||
The Chinese Islamic Association issued "A message to all Muslims in China from the Chinese Islamic Association for National Salvation" in Ramadan of 1940 during the ]. | |||
However, the Japanese Army had been given orders not to advance further than the Yongding River. In a sudden ], the Konoe government's foreign minister opened negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek's government in Nanjing and stated: "Japan wants Chinese cooperation, not Chinese land." Nevertheless, negotiations failed to move further. The ] on 9 August escalated the skirmishes and battles into full scale warfare.<ref name="Hoyt2001">{{cite book |author=Edwin Palmer Hoyt |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xITp5N5hceEC&pg=PA152 |title=Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict |year=2001 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-8154-1118-5 |pages=152–}}</ref> | |||
<blockquote> | |||
"We have to implement the teaching "the love of the fatherland is na article of faith" by the Prophet Muhammad and to inherit the Hui's glorious history in China. In addition, let us reinforce our unity and participate in the twice more difficult taks of supporting a defensive war and promoting religion.... We hope that ahongs and the elite will initiate a movement of prayer during Ramadan and implement group prayer to support our intimate feeling toward Islam. A sincere unity of Muslims should be developed to contribute power towards the expulsion of Japan." | |||
</blockquote> | |||
The 29th Army's resistance (and poor equipment) inspired the 1937 "]", which—with slightly reworked lyrics—became the National Revolutionary Army's standard ] and popularized the ] '']'' to describe the Japanese invaders.<ref>Lei, Bryant. University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh), 2004.</ref> | |||
Ahong is the Chinese word for Imam. During the war against Japan, the Imams supported Muslim reisistance in battle, calling for muslims to participate in the Jihad against Japan, and becoming a ] (islamic term for martyr).<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=MJzB6wrz6Q4C&dq=ma+fuxiang+defence&q=jihad+japan#v=snippet&q=expulsion%20of%20japan&f=false|title=Intellectuals in the modern Islamic world: transmission, transformation, communication|author=Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, Yasushi Kosugi|year=2006|publisher=Taylor & Francis|location=|page=136|isbn=00415368359|pages=375|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
===Battle of Shanghai=== | |||
Later in the war, Ma Bufang sent cavalry divisions made out of ], ] Mongols, and ], all of them ], to fight Japan. Ma Hongkui seized the city of Dingyuanying in ] and arrested the Mongol prince ] in 1938, because ], who was a Japanese officer of the ], visited the prince. Darijaya was exiled to ] until 1944.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=uFchTL63KoaglAfImbFK&ct=result&id=mttBAAAAYAAJ&dq=darijaya+ma+hongkui&q=ma+hongkui|title=Papers on Far Eastern history, Issues 39-42|author=Australian National University. Department of Far Eastern History|year=1989|publisher=Dept. of Far Eastern History, Australian National University|location=Canberra|page=125, 127|isbn=|pages=|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=WltwAAAAMAAJ&q=darijaya+ma+hongkui&dq=darijaya+ma+hongkui&hl=en&ei=uFchTL63KoaglAfImbFK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAg|title=China's inner Asian frontier: photographs of the Wulsin expedition to northwest China in 1923 : from the archives of the Peabody Museum, Harvard University, and the National Geographic Society|author=Frederick Roelker Wulsin, Mary Ellen Alonso, Joseph Fletcher, Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, National Geographic Society (U.S.), Peabody Museum of Salem, Pacific Asia Museum|year=1979|publisher=The Museum : distributed by Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|page=50|isbn=0674119681, 9780674119680|pages=108|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=90CN0vtxdY0C&pg=PA144&dq=tang+yanhe&hl=en&ei=hJ4rTNHqCsb_lgfAteyqBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA#v=snippet&q=tang%20yanhe%20hezhou%20shuangcheng&f=false|title=Familiar strangers: a history of Muslims in Northwest China|author=Jonathan Neaman Lipman|year=2004|publisher=University of Washington Press|location=Seattle|page=125, 126|isbn=|pages=|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> At the ], the Hui Muslim cavalry led by Ma Hongbin and ] defeated the Japanese troops. Ma Hongbin was also involved in the offensive against the Japanese at the ]. | |||
{{Main|Battle of Shanghai}} | |||
], 1937]] | |||
The ] (GHQ) in Tokyo, content with the gains acquired in northern China following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, initially showed reluctance to escalate the conflict into a full-scale war. Following the shooting of two Japanese officers who were attempting to enter the Hongqiao military airport on 9 August 1937, the Japanese demanded that all Chinese forces withdraw from Shanghai; the Chinese outright refused to meet this demand. In response, both the Chinese and the Japanese marched reinforcements into the Shanghai area. Chiang concentrated his best troops north of Shanghai in an effort to impress the city's large foreign community and increase China's foreign support.<ref name="Crean" />{{rp|71}} | |||
The Muslim Generals ] and ] protected Lanzhou with their cavalry troops, and put up resistance, the Japanese never captured Lanzhou during the war.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=13-VTIrrBsH_lge18Y2kCg&ct=result&id=6O67mW5ODV0C&dq=by+the+Japanese+because+of+the+strong+resistance+put+up+by+the+cavalry+troops+of+the+Muslim+Generals+Ma+Hung-kwei+and+Ma+Pu-fang&q=lanzhou+resistance+never+captured+muslim+generals+ma+pu-fang+ma+hung-kwei|title=Collier's encyclopedia: with bibliography and index, Volume 14|author=Stéphane William Darrach Halsey, Bernard Johnston (M.A.)|year=1989|publisher=Macmillan Educational Co.|location=|page=285|isbn=|pages=|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=13-VTIrrBsH_lge18Y2kCg&ct=result&id=HIIJAAAAIAAJ&dq=by+the+Japanese+because+of+the+strong+resistance+put+up+by+the+cavalry+troops+of+the+Muslim+Generals+Ma+Hung-kwei+and+Ma+Pu-fang&q=strong+resistance+japanese+cavalry+muslim+generals|title=Collier's encyclopedia: with bibliography and index, Volume 14|author=Stéphane William Darrach Halsey, Bernard Johnston (M.A.)|year=1983|publisher=Macmillan Educational Co.|location=|page=285|isbn=|pages=|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=http://www.google.com/search?tbs=bks%3A1&tbo=1&q=by+the+Japanese+because+of+the+strong+resistance+put+up+by+the+cavalry+troops+of+the+Muslim+Generals+Ma+Hung-kwei+and+Ma+Pu-fang&btnG=Search+Books|title=Collier's encyclopedia: with bibliography and index, Volume 14|author=Stéphane William Darrach Halsey, Bernard Johnston (M.A.)|year=1983|publisher=Macmillan Educational Co.|location=|page=285|isbn=|pages=|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
On 13 August 1937, Kuomintang soldiers attacked ] positions in Shanghai, with Japanese army troops and marines in turn crossing into the city with naval gunfire support at ], leading to the Battle of Shanghai. On 14 August, Chinese forces under the command of ] were ordered to capture or destroy the Japanese strongholds in Shanghai, leading to bitter street fighting. In an attack on the Japanese cruiser '']'', Kuomintang planes accidentally bombed the ], which led to more than 3,000 civilian deaths.<ref name="Wakeman280281">{{Cite book |first=Frederic E. |last=Wakeman | pages=280–281 |title=Policing Shanghai, 1927–1937 |publisher=University of California Press |year=1996 | isbn=0-520-20761-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vT5GrHv4VcMC&q=August%2014%2C%201937%20Shanghai&pg=PA281}}</ref> | |||
] sent the Muslim Brigade commander ] Ma Buluan (马步銮),<ref></ref> who led the 1st Regiment of the nationalist Reorganized 8th Cavalry Brigade, which was originally known as the nationalist 1st Cavalry Division, and was later renamed as the 8th Cavalry Division during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The brigade was stationed in eastern ], and fought a number of battles against the Japanese invaders who grew to fear the nationalist cavalry unit, calling it “Ma’s Islamic Division”. After ], the unit returned to ] from ] and was subsequently reorganized as the 1st Regiment of the Reorganized 8th Cavalry Brigade of the nationalist Reorganized 82nd Division. | |||
In the three days from 14 to 16 August 1937, the ] (IJN) sent many ]s of the then-advanced long-ranged ] medium-heavy land-based bombers and assorted ] with the expectation of destroying the ]. However, the Imperial Japanese Navy encountered unexpected resistance from the defending Chinese ]/] and ] fighter squadrons; suffering heavy (50%) losses from the defending Chinese pilots (14 August was subsequently commemorated by the KMT as China's ''Air Force Day'').<ref>{{cite web|url=http://air.mnd.gov.tw/English/Publish.aspx?cnid=906&p=13447&Level=2|title=-Brief history of military airplanes|date=19 September 2006|work=mnd.gov.tw|access-date=13 August 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160826110540/http://air.mnd.gov.tw/English/Publish.aspx?cnid=906&p=13447&Level=2|archive-date=26 August 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/02/13/2003525367|title=War hero's son seeks to establish museum in Taiwan|work=Taipei Times|date=13 February 2012|access-date=13 August 2016|archive-date=24 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210924090122/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/02/13/2003525367|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
] | |||
] | |||
The skies of China had become a testing zone for advanced ] and new-generation ] combat-aircraft designs. The introduction of the advanced ] "Claude" fighters into the Shanghai-Nanjing theater of operations, beginning on 18 September 1937, helped the Japanese achieve a certain level of ].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail-page-2.asp?aircraft_id=619|title=Mitsubishi A5M (Claude) – Development and Operational History, Performance Specifications and Picture Gallery|work=militaryfactory.com|access-date=13 August 2016|archive-date=3 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303225928/http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail-page-2.asp?aircraft_id=619|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Januszewski|first=Tadeusz |title=Mitsubishi A5M Claude (Yellow Series) |year=2013 |publisher=Stratus |location=Sandomierz, Poland |isbn=978-83-61421-99-3}}</ref> However the few experienced Chinese veteran pilots, as well as several Chinese-American volunteer fighter pilots, including Maj. ], Maj. ], and Capt. Chan Kee-Wong, even in their older and slower biplanes, proved more than able to hold their own against the sleek A5Ms in ]s, and it also proved to be a ] against the Chinese Air Force. At the start of the battle, the local strength of the NRA was around five divisions, or about 70,000 troops, while local Japanese forces comprised about 6,300 marines. On 23 August, the Chinese Air Force attacked Japanese troop landings at Wusongkou in northern Shanghai with Hawk III fighter-attack planes and P-26/281 fighter escorts, and the Japanese intercepted most of the attack with ] and ] fighters from the aircraft carriers '']'' and '']'', shooting down several of the Chinese planes while losing a single A4N in the dogfight with Lt. ] in his P-26/281; the Japanese Army reinforcements succeeded in landing in northern Shanghai.<ref>{{cite web|title=Martyr Qin Jia-zhu|url=https://air.mnd.gov.tw/EN/PastCurrent/PastCurrent_Detail.aspx?FID=28&CID=176&ID=1327|access-date=2020-11-08|website=air.mnd.gov.tw|archive-date=5 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201105082630/https://air.mnd.gov.tw/EN/PastCurrent/PastCurrent_Detail.aspx?FID=28&CID=176&ID=1327|url-status=live}}</ref> The ] (IJA) ultimately committed over 300,000 troops, along with numerous naval vessels and aircraft, to capture the city. After more than three months of intense fighting, their casualties far exceeded initial expectations.<ref>Fu Jing-hui, An Introduction of Chinese and Foreign History of War, 2003, pp. 109–111</ref> On 26 October, the IJA captured Dachang, a key strong-point within Shanghai, and on 5 November, additional reinforcements from Japan landed in Hangzhou Bay. Finally, on 9 November, the NRA began a general retreat. | |||
Chiang Kai-Shek also suspected that the Tibetans were collaborating with the Japanese. Under orders from the ] government of Chiang Kai-Shek, Ma Bufang repaired the Yushu airport to deter Tibetan independence.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=rozF-AZgmM8C&pg=PA61&dq=ma+bufang+japanese&hl=en&ei=ZBghTJLZOIKClAfC_Nxi&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CEkQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=ma%20bufang%20japanese&f=false|title=Indo-Tibet-China conflict|author=Dinesh Lal|year=2008|publisher=Gyan Publishing House|location=|page=61|isbn=8178357143|pages=309|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> Chiang also ordered Ma Bufang to put his Muslim soldiers on alert for an invasion of Tibet in 1942.<ref name="Lin">{{cite web|url=http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=449716|title=War or Stratagem? Reassessing China's Military Advance towards Tibet, 1942–1943|last=Lin|first=Hsiao-ting|publisher=|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref><ref></ref> Ma Bufang complied, and moved several thousand troops to the border with Tibet.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=ZBghTJLZOIKClAfC_Nxi&ct=result&id=4_BxAAAAMAAJ&dq=ma+bufang+japanese&q=ma+bufang+|title=China in the anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945: politics, culture and society|author=David P. Barrett, Lawrence N. Shyu|year=2001|publisher=Peter Lang|location=|page=98|isbn=0820445568|pages=240|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> Chiang also threatened the Tibetans with bombing if they did not comply. | |||
Japan did not immediately occupy the Shanghai International Settlement or the ], areas which were outside of China's control due to the ] system. Japan moved into these areas after its 1941 declaration of war against the United States and the United Kingdom.<ref name=":02" />{{rp|11–12}} | |||
Ma Bufang was openly hostile towards the Tibetans and Buddhist Mongols (despite that he also had Muslim Mongols in his army). His Muslim troops launched a campaign of ] against the Tibetans and Buddhist Mongols in northeast and eastern Qinghai during the war, and also destroyed ] Temples.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=DbkfQATHikQC&pg=PA72&dq=ma+bufang+ethnic+cleansing+tibetans&hl=en&ei=NBUhTKnpOcH7lwfr64l-&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=ma%20bufang%20ethnic%20cleansing%20tibetans&f=false|title=China's campaign to "Open up the West": national, provincial, and local perspectives|author=David S. G. Goodman|year=2004|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=|page=72|isbn=0521613493|pages=204|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
===Battle of Nanjing and massacre=== | |||
===Chinese resistance strategy=== | |||
{{Main|Nanjing Massacre}} | |||
] in a show of solidarity with ].]] | |||
]'']] | |||
] fighting in ].]] | |||
The basis of Chinese strategy before the entrance of Western Allies can be divided into two periods: | |||
In November 1937, the Japanese concentrated 220,000 soldiers and began a campaign against Nanjing.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=29}} Building on the hard-won victory in Shanghai, the IJA advanced on and ] of Nanjing (December 1937) and ] (September{{snd}}November 1937). | |||
'''First Period''': 7 July 1937 (]) – 25 October 1938 (]). | |||
Japanese forces inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese soldiers defending the city, killing approximately 50,000 of them including 17 Chinese generals.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=29}} Upon the capture of Nanjing, Japanese committed massive war atrocities including mass murder and rape of Chinese civilians after 13 December 1937, which has been referred to as the ]. Over the next several weeks, Japanese troops perpetrated numerous mass executions and tens of thousands of rapes. The army looted and burned the surrounding towns and the city, destroying more than a third of the buildings.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia| url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Nanjing-Massacre |title=Nanjing Massacre |date=13 December 2022 |encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica}}</ref> | |||
Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for ] and had little military-industrial strength, no ], and few ]. Up until the mid-1930s China had hoped that the ] would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the ] (KMT) government was mired in a civil war against the ] (CCP), as ] was quoted: "''the Japanese are a disease of the skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart''". The ] between the KMT and CCP was never truly unified, as each side was preparing for a showdown with the other once the Japanese were driven out. | |||
The number of Chinese killed in the massacre has been subject to much debate, with estimates ranging from 100,000 to more than 300,000.<ref name="highest death toll estimate">Daqing Yang, "A Sino-Japanese Controversy: The Nanjing Atrocity As History", ''Sino-Japanese Studies'', November 1990, 16.</ref> The numbers agreed upon by most scholars are provided by the ], which estimate at least 200,000 murders and 20,000 rapes.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Askew |first=David |date=2002 |title="The Nanjing Incident: Recent Research and Trends" |url=http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/Askew.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180405031715/http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/Askew.html |access-date=2024-05-20|archive-date=5 April 2018}}</ref> | |||
Even under these extremely unfavorable circumstances, Chiang realized that to win support from the ] and other foreign nations, China had to prove it was capable of fighting. A fast retreat would discourage foreign aid so Chiang decided to make a stand in the ]. Chiang sent the best of his ] to defend China's largest and most ] city from the Japanese. The battle lasted over three months, saw heavy casualties on both sides and ended with a Chinese retreat towards Nanjing. While this was a military defeat for the Chinese, it proved that China would not be defeated easily and showed China's determination to the world, which became an enormous morale booster for the Chinese people as it ended the Japanese taunt that Japan could conquer Shanghai in three days and China in three months. | |||
The Japanese atrocities in Nanjing, especially following the Chinese defense of Shanghai, increased international goodwill for the Chinese people and the Chinese government.<ref name="Crean" />{{rp|72}} | |||
Afterwards the Chinese began to adopt the strategy of "trading space for time" ({{zh icon}}: {{lang|zh-Hant|以空間換取時間}}). The Chinese army would put up fights to delay Japanese advance to northern and eastern cities, to allow the ], along with its professionals and key industries, to retreat west into ]. As a result of Chinese troops' ] strategies, where ]s and ]s were intentionally sabotaged to ], the consecutive Japanese advancements and conquests began to stall in late-1938. | |||
The Nationalist government re-established itself in Chongqing, which became the wartime seat of government until 1945.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=32}} | |||
'''Second Period''': 25 October 1938 (Fall of Wuhan) - December 1941 (before the Allies' ] on Japan). | |||
] in 1939.]] | |||
==1938== | |||
During this period, the Chinese main objective was to prolong the war as long as possible, exhausting the Japanese resources and building up the Chinese military capacity. American general ] called this strategy "winning by outlasting". Therefore, the National Revolutionary Army adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, ]s, and ]s in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic is the successful defense of ] in ] and again in ] while inflicting heavy casualties on the IJA. | |||
By January 1938, most conventional Kuomintang forces had either been defeated or no longer offered major resistance to Japanese advances.<ref name=":4" />{{rp|122}} KMT forces won a few victories in 1938 (the ] and the ]) but were generally ineffective that year.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=29}} By March 1938, the Japanese controlled almost all of North China.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|pages=29–30}} Communist-led rural resistance to the Japanese remained active, however.<ref name=":4">{{Cite book |last=Opper |first=Marc |title=People's Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam |year=2020 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-472-90125-8 |location=Ann Arbor |doi=10.3998/mpub.11413902 |hdl=20.500.12657/23824 |s2cid=211359950}}</ref>{{rp|122}} | |||
===Battles of Xuzhou and Taierzhuang=== | |||
Also, local Chinese resistance forces, organised by the Chinese communists and KMT continued their resistance in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast lands of China difficult. In 1940 the ] launched a ] in north China, destroyed railways and blew up a major coal mine. These constant harassment and sabotage operations deeply frustrated the Japanese army and led them to employ the "]" (kill all, loot all, burn all) ({{lang|mul-Hani|三光政策}}, ]: ''Sānguāng Zhèngcè'', Japanese ]: ''Sankō Seisaku''). It was during this time period that the bulk of ] were committed. | |||
] in the ], March–April 1938]] | |||
With many victories achieved, Japanese field generals ] in an attempt to wipe out the Chinese forces in the area. The Japanese managed to overcome Chinese resistance around Bengbu and the Teng xian, but were fought to a halt at Linyi.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mackinnon |first=Stephen |title=Wuhan, 1938: War, Refugees, and the Making of Modern China |date=2008 |publisher=University of California Press |pages=32}}</ref> | |||
By 1941, Japan had occupied much of north and coastal China, but the KMT central government and military had successfully retreated to the western interior to continue their stubborn resistance, while the Chinese communists remained in control of base areas in ]. Furthermore, in the occupied areas Japanese control was limited to just railroads and major cities ("points and lines"), but they did not have a major military or administrative presence in the vast Chinese countryside, which was a hotbed of Chinese partisan activities. This stalemate situation made a decisive victory seem impossible to the Japanese. | |||
The Japanese were then decisively defeated at the Battle of Taierzhuang (March–April 1938), where the Chinese used night attacks and ] to overcome Japanese advantages in firepower. The Chinese also severed Japanese supply lines from the rear, forcing the Japanese to retreat in the first Chinese victory of the war.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=149–150}} | |||
===Relationship between the Nationalists and Communists=== | |||
The Japanese then attempted to surround and destroy the Chinese armies in the Xuzhou region with an enormous ]. However the majority of the Chinese forces, some 200,000-300,000 troops in 40 divisions, managed to break out of the encirclement and retreat to defend Wuhan, the Japanese's next target.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Harmsen |first=Peter |title=Storm Clouds over the Pacific, 1931-1941 |year=2018 |publisher=Casemate |page=111}}</ref> | |||
After the ] in 1931, Chinese public opinion strongly criticized the leader of Manchuria, the "young marshal" ], for his nonresistance to the Japanese invasion, even though the Kuomintang central government was indirectly responsible for this policy. Afterwards Chiang Kai-shek assigned Zhang and his ] the duty of suppressing the ] of the ] (CCP) in ] after their ]. This resulted in great casualties for his Northeast Army, and Chiang Kai-shek did not give him any support in manpower and weaponry. | |||
===Battle of Wuhan=== | |||
] Commander Zhu De with KMT Blue Sky White Sun Emblem cap.]] | |||
] | |||
Following Xuzhou, the IJA changed its strategy and deployed almost all of its existing armies in China to ], which had become the political, economic and military center of China, in hopes of destroying the fighting strength of the NRA and forcing the KMT government to negotiate for peace.{{sfn|Huang|p=168}} On 6 June, they captured Kaifeng, the capital of Henan, and threatened to take Zhengzhou, the junction of the Pinghan and Longhai railways. | |||
On 12 December 1936 a deeply disgruntled Zhang Xueliang decided to conspire with the CCP and ] in ] to force an end to the conflict between KMT and CCP. To secure the release of Chiang, the KMT was forced to agree to a temporary end to the ] and the forming of a ] between the CCP and KMT against Japan on 24 December 1936. The cooperation took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered CCP, and they agreed to form the ] and the ] which were nominally under the command of the ]. The Red Army of CCP fought in alliance with the KMT forces during the ], and the high point of their cooperation came in 1938 during the ]. | |||
The Japanese forces, numbering some 400,000 men, were faced by over 1 million NRA troops in the Central Yangtze region. Having learned from their defeats at Shanghai and Nanjing, the Chinese had adapted themselves to fight the Japanese and managed to check their forces on many fronts, slowing and sometimes reversing the Japanese advances, as in the case of ].<ref name="Mackinnon2008" />{{rp|39–41}} | |||
However, despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich ] Valley in central China, the distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. The uneasy alliance began to break down by late 1938 as a result of the Communists efforts to aggressively expand their military strength through absorbing Chinese guerrilla forces behind enemy lines. For Chinese militia who refuse to switch their allegiance, the CCP would call them "collaborators" and then attack to eliminate their forces. For example, the Red Army led by ] attacked and wiped out a brigade of Chinese militia led by Zhang Yin-wu in ] in June, 1939<ref>Ray Huang, 1994, p.259</ref>. Starting in 1940, open conflicts between the Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the occupied areas outside of Japanese control, culminating in the ] in January 1941. | |||
To overcome Chinese resistance, Japanese forces frequently deployed poison gas and committed atrocities against civilians, such as a "mini-Nanjing Massacre" in the city of ] upon its capture.<ref name="Mackinnon2008">{{Cite book |last=Mackinnon |first=Stephen |title=Wuhan 1938: War, Refugees, and the Making of Modern China |year=2008 |publisher=University of California Press}}</ref>{{rp|39}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Harmsen |first=Peter |title=Storm Clouds over the Pacific, 1931-1941 |year=2018 |publisher=Casemate |pages=119}}</ref> After four months of intense combat, the Nationalists were forced to abandon Wuhan by October, and its government and armies retreated to Chongqing.<ref name="Crean" />{{rp|72}} Both sides had suffered tremendous casualties in the battle, with the Chinese losing up to 500,000 soldiers killed or wounded,<ref name="Mackinnon2008" />{{rp|42}}</ref> and the Japanese up to 200,000.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Clodfelter |first=Michael |title=Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015 |year=2017 |publisher=McFarland & Company |edition=4th |page=393}}</ref> | |||
Afterwards, the Second United Front completely broke down and Chinese Communists leader ] outlined the preliminary plan for the CCP's eventual seizure of power from Chiang Kai-shek. Mao began his final push for consolidation of CCP power under his authority, and his teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as "]". The communists also began to focus most of their energy on building up their sphere of influence wherever opportunities were presented, mainly through rural mass organizations, administrative, ] and ] reform measures favoring poor ]s; while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence by military blockade of areas controlled by CCP and fighting the Japanese at the same time<ref name=CRISIS-TIME-MAGAZINE>{{cite news | |||
|title=Crisis | |||
|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801570-4,00.html | |||
|publisher=] | |||
|date=13 November 1944}}</ref> | |||
=== |
===Communist resistance=== | ||
After their victory at Wuhan, Japan advanced deep into Communist territory and redeployed 50,000 troops to the ]. Elements of the Eighth Route Army soon attacked the advancing Japanese, inflicting between 3,000 and 5,000 casualties and resulting in a Japanese retreat.<ref name=":4" />{{Rp|pages=122-124}} The Eighth Route Army carried out guerilla operations and established military and political bases.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|pages=34-35}} As the Japanese military came to understand that the Communists avoided conventional attacks and defense, it altered its tactics.<ref name=":4" />{{rp|122}} The Japanese military built more roads to quicken movement between strongpoints and cities, blockaded rivers and roads in an effort to disrupt Communists supply, sought to expand militia from its puppet regime to conserve manpower, and use systematic violence on civilians in the Border Region in an effort to destroy its economy. The Japanese military mandated confiscation of the Eighth Route Army's goods and used this directive as a pretext to confiscate goods, including engaging in grave robbery in the Border Region.<ref name=":4" />{{rp|122–124}} | |||
{{see also|Motives of the Second Sino-Japanese War}} | |||
] with Chinese insignia. I-16 was the main fighter plane used by the ] and ].]] | |||
] of the ], painted with the shark-face emblem and the 12-point sun of the Chinese Air Force.]] | |||
With Japanese casualties and costs mounting, the Imperial General Headquarters attempted to break Chinese resistance by ordering the ] and ] to launch the war's first ] on civilian targets. Japanese raiders hit the Kuomintang's newly established ] and most other major cities in unoccupied China, leaving many people either dead, injured, or homeless. | |||
At the outbreak of full scale war, many global powers were reluctant to provide support to China; because in their opinion the Chinese would eventually lose the war, and they did not wish to antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial possessions in the region. They expected any support given to the Chinese might worsen their own relationship with the Japanese, who taunted the Chinese with the prospect of conquest within three months. However, ] and the ] did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated to the Asian theatre of ], with the ] and ] lending support to China afterwards. | |||
=== |
===Yellow River flood=== | ||
]]] | |||
Prior to the outbreak of the war, Germany and China had ], with Germany helping China modernize its industry and military in exchange for raw materials. More than half of the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to China. Nevertheless the proposed 30 ] equipped and trained with German assistance did not materialize when Germany ] in 1938, because ] wanted to form an alliance with Japan against the Soviet Union. | |||
{{Excerpt|1938 Yellow River flood|paragraphs=1-2}} | |||
==1939–1940: Chinese counterattack and stalemate== | |||
====Soviet support==== | |||
{{Unreferenced section|date=October 2023}} | |||
With the signing of the ] between Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union wished to keep China in the war to hinder the Japanese from invading ], thus saving itself from the threat of a ]. In September 1937, the Soviet leadership signed the ], began aiding China, and approved ], a ]. As part of the secret operation, Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of the Chinese war-supply transport. ]s, ], military supplies and advisors arrived, including Soviet general ], later to become victor at the ]. Prior to the entrance of Western allies, the Soviet Union provided the largest amount of foreign aid to China, totalling some $250 million of credits in munitions and supplies. In 1941, Soviet aid ended as a result of the ] and the beginning of the ]. This pact enabled the Soviet Union to avoid fighting against Germany and Japan at the same time. 3,665 Soviet advisors and pilots fought for the Chinese side<ref>Taylor, Jay, The Generalissimo, p.156.</ref> In total, 227 Soviets died fighting for China<ref>http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter4_4.html</ref>. The Soviets brazenly breached the pact with China, see ]. | |||
] | |||
By 1939, the Nationalist army had withdrawn to the southwest and northwest of China and the Japanese controlled the coastal cities that been centres of Nationalist power.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=30}} From 1939 to 1945, China was divided into three regions: Japanese-occupied territories (''Lunxianqu''), the Nationalist-controlled region (''Guotongqu''), and the Communist-controlled regions (''Jiefangqu<u>,</u>'' or liberated areas).<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=35}} | |||
From the beginning of 1939, the war entered a new phase with the unprecedented defeat of the Japanese at ] and ]. These outcomes encouraged the Chinese to launch their first large-scale ] against the IJA in December 1939; however, due to its low military-industrial capacity and limited experience in modern warfare, this offensive was defeated. Afterwards Chiang could not risk any more all-out offensive campaigns given the poorly trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within the Kuomintang and in China in general. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped troops in the Battle of Shanghai and was at times at the mercy of his generals, who maintained a high degree of autonomy from the central KMT government. | |||
====Allied support==== | |||
] Commander ]]] | |||
]" issued to AVG pilots requesting all Chinese to offer rescue and protection.]] | |||
During the offensive, Hui forces in Suiyuan under generals ] and ] routed the Imperial Japanese Army and their puppet Inner Mongol forces and prevented the planned Japanese advance into northwest China. Ma Hongbin's father ] had fought against Japanese in the ]. General ] led Hui, Salar and Dongxiang cavalry to defeat the Japanese at the ]. Ma Biao fought against the Japanese in the Boxer Rebellion. | |||
From December 1937 events such as the ] and the ] swung public opinion in the West sharply against Japan and increased their fear of Japanese expansion, which prompted the United States, the ], and ] to provide loan assistance for war supply contracts to the ]. Furthermore, ] prevented a Japanese government-owned company from taking over an iron mine in Australia, and banned ] exports in 1938.<ref></ref> Japan retaliated by ] (present-day ], ] and ]) in 1940, and successfully blockaded China from the import of arms, fuel and 10,000 tons/month of materials supplied by the Allies through the ]. | |||
After 1940, the Japanese encountered tremendous difficulties in administering and garrisoning the seized territories, and tried to solve their occupation problems by implementing a strategy of creating friendly puppet governments favourable to Japanese interests in the territories conquered. This included prominently the ] headed by ], one of Chiang's rivals in the KMT.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=35}} However, ] committed by the Imperial Japanese Army, as well as Japanese refusal to delegate any real power, left the puppets very unpopular and largely ineffective. The only success the Japanese had was to recruit a large ] to maintain public security in the occupied areas. | |||
In mid-1941, the United States government financed the creation of the ] (AVG), or ], to replace the withdrawal of Soviet volunteers and aircraft. Led by ], their early combat success of 300 kills against a loss of 12 of their shark painted ] fighters earned them wide recognition at the time when Allies were suffering heavy losses, and soon afterwards their dogfighting tactics would be adopted by the ]. Furthermore, to pressure the Japanese to end all hostilities in China, the United States, Britain, and the ] began oil and/or steel ]s against Japan. The loss of oil imports made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China. This set the stage for Japan to launch a series of military attacks against the Allies when the ] raided ] on December 7, 1941. | |||
=== |
===Japanese expansion=== | ||
By 1941, Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China and Vietnam, but ] fighting continued in these occupied areas. Japan had suffered high casualties which resulted from unexpectedly stubborn Chinese resistance, and neither side could make any swift progress in the manner of ] in Western Europe. | |||
], ], and ] met at the ] in 1943 during World War II.]] | |||
] ] and his wife ] with ] ] in 1942, ].]] | |||
By 1943, Guangdong had experienced famine. As the situation worsened, New York Chinese compatriots received a letter stating that 600,000 people were killed in ] by starvation.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4hdwAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA117 |title=Brokering Belonging: Chinese in Canada's Exclusion Era, 1885–1945 |isbn=978-0199780549 |last1=Mar |first1=Lisa Rose |year=2010 |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref> | |||
Within a few days of the ], China formally ] against Japan, Germany and Italy,<ref name="China Declares War">{{cite journal|date=December 15, 1941 |title=China's Declaration of War Against Japan, Germany and Italy |journal=Contemporary China |publisher=jewishvirtuallibrary.org |volume=1 |issue=15 |url=http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ww2/chinawar.html |accessdate=September 10, 2010}}</ref> and right afterwards the ] achieved another ] against the ] (IJA) in ], which earned the Chinese government much prestige from the ]. ] ] referred to the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China as the world's "]", elevating the international status of China to an unprecedented height after a century of humiliation at the hands of various imperialist powers. | |||
===Second phase: October 1938 – December 1941=== | |||
] continued to receive supplies from the United States as the Chinese conflict was merged into the ]. However, in contrast to the Arctic supply route to the Soviet Union that stayed open most of the war, sea routes to China and the ] had been closed since 1940. Therefore between the ] in 1942 and its re-opening as the ] in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what could be flown in over "]". Most of China's own industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union refused to allow the United States to supply China through ] into ] because the Xinjiang warlord ] turned ] in 1942 with Chiang's approval. For these reasons, the Chinese government never had the supplies and equipment needed to mount any major counter-offensive. Despite the severe shortage of ], in 1943, the Chinese were successful in repelling major Japanese offensives in ] and ]. | |||
] | |||
During this period, the main Chinese objective was to drag out the war for as long as possible in a war of attrition, thereby exhausting Japanese resources while it was building up China's military capacity. American general ] called this strategy "winning by outlasting". The NRA adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, flanking attacks, and encirclements in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic was the successful defense of ] in 1939, and again in the ], in which heavy casualties were inflicted on the IJA. | |||
Chiang was appointed Allied ] in the China theater in 1942, while American general ] served for a time as Chiang's ], and at the same time commanding American forces in the ]. However, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down for many reasons. Many historians (such as ]) suggested it was largely due to the corruption and inefficiency of the ] (KMT) government. However, other historians (such as ]) found that it was a more complicated situation. Stilwell had a strong desire to assume total control of Chinese troops, which Chiang vehemently opposed. Stilwell also did not appreciate the complexity of the situation, including the buildup of the ] during the war (essentially Chiang had to fight a multi-front war — the Japanese on one side, the Communists on the other). Stilwell openly criticized the Chinese government's conduct of the war in the American media, and to American President Roosevelt. Chiang continued to maintain a defensive posture despite pleads from the other Allies to actively break the Japanese blockade, because China had already suffered tens of millions of war casualties and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate to America's overwhelming industrial output. Due to these reasons the other Allies gradually began to lose confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the ] and ], employing an ] strategy. | |||
Local Chinese ], organized separately by both the CCP and the KMT, continued their resistance in occupied areas to make Japanese administration over the vast land area of China difficult. In 1940, the ] launched a ] in north China, destroying railways and a major coal mine. These constant guerilla and sabotage operations deeply frustrated the Imperial Japanese Army and they led them to employ the ]—kill all, loot all, burn all. It was during this period that the bulk of Japanese war crimes were committed. | |||
Conflicts among China, the United States, and the United Kingdom also emerged in the Pacific War. ] ] was reluctant to devote British troops, the majority of whom were defeated by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to reopen the ]. On the other hand, Stilwell believed that the reopening of the Burma Road was vital to China as all the ports on mainland China were under Japanese control. Churchill's "]" policy obviously did not sit well with Chiang, while the later British insistence that China send in more and more troops into ] in the ] was suspected by Chiang as an attempt by Britain to use Chinese manpower to defend British colonial holdings and prevent the gate to India from falling to Japan.<ref>Ray Huang, 1994, p.300</ref> Chiang also believed that China should divert their crack army divisions from Burma to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American bombers and defeat the IJA through bombing, a strategy that American general ] supported but Stilwell strongly opposed. In addition, Chiang voiced his support of ] in a meeting with ] in 1942, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.<ref>Ray Huang, 1994, p.299</ref> | |||
By 1941, Japan had occupied much of north and coastal China, but the KMT central government and military had retreated to the western interior to continue their resistance, while the Chinese communists remained in control of base areas in ]. In the occupied areas, Japanese control was mainly limited to railroads and major cities ("points and lines"). They did not have a major military or administrative presence in the vast Chinese countryside, where Chinese guerrillas roamed freely. | |||
The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a large number of Japanese troops, as well as being a location for American airbases from which to strike the Japanese home islands. In 1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, the IJA mobilized over 400,000 men and launched their ] in World War II to attack the American airbases in China and link up the railway between ] and ]. This brought major cities in ], ] and ] under Japanese occupation. The failure of the Chinese forces to defend these areas encouraged Stilwell to attempt to gain command of the entire Chinese army, and his subsequent showdown with Chiang led to his replacement by ] ]. | |||
From 1941 to 1942, Japan concentrated most of its forces in China in an effort to defeat the Communist bases behind Japan's lines.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=35}} To decrease guerilla's human and material resources, the Japanese military implemented its Three Alls policy ("Kill all, loot all, burn all").<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=35}} In response, the Communist armies increased their role in production activities, including farming, raising hogs, and cloth-making.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=35}} | |||
However, by the end of 1944 ] under the command of ] attacking from India and those under the command of ] attacking from ] joined forces in ], which succeeded in driving out the Japanese in North Burma and securing the ], a vital supply route to China<ref>Ray Huang, 1994, p.420</ref>. In Spring 1945 the Chinese launched offensives and retook ] and ]. With the Chinese army progressing well in training and equipment, Wedemeyer planned to launch Operation Carbonado in summer 1945 to retake ], thus obtaining a coastal port, and from there drive northwards toward ]. However, the ] hastened Japanese surrender and these plans were not put into action. | |||
===Relationship between the Nationalists and the Communists=== | |||
==Contemporary Wars Being Fought by China== | |||
] Commander ] with a KMT "Blue Sky, White Sun" emblem cap]] | |||
The Chinese were not entirely devoting all their resources to the Japanese, because they were fighting several other wars at the same time. | |||
After the Mukden Incident in 1931, Chinese public opinion was strongly critical of Manchuria's leader, the "young marshal" Zhang Xueliang, for his non-resistance to the Japanese invasion, even though the Kuomintang central government was also responsible for this policy, giving Zhang an order to improvise while not offering support. After losing Manchuria to the Japanese, Zhang and his ] were given the duty of suppressing the Red Army in Shaanxi after their ]. This resulted in great casualties for his Northeast Army, which received no support in manpower or weaponry from Chiang Kai-shek. | |||
The Soviet Union attacked the Republic of China in 1937 during the ]. The Muslim General Ma Hushan of the Kuomintang ] resisted the Soviet Invasion, which was being led by Russian troops commanded by Muslim General ], previously one of Chiang Kaishek's suboordinates. | |||
In the ] that took place on 12 December 1936, Zhang Xueliang kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in ], hoping to force an end to KMT–CCP conflict. To secure the release of Chiang, the KMT agreed to a temporary ceasefire with the Communists. On 24 December, the two parties agreed to a ] against Japan; this had salutary effects for the beleaguered Communists, who agreed to form the ] and the ] under the nominal control of the NRA. In addition, ] and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border regions were created, under the control of the CCP. In Shaan-Gan-Ning, Communists in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Base Area fostered ], taxed it, and engaged in its trade—including selling to Japanese-occupied and KMT-controlled provinces.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last1=Saich |first1=Tony |title=New Perspectives on the Chinese Revolution |last2=Van De Ven |first2=Hans J.|year=2015 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-46391-7 |pages=263–297 |chapter=The Blooming Poppy under the Red Sun: The Yan'an Way and the Opium Trade |doi=10.4324/9781315702124}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Hevia |first=James Louis |year=2003 |title=Opium, Empire, and Modern History |url=http://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/china_review_international/v010/10.2hevia.pdf |journal=China Review International |volume=10 |issue=2 |pages=307–326 |doi=10.1353/cri.2004.0076 |s2cid=143635262 |issn=1527-9367}}</ref> The Red Army fought alongside KMT forces during the ], and the high point of their cooperation came in 1938 during the Battle of Wuhan. | |||
General Ma Hushan was expecting some sort of help from Nanjing, as he exchanged messages with Chiang regarding Soviet attack. Both the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Xinjiang war erupting at the same time left Chiang and Ma Hushan on their own to face the Japanese and Soviet enemies. | |||
The formation of a united front added to the legality of the CCP, but what kind of support the central government would provide to the communists were not settled. When compromise with the CCP failed to incentivize the Soviet Union to engage in an open conflict against Japan, the KMT withheld further support for the Communists. To strengthen their legitimacy, Communist forces actively engaged the Japanese early on. These operations weakened Japanese forces in Shanxi and other areas in the North. Mao Zedong was distrustful of Chiang Kai-shek, however, and shifted strategy to guerrilla warfare in order to preserve the CCP's military strength.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Nobu |first1=Iwatani |title=How the War with Japan Saved the Chinese Communist Party |url=https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00722/ |website=Nippon Communications Foundation |date=27 July 2021}}</ref> | |||
The ] was being waged by the Kuomintang Muslim General ] against Tibetan rebels, and several border crisis with Tibet erupted that required troops. | |||
Despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich ] Valley in central China, the distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. The uneasy alliance began to break down by late 1938, partially due to the Communists' aggressive efforts to expand their military strength by absorbing Chinese guerrilla forces behind Japanese lines. Chinese militia who refused to switch their allegiance were often labelled "collaborators" and attacked by CCP forces. For example, the Red Army led by ] attacked and wiped out a brigade of Chinese militia led by Zhang Yin-wu in Hebei in June 1939.{{sfn|Huang|p=259}} Starting in 1940, open conflict between Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the occupied areas outside of Japanese control, culminating in the ] in January 1941. | |||
Since the Pro Soviet governor ] controlled ], which was garrisoned with Soviet troops in ], which bordered ], the Chinese government had to keep troops stationed there as well. | |||
Afterwards, the Second United Front completely broke down and Chinese Communists leader ] outlined the preliminary plan for the CCP's eventual seizure of power from Chiang Kai-shek. Mao himself is quoted outlining the "721" policy, saying "We are fighting 70 percent for self development, 20 percent for compromise, and 10 percent against Japan".{{Citation needed|date=May 2024}} Mao began his final push for consolidation of CCP power under his authority, and his teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as ]. The Communists also began to focus most of their energy on building up their sphere of influence wherever opportunities were presented, mainly through rural mass organizations, administrative, land and tax reform measures favouring poor peasants; while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence by military blockade of areas controlled by CCP and fighting the Japanese at the same time.<ref name=CRISIS-TIME-MAGAZINE>{{cite magazine|title=Crisis|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801570-4,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071120121411/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801570-4,00.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=20 November 2007|magazine=]|date=13 November 1944}}</ref> | |||
The Muslim General ] was in virtual control of the ] corridor at this time.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=DEZKTPtzgfvwBramnT8&ct=result&id=y3oeAAAAMAAJ&dq=salar+army++Ma+pu-fang&q=Ma+pu-fang|title=Asia, Volume 40|author=|year=1940|publisher=Asia Magazine|location=|page=|isbn=|pages=|accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref> Ma Buqing had earlier fought against the Japanese, but since the Soviet threat was great, Chiang made some arrangements regarding Ma's position. In July 1942 Chiang Kai-shek instructed Ma Buqing to move 30,000 of his troops to the Tsaidam marsh in the ] of ].<ref></ref><ref></ref> Chiang named Ma Reclamation Commissioner, to threaten ]'s southern flank in ], which bordered Tsaidam. | |||
===Entrance of the Western Allies=== | |||
After Ma evacuated his positions in Gansu, Kuomintang troops from central China flooded the area, and inflitrated Soviet occupied Xinjiang, gradually reclaiming it and forcing Sheng Shicai to break with the Soviets. | |||
] with Lieutenant General ] in 1942, ]]] | |||
] | |||
The ] broke out in ] when the Kuomintang Chinese Muslim Officer ] was killed while fighting Turkic Uyghur Rebels in November 1944. The ] supported the Turkic rebels against the Kuomintang, and Kuomintang forces were fighting back. | |||
] | |||
Japan had expected to extract economic benefits of its invasions of China and elsewhere, including in the form of fuel and raw material resources.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=30}} As Japanese aggression continued, however, the United States responded with trade embargoes on various goods, including oil and petroleum (beginning December 1939) and scrap iron and munitions (beginning July 1940).<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=30}} The United States demanded that Japan withdraw from China and also refused to recognize Japan's occupations of the Indochinese countries.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=30}} In spring 1941, trade negotiations between the United States and Japan failed.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=30}} In July 1941, the United States froze Japanese financial assets and obtained Dutch and British agreements to also cut those countries' oil exports to Japan.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=30}} This in turn prompted the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=30}} | |||
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States declared war against Japan, and within days China joined the Allies in formal declaration of war against Japan, Germany and Italy.{{citation needed|date=October 2023}} As the Western Allies entered the war against Japan, the Sino-Japanese War would become part of a greater conflict, the ] of ]. Japan's military action against the United States also restrained its capacity to conduct further offensive operations in China.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=30}} | |||
After the Lend-Lease Act was passed in 1941, American financial and military aid began to trickle in.<ref>Tai-Chun Kuo, "A Strong Diplomat in a Weak Polity: TV Soong and wartime US–China relations, 1940–1943." ''Journal of Contemporary China'' 18.59 (2009): 219–231.</ref> ] commanded the 1st American Volunteer Group (nicknamed the ]), with American pilots flying American warplanes which were painted with the Chinese flag to attack the Japanese. He headed both the volunteer group and the uniformed U.S. Army Air Forces units that replaced it in 1942.<ref>Daniel Ford, ''Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and His American Volunteers, 1941–1942'' (2007).</ref> However, it was the Soviets that provided the greatest material help for China from 1937 into 1941, with fighter aircraft for the Nationalist Chinese Air Force and artillery and armour for the Chinese Army through the ]; ] also provided for a group of Soviet volunteer combat aviators to join the Chinese Air Force in the fight against the Japanese occupation from late 1937 through 1939. The United States embargoed Japan in 1941 depriving it of shipments of oil and various other resources necessary to continue the war in China. This pressure, which was intended to disparage a continuation of the war and bring Japan into negotiation, resulted in the ] and Japan's drive south to procure from the resource-rich European colonies in Southeast Asia by force the resources which the United States had denied to them. | |||
Almost immediately, Chinese troops achieved another decisive victory in the ], which earned the Chinese government much prestige from the Western Allies. President Franklin D. Roosevelt referred to the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China as the world's "]"; his primary reason for elevating China to such a status was the belief that after the war it would serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Westad |first=Odd |title=Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950 |year=2003 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-0-8047-4484-3 |page= |url=https://archive.org/details/decisiveencounte00west |url-access=registration}}</ref> | |||
Knowledge of Japanese naval movements in the Pacific was provided to the American Navy by the ] (SACO) which was run by the Chinese intelligence head ].<ref name="Wakeman2003">{{cite book|author=Frederic E. Wakeman|title=Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jYYYQYK6FAYC&pg=PA309|year=2003|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-92876-3|pages=309–|access-date=29 July 2016|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012012438/https://books.google.com/books?id=jYYYQYK6FAYC&pg=PA309|url-status=live}}</ref> Philippine and Japanese ocean weather was affected by weather originating near northern China.<ref name="Kush2012">{{cite book|author=Linda Kush|title=The Rice Paddy Navy: U.S. Sailors Undercover in China|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2azvCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT206|year= 2012|publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing|isbn=978-1-78200-312-0|pages=206–|access-date=29 July 2016|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012012459/https://books.google.com/books?id=2azvCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT206|url-status=live}}</ref> The base of SACO was located in Yangjiashan.<ref name="Wakeman2003 2">{{cite book|author=Frederic E. Wakeman|title=Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jYYYQYK6FAYC&pg=PA497|year=2003|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-92876-3|pages=497–|access-date=29 July 2016|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012012542/https://books.google.com/books?id=jYYYQYK6FAYC&pg=PA497|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive supplies from the United States. However, in contrast to the ] to the Soviet Union which stayed open through most of the war, sea routes to China and the ] had been closed since 1940. Therefore, between the ] in 1942 and its re-opening as the ] in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what could be flown in over "]". In Burma, on 16 April 1942, 7,000 British soldiers were encircled by the Japanese 33rd Division during the ] and rescued by the Chinese 38th Division.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Slim |first=William |title=Defeat into Victory |year=1956 |publisher=Cassell |location=London |isbn=0-304-29114-5}}</ref> After the ], the Imperial Japanese Army conducted a massive sweep through ] and ], now known as the ], with the goal of finding the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. The operation started 15 May 1942, with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September.<ref>{{Cite book |first=R. Keith |last=Schoppa |title=In a Sea of Bitterness, Refugees during the Sino-Japanese War|publisher=Harvard University Press |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-674-05988-7 |page=28}}</ref> During this campaign, the Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and also spread ], ], ] and ] pathogens. Chinese estimates allege that as many as 250,000 civilians, the vast majority of whom were destitute Tanka boat people and other pariah ethnicities unable to flee, may have died of disease.<ref>Yuki Tanaka, ''Hidden Horrors'', Westviewpres, 1996, p. 138</ref> It caused more than 16 million civilians to evacuate far away deep inward China. 90% of Ningbo's population had already fled before battle started.<ref name="Mackinnon2008" />{{rp|49}} | |||
Most of China's industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union refused to allow the United States to supply China through the ] into ] as the Xinjiang warlord Sheng Shicai had turned anti-Soviet in 1942 with Chiang's approval. For these reasons, the Chinese government never had the supplies and equipment needed to mount major counter-offensives. Despite the severe shortage of matériel, in 1943, the Chinese were successful in repelling major Japanese offensives ] and ]. | |||
Chiang was named Allied commander-in-chief in the China theater in 1942. American general Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's chief of staff, while simultaneously commanding American forces in the ]. For many reasons, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down. Many historians (such as ]) have suggested it was largely due to the corruption and inefficiency of the Kuomintang government, while others (such as ] and ]) have depicted it as a more complicated situation. Stilwell had a strong desire to assume total control of Chinese troops and pursue an aggressive strategy, while Chiang preferred a patient and less expensive strategy of out-waiting the Japanese. Chiang continued to maintain a defensive posture despite Allied pleas to actively break the Japanese blockade, because China had already suffered tens of millions of war casualties and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate in the face of America's overwhelming industrial output. For these reasons the other Allies gradually began to lose confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the ] and ], employing an ] strategy.<ref>Hans Van de Ven, "Stilwell in the Stocks: The Chinese Nationalists and the Allied Powers in the Second World War", ''Asian Affairs'' 34.3 (November 2003): 243–259.</ref> | |||
], and ] at the 1943 ]]] | |||
Long-standing differences in national interest and political stance among China, the United States, and the United Kingdom remained in place. British Prime Minister ] was reluctant to devote British troops, many of whom had been routed by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to the reopening of the ]; Stilwell, on the other hand, believed that reopening the road was vital, as all China's mainland ports were under Japanese control. The Allies' "]" policy did not sit well with Chiang, while the later British insistence that China send more and more troops to Indochina for use in the ] was seen by Chiang as an attempt to use Chinese manpower to defend British colonial possessions. Chiang also believed that China should divert its crack army divisions from Burma to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American bombers that he hoped would defeat Japan through bombing, a strategy that American general Claire Lee Chennault supported but which Stilwell strongly opposed. In addition, Chiang voiced his support of the ] in a 1942 meeting with ], which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.{{sfn|Huang|pp=299–300}} | |||
American and Canadian-born Chinese were recruited to act as covert operatives in Japanese-occupied China. Employing their racial background as a disguise, their mandate was to blend in with local citizens and wage a campaign of sabotage. Activities focused on destruction of Japanese transportation of supplies (signaling bomber destruction of railroads, bridges).{{Sfn|MacLaren|pages=200–220}} Chinese forces ] in late 1943, besieged Japanese troops in ], and ].<ref>{{Cite book|year=2012|title=The Second World War|location=London|publisher=]|isbn=978-0-297-84497-6|ref=CITEREFBeevor2012}}</ref> The British and Commonwealth forces had their operation in ] which attempted to provide assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Army.{{sfn|Stevens|p=70}} The first phase in 1942 under command of ] achieved very little, but lessons were learned and a second more successful phase, commenced in February 1943 under British Military command, was conducted before the Japanese ] offensive in 1944 compelled evacuation.{{sfn|Stevens|p=73}} | |||
== 1944 and Operation Ichi-Go == | |||
In 1944, the Communists launched counteroffensives from the liberated areas against Japanese forces.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=53}} | |||
Japan's 1944 ] was the largest military campaign of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The campaign mobilized 500,000 Japanese troops, 100,000 horses, 1,500 artillery pieces, and 800 tanks.<ref name="Coble2023">{{Cite book |last=Coble |first=Parks M. |author-link=Parks M. Coble |title=The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War |year=2023 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-009-29761-5}}</ref>{{rp|19}} The 750,000 casualty figure for Nationalist Chinese forces are not all dead and captured, Cox included in the 750,000 casualties that China incurred in Ichigo soldiers who simply "melted away" and others who were rendered combat ineffective besides killed and captured soldiers.<ref name="Cox, 1980 pp. 2"> Retrieved 9 March 2016</ref> | |||
In late November 1944, the Japanese advanced slowed approximately 300 miles from Chongqing as it experienced shortages of trained soldiers and materiel. Although Operation Ichi-Go achieved its goals of seizing United States air bases and establishing a potential railway corridor from Manchukuo to Hanoi, it did so too late to impact the result of the broader war. American bombers in Chengdu were moved to the ] where, along with bombers from bases in Saipan and Tinian, they could still bomb the Japanese home islands.<ref name="Coble2023" />{{rp|21–22}} | |||
After Operation Ichigo, Chiang Kai-shek started a plan to withdraw Chinese troops from the Burma theatre against Japan in Southeast Asia for a counter offensive called "White Tower" and "Iceman" against Japanese soldiers in China in 1945.{{sfn|Hsiung|Levine|1992|pp=162–166}} | |||
The poor performance of Chiang Kai-shek's forces in opposing the Japanese advance during Operation Ichigo became widely viewed as demonstrating Chiang's incompetence.<ref name=":02" />{{rp|3}} It irreparably damaged the Roosevelt administration's view of Chiang and the KMT.<ref name="Crean" />{{rp|75}} The campaign further weakened the Nationalist economy and government revenues.<ref name=":02" />{{rp|22–24}} Because of the Nationalists' increasing inability to fund the military, Nationalist authorities overlooked military corruption and smuggling. The Nationalist army increasingly turned to raiding villages to ] peasants into service and force marching them to assigned units. Approximately 10% of these peasants died before reaching their units.<ref name=":02" />{{rp|24–25}} | |||
By the end of 1944, Chinese troops under the command of ] attacking from India, and those under ] attacking from ], joined forces in ], successfully driving the Japanese out of North Burma and securing the Ledo Road, China's vital supply artery.{{sfn|Huang|p=420}} In Spring 1945 the Chinese launched offensives that retook ] and ]. With the Chinese army progressing well in training and equipment, Wedemeyer planned to launch Operation Carbonado in summer 1945 to retake Guangdong, thus obtaining a coastal port, and from there drive northwards toward Shanghai. However, the ] and ] hastened Japanese surrender and these plans were not put into action.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/chinoff/chinoff.htm |title=China Offensive |date=3 October 2003 |website=Center of Military History |publisher=United states Army |access-date=14 November 2014 |archive-date=11 November 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141111214346/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/chinoff/chinoff.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> | |||
==Chinese industrial base and the CIC== | |||
{{Main|Chinese Industrial Cooperatives|History of the cooperative movement in China|Gung-ho}} | |||
==Foreign aid== | |||
{{Further|Japanese in the Chinese resistance to the Empire of Japan}} | |||
Before the start of full-scale warfare of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Germany had since the time of the ], provided much equipment and training to crack units of the National Revolutionary Army of China, including some aerial-combat training with the '']'' to some pilots of the pre-Nationalist Air Force of China.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Chan |last2=Gong |last3=Little |first1=Andy |first2=John |first3=Michael|date=2015-10-07|title=World War 2 Flying Ace Arthur Chin's Amazing True Story|url=https://disciplesofflight.com/world-war-2-flying-ace-arthur-chin/|access-date=2021-01-20|website=|archive-date=26 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190326113109/https://disciplesofflight.com/world-war-2-flying-ace-arthur-chin/|url-status=live}}</ref> A number of foreign powers, including the Americans, Italians and Japanese, provided training and equipment to different air force units of pre-war China. With the outbreak of full-scale war between China and the Empire of Japan, the Soviet Union became the primary supporter for China's ''war of resistance'' through the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact from 1937 to 1941. When the Imperial Japanese invaded ], the United States enacted the ] against Japan and froze all Japanese assets in 1941,<ref>{{cite web|title=HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Strategy and Command: The First Two Years|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-5.html|access-date=2020-11-13|website=www.ibiblio.org|quote=By the fall of 1941 relations between the United States and Japan had reached a critical stage... the Japanese, most of whom were unwilling to pay the American price for peace... were convinced that acceptance of American peace terms would only lead to further demands and ultimately leave Japan dependent on the United States and Great Britain.|archive-date=25 May 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130525064812/http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Strategy/Strategy-5.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|date=2007-10-13|title=Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE), Template|url=http://american.edu/TED/ice/japan-oil.htm|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071013230714/http://american.edu/TED/ice/japan-oil.htm|archive-date=13 October 2007|access-date=2020-11-13|quote=The US, the biggest oil supplier for Japan at the time, imposed the oil embargo on Japan in July, 1941, and it helped the Japanese to make up their minds to fight against the Americans. Thus, in a way, the attack on Pearl Harbor was not a surprise one at all; it was a necessary result of the conflict and negotiation.}}</ref> and with it came the ] of which China became a beneficiary on 6 May 1941; from there, China's main diplomatic, financial and military supporter came from the U.S., particularly following the attack on Pearl Harbor''.'' | |||
===Overseas Chinese=== | |||
Over 3,200 overseas Chinese drivers and motor vehicle mechanics embarked to wartime China to support military and logistics supply lines, especially through Indo-China, which became of absolute tantamount importance when the Japanese cut-off all ocean-access to China's interior with the capture of ] after the Battle of South Guangxi. Overseas Chinese communities in the U.S. raised money and nurtured talent in response to Imperial Japan's aggressions in China, which helped to fund an entire squadron of Boeing P-26 fighter planes purchased for the looming war situation between China and the Empire of Japan; over a dozen Chinese-American aviators, including ], ], ], ] et al., formed the original contingent of foreign volunteer aviators to join the Chinese air forces (some provincial or warlord air forces, but ultimately all integrating into the centralized Chinese Air Force; often called the ''Nationalist Air Force of China'') in the "patriotic call to duty for the motherland" to fight against the Imperial Japanese invasion.<ref>{{cite web|title=Before the Flying Tigers|url=https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0699before/|access-date=2020-11-08|website=Air Force Magazine|language=en-US|archive-date=25 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201125171645/https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0699before/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Major 'Buffalo' Wong Sun-Shui|url=http://www.century-of-flight.freeola.com/Aviation%20history/WW2/aces/Wong%20Sun-Shui.htm|access-date=2020-11-08|website=www.century-of-flight.freeola.com|archive-date=5 September 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080905180041/http://www.century-of-flight.freeola.com/Aviation%20history/WW2/aces/Wong%20Sun-Shui.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|date=2016-11-10|title=Sky's the Limit|url=https://1859oregonmagazine.com/think-oregon/art-culture/hazel-lee/|access-date=2020-11-08|website=1859 Oregon's Magazine|language=en-US|archive-date=30 January 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180130091648/https://1859oregonmagazine.com/think-oregon/art-culture/hazel-lee/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Remembering Hazel Lee, the first Chinese-American female military pilot|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/remembering-hazel-lee-first-chinese-american-female-military-pilot-n745851|access-date=2020-11-08|website=NBC News|date=25 May 2017 |archive-date=11 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180211113655/https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/remembering-hazel-lee-first-chinese-american-female-military-pilot-n745851|url-status=live}}</ref> Several of the original Chinese-American volunteer pilots were sent to ] in Germany for aerial-gunnery training by the Chinese Air Force in 1936.<ref>{{cite web|date=2015-10-07|title=World War 2 Flying Ace Arthur Chin's Amazing True Story|url=https://disciplesofflight.com/world-war-2-flying-ace-arthur-chin/|access-date=2020-11-08|archive-date=26 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190326113109/https://disciplesofflight.com/world-war-2-flying-ace-arthur-chin/|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
===German=== | |||
{{Main|China-Germany relations (1912-1949)}} | |||
] and ] in Berlin]] | |||
Prior to the war, Germany and China were in close economic and military cooperation, with Germany helping China modernize its industry and military in exchange for raw materials. Germany sent military advisers such as ] to China to help the KMT government reform its armed forces.{{sfnp|Mitter|2013|p=}} ] began training to German standards and were to form a relatively small but well trained Chinese Central Army. By the mid-1930s about 80,000 soldiers had received German-style training.{{sfnp|Mitter|2013|p=}} After the KMT lost Nanjing and retreated to Wuhan, Hitler's government decided to withdraw its support of China in 1938 in favour of an alliance with Japan as its main anti-Communist partner in East Asia.{{sfnp|Mitter|2013|p=}} | |||
===Soviet=== | |||
After Germany and Japan signed the anti-communist ], the Soviet Union hoped to keep China fighting, in order to deter a ] of Siberia and save itself from a ]. In September 1937, they signed the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and approved Operation Zet, the formation of a secret ], in which Soviet technicians upgraded and ran some of China's transportation systems. ]s, ], supplies and advisors arrived, headed by ]. Prior to the Western Allies, the Soviets provided the most foreign aid to China: some $250 million in credits for munitions and other supplies. The Soviet Union defeated Japan in the ] in May – September 1939, leaving the Japanese reluctant to fight the Soviets again.<ref>Douglas Varner, ''To the Banks of the Halha: The Nomohan Incident and the Northern Limits of the Japanese Empire'' (2008)</ref> In April 1941, Soviet aid to China ended with the ] and the beginning of the ]. This pact enabled the Soviet Union to avoid fighting against Germany and Japan at the same time. In August 1945, the Soviet Union annulled the neutrality pact with Japan and invaded Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, the Kuril Islands, and northern Korea. The Soviets also continued to support the Chinese Communist Party. In total, 3,665 Soviet advisors and pilots served in China,{{sfn|Taylor|page=156}} and 227 of them died fighting there.<ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100313141742/http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter4_4.html|date=13 March 2010}}</ref> | |||
The Soviet Union provided financial aid to both the Communists and the Nationalists.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=34}} | |||
=== United States === | |||
{{further|American Volunteer Group|Flying Tigers|China Air Task Force}} | |||
] Commander ]]] | |||
The United States generally avoided taking sides between Japan and China until 1940, providing virtually no aid to China in this period. For instance, the 1934 Silver Purchase Act signed by President Roosevelt caused chaos in China's economy which helped the Japanese war effort. The 1933 Wheat and Cotton Loan mainly benefited American producers, while aiding to a smaller extent both Chinese and Japanese alike. This policy was due to US fear of breaking off profitable trade ties with Japan, in addition to US officials and businesses perception of China as a potential source of massive profit for the US by absorbing surplus American products, as William Appleman Williams states.<ref>{{cite book |first=William D. |last=Pederson |title=A Companion to Franklin D. Roosevelt |date=2011 |publisher=Blackwell Publishing |isbn=978-1444395174 |pages=591–597, 601}}</ref> | |||
From December 1937, events such as the ] and the Nanjing Massacre swung public opinion in the West sharply against Japan and increased their fear of Japanese expansion, which prompted the United States, the United Kingdom, and ] to provide loan assistance for war supply contracts to ]. Australia also prevented a Japanese government-owned company from taking over an iron mine in Australia, and banned ] exports in 1938.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/3~221 |title=Memorandum by Mr J. McEwen, Minister for External Affairs 10 May 1940 |publisher=Info.dfat.gov.au |access-date=2010-12-02 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110221003912/http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/%28LookupVolNoNumber%29/3~221 |archive-date=21 February 2011 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> However, in July 1939, negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Khatira and the British Ambassador in Tokyo, ], led to an agreement by which the United Kingdom recognized Japanese conquests in China. At the same time, the US government extended a trade agreement with Japan for six months, then fully restored it. Under the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army,<ref>US Congress. Investigation of Concentracion of Economic Power. Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee. 76th Congress, 2nd Session, Pt. 21. Washington, 1940, p. 11241</ref> machine tools for aircraft factories, ]s (steel and scrap iron up to 16 October 1940, petrol and petroleum products up to 26 June 1941),<ref>Д. Г. Наджафов. Нейтралитет США. 1935–1941. М., "Наука", 1990. стр.157</ref> and various other much-needed supplies. | |||
In a hearing before the United States Congress House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on Wednesday, 19 April 1939, the acting chairman Sol Bloom and other Congressmen interviewed Maxwell S. Stewart, a former Foreign Policy Association research staff and economist who charged that America's Neutrality Act and its "neutrality policy" was a massive farce which only benefited Japan and that Japan did not have the capability nor could ever have invaded China without the massive amount of raw material America exported to Japan. America exported far more raw material to Japan than to China in the years 1937–1940.<ref>{{cite book |author1=United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs |title=Hearings |date=1939 |page=266 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=E9IfAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA266}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author1=United States. Congress. House |title=Hearings |date=1939 |page=266 |publisher=U.S. Government Printing Office |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-JMa8xpP5tYC&pg=PA266}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author1=United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs |title=American Neutrality Policy: Hearings Before the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Seventy-Sixth Congress, First Session, on Apr. 11–13, 17–21, 24–28, May 2, 1939 |date=1939 |publisher=U.S. Government Printing Office |page=266 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tcxEAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA266}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author1=United States. Congress. House. Foreign AFfairs |title=American Neutrality Policy: Hearings ... on Present Neutrality Law (public Res. No. 27)... April 11 – May 2, 1939 |date=1939 |pages=263–302 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eEB5-sXYBVcC&pg=PA266}}</ref> According to the United States Congress, the U.S.'s third largest export destination was Japan until 1940 when France overtook it due to France being at war too. Japan's military machine acquired war materials, automotive equipment, steel, scrap iron, copper, oil, that it wanted from the United States in 1937–1940 and was allowed to purchase aerial bombs, aircraft equipment, and aircraft from America up to the summer of 1938. A 1934 ] memo even noted how Japan's business dealings with ] company, under the leadership of ], made United States oil the "major portion of the petroleum and petroleum products now imported into Japan."<ref name=teaglejapan>{{cite web|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v03/d649|title=Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) of a Conversation With the President of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Walter C. Teagle)|author=Office of the Historian|publisher=U.S State Department|date=October 24, 1934|accessdate=January 18, 2025}}</ref> War essentials exports from the United States to Japan increased by 124% along with a general increase of 41% of all American exports from 1936 to 1937 when Japan invaded China. Japan's war economy was fueled by exports to the United States at over twice the rate immediately preceding the war.<ref>{{cite book |author1=United States. Congress |title=Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ... Congress, Volume 113, Part 1 |date=1967 |publisher=U.S. Government Printing Office |page=474 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G-9N8WlYKK4C&pg=PA473 |access-date=31 May 2017 |archive-date=12 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012013420/https://books.google.com/books?id=G-9N8WlYKK4C&pg=PA473 |url-status=live }}</ref> According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Japan corresponded to the following share of American exports. | |||
]" issued to American Volunteer Group pilots requesting all Chinese to offer rescue and protection]] | |||
Japan invaded and occupied the northern part of ] in September 1940 to prevent China from receiving the 10,000 tons of materials delivered monthly by the Allies via the ] line. | |||
On 22 June 1941, ]. In spite of non-aggression pacts or trade connections, Hitler's assault threw the world into a frenzy of re-aligning political outlooks and strategic prospects. | |||
On 21 July, Japan occupied the southern part of French Indochina (southern Vietnam and Cambodia), contravening a 1940 ] not to move into southern French Indochina. From bases in Cambodia and southern Vietnam, Japanese planes could attack Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. As the Japanese occupation of northern French Indochina in 1940 had already cut off supplies from the West to China, the move into southern French Indochina was viewed as a direct threat to British and Dutch colonies. Many principal figures in the Japanese government and military (particularly the navy) were against the move, as they foresaw that it would invite retaliation from the West. | |||
{{anchor|Oil embargo (Sino-Japanese War)}} | |||
On 24 July 1941, Roosevelt requested Japan withdraw all its forces from Indochina. Two days later the US and the UK began an oil embargo; two days after that the Netherlands joined them. This was a decisive moment in the Second Sino-Japanese War. The loss of oil imports made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China on a long-term basis. It set the stage for Japan to launch a series of military attacks against the Allies, including the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. | |||
In mid-1941, the United States government financed the creation of the ]s (AVG), of which one the "Flying Tigers" reached China, to replace the withdrawn Soviet volunteers and aircraft. The Flying Tigers did not enter actual combat until after the United States had declared war on Japan. Led by Chennault, their early combat success of 300 kills against a loss of 12 of their newly introduced ] fighters heavily armed with six ] and very fast diving speeds earned them wide recognition at a time when the Chinese Air Force and Allies in the Pacific and SE Asia were suffering heavy losses, and soon afterwards their "boom and zoom" high-speed hit-and-run air combat tactics would be adopted by the ].<ref>{{cite news|url = https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/06/16/ace-served-flying-tigers-china/28837427/|title = Ace served with Flying Tigers in China|website = ]|access-date = 26 May 2017|archive-date = 12 December 2019|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20191212231029/https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/06/16/ace-served-flying-tigers-china/28837427/|url-status = live}}</ref> | |||
Disagreements existed both between the United States and the Nationalists, and within the United States military, about the form of aid.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=35}} Chennault contended that aid should be in the form of building on the success of the Flying Tigers and go to the US Fourteenth Air Force in China.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=35}} Lieutenant General ], who was in charge of training Nationalist divisions equipped by the United States, became increasingly frustrated by the Nationalists' refusal to use them to fight the Japanese in Burma or in southeastern China.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=35}} | |||
The Sino-American Cooperative Organization<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.drnh.gov.tw/ImagesPost/365fe047-7f22-47fb-a84e-d4d5f94cbe43/3fca19ba-644a-4958-b81b-9f7ff743a1d6_ALLFILES.pdf |title=軍統局對美國戰略局的認識與 合作開展 |access-date=24 June 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150625193541/http://www.drnh.gov.tw/ImagesPost/365fe047-7f22-47fb-a84e-d4d5f94cbe43/3fca19ba-644a-4958-b81b-9f7ff743a1d6_ALLFILES.pdf |archive-date=25 June 2015 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|date=2015-06-24|title=館戴笠與忠義救國軍|url=http://www.drnh.gov.tw/ImagesPost/365fe047-7f22-47fb-a84e-d4d5f94cbe43/19036c97-3e88-415c-9c4e-d728b91c910c_ALLFILES.pdf|access-date=2020-11-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150624183008/http://www.drnh.gov.tw/ImagesPost/365fe047-7f22-47fb-a84e-d4d5f94cbe43/19036c97-3e88-415c-9c4e-d728b91c910c_ALLFILES.pdf|archive-date=24 June 2015}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bergin|first=Bob|date=March 2009|title=Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no1/pdfs/U-%20Bergin-Spymaster.pdf|journal=Studies in Intelligence|volume=53|pages=75–78|access-date=24 June 2015|archive-date=4 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304055154/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no1/pdfs/U-%20Bergin-Spymaster.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> was an organization created by the SACO Treaty signed by the Republic of China and the United States of America in 1942 that established a mutual intelligence gathering entity in China between the respective nations against Japan. It operated in China jointly along with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America's first intelligence agency and forerunner of the CIA while also serving as joint training program between the two nations. Among all the wartime missions that Americans set up in China, SACO was the only one that adopted a policy of "total immersion" with the Chinese. The "Rice Paddy Navy" or "What-the-Hell Gang" operated in the China-Burma-India theater, advising and training, forecasting weather and scouting landing areas for USN fleet and Gen Claire Chennault's 14th AF, rescuing downed American flyers, and intercepting Japanese radio traffic. An underlying mission objective during the last year of war was the development and preparation of the China coast for Allied penetration and occupation. ] was scouted as a potential staging area and springboard for the future military landing of the Allies of World War II in Japan. | |||
=== United Kingdom === | |||
{{further|Mission 204|British Army Aid Group}} | |||
After the Tanggu Truce of 1933, Chiang Kai-Shek and the British government would have more friendly relations but were uneasy due to British foreign concessions there. During the Second Sino-Japanese War the British government would initially have an impartial viewpoint toward the conflict urging both to reach an agreement and prevent war. British public opinion would swing in favor of the Chinese after ]'s car which had Union Jacks on it was attacked by Japanese aircraft with Hugessen being temporarily paralyzed with outrage against the attack from the public and government. The British public were largely supportive of the Chinese and many relief efforts were untaken to help China. Britain at this time was beginning the process of rearmament and the sale of military surplus was banned but there was never an embargo on private companies shipping arms. A number of unassembled ] fighters were imported to China via Hong Kong for the Chinese Air Force. Between July 1937 and November 1938 on average 60,000 tons of munitions were shipped from Britain to China via Hong Kong. Attempts by the United Kingdom and the United States to do a joint intervention were unsuccessful as both countries had rocky relations in the interwar era.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Perry |first=J. K. J. |date=7 September 2011 |title=Powerless and Frustrated: Britain's Relationship With China During the Opening Years of the Second Sino–Japanese War, 1937–1939 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592296.2011.599641 |journal=Diplomacy & Statecraft |volume=22 |issue=3 |pages=408–430 |doi=10.1080/09592296.2011.599641 |s2cid=153517917 |access-date=23 October 2023 |via=Taylor & Francis Online}}</ref> | |||
In February 1941 a Sino-British agreement was forged whereby British troops would assist the Chinese "Surprise Troops" units of guerrillas already operating in China, and China would assist Britain in Burma.<ref>{{cite book|last=Kirby|first=Major General Woodburn, S|title=The War against Japan, Vol 2: India's Most Dangerous Hour|location=London|publisher=Her Majesty's Stationery Office|year=1958}}</ref> | |||
] in June 1942]] | |||
When ] in December 1941, the ] (B.A.A.G.) was set up and headquartered in ], ]. It's aim was to assist prisoners of war and internees to escape from Japanese camps. This led to the formation of the ] which later fought in Burma.<ref name="NSW_2012">{{cite web |title=The Hong Kong Volunteer Company|url=https://static1.squarespace.com/static/531286c0e4b04bcb37e6c5c5/t/53214071e4b010ef1a5b9dd8/1394688113290/HK+Vol+&+ex+PoW+Assn+NSW.+OP9+The+Hong+Kong+Volunteer+Company.pdf |publisher=Hong Kong Volunteer & Ex.PoW Association of NSW |access-date=23 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211223171645/https://static1.squarespace.com/static/531286c0e4b04bcb37e6c5c5/t/53214071e4b010ef1a5b9dd8/1394688113290/HK+Vol+&+ex+PoW+Assn+NSW.+OP9+The+Hong+Kong+Volunteer+Company.pdf | archive-date=23 December 2021 |url-status=live }}</ref> B.A.A.G. also sent agents to gather intelligence – military, political and economic in Southern China, as well as giving medical and humanitarian assistance to Chinese civilians and military personnel.<ref name="IWM">{{cite web |url=https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/30076590 |title=BADGE, UNIT, BRITISH, BRITISH ARMY AID GROUP (BAAG) |date= |website=www.iwm.org.uk |publisher=Imperial War Museum }}</ref> | |||
A British-Australian commando operation, ] (''Tulip Force''), was initialized to provide training to Chinese guerrilla troops. The mission conducted two operations, mostly in the provinces of Yunnan and Jiangxi. | |||
The first operation commenced in February 1942 from Burma on a long journey to the Chinese front. Due to issues with supporting the Chinese and gradual disease and supply issues, the first phase achieved very little and the unit was withdrawn in September.<ref>{{cite book| last1=Whitehead |first1= John|last2= Bennett|first2=George |title= Escape to Fight on: With 204 Military Mission in China |publisher= Robert Hale|pages=132, 174–78 |date=1990 |isbn=9780709041313}}</ref> | |||
Another phase was set up with lessons learned from the first. Commencing in February 1943 this time valid assistance was given to the Chinese 'Surprise Troops' in various actions against the Japanese. These involved ambushes, attacks on airfields, blockhouses, and supply depots. The unit operated successfully before withdrawal in November 1944.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stevens |first1=Keith |title=A token operation: 204 military mission to China, 1941–1945 |journal=Asian Affairs |date=March 2005 |volume=36 |issue=1 |pages=66–74 |doi=10.1080/03068370500039151 |s2cid=161326427 }}</ref> | |||
Commandos and members of ] who had formed ], worked with the ] who also operated in China, mostly while on their way into ].<ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/free-thai-movement.html| title = A Look Back ... "Free Thai" Movement is Born| date = 30 April 2013| website = cia.gov| publisher = ]| access-date = 20 June 2016| archive-date = 13 August 2016| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160813081130/https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/free-thai-movement.html| url-status = dead}}</ref> | |||
After the Japanese blocked the ] in April 1942, and before the ] was finished in early 1945, the majority of US and British supplies to the Chinese had to be delivered via airlift over the eastern end of the ] known as "]". Flying over the Himalayas was extremely dangerous, but the airlift continued daily to August 1945, at great cost in men and aircraft. | |||
==French Indochina== | |||
{{See also|Japanese invasion of French Indochina|Japanese coup d'état in French Indochina}} | |||
] retreating to the Chinese border after the Japanese coup d'état in March 1945]] | |||
The Chinese Kuomintang also supported the Vietnamese ] (VNQDD) in its battle against French and Japanese imperialism. In ], Chinese military leaders were organizing Vietnamese nationalists against the Japanese. The VNQDD had been active in Guangxi and some of their members had joined the KMT army.<ref name="William J. Duiker 1976 272">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HKRuAAAAMAAJ&q=Chang+Fa-Kuei+vnqdd|title=The rise of nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1941|author=William J. Duiker|year=1976|publisher=Cornell University Press|page=272|isbn=0-8014-0951-9}}</ref> Under the umbrella of KMT activities, a broad alliance of nationalists emerged. With Ho at the forefront, the ] (Vietnamese Independence League, usually known as the Viet Minh) was formed and based in the town of ].<ref name="William J. Duiker 1976 272"/> The pro-VNQDD nationalist Ho Ngoc Lam, a KMT army officer and former disciple of ],{{citation needed|date=May 2024}} was named as the deputy of ], later to be Ho's Prime Minister. The front was later broadened and renamed the Viet Nam Giai Phong Dong Minh (Vietnam Liberation League).<ref name="William J. Duiker 1976 272"/> | |||
The Viet Nam Revolutionary League was a union of various Vietnamese nationalist groups, run by the pro Chinese VNQDD. Chinese KMT General ] created the league to further Chinese influence in Indochina, against the French and Japanese. Its stated goal was for unity with China under the ], created by KMT founder Dr. Sun and opposition to Japanese and French Imperialists.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/endlesswarvietna0000harr|url-access=registration|quote=Chang Fa-Kuei vnqdd.|title=The endless war: Vietnam's struggle for independence|author=James P. Harrison|year=1989|publisher=Columbia University Press|page=|isbn=0-231-06909-X|access-date=2010-11-30}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uEDfAAAAMAAJ&q=Chang+Fa-Kuei+vnqdd|title=The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: History of the Indochina incident, 1940–1954|author=United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Historical Division|year=1982|publisher=Michael Glazier|page=56|isbn=9780894532870}}</ref> The Revolutionary League was controlled by Nguyen Hai Than, who was born in China and could not speak Vietnamese{{citation needed|date=December 2020}}. General Zhang shrewdly blocked the Communists of Vietnam, and ] from entering the league, as Zhang's main goal was Chinese influence in Indochina.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9RorGHF0fGIC&pg=PA106|title=The last emperors of Vietnam: from Tự Đức to Bảo Đại|author=Oscar Chapuis|year=2000|publisher=Greenwood |page=106|isbn=0-313-31170-6}}</ref> The KMT utilized these Vietnamese nationalists during World War II against Japanese forces.<ref name="William J. Duiker 1976 272"/> ], through General Stilwell, privately made it clear that they preferred that the French not reacquire French Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) after the war was over. Roosevelt offered Chiang Kai-shek control of all of Indochina. It was said that Chiang Kai-shek replied: "Under no circumstances!"<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=v5YlBtzklvQC&pg=PA235|title=The march of folly: from Troy to Vietnam|author=Barbara Wertheim Tuchman|year=1985|publisher=Random House, Inc.|page=235|isbn=0-345-30823-9}}</ref> | |||
After the war, 200,000 Chinese troops under General ] were sent by Chiang Kai-shek to northern Indochina (north of the 16th parallel) to accept the surrender of Japanese occupying forces there, and remained in Indochina until 1946, when the French returned.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/americaswarinvie0000addi |url-access=registration |title=America's war in Vietnam: a short narrative history|author=Larry H. Addington|year=2000|publisher=Indiana University Press|page=|isbn=0-253-21360-6}}</ref> The Chinese used the VNQDD, the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Kuomintang, to increase their influence in French Indochina and to put pressure on their opponents.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=o1t8-EjWyrgC&pg=PA119|title=Britain in Vietnam: prelude to disaster, 1945-6|author=Peter Neville|year=2007|publisher=Psychology Press|page=119|isbn=978-0-415-35848-4}}</ref> Chiang Kai-shek threatened the French with war in response to maneuvering by the French and Ho Chi Minh's forces against each other, forcing them to come to a peace agreement. In February 1946, he also forced the French to surrender all of their concessions in China and to renounce their extraterritorial privileges in exchange for the Chinese withdrawing from northern Indochina and allowing French troops to reoccupy the region. Following France's agreement to these demands, the withdrawal of Chinese troops began in March 1946.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pVNaoUu7veUC&pg=PA21|title=The tragedy of the Vietnam War: a South Vietnamese officer's analysis|author=Van Nguyen Duong|year=2008|publisher=McFarland|page=21|isbn=978-0-7864-3285-1|access-date=18 October 2015|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012013925/https://books.google.com/books?id=pVNaoUu7veUC&pg=PA21|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1I4HOcmE4XQC&pg=PA41|title=Vietnam 1946: how the war began|author=Stein Tønnesson|year=2010|publisher=University of California Press|page=41|isbn=978-0-520-25602-6|access-date=18 October 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yQGqQ3LmExwC&pg=PA63|title=The Vietnam War as history: edited by Elizabeth Jane Errington and B.J.C. McKercher|author=Elizabeth Jane Errington|year=1990|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|page=63|isbn=0-275-93560-4}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1945.html|title=The Vietnam War Seeds of Conflict 1945–1960|publisher=The History Place|year=1999|access-date=2010-12-28|archive-date=17 December 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081217062228/http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1945.html|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
==Central Asian rebellions== | |||
In 1937, then pro-Soviet General Sheng Shicai ] accompanied by Soviet troops to defeat General ] of the ]. General Ma expected help from Nanjing, but did not receive it. The Nationalist government was forced to deny these maneuvers as "Japanese propaganda", as it needed continued military supplies from the Soviets.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rsLQdBUgyMUC|title=Modern China's Ethnic Frontiers: A Journey to the West|author=Hsiao-ting Lin|year=2010|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-0-415-58264-3|page=58|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012013926/https://books.google.com/books?id=rsLQdBUgyMUC|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
As the war went on, Nationalist General Ma Buqing was in virtual control of the ] corridor.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=y3oeAAAAMAAJ|title=Asia, Volume 40|year=1940|publisher=Asia Magazine|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012013926/https://books.google.com/books?id=y3oeAAAAMAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> Ma had earlier fought against the Japanese, but because the Soviet threat was great, Chiang in July 1942 directed him to move 30,000 of his troops to the Tsaidam marsh in the ] of ].<ref>{{citation|title=War, Leadership and Ethnopolitics: Chiang Kai-shek and China's frontiers, 1941–1945 |publisher=Informaworld.com }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/31657/Full_Text.pdf |title=Nationalists, Muslim Warlords, and the "Great Northwestern Development" in Pre-Communist China |author=Hsiao-ting Lin |access-date=2010-12-02 |publisher=Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program |date=February 2007 |volume=5 |number=1 |journal=The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly |pages=115–135 |archive-date=29 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190329212604/https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/31657/Full_Text.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Chiang further named Ma as Reclamation Commissioner, to threaten Sheng's southern flank in Xinjiang, which bordered Tsaidam. | |||
The ] broke out in Xinjiang when the Kuomintang Hui Officer Liu Bin-Di was killed while fighting Turkic Uyghur rebels in November 1944. The Soviet Union supported the Turkic rebels against the Kuomintang, and Kuomintang forces fought back.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4J0uAAAAIAAJ|title=Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volumes 4–5|author=Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs|year=1982|publisher=King Abdulaziz University|page=299|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012013926/https://books.google.com/books?id=4J0uAAAAIAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
==Ethnic minorities== | |||
{{Main|Chinese ethnic minorities in the Second Sino-Japanese War}} | |||
] | |||
Japan attempted to reach out to Chinese ethnic minorities in order to rally them to their side against the ], but only succeeded with certain ], ], ], and ] elements. | |||
The Japanese attempt to get the Muslim ] on their side failed, as many Chinese generals such as ], Ma Hongbin, ], and ] were Hui. The Japanese attempted to approach Ma Bufang but were unsuccessful in making any agreement with him.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WltwAAAAMAAJ&q=ma+bufang|title=China's inner Asian frontier: photographs of the Wulsin expedition to northwest China in 1923 : from the archives of the Peabody Museum, Harvard University, and the National Geographic Society|author1=Frederick Roelker Wulsin |author2=Joseph Fletcher |editor=Mary Ellen Alonso |year=1979|publisher=The Museum : distributed by Harvard University Press|page=50|isbn=0-674-11968-1|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012013926/https://books.google.com/books?id=WltwAAAAMAAJ&q=ma+bufang|url-status=live}}</ref> Ma Bufang ended up supporting the anti-Japanese Imam ], who prayed for the destruction of the Japanese.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MJzB6wrz6Q4C&q=uxiang|title=Intellectuals in the modern Islamic world: transmission, transformation, communication|author1=Stéphane A. Dudoignon|author2=Hisao Komatsu|author3=Yasushi Kosugi|year=2006|publisher=Taylor & Francis|page=261|isbn=0-415-36835-9|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014428/https://books.google.com/books?id=MJzB6wrz6Q4C&q=uxiang|url-status=live}}</ref> Ma became chairman (governor) of Qinghai in 1938 and commanded a group army. He was appointed because of his anti-Japanese inclinations,<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fOkvAQAAIAAJ|title=China Political Reports 1911–1960: 1942–1945|author=Robert L. Jarman|year=2001|publisher=Archive Editions|isbn=1-85207-930-4|page=311|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014427/https://books.google.com/books?id=fOkvAQAAIAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> and was such an obstruction to Japanese agents trying to contact the Tibetans that he was called an "adversary" by a Japanese agent.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wDqlbKQhFIQC&pg=PA56|title=Japanese agent in Tibet: my ten years of travel in disguise|author1=Hisao Kimura|author2=Scott Berry|year=1990|publisher=Serindia Publications, Inc.|isbn=0-906026-24-5|page=232|access-date=2010-06-28|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014428/https://books.google.com/books?id=wDqlbKQhFIQC&pg=PA56|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
===Hui Muslims=== | |||
Hui cemeteries were destroyed for military reasons.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Lei |first=Wan |date=February 2010 |title=The Chinese Islamic 'Goodwill Mission to the Middle East' During the Anti-Japanese War |url=https://www.academia.edu/4427135 |journal=DÎVÂN DİSİPLİNLERARASI ÇALIŞMALAR DERGİSİ |volume=cilt 15 |issue=sayı 29 |pages=139–141 |access-date=19 June 2014 |archive-date=18 March 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140318035752/http://www.academia.edu/4427135/The_Chinese_Islamic_Goodwill_Mission_to_the_Middle_East_-_Japonyaya_Karsi_Savasta_Cinli_Muslumanlarin_Orta_Dogu_iyi_Niyet_Heyeti_-_Wan_LEI |url-status=live }}</ref> Many Hui fought in the war against the Japanese such as Bai Chongxi, Ma Hongbin, Ma Hongkui, Ma Bufang, ], Ma Biao, ], Ma Buqing and Ma Hushan. Qinghai Tibetans served in the Qinghai army against the Japanese.<ref>{{cite book|title=China at War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=O9EMAQAAMAAJ&q=unique+1937+aboriginal|year=1940|publisher=China Information Publishing Company|page=16|access-date=20 October 2020|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014429/https://books.google.com/books?id=O9EMAQAAMAAJ&q=unique+1937+aboriginal|url-status=live}}</ref> The Qinghai Tibetans view the Tibetans of Central Tibet (Tibet proper, ruled by the Dalai Lamas from Lhasa) as distinct and different from themselves, and even take pride in the fact that they were not ruled by Lhasa ever since the collapse of the ].<ref>{{cite journal |last= Goodman |first= David S. G. |year= 2004 |title= Qinghai and the Emergence of the West: Nationalities, Communal Interaction and National Integration |url= http://qinghaiecotourism.com/zh/assets/Emergence%25202004.pdf |journal= The China Quarterly |publisher= Cambridge University Press for the School of Oriental and African Studies. University of London, UK. |issn= 0305-7410 |page= 385 |access-date= 13 July 2014 |archive-date= 2 April 2015 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20150402131412/http://qinghaiecotourism.com/zh/assets/Emergence%25202004.pdf |url-status= live }}</ref> | |||
Xining was subjected to aerial bombardment by Japanese warplanes in 1941, causing all ethnicities in Qinghai to unite against the Japanese. General ] directed the defense of the city of Xining during air raids by Japanese planes. Han survived an aerial bombardment by Japanese planes in Xining while he was being directed via telephone by Ma Bufang, who hid in an air-raid shelter in a military barracks. The bombing resulted in Han being buried in rubble, though he was later rescued. | |||
John Scott reported in 1934 that there was both strong anti-Japanese feeling and anti-Bolshevik among the Muslims of Gansu and he mentioned the Muslim generals Ma Fuxiang, Ma Qi, Ma Anliang and Ma Bufang who was chairman of Qinghai province when he stayed in Xining.<ref>{{cite book |last=Scott |first=John |author-link= |date=17 October 1934 |title=Journal Of The Royal Central Asian Society – Vol.21; Pt. 1- 4 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/dli.bengal.10689.4291/page/n25/mode/2up?view=theater |location= |publisher= |pages=25, 26 |isbn=|quote=We spent a day resting at Hsining. This is a walled city lying just within the old Tibetan border, and is the capital of the new Province of Ching Hai and the seat of the Provincial Civil Government. The Chairman of the Provincial Council, or Shihehang, is Ma Pu Fang, a young Moslem in the early thirties, a strong and somewhat ruthless character as befits a scion of the family which has in recent years produced such outstanding men as Ma An Liang, Ma Ch'i, and Ma Fu Hsiang. He has kept the Province in fair order, since he assumed control a year or two ago; though his relations with the Military Governor, his uncle Ma Shun Cheng, are at the moment none too cordial and trouble threatens. Further, there is a certain movement for independence among these Moslems, and a tendency to break away from Nanking and join up with their fellow-Moslems further west. The latter is much under the influence of Russia, which for years has tried to extend its influence into Kansu, but with very little success, for the Kansu Moslems are a sturdy independent people and make poor material for Bolshevik propaganda. We saw no signs of any Japanese whatever, and strong anti-Japanese feeling was very apparent.|chapter=A SHORT JOURNEY THROUGH NORTHWESTERN KANSU AND THE TIBETAN BORDER COUNTRY }}</ref> | |||
==Conclusion and aftermath== | ==Conclusion and aftermath== | ||
===End of Pacific War and surrender of Japanese troops in China=== | |||
{{Main|Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|Soviet invasion of Manchuria (1945)|Japanese Instrument of Surrender}} | |||
===End of the Pacific War and the surrender of Japanese troops in China=== | |||
On August 6, an ] ] bomber dropped the first ] used in combat on ]. On August 9, the ] renounced its ] with Japan and ], fulfilling its ] pledge to attack the Japanese within three months after the ]. The attack was made by three Soviet army groups. | |||
{{Main|Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|Soviet invasion of Manchuria|Japanese Instrument of Surrender}} | |||
During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese had consistent tactical successes but failed to achieve strategic results.<ref name="Crean" />{{Rp|page=|pages=70}} Although it seized the majority of China's industrial capacity, occupied most major cities, and rarely lost a battle, Japan's occupation of China was costly.<ref name="Crean" />{{Rp|page=70}} Japan had approximately 50,000 military fatalities each year and 200,000 wounded per year.<ref name="Crean" />{{Rp|page=70}}] | |||
In less than two weeks the ], which was the primary Japanese fighting force,<ref>http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp</ref><ref>Robert A. Pape. Why Japan Surrendered. ''International Security'', Vol. 18, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 154-201</ref> consisting of over a million men but lacking in adequate armor, artillery, or air support had been destroyed by the Soviets. On August 9, a second atomic bomb was dropped by the United States on ]. ] ] officially ] to the ] on August 15, 1945, and the ] was signed aboard the battleship ] on September 2. | |||
In less than two weeks the ], which was the primary Japanese fighting force,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp |title=Leavenworth Papers No. 7 (August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria) |access-date=2013-07-15 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080302130751/http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp |archive-date=2 March 2008 }}</ref><ref>Robert A. Pape. Why Japan Surrendered. ''International Security'', Vol. 18, No. 2 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 154–201</ref> consisting of over a million men but lacking in adequate armour, artillery, or air support, had been destroyed by the Soviets. Japanese Emperor ] officially ] to the Allies on 15 August 1945. The official surrender was signed aboard the battleship {{USS|Missouri|BB-63|6}} on 2 September 1945, in a ceremony where several Allied commanders including Chinese general ] were present. | |||
] | |||
After the Allied victory in the Pacific, General ] ordered all Japanese forces within China (excluding ]), |
After the Allied victory in the Pacific, General ] ordered all Japanese forces within China (excluding ]), Taiwan and French Indochina north of 16° north latitude to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek, and the Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on 9 September 1945, at 9:00.<ref name="surrender"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230402122255/http://www.taiwandocuments.org/surrender02.htm |date=2 April 2023 }} (page visited on 3 September 2015).</ref> The ninth hour of the ninth day of the ninth month was chosen in echo of the ] (on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month) and because "nine" is a ] in Chinese (to suggest that the peace won would last forever).<ref>Hans Van De Ven, "A call to not lead humanity into another war", '']'', 31 August 2015.</ref> | ||
Chiang relied on American help in transporting Nationalist troops to regain control of formerly Japanese-occupied areas.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=3}} Non-Chinese generally viewed the behavior of these troops as undercutting Nationalist legitimacy, and these troops engaged in corruption and looting, leading to widespread views of a "botched liberation".<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=3}} | |||
===Post war struggle and resumption of civil war=== | |||
] of the ] ] presenting the ] to general ] at ] on 9 September 1945.]] | |||
The Nationalist government seized Japanese-held businesses at the time of the Japanese surrender.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=92}} The Nationalist government made little effort to return these businesses to their original Chinese owners.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|pages=92–93}} A mechanism existed through which Chinese and foreign owners could petition for the return of their former property.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=92}} In practice, the Nationalist government and its officials retained a great deal of the seized property and embezzling property, particularly from warehouses, was common.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=93}} Nationalist officials sometimes extorted money from individuals in liberated territories under threat of labeling them as Japanese collaborators.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=93}} | |||
In 1945 ] emerged from the war nominally a great military power but economically weak and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy was sapped by the military demands of a long costly war and internal strife, by spiraling ], and by corruption in the ] government that included ], ] and ]. Furthermore, as part of the ], allowing a ] ] in ], the Soviets dismantled and removed more than half of the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese before handing over Manchuria to China. Large swathes of the prime farming areas had been ravaged by the fighting and there was ] in the wake of the war. Many towns and cities were destroyed, and millions were rendered homeless by floods. | |||
Chiang's focus on his communist opponents prompted him to leave Japanese troops or troops of the Japanese puppet regimes to remain on duty in occupied areas so as to avoid their surrender to Communist forces.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=3}} | |||
The problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, and the war left the Nationalists severely weakened and their policies left them unpopular. Meanwhile, the war strengthened the ] both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At ] and elsewhere in the liberated areas, ] was able to adapt ] to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. However, when this failed, more repressive forms of coercion, indoctrination and ostracization were also employed. The ] fostered an image of conducting ] in defense of the people. Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a seasoned fighting force. With skillful organizational and ], the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. | |||
===Post-war struggle and resumption of the civil war=== | |||
] in July 1945.]] | |||
{{Main|Chinese Civil War}} | |||
] | |||
In 1945, China emerged from the war nominally a great military power {{citation needed|date=October 2019}} but economically weak and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy was sapped by the military demands of a long costly war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by corruption in the Nationalist government that included profiteering, speculation and hoarding. | |||
Mao also began to execute his plan to establish a new China by rapidly moving his forces from Yan'an and elsewhere to Manchuria. This opportunity was available to the Communists because although Nationalist representatives were not invited to Yalta, they had been consulted and had agreed to the ] in the belief that the Soviet Union would deal only with the Nationalist government after the war. However, the Soviet occupation of Manchuria was long enough to allow the Communist forces to move in en masse and arm themselves with the military hardware surrendered by the Japanese army, quickly establish control in the countryside and move into position to encircle the Nationalist government army in major cities of northeast China. The ] broke out between the Nationalists and Communists following that, which concluded with the Communist victory in ] and the retreat of the Nationalists to ] in 1949. | |||
The poor performance of Nationalist forces opposing the Ichi-go campaign was largely viewed as reflecting poorly on Chiang's competence.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Coble |first=Parks M. |title=The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War |date=2023 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-009-29761-5 |location=Cambridge New York, NY |author-link=Parks M. Coble}}</ref>{{Rp|page=3}} Chiang blamed the failure on the United States, particularly Stilwell, who had used Chinese forces in the Burma Campaign and in Chiang's view, left China insufficiently defended.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=3}} | |||
===Peace treaty and Taiwan=== | |||
] and the island of ].]] | |||
{{Main|Legal status of Taiwan}} | |||
] and the ] islands were sovereign territories of ] put under the administrative control of the ] (ROC) government in 1945 by the ]<ref name="unhcr.org"> UNHCR</ref>. The ROC proclaimed Taiwan ] on October 25, 1945. However, due to the unresolved ], neither the newly established ] (PRC) in ] nor the Nationalist ROC that retreated to Taiwan was invited to sign the ], as neither had shown full and complete legal capacity to enter into an international legally binding agreement.<ref>name="aao.sinica.edu.tw" Disputes over Taiwanese Sovereignty and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty Since World War II</ref>. Since China was not present, the Japanese only formally renounced the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan and Penghu islands without specifying to which country Japan relinquished the sovereignty, and the treaty was signed in 1951 and came into force in 1952. | |||
As part of the Yalta Conference, which allowed a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, the Soviets dismantled and removed more than half of the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese before handing over Manchuria to China. Large swathes of the prime farming areas had been ravaged by the fighting and there was starvation and famine in the wake of the war. Many towns and cities were destroyed, and millions were rendered homeless by floods. | |||
In 1952, the ] was signed separately between the ROC and Japan that basically followed the same guideline of the Treaty of San Francisco, not specifying which country has sovereignty over Taiwan. However, Article 10 of the treaty states that the ] and the juridicial person should be the people and the juridicial person of the ROC.<ref name="unhcr.org"/> Both the PRC and ROC governments base their claims to Taiwan on the ] which specifically accepted the ] which refers to the ]. Disputes over the precise ''de jure'' sovereign of Taiwan persist to the present. On a ''de facto'' basis, sovereignty over Taiwan has been and continues to be exercised by the ROC. Japan's position has been to avoid commenting on Taiwan's status, maintaining that Japan renounced all claims to sovereignty over its former colonial possessions after World War II, including Taiwan.<ref> FOCUS: Taiwan-Japan ties back on shaky ground as Taipei snubs Tokyo envoy</ref> | |||
The problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction after the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, and the war left the Nationalists severely weakened, and their policies left them unpopular. Meanwhile, the war strengthened the Communists both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At Yan'an and elsewhere in the communist controlled areas, Mao Zedong was able to adapt ] to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. | |||
===Legacy=== | |||
] took place.]] | |||
In Japanese-occupied areas, the Communists had established military and political bases from which it carried out guerilla warfare.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=35}} The Communists built popular support in these areas, returning land to poor peasants, reducing peasant's rent, and arming the people.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=35}} By Spring 1945, there were 19 Communist-governed areas in China in which 95 million people lived.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=36}} In Fall 1945, the Communist armies had 1.27 million men and were supported by 2.68 million militia members.<ref name=":022" />{{Rp|page=36}} | |||
The question as to which political group directed the Chinese war effort and exerted most of the effort to resist the Japanese remains a controversial issue. | |||
Mao also began to execute his plan to establish a new China by rapidly moving his forces from Yan'an and elsewhere to Manchuria. This opportunity was available to the Communists because although Nationalist representatives were not invited to Yalta, they had been consulted and had agreed to the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in the belief that the Soviet Union would cooperate only with the Nationalist government after the war. | |||
In the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial near the ] and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the ] (PRC) claims that the ] mostly avoided fighting the Japanese to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the ] (CCP or CPC), while the Communists was the main military force in the Chinese resistance efforts against the Japanese invasion.<ref>http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2005-09/03/content_3439239.htm</ref> Recently, however, with a change in the political climate, the CCP has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese. The official history in mainland China now states that the KMT fought a bloody, yet indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while the CCP engaged the Japanese forces in far greater numbers behind enemy lines. For the sake of ] and appeasing the ] (ROC) on ], the PRC has begun to "acknowledge" the Nationalists and the Communists as "equal" contributors, because the victory over Japan belonged to the ], rather than to any political party.<ref name="China Observes Date of Japan's Surrender-New York Times">{{cite news | |||
|title=China Observes Date of Japan's Surrender | |||
|url=http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E7D81431F937A3575AC0A9639C8B63&scp=1&sq=Hu%20jintao%20Victory%20Japan&st=cse | |||
|publisher=] | |||
|date=4 September 2005 | |||
| first=Joseph | |||
| last=Kahn | |||
| accessdate=May 23, 2010}}</ref> | |||
However, the Soviet occupation of Manchuria was long enough to allow the Communist forces to move in en masse and arm themselves with the military hardware surrendered by the Imperial Japanese Army, quickly establish control in the countryside and move into position to encircle the Nationalist government army in major cities of northeast China. Following that, the Chinese Civil War broke out between the Nationalists and Communists, which concluded with the Communist victory in ] and the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan in 1949. | |||
Other scholars documented quite a different view. Such studies found evidence that the Communists actually played a minuscule role in the war against the Japanese compared to the Nationalists, and preserved its strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang (KMT).<ref>Chang and Ming, July 12, 2005, pg. 8; and Chang and Halliday, pg. 233, 246, 286–287</ref> This view point gives the KMT credit for the brunt of the fighting, which is confirmed by Communists leader ]'s secret report to ] in January 1940. This report stated that out of more than one million Chinese soldiers killed or wounded since the war began in 1937, only 40,000 were from the Communists ] and ]. In other words, by the CCP's own account, the Communists had suffered a mere three percent of total casualties half way into the war.<ref>Dallin and Firsov, Dimitrov and Stalin, pp.115, 120</ref> This is because the Communists were not the main participants in any of the 22 major battles between China and Japan (involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides) and usually avoided open warfare (the ] and the ] are notable exceptions), preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines. In comparison, right from the beginning of the war the Nationalists committed their best troops (including the 36th, 87th, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to ] from the Japanese, and continue to deploy most of their forces to fight the Japanese even as the Communists changed their strategy to engage mainly in a political offensive against the Japanese and declared that the CCP should "save and preserve our strength and wait for favorable timing" by the end of 1941.<ref>Yang Kuisong, "The Formation and Implementation of the Chinese Communists' Guerrilla Warfare Strategy in the Enemy's Rear during the Sino-Japanese War", paper presented at Harvard University Conference on Wartime China, Maui, January 2004, pp. 32-36</ref> The Japanese considered the KMT rather than the Communists as their main enemy<ref>Chang and Halliday, pg. 231</ref> and ] of Chongqing to the point that it was the most heavily bombed city in the world to date.<ref>Chang and Halliday, pg. 232</ref> | |||
===Aftermath=== | |||
To this day the war is a major point of contention between China and Japan. The war remains a major roadblock for ], and many people, particularly in China, harbour grudges over the war and related issues. A small but vocal group of Japanese nationalists and/or right-wingers deny a variety of crimes attributed to Japan. The Japanese invasion of its neighbours is often glorified or whitewashed, and wartime atrocities, most notably the ], ] and ], are frequently denied by such individuals. The Japanese government has also been accused of ] by allowing the approval of school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past. In response to criticism of Japanese textbook revisionism, the PRC government has been accused of using the war to stir up already growing ]s to whip up ] and divert its citizens' minds from internal matters. | |||
] took place]] | |||
The Nationalists suffered higher casualties because they were the main combatants opposing the Japanese in each of the 22 major battles (involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides) between China and Japan. The Communist forces, by contrast, usually avoided pitched battles with the Japanese, in which their guerrilla tactics were less effective, and generally limited their combat to guerrilla actions (the ] and the ] are notable exceptions).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lovell |first=Julia |title=Maoism: A Global History |date=2019-09-03 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-525-65605-0 |pages= |language=en |oclc=1078879585 |quote=Though it is also worth pointing out that, in practice, Mao's recipe for guerrilla manoeuvres played a limited role in Chinese revolutionary wars during the 1930s and '40s. Nationalist armies carried most of the resistance to the Japanese during the Second World War, and Chinese Communist victory in the final years of the civil war up to 1949 was won through field battles that the Soviets taught the CCP how to fight. |author-link=Julia Lovell}}</ref> The Nationalists committed their strongest divisions in early battle against the Japanese (including the 36th, 87th, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend Shanghai and continued to deploy most of their forces to fight the Japanese even as the Communists changed their strategy to engage mainly in a political offensive against the Japanese while declaring that the CCP should "save and preserve our strength and wait for favourable timing" by the end of 1941.<ref>Yang Kuisong, "The Formation and Implementation of the Chinese Communists' Guerrilla Warfare Strategy in the Enemy's Rear during the Sino-Japanese War", paper presented at Harvard University Conference on Wartime China, Maui, January 2004, pp. 32–36</ref> | |||
====Chinese Communists Party Declarations==== | |||
On 30 September 1931, two weeks after the ] (IJA) invaded ], the ] issued this manifesto: | |||
==Legacy== | |||
{{cquote|...This incident, in which Japan had invaded Manchuria, would not slow down the Chinese Communist Party's attack towards the KMT regime. On the contrary, Chinese Communist Party would double it's effort and work harder to overthrow this KMT regime, which is the tool of foreign imperialism in China.<ref>]</ref>{{cn}}}} | |||
===China-Japan relations=== | |||
In 1972, when the ] (PRC) and ] established formal diplomatic relationship, ] met the then ] ]. When Tanaka personally apologized to Mao for invading China, Mao responded: {{cquote|(You) don't have to say sorry, your country had made a great contribution to China. Why? Because if Imperial Japan did not start the war, how could we communists become mighty and powerful? How could we overthrow KMT? How could we defeat Chiang Kai-shek? No, we are grateful and do not want your war reparations! (Translated from Tanaka Kakuei Biography, original in Japanese).<ref>Arthur Waldron, ''China's New Remembering of World War II: The Case of Zhang Zizhong'', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, Special Issue: War in Modern China (Oct., 1996), pp. 972</ref>}} | |||
Today, the war is a major point of contention and resentment between China and Japan. The war remains a major roadblock for ]. Issues regarding the current historical outlook on the war exist. For example, the Japanese government has been accused of ] by allowing the approval of a few ] omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past, although the most recent controversial book, the ''New History Textbook'' was used by only 0.039% of junior high schools in Japan<ref>Sven Saaler: Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society. Munich: 2005</ref> and despite the efforts of the Japanese nationalist textbook reformers, by the late 1990s the most common Japanese schoolbooks contained references to, for instance, the Nanjing Massacre, ], and the ] of World War II, all historical issues which have faced challenges from ultranationalists in the past.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s841387.htm|title=Foreign Correspondent – 22/04/2003: Japan – Unit 731|publisher=Australian Broadcasting Corporation|access-date=13 August 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160803172812/http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s841387.htm|archive-date=3 August 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref> | |||
In 2005, a history textbook prepared by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform which had been approved by the government in 2001, sparked huge outcry and protests in China and Korea. It referred to the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities such as the ] as an "incident", glossed over the issue of comfort women, and made only brief references to the death of Chinese soldiers and civilians in Nanjing.<ref>{{cite web |last=Oi |first=Mariko |date=14 March 2013 |title=What Japanese history lessons leave out |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21226068 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616083041/https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21226068 |archive-date=16 June 2018 |access-date=21 June 2018 |publisher=BBC}}</ref> A copy of the 2005 version of a junior high school textbook titled ''New History Textbook'' found that there is no mention of the "Nanjing Massacre" or the "Nanjing Incident". Indeed, the only one sentence that referred to this event was: "they occupied that city in December".<ref>{{cite web |last=Wang |first=Zheng |date=23 April 2014 |title=History Education: The Source of Conflict Between China and Japan |url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/history-education-the-source-of-conflict-between-china-and-japan/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171111205550/https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/history-education-the-source-of-conflict-between-china-and-japan/ |archive-date=11 November 2017 |access-date=11 November 2017 |website=The Diplomat}}</ref> | |||
====Legacy in Taiwan==== | |||
While the ] (PRC) government has been accused of greatly exaggerating the ] (CCP or CPC)'s role in fighting the Japanese, the legacy of the war is more complicated in the ] on ]. Traditionally, the government has held celebrations marking the ] on September 9 (now known as ]), and Taiwan's ] on October 25. However, with the power transfer from ] (KMT) to the pro-] ] (DPP) in 2000 and the rise of ], events commemorating the war have become less commonplace. Many supporters of ] see no relevance in preserving the memory of the war of resistance that happened primarily on ]. Some 120,000 Taiwanese even ] into the ]. Still, many KMT supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the 60th anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of KMT stronghold ] held a series of talks in the ] regarding the war and post-war developments, while the KMT held its own exhibit in the KMT headquarters. In 2008, the KMT won the ], which impacts the government position once more. | |||
===Taiwan=== | |||
==Casualties assessment== | |||
{{Main|Legal status of Taiwan}} | |||
{{see also|Japanese war crimes|1938 Yellow River flood|1938 Changsha Fire}} | |||
] and the island of ]]] | |||
The conflict lasted for eight years, a month and three days (measured from 1937 to 1945). | |||
Taiwan and the ] islands were put under the administrative control of the Republic of China (ROC) government in 1945 by the ].<ref name="unhcr.org"> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110728144641/http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country%2C%2C%2C%2CTWN%2C%2C4954ce6323%2C0.html|date=28 July 2011}} United Nations High Commission for Refugees</ref> The ROC proclaimed Taiwan ] on 25 October 1945. However, due to the unresolved Chinese Civil War, neither the newly established People's Republic of China in mainland China nor the Nationalist ROC that retreated to Taiwan was invited to sign the ], as neither had shown full and complete legal capacity to enter into an international legally binding agreement.<ref name="aao.sinica.edu.tw">{{cite web |url=http://aao.sinica.edu.tw/download/publication_e/Year2007/human12.pdf |title=Disputes over Taiwan Sovereignty and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty Since World War II |access-date=2009-08-25 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090326201339/http://aao.sinica.edu.tw/download/publication_e/Year2007/human12.pdf |archive-date=26 March 2009 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> Since China was not present, the Japanese only formally renounced the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan and Penghu islands without specifying to which country Japan relinquished the sovereignty, and the treaty was signed in 1951 and came into force in 1952. | |||
===Chinese casualties=== | |||
*Chinese sources list the total number of military and non-military casualties, both dead and wounded, at 35 million.<ref></ref> Most Western historians believed that the total number of casualties was at least 20 million.<ref></ref> | |||
*The official ] statistics for China's civilian and military casualties in the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937-1945 are 20 million dead and 15 million wounded. The figures for total military casualties, killed and wounded are: ] 3.2 million; ] 500,000. | |||
*The official account of the war published in Taiwan reported the Nationalist Chinese Army lost 3,238,000 men ( 1,797,000 WIA; 1,320,000 KIA and 120,000 MIA.) and 5,787,352 civilians casualties. The ] fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes.<ref>Hsu Long-hsuen "History of the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945)" Taipei 1972</ref> | |||
*An academic study published in the United States estimates military casualties: 1.5 million killed in battle, 750,000 missing in action, 1.5 million deaths due to disease and 3 million wounded; civilian casualties: due to military activity, killed 1,073,496 and 237,319 wounded; 335,934 killed and 426,249 wounded in ] <ref>Ho Ping-ti. Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.</ref> | |||
*According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at least 2.7 million civilians died during the ''"kill all, loot all, burn all"'' operation (], or ''sanko sakusen'') implemented in May 1942 in north China by general ] and authorized on 3 December 1941 by Imperial Headquarter Order number 575.<ref>Himeta, ''Sankô sakusen towa nan dataka-Chûgokujin no mita Nihon no sensô'', Iwanami Bukuretto 1996, p.43.</ref> | |||
*The property loss suffered by the Chinese was valued at 383 billion US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times the ] of Japan at that time (US$7.7 billion).<ref>], Who Actually Fought the Sino-Japanese War 1937–1945? 1978</ref> | |||
*In addition, the war created 95 million ]s. | |||
In 1952, the ] was signed separately between the ROC and Japan that basically followed the same guideline of the Treaty of San Francisco, not specifying which country has sovereignty over Taiwan. However, Article 10 of the treaty states that the ] and the juridical person should be the people and the juridical person of the ROC.<ref name="unhcr.org"/> Both the PRC and ROC governments base their claims to Taiwan on the ] which specifically accepted the ] which refers to the ]. Disputes over the precise de jure sovereign of Taiwan persist to the present. On a de facto basis, sovereignty over Taiwan has been and continues to be exercised by the ROC. Japan's position has been to avoid commenting on Taiwan's status, maintaining that Japan renounced all claims to sovereignty over its former colonial possessions after World War II, including Taiwan.<ref>{{Dead link|date=August 2018|bot=InternetArchiveBot|fix-attempted=yes}} FOCUS: Taiwan–Japan ties back on shaky ground as Taipei snubs Tokyo envoy</ref> | |||
===Japanese casualties=== | |||
A total of 396,000 Japanese soldiers died in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Of this number, the ] lost 388,605 soldiers and the ] lost 8,000 soldiers. Another 54,000 soldiers also died after the war had ended, mostly from illness and starvation.<ref name="Coox pp. 308">ed. Coox, Alvin and Hilary Conroy "China and Japan: A Search for Balance since World War I", pp. 308.</ref> Of the 1,740,955 Japanese soldiers who died during World War II, 22 percent died in China.<ref>ed. Dower, John "War Without Mercy", pp. 297.</ref> Current Japanese statistics, however, lack complete estimates for the wounded. From 1937-1941, 185,647 Japanese soldiers were killed in China and 520,000 were wounded. Disease also incurred critical losses on Japanese forces. From 1937-1941, 430,000 Japanese soldiers were recorded as being sick. In North China alone, 18,000 soldiers were evacuated back to Japan for illnesses in 1938, 23,000 in 1939, and 15,000 in 1940. Chinese forces also report that by May 1945, 22,293 Japanese soldiers were captured as prisoners. Many more Japanese soldiers surrendered when the war ended.<ref name="Coox pp. 308"/><ref>Dower, John "War Without Mercy", pp. 297</ref> | |||
Traditionally, the ] government has held celebrations marking the ] on 9 September (now known as ]) and Taiwan's Retrocession Day on 25 October. However, after the ] (DPP) won the ] in 2000, these national holidays commemorating the war have been cancelled as the ] DPP does not see the relevancy of celebrating events that happened in mainland China. | |||
Communist Chinese sources report that their forces were responsible for the deaths of 1,704,117 Japanese soldiers. Such a figure, which almost equate total Japanese deaths in all of World War II, was ridiculed by Nationalist authorities as propaganda since the Communist ] was outnumbered by the Japanese Army by approximately 3 to 1. Nationalist War Minister ] himself contested the claim, finding it impossible for a force of "untrained, undisciplined, poorly equipped" guerrillas to have killed so many enemy soldiers.<ref>ed. Coox, Alvin and Hilary Conroy "China and Japan: A Search for Balance since World War I", pp. 296.</ref> | |||
Meanwhile, many KMT supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the 60th anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of KMT stronghold ] held a series of talks in the ] regarding the war and post-war developments, while the KMT held its own exhibit in the KMT headquarters. Whereas the KMT won the ] in 2008, the ROC government resumed commemorating the war. | |||
Nationalist Chinese authorities report Japanese casualties at 1.77 million deaths, 1.9 million wounded<ref>Chung Wu Taipei "History of the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945)" 1972 pp 565</ref> | |||
===Japanese women left in China=== | |||
The National Chinese authorities ridiculed Japanese estimates of Chinese casualties. The National Herald stated that the Japanese exaggerated Chinese casualties, while deliberately concealing the true amount of Japanese casualties, releasing false figures that made them appear lower.<ref>{{cite book|url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=riuRTN_fKcT6lwfU3tXjAQ&ct=result&id=6Rknr9XSMggC&dq=was+ridiculed+by+Nationalist+authorities+as+japanese&q=The+Japanese+attempt+to+exagerate+the+number+of+casualties+on+the+part+of+China+and+to+minimize+the+number+of+casualties+in+Japan+was%2C+stated+the+National+herald|title=China monthly review, Volume 95|author=|year=1940|publisher=Millard Publishing Co.|page=187||accessdate=2010-06-28}}</ref><ref></ref><ref></ref> | |||
{{Main|Japanese people in China}} | |||
Several thousand Japanese who were sent as colonizers to Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia were left behind in China. The majority of these were women, and they married mostly Chinese men and became known as "stranded war wives" (zanryu fujin).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://japanfocus.org/-Rowena-Ward/2374/article.html|title=Left Behind: Japan's Wartime Defeat and the Stranded Women of Manchukuo|work=The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus|date=March 2007 |access-date=13 August 2016|archive-date=12 January 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160112110754/http://japanfocus.org/-Rowena-Ward/2374/article.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014429/https://books.google.com/books?id=fDCsD-1zitUC&pg=PA59 |date=12 October 2022 }}, p. 59.</ref> | |||
==Number of troops involved== | |||
===Chinese forces=== | |||
{{see|Chinese armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War}} | |||
====National Revolutionary Army==== | |||
{{Main|National Revolutionary Army}} | |||
].]] | |||
===Korean women left in China=== | |||
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) throughout its lifespan employed approximately 4,300,000 regulars, in 370 ] ({{zh|t=正式師}}), 46 New Divisions ({{zh|t=新編師}}), 12 ] ({{zh|t=騎兵師}}), eight New Cavalry Divisions ({{zh|t=新編騎兵師}}), 66 Temporary Divisions ({{zh|t=暫編師}}), and 13 ] ({{zh|t=預備師}}), for a grand total of 515 divisions. However, many divisions were formed from two or more other divisions, and many were not active at the same time. The number of active divisions, at the start of the war in 1937, was about 170 NRA divisions. The average NRA division had 4,000–5,000 troops. A Chinese army was roughly the equivalent to a Japanese division in terms of manpower but the Chinese forces largely lacked artillery, heavy weapons, and motorized transport. The shortage of military hardware meant that three to four Chinese armies had the firepower of only one Japanese division. Because of these material constraints, available artillery and heavy weapons were usually assigned to specialist brigades rather than to the general division, which caused more problems as the Chinese command structure lacked precise coordination. The relative fighting strength of a Chinese division was even weaker when relative capacity in aspects of warfare, such as ], ], ], and medical services, are taken into account. | |||
{{Main|Koreans in China}} | |||
The National Revolutionary Army can be divided roughly into two groups. The first one is the so-called ''dixi'' ({{zh|t=嫡系}}, "direct descent") group, which comprised divisions trained by the ] and loyal to ], and can be considered the Central Army ({{zh|t=中央軍}}) of the NRA. The second group is known as the ''zapai'' ({{zh|t=雜牌}}, "miscellaneous units"), and comprised all divisions led by non-Whampoa commanders, and is more often known as the Regional Army or the Provincial Army ({{zh|t=省軍}}). Even though both military groups were part of the National Revolutionary Army, their distinction lies much in their allegiance to the central government of Chiang Kai-shek. Many former warlords and regional militarists were incorporated into the NRA under the flag of the ], but in reality they retained much independence from the central government. They also controlled much of the military strength of China, the most notable of them being the ], ], ] and ] cliques. | |||
In China some Korean comfort women stayed behind instead of going back to their native land.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014429/https://books.google.com/books?id=auqCyUi5Dq0C&pg=PA59 |date=12 October 2022 }}, p. 59.</ref><ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014429/https://books.google.com/books?id=mV5dymPXNBgC&pg=PA59 |date=12 October 2022 }}, p. 59.</ref> Most Korean comfort women who were left behind in China married Chinese men.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014429/https://books.google.com/books?id=To5OA8ZOEdYC&pg=PA90 |date=12 October 2022 }}, p. 90.</ref> | |||
====Communist Chinese forces==== | |||
{{main|People's Liberation Army}} | |||
Although during the war the ] forces fought as a nominal part of the NRA, the number of those on the Communist side, due to their ] status, is difficult to determine, though estimates place the total number of the ], ], and irregulars in the Communist armies at 1,300,000. | |||
===Commemorations=== | |||
====Foreign support forces to China==== | |||
Three major museums in China commemorate China's War of Resistance, including the ].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mitter |first=Rana |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1141442704 |title=China's good war : how World War II is shaping a new nationalism |date=2020 |publisher=The Belknap Press of ] |isbn=978-0-674-98426-4 |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |pages=111 |oclc=1141442704}}</ref> | |||
===Japanese forces=== | |||
====Imperial Japanese Army==== | |||
{{Main|Imperial Japanese Army}} | |||
].]] | |||
==Casualties== | |||
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had approximately 3,200,000 regulars. More Japanese troops were quartered in China than deployed elsewhere in the ] during the war. Japanese divisions ranged from 20,000 men in its divisions numbered less than 100, to 10,000 men in divisions numbered greater than 100. At the time of the ], the IJA had 51 divisions, of which 35 were in China, and 39 independent brigades, of which all but one were in China. This represented roughly 80% of the IJA's manpower. | |||
]. More than 5,000 civilians died during the first two days of air raids in 1939.<ref>], '']'', 2001, p. 364</ref>]] | |||
The conflict lasted eight years, two months and two days (from 7 July 1937, to 9 September 1945). The total number of casualties that resulted from this war (and subsequently theater) equaled more than half the total number of casualties that later resulted from the entire Pacific War.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.history.co.uk/study-topics/history-of-ww2/sino-japanese-war |title=Sino-Japanese War |publisher=History.co.uk |access-date=27 November 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151124021032/http://www.history.co.uk/study-topics/history-of-ww2/sino-japanese-war |archive-date=24 November 2015 |url-status=dead }}</ref> | |||
====Collaborationist Chinese Army==== | |||
{{Main|Collaborationist Chinese Army}} | |||
The Chinese armies allied to Japan had only 78,000 people in 1938, but had grown to around 649,640 men by 1943,<ref>Jowett, Phillip, Rays of the Rising Sun, pg.130-133.</ref> and reached a maximum strength of 900,000 troops before the end of the war. Almost all of them belonged to ], ] (]), ] (]) and the later Nanjing Nationalist Government (]). These collaborator troops were mainly assigned to garrison and logistics duties in their own territories, and were rarely fielded in combat because of low morale and Japanese distrust. They fared very poorly in skirmishes against both Chinese NRA and Communist forces. | |||
===Chinese=== | |||
==Military equipment== | |||
* Duncan Anderson, Head of the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, UK, writing for BBC states that the total number of casualties was around 20 million.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/nuclear_01.shtml |title=Nuclear Power: The End of the War Against Japan |publisher=BBC |access-date=2010-12-02 |archive-date=28 November 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151128194317/http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/nuclear_01.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
===National Revolutionary Army=== | |||
* The official ] statistics for China's civilian and military casualties in the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945 are 20 million dead and 15 million wounded. The figures for total military casualties, killed and wounded are: NRA 3.2 million; ] 500,000.{{citation needed|date=November 2015}} | |||
{{See also|Development of Chinese armoured forces (1927–1945)|List of aircraft used in China before 1937|Development of Chinese Nationalist air force (1937–1945)|List of World War II firearms of China}} | |||
* The official account of the war published in Taiwan reported that the Nationalist Chinese Army lost 3,238,000 men (1,797,000 wounded, 1,320,000 killed, and 120,000 missing) and 5,787,352 civilians casualties putting the total number of casualties at 9,025,352. The ] fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes.<ref name=Hsu>Hsu Long-hsuen "History of the Sino-Japanese war (1937–1945)" Taipei 1972</ref> The Chinese reported their yearly total battle casualties as 367,362 for 1937, 735,017 for 1938, 346,543 for 1939, and 299,483 for 1941.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Clodfelter |first=Michael |title=Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015 |date=2015 |publisher=McFarland & Company |edition=4th |pages=393}}</ref> | |||
* An academic study published in the United States in 1959 estimates military casualties: 1.5 million killed in battle, 750,000 missing in action, 1.5 million deaths due to disease and 3 million wounded; civilian casualties: due to military activity, killed 1,073,496 and 237,319 wounded; 335,934 killed and 426,249 wounded in Japanese air attacks.<ref>Ho Ping-ti. Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.</ref> | |||
* According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at least 2.7 million civilians died during the "kill all, loot all, burn all" operation (], or ''sanko sakusen'') implemented in May 1942 in north China by general ] and authorized on 3 December 1941, by Imperial Headquarter Order number 575.<ref>* {{cite book|last=Himeta|first=Mitsuyoshi|trans-title=Concerning the Three Alls Strategy/Three Alls Policy By the Japanese Forces|title=日本軍による「三光政策・三光作戦をめぐって|publisher=Iwanami Bukkuretto|year=1995|isbn=978-4-00-003317-6|page=43}}</ref> | |||
* The property loss suffered by the Chinese was valued at 383 billion US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times the ] of Japan at that time (US$7.7 billion).<ref>], Who Actually Fought the Sino-Japanese War 1937–1945? 1978</ref> | |||
* In addition, the war created 95 million ]s.<ref>{{Cite book|title=War, nation, memory : international perspectives on World War II in school history textbooks|last1=Crawford|first1=Keith A.|last2=Foster|first2=Stuart J.|publisher=Information Age|year=2007|isbn=9781607526599|location=Charlotte, NC|page=90|oclc=294758908}}</ref> | |||
* ] gave a figure of 3,949,000 people in China murdered directly by the Japanese army while giving a figure of 10,216,000 total dead in the war with the additional millions of deaths due to indirect causes like starvation, disease and disruption but not direct killing by Japan.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Rummel |first1=Rudolph |title=China's Bloody Century Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 |date=1991 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781315081328 |page=348 |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315081328 |doi=10.4324/9781315081328 |access-date=29 April 2020 |archive-date=3 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180603094240/https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315081328 |url-status=live }}</ref> China suffered from famines during the war caused by drought affected both China and ], ] in ] that led to starvation deaths of 2 to 3 million people, Guangdong famine caused more than 3 million people to flee or die, and the ] that killed about 3 million Indians in ] and parts of Southern India.<ref>{{cite web|date=2008-11-18|title=The Bengali Famine|url=https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/in-the-media/churchill-in-the-news/bengali-famine/|access-date=2020-11-08|website=The International Churchill Society|archive-date=30 December 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141230160807/http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/in-the-media/churchill-in-the-news/575-the-bengali-famine|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
===Japanese=== | |||
The Central Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with approximately 8,000 men each, nine independent ]s, nine cavalry divisions, two ], 16 artillery ]s and three armored battalions. The ] displaced only 59,000 tonnes and the ] comprised only about 700 obsolete aircraft. | |||
The Japanese recorded around 1.1 to 1.9 million military casualties during all of World War II (which include killed, wounded and missing). The official death toll of Japanese men killed in China, according to the Japan Defense Ministry, is 480,000. Based on the investigation of the Japanese '']'', the military death toll of Japan in China is about 700,000 since 1937 (excluding the deaths in Manchuria).<ref name="Yomiuri Shimbun"/> | |||
Another source from Hilary Conroy claims that a total of 447,000 Japanese soldiers died or went missing in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Of the 1,130,000 Imperial Japanese Army soldiers who died during World War II, 39 percent died in China.<ref name="Coox pp. 308"/> | |||
Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the ] and ] arsenals. However, for most of the ]s, the standard firearms were German-made ] ] and ]. A local variant of the 98k style rifles were often called the "]" a Chinese copy from the ''Mauser Standard Modell''. Another rifle they used was ]. The standard ] was a local copy of the ] ] ]. There were also Belgian and French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase any of the famous '']''s from Germany, but did produce their own copies of them. On average in these divisions, there was one machine gun set for each ]. ]s were mainly locally-made Type 1924 ] ]s, from German ]s. On average every ] would get one HMG. The standard sidearm was the ] ] ] | |||
Then in '']'', ] claims that a total of 396,000 Japanese soldiers died in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Of this number, the Imperial Japanese Army lost 388,605 soldiers and the Imperial Japanese Navy lost 8,000 soldiers. Another 54,000 soldiers also died after the war had ended, mostly from illness and starvation.<ref name="Coox pp. 308">ed. ] and Hilary Conroy "China and Japan: A Search for Balance since World War I", pp. 308.</ref> Of the 1,740,955 Japanese soldiers who died during World War II, 22 percent died in China.<ref name="Ref-1">Dower, John "War Without Mercy", pp. 297.</ref> | |||
Some divisions were equipped with 37 mm ] ]s, and/or ]s from ], Madsen and ]. Each infantry division had 6 French Brandt 81 mm ] and 6 Solothurn 20 mm ]s. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equipped with ] 72 mm L/14, or ] 72 mm L/29 ]s. They were 24 '']'' 150 mm ] ]s (bought in 1934) and 24 Krupp 150 mm ] howitzers (bought in 1936). | |||
Japanese statistics, however, lack complete estimates for the wounded. From 1937 to 1941, 185,647 Japanese soldiers were killed in China and 520,000 were wounded. Disease also incurred critical losses on Japanese forces. From 1937 to 1941, 430,000 Japanese soldiers were recorded as being sick. In North China alone, 18,000 soldiers were evacuated back to Japan for illnesses in 1938, 23,000 in 1939, and 15,000 in 1940.<ref name="Ref-1"/>{{efn|This number does not include the casualties of the large numbers of Chinese collaborator government troops fighting on the Japanese side.|group=efn}} From 1941 to 1945: 202,958 dead; another 54,000 dead after war's end. Chinese forces also report that by May 1945, 22,293 Japanese soldiers were captured as prisoners. Many more Japanese soldiers surrendered when the war ended.<ref name="Coox pp. 308"/><ref name="Ref-1"/> | |||
Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned ]s. Leg wrappings are standard for soldiers and officers alike since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment German M35 ] helmets (standard issue for the '']'' until late in the ]) rolled off the production lines in 1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, each with the 12-ray sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every soldier was issued ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat knives, food bag and a ]. | |||
Contemporary studies from the Beijing Central Compilation and Translation Press state that the Japanese suffered a total of 2,227,200 casualties, including 1,055,000 dead and 1,172,341 injured. This Chinese publication analyzes statistics provided by Japanese publications and claimed these numbers were largely based on Japanese publications.<ref name="Press">Liu Feng, (2007). "血祭太阳旗: 百万侵华日军亡命实录". Central Compilation and Translation Press. {{ISBN|978-7-80109-030-0}}. ''Note'': This Chinese publication analyses statistics provided by Japanese publications.</ref> | |||
On the other hand, warlord forces varied greatly in terms of equipment and training. Some warlord troops were notoriously under-equipped, such as ]'s ] (大刀, a one-bladed sword type close combat weapon) Team and the ]. Some, however, were highly professional forces with their own air force and navies. The quality of the ] was almost on par with the Central Army, as the ] region was wealthy and the local army could afford foreign instructors and arms. The Muslim ] to the northwest was famed for its well-trained ] divisions. | |||
Both Nationalist and Communist Chinese sources report that their respective forces were responsible for the deaths of over 1.7 million Japanese soldiers.{{Sfn|Hsu|page=565}} Nationalist War Minister ] himself contested the Communists' claims, finding it impossible for a force of "untrained, undisciplined, poorly equipped" guerrillas of Communist forces to have killed so many enemy soldiers.<ref>ed. Coox, Alvin and Hilary Conroy "China and Japan: A Search for Balance since World War I", pp. 296.</ref> | |||
===Imperial Japanese Army=== | |||
{{See also|List of Japanese infantry weapons used in the Second-Sino Japanese War|List of armour used by the Imperial Japanese Army in the Second Sino-Japanese War|List of Japanese aircraft in use during the Second Sino-Japanese War}} | |||
Although Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity, it did not possess capability for maintaining a long sustained war. At the beginning of the war, the Imperial Japanese Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and ]s, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 600 plus of light armor two-men tanks. ] were also available. The ] displaced a total of 1,900,000 tonnes, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of four Chinese regular divisions (at the beginning of the ]). | |||
The Nationalist Chinese authorities ridiculed Japanese estimates of Chinese casualties. In 1940, the National Herald stated that the Japanese exaggerated Chinese casualties, while deliberately concealing the true number of Japanese casualties, releasing false figures that made them appear much lower. The article reports on the casualty situation of the war up to 1940.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6Rknr9XSMggC|title=China monthly review, Volume 95|year=1940|publisher=Millard Publishing Co.|page=187|access-date=2010-06-28}}</ref> | |||
==Major figures== | |||
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===Use of chemical and biological weapons=== | |||
===Chinese Nationalists=== | |||
Despite Article 23 of the ], article V of the Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Washington_Treaty_in_Relation_to_the_Use_of_Submarines_and_Noxious_Gases_in_Warfare |title=Washington Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare — World War I Document Archive |publisher=Wwi.lib.byu.edu |access-date=2010-12-02 |archive-date=4 October 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091004221650/http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Washington_Treaty_in_Relation_to_the_Use_of_Submarines_and_Noxious_Gases_in_Warfare |url-status=live }}</ref> article 171 of the ] and a resolution adopted by the League of Nations on 14 May 1938, condemning the use of poison gas by the Empire of Japan, the Imperial Japanese Army frequently used chemical weapons during the war. | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|白崇禧}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|陳誠}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|陈诚}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|蔣介石}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|蒋介石}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|杜聿明}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|方先覺}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|方先觉}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|馮玉祥}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|冯玉祥}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|顧祝同}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|顾祝同}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|何應欽}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|何应钦}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|孔祥熙}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|胡克先}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|胡宗南}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|李宗仁}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|龍雲}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|龙云}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|馬步芳}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|馬步青}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|馬鴻賓}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|馬鴻逵}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hans|馬占山}} / 马占山) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|宋哲元}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|宋美齡}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|宋美龄}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|宋子文}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|孫連仲}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|孙连仲}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|孫立人}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|孙立人}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|湯恩伯}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|汤恩伯}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|唐生智}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|衛立煌}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|卫立煌}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|薛岳}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|閻錫山}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|阎锡山}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|謝晉元}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|谢晋元}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|張發奎}} / 张发奎) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|張治中}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|张治中}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|張自忠}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|张自忠}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|朱紹良}} / 朱绍良) | |||
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According to Walter E. Grunden, history professor at ], Japan permitted the use of chemical weapons in China because the Japanese concluded that Chinese forces did not possess the capacity to retaliate in kind.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Grunden |first1=W.E. |editor1-last=Friedrich |editor1-first=B. |editor2-last=Hoffmann |editor2-first=D. |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-51664-6_14 |editor3-last=Renn |editor3-first=J. |editor4-last=Schmaltz |editor4-first=F. |editor5-last=Wolf |editor5-first=M. |title=One Hundred Years of Chemical Warfare: Research, Deployment, Consequences |date=2017 |publisher=Springer, Cham |isbn=978-3-319-51663-9 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-51664-6_14 |chapter=No Retaliation in Kind: Japanese Chemical Warfare Policy in World War II |pages=259–271 |s2cid=158528688 |access-date=28 October 2022 |archive-date=16 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221016161215/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-51664-6_14 |url-status=live }}</ref> The Japanese incorporated gas warfare into many aspects of their army, which includes special gas troops, infantry, artillery, engineers and air force; the Japanese were aware of basic gas tactics of other armies, and deployed multifarious gas warfare tactics in China.<ref>{{cite book|author=United States. War Department. Military Intelligence Division|issue=24 of Special series, United States War Dept|date=1944|title=Enemy Tactics in Chemical Warfare|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gq1BAAAAIAAJ&dq=japanese+gas+hand+to+hand+combat&pg=PA69|publisher=War Department|pages=69–86|access-date=28 October 2022|archive-date=2 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230402122509/https://books.google.com/books?id=gq1BAAAAIAAJ&dq=japanese+gas+hand+to+hand+combat&pg=PA69|url-status=live}}</ref> The Japanese were very dependent on gas weapons when they were engaged in chemical warfare.<ref>{{cite book|author=United States. War Department. Military Intelligence Division|issue=24 of Special series, United States War Dept|date=1944|title=Enemy Tactics in Chemical Warfare|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gq1BAAAAIAAJ&dq=japanese+gas+hand+to+hand+combat&pg=PA69|publisher=War Department|pages=69|access-date=28 October 2022|archive-date=2 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230402122509/https://books.google.com/books?id=gq1BAAAAIAAJ&dq=japanese+gas+hand+to+hand+combat&pg=PA69|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
===Chinese Communists=== | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|陳毅}}, {{lang|zh-Hans|陈毅}}) | |||
*] (邓小平 / 鄧小平) | |||
*] (贺龙 / 賀龍) | |||
*] (林彪) | |||
*] (刘伯承 / 劉伯承) | |||
*] (刘少奇 / 劉少奇) | |||
*] (罗荣桓 / 羅榮桓) | |||
*] (毛泽东 / 毛澤東) | |||
*] (聂荣臻 / 聶榮臻) | |||
*] (彭德怀 / 彭德懷) | |||
*] ({{lang|zh-Hant|粟裕}}) | |||
*] (徐向前) | |||
*] (叶剑英 / 葉劍英) | |||
*] (叶挺 / 葉挺) | |||
*] (张爱萍 / 張愛萍) | |||
*] (周恩来 / 周恩來) | |||
*] (朱德) | |||
Japan used poison gas at Hankow during the Battle of Wuhan to break fierce Chinese resistance after conventional Japanese assaults were repelled by Chinese defenders. Rana Mitter writes, {{blockquote|Under General Xue Yue, some 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back Japanese forces at Huangmei. At the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands of men fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory assured only with the use of poison gas.{{Sfn|Mitter|2013|p=166}}}} | |||
===Foreigners supporting China=== | |||
*{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|United States|1912}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|United States|1912}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|United States|1912}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|United States|1912}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|United States|1912}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|Canada|1921}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|Austria}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|United Kingdom}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|Canada|1921}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|India|British}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|United Kingdom}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|USSR}} ] | |||
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According to ], during the battle at Hankow, in areas where Japanese artillery or gunboats on the river could not reach Chinese defenders on hilltops, Japanese infantrymen had to fight Chinese troops on the hills.<ref name="fredautley1">{{cite book |last=Utley |first=Freda |date=1939 |title=China at War |url=http://www.fredautley.com/pdffiles/book19.pdf |location=London |publisher=Faber and Faber |pages=110–112, 170 |access-date=28 October 2022 |archive-date=28 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221028055717/https://fredautley.com/pdffiles/book19.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> She noted that the Japanese were inferior at hand-to-hand combat against the Chinese, and resorted to deploying poison gas to defeat the Chinese troops.<ref name="fredautley1"/> She was told by General ] that the Japanese consistently used ] and ] against Chinese troops.<ref name="fredautley1"/> Li also added that his forces could not withstand large scale deployments of Japanese poison gas.<ref name="fredautley1"/> Since Chinese troops did not have gas-masks, the poison gases provided enough time for Japanese troops to bayonet debilitated Chinese soldiers.<ref name="fredautley1"/> | |||
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During the battle in Yichang of October 1941, Japanese troops used chemical munitions in their artillery and mortar fire, and warplanes dropped gas bombs all over the area; since the Chinese troops were poorly equipped and without gas-masks, they were severely gassed, burned and killed.<ref>{{cite book|author=United States. War Department. Military Intelligence Division|issue=24 of Special series, United States War Dept|date=1944|title=Enemy Tactics in Chemical Warfare|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gq1BAAAAIAAJ&dq=japanese+gas+hand+to+hand+combat&pg=PA82|pages=82–83|access-date=28 October 2022|archive-date=2 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230402122514/https://books.google.com/books?id=gq1BAAAAIAAJ&dq=japanese+gas+hand+to+hand+combat&pg=PA82|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
===Imperial Japanese Army=== | |||
*Shōwa Emperor ({{lang|ja-Hani|昭和天皇}}) ] ({{lang|ja-Hani|裕仁}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|阿部 信行}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|阿南 惟幾}}) | |||
*] Yasuhiko ({{lang|ja-Hani|朝香宮}}) | |||
*] Yasuhito ({{lang|ja-Hani|秩父宮}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|土肥原 賢二}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|伏見宮博恭王}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|橋本 欣五郎}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|畑 俊六}}) | |||
*] Naruhiko ({{lang|ja-Hani|東久邇宮 稔彦王}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|本間 雅晴}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|石井 四郎}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|磯谷 廉介}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|板垣 征四郎}}) | |||
*] Kotohito ({{lang|ja-Hani|閑院宮 載仁親王}}) | |||
*] (]: {{lang|ja-Hant|近衞 文麿}}, ]: {{lang|ja-Hani|近衛 文麿}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|石原 莞爾}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|小磯 國昭,小磯 国昭}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|松井 石根}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|牟田口 廉也}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|中島 今朝吾}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hant|西尾 壽造}}, {{lang|ja-Hani|西尾 寿造}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|岡村 寧次}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|酒井 隆}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|杉山 元}}) | |||
*] Tsuneyoshi ({{lang|ja-Hani|竹田宮 恒徳王}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hant|寺内 壽一}}, {{lang|ja-Hani|寺内 寿一}}) | |||
*] (]: {{lang|ja-Hant|東條 英機}}, ]: {{lang|ja-Hani|東条 英機}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|梅津 美治郎}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|山口 多聞}}) | |||
*] ({{lang|ja-Hani|山下 奉文}}) | |||
According to historians ] and Seiya Matsuno, the chemical weapons were authorized by specific orders given by Hirohito himself, transmitted by the Imperial General Headquarters. For example, the Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions during the Battle of Wuhan from August to October 1938.<ref>Y. Yoshimi and S. Matsuno, ''Dokugasusen Kankei Shiryō II (Materials on poison gas warfare), Kaisetsu, Hōkan 2, Jugonen Sensō Gokuhi Shiryōshu'', 1997, pp. 27–29</ref> They were also used during the invasion of Changde. Those orders were transmitted either by ] or General ].<ref>Yoshimi and Matsuno, ''idem'', ], Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001, pp. 360–364</ref> Gases manufactured in ] were used more than 2,000 times against Chinese soldiers and civilians in the war in China in the 1930s and 1940s<ref>{{cite web | first=Nicholas D. | last=Kristof | title=Okunoshima Journal; A Museum to Remind Japanese of Their Own Guilt | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/12/world/okunoshima-journal-a-museum-to-remind-japanese-of-their-own-guilt.html | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20190508142011/https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/12/world/okunoshima-journal-a-museum-to-remind-japanese-of-their-own-guilt.html|archivedate=8 May 2019 | newspaper=The New York Times | date=12 August 1995|accessdate=17 March 2024}}</ref> | |||
{{col-break}} | |||
] provided by ]'s units were also profusely used. For example, in 1940, the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force bombed ] with ]s carrying the ].<ref>''Japan triggered bubonic plague outbreak, doctor claims'', {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110912142325/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/japan-triggered-bubonic-plague-outbreak-doctor-claims-704147.html|date=12 September 2011}}, Prince ] and ] received a special screening by ] of a film showing imperial planes loading germ bombs for bubonic dissemination over Ningbo in 1940. (Daniel Barenblatt, ''A Plague upon Humanity'', 2004, p. 32.) All these weapons were experimented with on humans before being used in the field.</ref> During the ] the accused, such as Major General Kiyashi Kawashima, testified that, in 1941, some 40 members of Unit 731 air-dropped plague-contaminated fleas on ]. These attacks caused epidemic plague outbreaks.<ref>Daniel Barenblatt, ''A Plague upon Humanity'', 2004, pages 220–221.</ref> In the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, of the 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with the disease, about 1,700 Japanese troops died when the biological weapons rebounded on their own forces.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Implementation of Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Held in Budapest, Hungary, 2001|editor1-first=Marie Isabelle|editor1-last=Chevrier|editor2-first=Krzysztof|editor2-last=Chomiczewski|editor3-first=Henri|editor3-last=Garrigue|volume=150 of NATO science series: Mathematics, physics, and chemistry|edition=illustrated|year=2004|publisher=Springer|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lILltXBTo8oC&pg=PA19|page=19|isbn=1-4020-2097-X|access-date=10 March 2014|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014429/https://books.google.com/books?id=lILltXBTo8oC&pg=PA19|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Weapons of Mass Destruction|editor1-first=Eric A.|editor1-last=Croddy|editor2-first=James J.|editor2-last=Wirtz|others=Jeffrey A. Larsen, Managing Editor|year=2005|publisher=ABC-CLIO|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZzlNgS70OHAC&pg=PA171|page=171|isbn=1-85109-490-3|access-date=10 March 2014|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014931/https://books.google.com/books?id=ZzlNgS70OHAC&pg=PA171|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
===Chinese collaborators supporting Japan=== | |||
*{{flagicon image|Flag of Manchukuo.svg}} ] | |||
**] | |||
*{{flagicon image|Flag of the Mengjiang.svg}} ] | |||
**] | |||
*{{flagicon image|Flag_of_the_Republic_of_China_1912-1928.svg}} ] | |||
**] (殷汝耕) | |||
*{{flagicon image|Flag_of_the_Republic_of_China_1912-1928.svg}} ] | |||
**] (王克敏) | |||
*{{flagicon image|CJZ1.svg}}] | |||
**] (梁鴻志 / 梁鸿志) | |||
*{{flagicon image|Flag of the Republic of China-Nanjing (Peace, Anti-Communism, National Construction).svg}} ] | |||
**] (陳公博 / 陈公博) | |||
**] (汪精衛 / 汪精卫) | |||
**] (周佛海) | |||
{{col-end}} | |||
Japan gave its own soldiers ] in the form of ].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Morgans |first1=Julian |title=A Brief History of Meth |url=https://www.vice.com/en_asia/article/4wb78m/from-kamikaze-pilots-to-footy-players-heres-a-short-history-of-ice |work=VICE News |date=22 October 2015 |access-date=29 April 2020 |archive-date=6 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200806162920/https://www.vice.com/en_asia/article/4wb78m/from-kamikaze-pilots-to-footy-players-heres-a-short-history-of-ice |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
==Military engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War== | |||
===Battles=== | |||
Battles with articles. Flag shows victorious side in each engagement. Date shows beginning date except for the 1942 battle of Changsha, which began in Dec. 1941. | |||
===Use of suicide attacks=== | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] September 1931 | |||
Chinese armies deployed "dare to die corps" ({{lang-zh|s=敢死队 |t=敢死隊 |p=gǎnsǐduì |w= |first=t}}) or "suicide squads" against the Japanese.<ref>{{cite book|title=Modern China: the fall and rise of a great power, 1850 to the present|first=Jonathan|last=Fenby|year=2008|publisher=Ecco|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8VIUAQAAIAAJ&q=dare+to+die+corps+swords|page=284|isbn=978-0-06-166116-7|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014932/https://books.google.com/books?id=8VIUAQAAIAAJ&q=dare+to+die+corps+swords|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] September 1931 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] October 1931 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] November 1931 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] December 1931 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] January 1932 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} {{flagicon|Japan|naval}} ] January 1932 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] March 1932 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] January 1933 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] February 1933 | |||
*] | |||
**{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] October 1936 | |||
* ] (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) July 1937 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] July 1937 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] August 1937 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} {{flagicon|Japan|naval}} ] August 1937 | |||
**{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] October 26, 1937 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] August 1937 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] August 1937 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] September 1937 | |||
**{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] September 1937 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] September 1937 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] December 1937 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] December 1937 | |||
**{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] March 1938 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] January 1938 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] May 1938 | |||
*{{flagicon|Japan|naval}} ] May 1938 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] June 1938 | |||
**{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] October 1938 | |||
*{{flagicon|Japan|naval}} ] February 1939 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] March 1939 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] March 1939 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] May 1939 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} {{flagicon|Japan|naval}} ] June 1939 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] September 1939 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] November 1939 | |||
**{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] December 1939 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] November 1939 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] Jan - Feb 1940 | |||
**{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] March 1940 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] May 1940 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] August 1940 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} {{flagicon|Japan|naval}}] September 1940 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] November 1940 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] January 1941 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] March 1941 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] March 1941 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] May 1941 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] September 1941 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] January 1942 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] March 1942 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] | |||
**{{flagicon|Republic of China}} {{flagicon|United Kingdom}} ] | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] April 1942 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] May 1943 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} {{flagicon|United States}} ] October 1943 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] November 1943 | |||
*{{flagicon|Japan|alt}} ] | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} Operation Kogo ] April 1944 | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} Operation Togo 1 ] | |||
**{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} Operation Togo 2 and Operation Togo 3 ] August 1944 | |||
*{{flagicon|Empire of Japan}} ] March — May, 1945 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} {{flagicon|United States}} ] April — June, 1945 | |||
*{{flagicon|Republic of China}} ] April — July, 1945 | |||
]]] | |||
===Aerial engagements=== | |||
* ] | |||
] was also used against the Japanese. A Chinese soldier detonated a grenade vest and killed 20 Japanese at ]. Chinese troops ] and threw themselves under Japanese tanks to blow them up.<ref>{{Cite thesis|last=Schaedler |first=Luc |title=Angry Monk: Reflections on Tibet: Literary, Historical, and Oral Sources for a Documentary Film |degree=PhD |url=http://www.zora.uzh.ch/17710/3/Angry_Monk_Dissertation.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140719204815/http://www.zora.uzh.ch/17710/3/Angry_Monk_Dissertation.pdf |archive-date=19 July 2014 |date=Autumn 2007 |page=518 |publisher=University of Zurich |access-date=24 April 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref> This tactic was used during the Battle of Shanghai, where a Chinese suicide bomber stopped a Japanese tank column by exploding himself beneath the lead tank,<ref>{{cite book|title=Shanghai 1937: Stalingrad on the Yangtze|first=Peter|last=Harmsen|edition=illustrated|year=2013|publisher=Casemate|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jpPUAgAAQBAJ&q=shanghai+grenade+tanks+japanese&pg=PT127|page=112|isbn=978-1-61200-167-8|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014932/https://books.google.com/books?id=jpPUAgAAQBAJ&q=shanghai+grenade+tanks+japanese&pg=PT127|url-status=live}}</ref> and at the Battle of Taierzhuang, where dynamite and grenades were strapped on by Chinese troops who rushed at Japanese tanks and blew themselves up.<ref>{{cite journal|date=Summer 2001 |title=Chinese Tank Forces and Battles before 1949 |url=http://mailer.fsu.edu/~akirk/tanks/Stories/emagazine-3/tanks/Chinese_Tank_Forces_and_Battles_before_1945_ed.htm |journal=TANKS! E-Magazine |issue=#4 |access-date=2 August 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121007212422/http://mailer.fsu.edu/~akirk/tanks/Stories/emagazine-3/tanks/Chinese_Tank_Forces_and_Battles_before_1945_ed.htm |archive-date=7 October 2012 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=China Condensed: 5000 Years of History & Culture|first=Siew Chey|last=Ong|edition=illustrated|year=2005|publisher=Marshall Cavendish|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bt7q8hfiZ4gC&q=taierzhuang+suicide+bombers&pg=PA94|page=94|isbn=981-261-067-7|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014932/https://books.google.com/books?id=bt7q8hfiZ4gC&q=taierzhuang+suicide+bombers&pg=PA94|url-status=live}}</ref> During one incident at Taierzhuang, Chinese suicide bombers destroyed four Japanese tanks with grenade bundles.{{citation needed|date=November 2019}} | |||
===Japanese invasions and operations=== | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
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*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
*] | |||
== |
==Combatants== | ||
{{Main|Combatants of the Second Sino-Japanese War}} | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
* | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
{{Portal bar|Japan|China|History}} | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
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* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | |||
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* ] | |||
==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
{{ |
{{Notelist}} | ||
{{reflist|colwidth=30em}} | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
* | |||
* Historiographical overview of major books from the 1970s through 2006 (''for paid subscribers only''). | |||
* Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, ] (London, 2005); Jonathan Cape, ISBN 0-679-42271-4 | |||
* Annalee Jacoby and Theodore H. White, ''Thunder out of China'', New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946 | |||
* 從大歷史的角度讀蔣介石日記 Reading Chiang Kai-shek's Diary from a Macro History Perspective | |||
** Author : ] | |||
** Press : China Times Publishing Company | |||
** Date published : 1994-1-31 | |||
** ISBN 957-13-0962-1 | |||
* 中国抗日战争正面战场作战记 China's Anti-Japanese War Combat Operations | |||
** Author : Guo Rugui, editor-in-chief Huang Yuzhang | |||
** Press : Jiangsu People's Publishing House | |||
** Date published : 2005-7-1 | |||
** ISBN 7-214-03034-9 | |||
** On line in Chinese: | |||
===Citations=== | |||
* {{cite book | |||
{{reflist}} | |||
| last = Jowett | |||
| first = Phillip | |||
| authorlink = | |||
| coauthors = | |||
| year = 2005 | |||
| chapter = | |||
| title = Rays of the Rising Sun: Japan's Asian Allies 1931–45 Volume 1: China and Manchukuo | |||
| publisher = Helion and Company Ltd | |||
| location = | |||
| isbn = 1-874622-21-3 | |||
}}- Book about the Chinese and Mongolians who fought for the Japanese during the war. | |||
*{{cite book | |||
| last = Long-hsuen | |||
| first = Hsu | |||
| authorlink = | |||
| coauthors = Chang Ming-kai | |||
| year = 1972 | |||
| chapter = | |||
| title = History of the Sino-Japanese war (1937–1945) | |||
| publisher = Chung Wu Publishers | |||
| location = | |||
| id = ASIN B00005W210 | |||
}} | |||
* {{cite book | |||
| last = Taylor | |||
| first = Jay | |||
| authorlink = | |||
| coauthors = | |||
| year = 2009 | |||
| chapter = | |||
| title = The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the struggle for modern China | |||
| publisher = Harvard University Press | |||
| location = Cambridge, Massachusetts | |||
| isbn = 987-0-674-03338-2 | |||
}} | |||
===Bibliography=== | |||
* {{cite book | |||
{{refbegin|40em}} | |||
| last = Wilson | |||
* Bayly, C. A., and T. N. Harper. ''Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941–1945''. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005. xxxiii, 555p. {{ISBN|0-674-01748-X}}. | |||
| first = Dick | |||
* Bayly, C. A., T. N. Harper. ''Forgotten Wars: Freedom and Revolution in Southeast Asia''. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007. xxx, 674p. {{ISBN|978-0-674-02153-2}}. | |||
| authorlink = | |||
* | |||
| coauthors = | |||
* Buss, Claude A. ''War And Diplomacy in Eastern Asia'' (1941) 570pp | |||
| year = 1982 | |||
* {{cite book |title = The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1941 |author-link = William Duiker |first = William |last = Duiker |year = 1976 |publisher = ] |location = Ithaca, New York |isbn = 0-8014-0951-9 |url-access = registration |url = https://archive.org/details/riseofnationalis0000duik }} | |||
| chapter = | |||
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200314211033/https://muse.jhu.edu/article/191940 |date=14 March 2020 }} Historiographical overview of major books from the 1970s through 2006 | |||
| title = When Tigers Fight: The story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945 | |||
* Guo Rugui, editor-in-chief Huang Yuzhang,中国抗日战争正面战场作战记 China's Anti-Japanese War Combat Operations (Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 2005) {{ISBN|7-214-03034-9}}. On line in Chinese: | |||
| publisher = Viking Press | |||
* {{cite book |last1=Hastings|first1=Max|title=Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944–45|date=2009|publisher=Vintage Books|isbn=978-0-307-27536-3}} | |||
| location = New York | |||
* {{cite book |last1=Förster|first1=Stig<!--was small caps-->|last2=Gessler|first2=Myriam|year=2005|chapter=The Ultimate Horror: Reflections on Total War and Genocide|title=''In Roger Chickering, Stig Förster and Bernd Greiner, eds.,'' A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945 ''(pp. 53–68)''|location=Cambridge|publisher=]|isbn=978-0-521-83432-2}} | |||
| isbn = 0-670-76003-X | |||
* {{citation|editor1-last= Hsiung |editor1-first = James Chieh |editor2-first= Steven I. |editor2-last = Levine |title = China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945 |place = Armonk, NY |publisher = M.E. Sharpe |year = 1992 |isbn = 0-87332-708-X}}. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210307234918/https://www.google.com/books/edition/China_s_Bitter_Victory_War_with_Japan_19/LY4YDQAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=China%27s%20bitter%20victory&printsec=frontcover |date=7 March 2021 }}: Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2015. Chapters on military, economic, diplomatic aspects of the war. | |||
}} | |||
* {{cite book|last=Huang|first=Ray|title=從大歷史的角度讀蔣介石日記 (Reading Chiang Kai-shek's Diary from a Macro History Perspective)|publisher=China Times Publishing Company|date=31 January 1994|isbn=957-13-0962-1|ref={{sfnRef|Huang}}}} | |||
* Annalee Jacoby and Theodore H. White, ''Thunder out of China'', New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946. Critical account of Chiang's government by ''Time'' magazine reporters. | |||
*{{cite book | |||
* {{cite book|last=Jowett|first=Phillip|year=2005|title=Rays of the Rising Sun: Japan's Asian Allies 1931–45 Volume 1: China and Manchukuo|publisher=Helion and Company Ltd|isbn=1-874622-21-3|ref={{sfnRef|Jowett}}}} – Book about the Chinese and Mongolians who fought for the Japanese during the war. | |||
|last = Salisbury | |||
* {{cite book|last=Hsu|first=Long-hsuen|author2=Chang Ming-kai|year=1972|title=History of the Sino-Japanese war (1937–1945)|publisher=Chung Wu Publishers|id=ASIN B00005W210|ref={{sfnRef|Hsu}}}} | |||
|first = Harrison | |||
* Lary, Diana and Stephen R. Mackinnon, eds. ''The Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China''. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001. 210p. {{ISBN|0-7748-0840-3}}. | |||
|authorlink = Harrison Salisbury | |||
* {{cite journal |last1=Laureau|first1=Patrick|title=Des Français en Chine (2ème partie)|journal=Avions: Toute l'aéronautique et son histoire |date=June 1993 |issue=4 |pages=32–38 |trans-title=The French in China|language=French |issn=1243-8650}} | |||
|title = China 100 years of revolution | |||
* MacKinnon, Stephen R., Diana Lary and Ezra F. Vogel, eds. ''China at War: Regions of China, 1937–1945''. Stanford University Press, 2007. xviii, 380p. {{ISBN|978-0-8047-5509-2}}. | |||
|publisher = J-C Suates | |||
* {{cite book|last=MacLaren|first=Roy|authorlink=|year=1981|chapter=|title=Canadians Behind Enemy Lines 1939–1945|publisher=UBC Press|location=|isbn=0-7748-1100-5|ref={{sfnRef|MacLaren}}}} - Book about the Chinese from Canada as well as Americans who fought against Japan in the Second World War. | |||
|series = | |||
* Macri, Franco David. ''Clash of Empires in South China: The Allied Nations' Proxy War with Japan, 1935–1941'' (2015) {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171003225025/https://muse.jhu.edu/book/40548|date=3 October 2017}} | |||
|year = 2000 | |||
* {{cite book|last=Mitter|first=Rana|author-link=Rana Mitter|title=Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937–1945|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Bqc_YkuyaCIC|year=2013|publisher=HMH|isbn=978-0-547-84056-7|access-date=27 January 2020|archive-date=12 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014934/https://books.google.com/books?id=Bqc_YkuyaCIC|url-status=live}} | |||
|doi = 10.1007/b62130 | |||
* Peattie, Mark. Edward Drea, and Hans van de Ven, eds. ''The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945'' (Stanford University Press, 2011); 614 pages | |||
|isbn = 0233975993}} | |||
* Quigley, Harold S. ''Far Eastern War 1937 1941'' (1942) | |||
* Zarrow, Peter. "The War of Resistance, 1937-45". ''China in war and revolution 1895-1949''. London: Routledge, 2005. | |||
* Steiner, Zara. "Thunder from the East: The Sino-Japanese Conflict and the European Powers, 1933=1938": in Steiner, ''The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933–1939'' (2011) pp 474–551. | |||
* {{cite journal |last1=Stevens |first1=Keith |title=A token operation: 204 military mission to China, 1941–1945 |journal=Asian Affairs |date=March 2005 |volume=36 |issue=1 |pages=66–74 |doi=10.1080/03068370500039151 |s2cid=161326427 |ref = {{sfnRef|Stevens}}}} | |||
* {{cite book|last=Taylor|first=Jay|year=2009|title=The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the struggle for modern China|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|isbn=978-0-674-03338-2|ref={{sfnRef|Taylor}}|url=https://archive.org/details/generalissimochi00tayl}} | |||
* Van de Ven, Hans, Diana Lary, Stephen MacKinnon, eds. ''Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II'' (Stanford University Press, 2014) 336 pp. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150626130559/https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=42871|date=26 June 2015}} | |||
* {{cite book |last = van de Ven |first = Hans |year = 2017 |title = China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China, 1937–1952 |publisher = Profile Books |location = London |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=a9PMmgEACAAJ |isbn = 9781781251942 |access-date = 3 January 2020 |archive-date = 12 October 2022 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20221012014934/https://books.google.com/books?id=a9PMmgEACAAJ |url-status = live }} | |||
* {{cite book|last=Wilson|first=Dick|year=1982|title=When Tigers Fight: The story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945|publisher=Viking Press|location=New York|isbn=0-670-76003-X|ref={{sfnRef|Wilson}}|url=https://archive.org/details/whentigersfights00wils}} | |||
* {{cite journal|last =Zarrow|first=Peter|title=The War of Resistance, 1937–45|journal=China in War and Revolution 1895–1949|location=London|publisher=Routledge|date=2005|ref={{sfnRef|Zarrow}}}} | |||
* {{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OKLiAAAAMAAJ|title=China at war, Volume 1, Issue 3|year=1938|publisher=China Information Committee|page=66|access-date=21 March 2012}} Issue 40 of China, a collection of pamphlets. Original from Pennsylvania State University. Digitized 15 September 2009 | |||
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==External links== | ==External links== | ||
{{Wikivoyage|World War II in China}} | |||
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* "CBI Theater of Operations" – Links to selected documents, photos, maps, and books. | |||
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* {{cite web|url=http://warmuseum.ca/cwm/newspapers/operations/china_e.html |title=World War II Newspaper Archives – War in China, 1937–1945 |access-date=2004-08-19 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20031129080955/http://warmuseum.ca/cwm/newspapers/operations/china_e.html |archive-date=29 November 2003 |df=mdy }} | |||
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* , China 1:250,000, Series L500, U.S. Army Map Service, 1954– . Topographic Maps of China during the Second World War. | |||
* See bottom of the list for 1930s maps. | |||
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* Manchuria 1:250,000, Series L542, U.S. Army Map Service, 1950– . Topographic Maps of Manchuria during the Second World War. | ||
* {{cite web|url=http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/sino-japanese/index.htm |title=Joint Study of the Sino-Japanese War, Harvard University |access-date=2007-07-07 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20010713042417/http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/sino-japanese/index.htm |archive-date=13 July 2001 |df=mdy }} Multi-year project seeks to expand research by promoting cooperation among scholars and institutions in China, Japan, the United States, and other nations. Includes extensive bibliographies. | |||
* Manchuria 1:250,000, Series L542, U.S. Army Map Service, 1950- . Topographic Maps of Manchuria during the Second World War. | |||
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* Joint Study of the Sino-Japanese War, Harvard University. Multi-year project seeks to expand research by promoting cooperation among scholars and institutions in China, Japan, the United States, and other nations. Includes extensive bibliographies | |||
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Latest revision as of 03:36, 20 January 2025
1937–1945 war between China and Japan
Second Sino-Japanese War | |||||||||
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Part of the interwar period and the Pacific War | |||||||||
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Strength | |||||||||
14 million total
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4.1 million total
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Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Air Defense Service :
Losses of wounded and sick in hospitals directly administered by the Nationalist Government :
Estimated number of deserters in the war : 5.894-5.971 million
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15–22 million total casualties | |||||||||
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Second Sino-Japanese War | |
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Military campaigns of the Empire of Japan | |
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Meiji period |
Second Sino-Japanese War | |||||||||
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Chinese name | |||||||||
Traditional Chinese | 抗日戰爭 | ||||||||
Simplified Chinese | 抗日战争 | ||||||||
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Alternative name | |||||||||
Traditional Chinese | 抗戰 | ||||||||
Simplified Chinese | 抗战 | ||||||||
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Second alternative Chinese name | |||||||||
Traditional Chinese | 八年抗戰 | ||||||||
Simplified Chinese | 八年抗战 | ||||||||
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Third alternative Chinese name | |||||||||
Traditional Chinese | 十四年抗戰 | ||||||||
Simplified Chinese | 十四年抗战 | ||||||||
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Fourth alternative Chinese name | |||||||||
Traditional Chinese | 第二次中日戰爭 | ||||||||
Simplified Chinese | 第二次中日战争 | ||||||||
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Fifth alternative Chinese name | |||||||||
Traditional Chinese | (日本)侵華戰爭 | ||||||||
Simplified Chinese | (日本)侵华战争 | ||||||||
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Japanese name | |||||||||
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The Second Sino-Japanese War was fought between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan between 1937 and 1945, following a period of war localized to Manchuria that started in 1931. It is considered part of World War II, and often regarded as the beginning of World War II in Asia. It was the largest Asian war in the 20th century and has been described as "the Asian Holocaust", in reference to the scale of Japanese war crimes against Chinese civilians. It is known in China as the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (simplified Chinese: 抗日战争; traditional Chinese: 抗日戰爭).
On 18 September 1931, the Japanese staged the Mukden incident, a false flag event fabricated to justify their invasion of Manchuria and establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. This is sometimes marked as the beginning of the war. From 1931 to 1937, China and Japan engaged in skirmishes, including in Shanghai and in Northern China. Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces, respectively led by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, had fought each other in the Chinese Civil War since 1927. In late 1933, Chiang Kai-shek encircled the Chinese Communists in an attempt to finally destroy them, forcing the Communists into the Long March, resulting in the Communists losing around 90% of their men. As a Japanese invasion became imminent, Chiang still refused to form a united front before he was placed under house arrest by his subordinates who forced him to form the Second United Front in late 1936 in order to resist the Japanese invasion together.
The full-scale war began on 7 July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge incident near Beijing, which prompted a full-scale Japanese invasion of the rest of China. The Japanese captured the capital of Nanjing in 1937 and perpetrated the Nanjing Massacre. After failing to stop the Japanese capture of Wuhan in 1938, then China's de facto capital at the time, the Nationalist government relocated to Chongqing in the Chinese interior. After the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Soviet aid bolstered the National Revolutionary Army and Air Force. By 1939, after Chinese victories at Changsha and with Japan's lines of communications stretched deep into the interior, the war reached a stalemate. The Japanese were unable to defeat Chinese Communist Party forces in Shaanxi, who waged a campaign of sabotage and guerrilla warfare. In November 1939, Chinese nationalist forces launched a large scale winter offensive, and in August 1940, communist forces launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive in central China.
In December 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and declared war on the United States. The US increased its aid to China under the Lend-Lease Act, becoming its main financial and military supporter. With Burma cut off, the United States Army Air Forces airlifted material over the Himalayas. In 1944, Japan launched Operation Ichi-Go, the invasion of Henan and Changsha. In 1945, the Chinese Expeditionary Force resumed its advance in Burma and completed the Ledo Road linking India to China. China launched large counteroffensives in South China and repulsed a failed Japanese invasion of West Hunan and recaptured Japanese occupied regions of Guangxi.
Japan formally surrendered on 2 September 1945, following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Soviet declaration of war and subsequent invasions of Manchukuo and Korea. The war resulted in the deaths of around 20 million people, mostly Chinese civilians. China was recognized as one of the Four Policemen, regained all territories lost, and became one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The Chinese Civil War resumed in 1946, ending with a communist victory and the Proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949.
Names
In China, the war is most commonly known as the "War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression" (simplified Chinese: 抗日战争; traditional Chinese: 抗日戰爭), and shortened to "Resistance against Japanese Aggression" (抗日) or the "War of Resistance" (抗战; 抗戰). It was also called the "Eight Years' War of Resistance" (八年抗战; 八年抗戰), but in 2017 the Chinese Ministry of Education issued a directive stating that textbooks were to refer to the war as the "Fourteen Years' War of Resistance" (十四年抗战; 十四年抗戰), reflecting a focus on the broader conflict with Japan going back to the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria. According to historian Rana Mitter, historians in China are unhappy with the blanket revision, and (despite sustained tensions) the Republic of China did not consider itself to be in an ongoing war with Japan over these six years. It is also referred to as part of the "Global Anti-Fascist War".
In contemporary Japan, the name "Japan–China War" (Japanese: 日中戦争, romanized: Nitchū Sensō) is most commonly used because of its perceived objectivity. When the invasion of China proper began in earnest in July 1937 near Beijing, the government of Japan used "The North China Incident" (北支事變/華北事變, Hokushi Jihen/Kahoku Jihen), and with the outbreak of the Battle of Shanghai the following month, it was changed to "The China Incident" (支那事變, Shina Jihen).
The word "incident" (事變, jihen) was used by Japan, as neither country had made a formal declaration of war. From the Japanese perspective, localizing these conflicts was beneficial in preventing intervention from other countries, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, which were its primary source of petroleum and steel respectively. A formal expression of these conflicts would potentially lead to an American embargo in accordance with the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s. In addition, due to China's fractured political status, Japan often claimed that China was no longer a recognizable political entity on which war could be declared.
Other names
In Japanese propaganda, the invasion of China became a crusade (聖戦, seisen), the first step of the "eight corners of the world under one roof" slogan (八紘一宇, Hakkō ichiu). In 1940, Japanese prime minister Fumimaro Konoe launched the Taisei Yokusankai. When both sides formally declared war in December 1941, the name was replaced by "Greater East Asia War" (大東亞戰爭, Daitōa Sensō).
Although the Japanese government still uses the term "China Incident" in formal documents, the word Shina is considered derogatory by China and therefore the media in Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like "The Japan–China Incident" (日華事變/日支事變, Nikka Jiken/Nisshi Jiken), which were used by media as early as the 1930s.
The name "Second Sino-Japanese War" is not commonly used in Japan as the China it fought a war against in 1894 to 1895 was led by the Qing dynasty, and thus is called the Qing-Japanese War (日清戦争, Nisshin–Sensō), rather than the First Sino-Japanese War.
Another term for the second war between Japan and China is the "Japanese invasion of China", a term used mainly in foreign and Chinese narratives.
Background
Main article: China–Japan relationsThe origins of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), in which China, then under the rule of the Qing dynasty, was defeated by Japan and forced to cede Taiwan and recognize the full and complete independence of Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japan also annexed the Senkaku Islands, which Japan claims were uninhabited, in early 1895 as a result of its victory at the end of the war. Japan had also attempted to annex the Liaodong Peninsula following the war, though was forced to return it to China following the Triple Intervention by France, Germany, and Russia. The Qing dynasty was on the brink of collapse due to internal revolts and the imposition of the unequal treaties, while Japan had emerged as a great power through its efforts to modernize. In 1905, Japan successfully defeated the Russian Empire in the Russo-Japanese War, gaining Dalian and southern Sakhalin and establishing a protectorate over Korea.
Warlords in the Republic of China
Main articles: 1911 Revolution and Warlord EraIn 1911, factions of the Qing Army uprose against the government, staging a revolution that swept across China's southern provinces. The Qing responded by appointing Yuan Shikai, commander of the loyalist Beiyang Army, as temporary prime minister in order to subdue the revolution. Yuan, wanting to remain in power, compromised with the revolutionaries, and agreed to abolish the monarchy and establish a new republican government, under the condition he be appointed president of China. The new Beiyang government of China was proclaimed in March 1912, after which Yuan Shikai began to amass power for himself. In 1913, the parliamentary political leader Song Jiaoren was assassinated; it is generally believed Yuan Shikai ordered the assassination. Yuan Shikai then forced the parliament to pass a bill to strengthen the power of the president and sought to restore the imperial system, becoming the new emperor of China.
However, there was little support for an imperial restoration among the general population, and protests and demonstrations soon broke out across the country. Yuan's attempts at restoring the monarchy triggered the National Protection War, and Yuan Shikai was overthrown after only a few months. In the aftermath of Shikai's death in June 1916, control of China fell into the hands of the Beiyang Army leadership. The Beiyang government was a civilian government in name, but in practice it was a military dictatorship with a different warlord controlling each province of the country. China was reduced to a fractured state. As a result, China's prosperity began to wither and its economy declined. This instability presented an opportunity for nationalistic politicians in Japan to press for territorial expansion.
Twenty-One Demands
Main article: Twenty-One DemandsIn 1915, Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to extort further political and commercial privilege from China, which was accepted by the regime of Yuan Shikai. Following World War I, Japan acquired the German Empire's sphere of influence in Shandong province, leading to nationwide anti-Japanese protests and mass demonstrations in China. The country remained fragmented under the Beiyang Government and was unable to resist foreign incursions. For the purpose of unifying China and defeating the regional warlords, the Kuomintang (KMT) in Guangzhou launched the Northern Expedition from 1926 to 1928 with limited assistance from the Soviet Union.
Jinan incident
Main article: Jinan incidentThe National Revolutionary Army (NRA) formed by the Kuomintang swept through southern and central China until it was checked in Shandong, where confrontations with the Japanese garrison escalated into armed conflict. The conflicts were collectively known as the Jinan incident of 1928, during which time the Japanese military killed several Chinese officials and fired artillery shells into Jinan. According to the investigation results of the Association of the Families of the Victims of the Jinan massacre, it showed that 6,123 Chinese civilians were killed and 1,701 injured. Relations between the Chinese Nationalist government and Japan severely worsened as a result of the Jinan incident.
Reunification of China (1928)
Main article: Northeast Flag ReplacementAs the National Revolutionary Army approached Beijing, Zhang Zuolin decided to retreat back to Manchuria, before he was assassinated by the Kwantung Army in 1928. His son, Zhang Xueliang, took over as the leader of the Fengtian clique in Manchuria. Later in the same year, Zhang declared his allegiance to the Nationalist government in Nanjing under Chiang Kai-shek, and consequently, China was nominally reunified under one government.
1929 Sino-Soviet war
Main article: Sino-Soviet conflict (1929)The July–November 1929 conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railroad (CER) further increased the tensions in the Northeast that led to the Mukden Incident and eventually the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Soviet Red Army victory over Xueliang's forces not only reasserted Soviet control over the CER in Manchuria but revealed Chinese military weaknesses that Japanese Kwantung Army officers were quick to note.
The Soviet Red Army performance also stunned the Japanese. Manchuria was central to Japan's East Asia policy. Both the 1921 and 1927 Imperial Eastern Region Conferences reconfirmed Japan's commitment to be the dominant power in the Northeast. The 1929 Red Army victory shook that policy to the core and reopened the Manchurian problem. By 1930, the Kwantung Army realized they faced a Red Army that was only growing stronger. The time to act was drawing near and Japanese plans to conquer the Northeast were accelerated.
Chinese Communist Party
In 1930, the Central Plains War broke out across China, involving regional commanders who had fought in alliance with the Kuomintang during the Northern Expedition, and the Nanjing government under Chiang. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) previously fought openly against the Nanjing government after the Shanghai massacre of 1927, and they continued to expand during this protracted civil war. The Kuomintang government in Nanjing decided to focus their efforts on suppressing the Chinese Communists through the Encirclement Campaigns, following the policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" (Chinese: 攘外必先安內).
After the defeat of the Chinese Soviet Republic by the Nationalists, the Communists retreated on the Long March to Yan'an. The Nationalist government ordered local warlords to continue the campaign against the Communists rather than focus on the Japanese threat. A December 1936 coup by two Nationalist Generals, the Xi'an Incident, forced Chiang Kai-shek to accept a United Front with the Communists to oppose Japan.
Invasion of Manchuria and Northern China
Further information: Japanese invasion of ManchuriaThe internecine warfare in China provided excellent opportunities for Japan, which saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials, a market for its manufactured goods (now excluded from the markets of many Western countries as a result of Depression-era tariffs), and a protective buffer state against the Soviet Union in Siberia. As a result, the Japanese Army was widely prevalent in Manchuria immediately following the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, where Japan gained significant territory in Manchuria. As a result of their strengthened position, by 1915 Japan had negotiated a significant amount of economic privilege in the region by pressuring Yuan Shikai, the president of the Republic of China at the time. With a widened range of economic privileges in Manchuria, Japan began focusing on developing and protecting matters of economic interests. This included railroads, businesses, natural resources, and a general control of the territory. With its influence growing, the Japanese Army began to justify its presence by stating that it was simply protecting its own economic interests. However militarists in the Japanese Army began pushing for an expansion of influence, leading to the Japanese Army assassinating the warlord of Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin. This was done with hopes that it would start a crisis that would allow Japan to expand their power and influence in the region. When this was not as successful as they desired, Japan then decided to invade Manchuria outright after the Mukden incident in September 1931. Japanese soldiers set off a bomb on the Southern Manchurian Railroad in order to provoke an opportunity to act in "self defense" and invade outright. Japan charged that its rights in Manchuria, which had been established as a result of its victory in 1905 at the end of the Russo-Japanese War, had been systematically violated and there were "more than 120 cases of infringement of rights and interests, interference with business, boycott of Japanese goods, unreasonable taxation, detention of individuals, confiscation of properties, eviction, demand for cessation of business, assault and battery, and the oppression of Korean residents".
After five months of fighting, Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932, and installed the last Emperor of China, Puyi, as its puppet ruler. Militarily too weak to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the League of Nations for help. The League's investigation led to the publication of the Lytton Report, condemning Japan for its incursion into Manchuria, causing Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. No country took action against Japan beyond tepid censure. From 1931 until summer 1937, the Nationalist Army under Chiang Kai-shek did little to oppose Japanese encroachment into China.
Incessant fighting followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese troops fought the 28 January battle. This resulted in the demilitarization of Shanghai, which forbade the Chinese to deploy troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an ongoing campaign to pacify the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Armies that arose from widespread outrage over the policy of non-resistance to Japan. On 15 April 1932, the Chinese Soviet Republic led by the Communists declared war on Japan.
In 1933, the Japanese attacked the Great Wall region. The Tanggu Truce established in its aftermath, gave Japan control of Rehe Province, as well as a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beijing-Tianjin region. Japan aimed to create another buffer zone between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing.
Japan increasingly exploited China's internal conflicts to reduce the strength of its fractious opponents. Even years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government was limited to just the area of the Yangtze River Delta. Other sections of China were essentially in the hands of local Chinese warlords. Japan sought various Chinese collaborators and helped them establish governments friendly to Japan. This policy was called the Specialization of North China (華北特殊化; huáběitèshūhùa), more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong.
This Japanese policy was most effective in the area of what is now Inner Mongolia and Hebei. In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the He–Umezu Agreement, which forbade the KMT to conduct party operations in Hebei. In the same year, the Chin–Doihara Agreement was signed expelling the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935 the Chinese government had essentially abandoned northern China. In its place, the Japanese-backed East Hebei Autonomous Council and the Hebei–Chahar Political Council were established. There in the empty space of Chahar the Mongol military government was formed on 12 May 1936. Japan provided all the necessary military and economic aid. Afterwards Chinese volunteer forces continued to resist Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and Chahar and Suiyuan.
Some Chinese historians believe the 18 September 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria marks the start of the War of Resistance. Although not the conventional Western view, British historian Rana Mitter describes this Chinese trend of historical analysis as "perfectly reasonable". In 2017, the Chinese government officially announced that it would adopt this view. Under this interpretation, the 1931–1937 period is viewed as the "partial" war, while 1937–1945 is a period of "total" war. This view of a fourteen-year war has political significance because it provides more recognition for the role of northeast China in the War of Resistance.
1937: Full-scale invasion of China
Main article: Marco Polo Bridge IncidentOn the night of 7 July 1937, Chinese and Japanese troops exchanged fire in the vicinity of the Marco Polo (or Lugou) Bridge about 16 km from Beijing. The initial confused and sporadic skirmishing soon escalated into a full-scale battle.
Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for total war and had little military-industrial strength, no mechanized divisions, and few armoured forces.
Within the first year of full-scale war, Japanese forces obtained victories in most major Chinese cities.
Battle of Beiping–Tianjin
Main article: Battle of Beiping–TianjinOn 11 July, in accordance with the Goso conference, the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff authorized the deployment of an infantry division from the Chōsen Army, two combined brigades from the Kwantung Army and an air regiment composed of 18 squadrons as reinforcements to Northern China. By 20 July, total Japanese military strength in the Beijing-Tianjin area exceeded 180,000 personnel.
The Japanese gave Sung and his troops "free passage" before moving in to pacify resistance in areas surrounding Beijing (then Beiping) and Tianjin. After 24 days of combat, the Chinese 29th Army was forced to withdraw. The Japanese captured Beijing and the Taku Forts at Tianjin on 29 and 30 July respectively, thus concluding the Beijing-Tianjin campaign. By August 1937, Japan had occupied Beijing and Tianjin.
However, the Japanese Army had been given orders not to advance further than the Yongding River. In a sudden volte-face, the Konoe government's foreign minister opened negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek's government in Nanjing and stated: "Japan wants Chinese cooperation, not Chinese land." Nevertheless, negotiations failed to move further. The Ōyama Incident on 9 August escalated the skirmishes and battles into full scale warfare.
The 29th Army's resistance (and poor equipment) inspired the 1937 "Sword March", which—with slightly reworked lyrics—became the National Revolutionary Army's standard marching cadence and popularized the racial epithet guizi to describe the Japanese invaders.
Battle of Shanghai
Main article: Battle of ShanghaiThe Imperial General Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo, content with the gains acquired in northern China following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, initially showed reluctance to escalate the conflict into a full-scale war. Following the shooting of two Japanese officers who were attempting to enter the Hongqiao military airport on 9 August 1937, the Japanese demanded that all Chinese forces withdraw from Shanghai; the Chinese outright refused to meet this demand. In response, both the Chinese and the Japanese marched reinforcements into the Shanghai area. Chiang concentrated his best troops north of Shanghai in an effort to impress the city's large foreign community and increase China's foreign support.
On 13 August 1937, Kuomintang soldiers attacked Japanese Marine positions in Shanghai, with Japanese army troops and marines in turn crossing into the city with naval gunfire support at Zhabei, leading to the Battle of Shanghai. On 14 August, Chinese forces under the command of Zhang Zhizhong were ordered to capture or destroy the Japanese strongholds in Shanghai, leading to bitter street fighting. In an attack on the Japanese cruiser Izumo, Kuomintang planes accidentally bombed the Shanghai International Settlement, which led to more than 3,000 civilian deaths.
In the three days from 14 to 16 August 1937, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) sent many sorties of the then-advanced long-ranged G3M medium-heavy land-based bombers and assorted carrier-based aircraft with the expectation of destroying the Chinese Air Force. However, the Imperial Japanese Navy encountered unexpected resistance from the defending Chinese Curtiss Hawk II/Hawk III and P-26/281 Peashooter fighter squadrons; suffering heavy (50%) losses from the defending Chinese pilots (14 August was subsequently commemorated by the KMT as China's Air Force Day).
The skies of China had become a testing zone for advanced biplane and new-generation monoplane combat-aircraft designs. The introduction of the advanced A5M "Claude" fighters into the Shanghai-Nanjing theater of operations, beginning on 18 September 1937, helped the Japanese achieve a certain level of air superiority. However the few experienced Chinese veteran pilots, as well as several Chinese-American volunteer fighter pilots, including Maj. Art Chin, Maj. John Wong Pan-yang, and Capt. Chan Kee-Wong, even in their older and slower biplanes, proved more than able to hold their own against the sleek A5Ms in dogfights, and it also proved to be a battle of attrition against the Chinese Air Force. At the start of the battle, the local strength of the NRA was around five divisions, or about 70,000 troops, while local Japanese forces comprised about 6,300 marines. On 23 August, the Chinese Air Force attacked Japanese troop landings at Wusongkou in northern Shanghai with Hawk III fighter-attack planes and P-26/281 fighter escorts, and the Japanese intercepted most of the attack with A2N and A4N fighters from the aircraft carriers Hosho and Ryujo, shooting down several of the Chinese planes while losing a single A4N in the dogfight with Lt. Huang Xinrui in his P-26/281; the Japanese Army reinforcements succeeded in landing in northern Shanghai. The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) ultimately committed over 300,000 troops, along with numerous naval vessels and aircraft, to capture the city. After more than three months of intense fighting, their casualties far exceeded initial expectations. On 26 October, the IJA captured Dachang, a key strong-point within Shanghai, and on 5 November, additional reinforcements from Japan landed in Hangzhou Bay. Finally, on 9 November, the NRA began a general retreat.
Japan did not immediately occupy the Shanghai International Settlement or the Shanghai French Concession, areas which were outside of China's control due to the treaty port system. Japan moved into these areas after its 1941 declaration of war against the United States and the United Kingdom.
Battle of Nanjing and massacre
Main article: Nanjing MassacreIn November 1937, the Japanese concentrated 220,000 soldiers and began a campaign against Nanjing. Building on the hard-won victory in Shanghai, the IJA advanced on and captured the KMT capital city of Nanjing (December 1937) and Northern Shanxi (September – November 1937).
Japanese forces inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese soldiers defending the city, killing approximately 50,000 of them including 17 Chinese generals. Upon the capture of Nanjing, Japanese committed massive war atrocities including mass murder and rape of Chinese civilians after 13 December 1937, which has been referred to as the Nanjing Massacre. Over the next several weeks, Japanese troops perpetrated numerous mass executions and tens of thousands of rapes. The army looted and burned the surrounding towns and the city, destroying more than a third of the buildings.
The number of Chinese killed in the massacre has been subject to much debate, with estimates ranging from 100,000 to more than 300,000. The numbers agreed upon by most scholars are provided by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which estimate at least 200,000 murders and 20,000 rapes.
The Japanese atrocities in Nanjing, especially following the Chinese defense of Shanghai, increased international goodwill for the Chinese people and the Chinese government.
The Nationalist government re-established itself in Chongqing, which became the wartime seat of government until 1945.
1938
By January 1938, most conventional Kuomintang forces had either been defeated or no longer offered major resistance to Japanese advances. KMT forces won a few victories in 1938 (the Battle of Taierzhuang and the Battle of Wanjialing) but were generally ineffective that year. By March 1938, the Japanese controlled almost all of North China. Communist-led rural resistance to the Japanese remained active, however.
Battles of Xuzhou and Taierzhuang
With many victories achieved, Japanese field generals escalated the war in Jiangsu in an attempt to wipe out the Chinese forces in the area. The Japanese managed to overcome Chinese resistance around Bengbu and the Teng xian, but were fought to a halt at Linyi.
The Japanese were then decisively defeated at the Battle of Taierzhuang (March–April 1938), where the Chinese used night attacks and close quarters combat to overcome Japanese advantages in firepower. The Chinese also severed Japanese supply lines from the rear, forcing the Japanese to retreat in the first Chinese victory of the war.
The Japanese then attempted to surround and destroy the Chinese armies in the Xuzhou region with an enormous pincer movement. However the majority of the Chinese forces, some 200,000-300,000 troops in 40 divisions, managed to break out of the encirclement and retreat to defend Wuhan, the Japanese's next target.
Battle of Wuhan
Following Xuzhou, the IJA changed its strategy and deployed almost all of its existing armies in China to attack the city of Wuhan, which had become the political, economic and military center of China, in hopes of destroying the fighting strength of the NRA and forcing the KMT government to negotiate for peace. On 6 June, they captured Kaifeng, the capital of Henan, and threatened to take Zhengzhou, the junction of the Pinghan and Longhai railways.
The Japanese forces, numbering some 400,000 men, were faced by over 1 million NRA troops in the Central Yangtze region. Having learned from their defeats at Shanghai and Nanjing, the Chinese had adapted themselves to fight the Japanese and managed to check their forces on many fronts, slowing and sometimes reversing the Japanese advances, as in the case of Wanjialing.
To overcome Chinese resistance, Japanese forces frequently deployed poison gas and committed atrocities against civilians, such as a "mini-Nanjing Massacre" in the city of Jiujiang upon its capture. After four months of intense combat, the Nationalists were forced to abandon Wuhan by October, and its government and armies retreated to Chongqing. Both sides had suffered tremendous casualties in the battle, with the Chinese losing up to 500,000 soldiers killed or wounded,</ref> and the Japanese up to 200,000.
Communist resistance
After their victory at Wuhan, Japan advanced deep into Communist territory and redeployed 50,000 troops to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region. Elements of the Eighth Route Army soon attacked the advancing Japanese, inflicting between 3,000 and 5,000 casualties and resulting in a Japanese retreat. The Eighth Route Army carried out guerilla operations and established military and political bases. As the Japanese military came to understand that the Communists avoided conventional attacks and defense, it altered its tactics. The Japanese military built more roads to quicken movement between strongpoints and cities, blockaded rivers and roads in an effort to disrupt Communists supply, sought to expand militia from its puppet regime to conserve manpower, and use systematic violence on civilians in the Border Region in an effort to destroy its economy. The Japanese military mandated confiscation of the Eighth Route Army's goods and used this directive as a pretext to confiscate goods, including engaging in grave robbery in the Border Region.
With Japanese casualties and costs mounting, the Imperial General Headquarters attempted to break Chinese resistance by ordering the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service and Imperial Japanese Army Air Service to launch the war's first massive air raids on civilian targets. Japanese raiders hit the Kuomintang's newly established provisional capital of Chongqing and most other major cities in unoccupied China, leaving many people either dead, injured, or homeless.
Yellow River flood
This section is an excerpt from 1938 Yellow River flood.The 1938 Yellow River flood (simplified Chinese: 花园口决堤事件; traditional Chinese: 花園口決堤事件; pinyin: Huāyuánkǒu Juédī Shìjiàn; lit. 'Huayuankou Dam Burst Incident') was a man-made flood from June 1938 to January 1947 created by the intentional destruction of levees on the Yellow River in Huayuankou, Henan by the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The first wave of floods hit Zhongmu County on 13 June 1938.
NRA commanders intended the flood to act as a scorched earth defensive line against the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces. There were three long-term strategic intentions behind the decision to cause the flooding: firstly, the flood in Henan safeguarded the Guanzhong section of the Longhai railway, a major northwestern route used by the Soviet Union to send supplies to the NRA from August 1937 to March 1941. Secondly, the flooding of significant portions of land and railway sections made it difficult for the Japanese military to enter Shaanxi, thereby preventing them from invading the Sichuan basin, where the Chinese wartime capital of Chongqing and China's southwestern home front were located. Thirdly, the floods in Henan and Anhui destroyed much of the tracks and bridges of the Beijing–Wuhan railway, the Tianjin–Pukou railway and the Longhai railway, thereby preventing the Japanese from effectively moving their forces across Northern and Central China. In the short term, the NRA aimed to use the flood to halt the rapid transit of Japanese units from Northern China to areas near Wuhan.1939–1940: Chinese counterattack and stalemate
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By 1939, the Nationalist army had withdrawn to the southwest and northwest of China and the Japanese controlled the coastal cities that been centres of Nationalist power. From 1939 to 1945, China was divided into three regions: Japanese-occupied territories (Lunxianqu), the Nationalist-controlled region (Guotongqu), and the Communist-controlled regions (Jiefangqu, or liberated areas).
From the beginning of 1939, the war entered a new phase with the unprecedented defeat of the Japanese at Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang and First Battle of Changsha. These outcomes encouraged the Chinese to launch their first large-scale counter-offensive against the IJA in December 1939; however, due to its low military-industrial capacity and limited experience in modern warfare, this offensive was defeated. Afterwards Chiang could not risk any more all-out offensive campaigns given the poorly trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within the Kuomintang and in China in general. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped troops in the Battle of Shanghai and was at times at the mercy of his generals, who maintained a high degree of autonomy from the central KMT government.
During the offensive, Hui forces in Suiyuan under generals Ma Hongbin and Ma Buqing routed the Imperial Japanese Army and their puppet Inner Mongol forces and prevented the planned Japanese advance into northwest China. Ma Hongbin's father Ma Fulu had fought against Japanese in the Boxer Rebellion. General Ma Biao led Hui, Salar and Dongxiang cavalry to defeat the Japanese at the Battle of Huaiyang. Ma Biao fought against the Japanese in the Boxer Rebellion.
After 1940, the Japanese encountered tremendous difficulties in administering and garrisoning the seized territories, and tried to solve their occupation problems by implementing a strategy of creating friendly puppet governments favourable to Japanese interests in the territories conquered. This included prominently the regime headed by Wang Jingwei, one of Chiang's rivals in the KMT. However, atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army, as well as Japanese refusal to delegate any real power, left the puppets very unpopular and largely ineffective. The only success the Japanese had was to recruit a large Collaborationist Chinese Army to maintain public security in the occupied areas.
Japanese expansion
By 1941, Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China and Vietnam, but guerrilla fighting continued in these occupied areas. Japan had suffered high casualties which resulted from unexpectedly stubborn Chinese resistance, and neither side could make any swift progress in the manner of Nazi Germany in Western Europe.
By 1943, Guangdong had experienced famine. As the situation worsened, New York Chinese compatriots received a letter stating that 600,000 people were killed in Siyi by starvation.
Second phase: October 1938 – December 1941
During this period, the main Chinese objective was to drag out the war for as long as possible in a war of attrition, thereby exhausting Japanese resources while it was building up China's military capacity. American general Joseph Stilwell called this strategy "winning by outlasting". The NRA adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, flanking attacks, and encirclements in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic was the successful defense of Changsha in 1939, and again in the 1941 battle, in which heavy casualties were inflicted on the IJA.
Local Chinese resistance forces, organized separately by both the CCP and the KMT, continued their resistance in occupied areas to make Japanese administration over the vast land area of China difficult. In 1940, the Chinese Red Army launched a major offensive in north China, destroying railways and a major coal mine. These constant guerilla and sabotage operations deeply frustrated the Imperial Japanese Army and they led them to employ the Three Alls Policy—kill all, loot all, burn all. It was during this period that the bulk of Japanese war crimes were committed.
By 1941, Japan had occupied much of north and coastal China, but the KMT central government and military had retreated to the western interior to continue their resistance, while the Chinese communists remained in control of base areas in Shaanxi. In the occupied areas, Japanese control was mainly limited to railroads and major cities ("points and lines"). They did not have a major military or administrative presence in the vast Chinese countryside, where Chinese guerrillas roamed freely.
From 1941 to 1942, Japan concentrated most of its forces in China in an effort to defeat the Communist bases behind Japan's lines. To decrease guerilla's human and material resources, the Japanese military implemented its Three Alls policy ("Kill all, loot all, burn all"). In response, the Communist armies increased their role in production activities, including farming, raising hogs, and cloth-making.
Relationship between the Nationalists and the Communists
After the Mukden Incident in 1931, Chinese public opinion was strongly critical of Manchuria's leader, the "young marshal" Zhang Xueliang, for his non-resistance to the Japanese invasion, even though the Kuomintang central government was also responsible for this policy, giving Zhang an order to improvise while not offering support. After losing Manchuria to the Japanese, Zhang and his Northeast Army were given the duty of suppressing the Red Army in Shaanxi after their Long March. This resulted in great casualties for his Northeast Army, which received no support in manpower or weaponry from Chiang Kai-shek.
In the Xi'an Incident that took place on 12 December 1936, Zhang Xueliang kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in Xi'an, hoping to force an end to KMT–CCP conflict. To secure the release of Chiang, the KMT agreed to a temporary ceasefire with the Communists. On 24 December, the two parties agreed to a United Front against Japan; this had salutary effects for the beleaguered Communists, who agreed to form the New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army under the nominal control of the NRA. In addition, Shaan-Gan-Ning and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border regions were created, under the control of the CCP. In Shaan-Gan-Ning, Communists in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Base Area fostered opium production, taxed it, and engaged in its trade—including selling to Japanese-occupied and KMT-controlled provinces. The Red Army fought alongside KMT forces during the Battle of Taiyuan, and the high point of their cooperation came in 1938 during the Battle of Wuhan.
The formation of a united front added to the legality of the CCP, but what kind of support the central government would provide to the communists were not settled. When compromise with the CCP failed to incentivize the Soviet Union to engage in an open conflict against Japan, the KMT withheld further support for the Communists. To strengthen their legitimacy, Communist forces actively engaged the Japanese early on. These operations weakened Japanese forces in Shanxi and other areas in the North. Mao Zedong was distrustful of Chiang Kai-shek, however, and shifted strategy to guerrilla warfare in order to preserve the CCP's military strength.
Despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze River Valley in central China, the distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. The uneasy alliance began to break down by late 1938, partially due to the Communists' aggressive efforts to expand their military strength by absorbing Chinese guerrilla forces behind Japanese lines. Chinese militia who refused to switch their allegiance were often labelled "collaborators" and attacked by CCP forces. For example, the Red Army led by He Long attacked and wiped out a brigade of Chinese militia led by Zhang Yin-wu in Hebei in June 1939. Starting in 1940, open conflict between Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the occupied areas outside of Japanese control, culminating in the New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941.
Afterwards, the Second United Front completely broke down and Chinese Communists leader Mao Zedong outlined the preliminary plan for the CCP's eventual seizure of power from Chiang Kai-shek. Mao himself is quoted outlining the "721" policy, saying "We are fighting 70 percent for self development, 20 percent for compromise, and 10 percent against Japan". Mao began his final push for consolidation of CCP power under his authority, and his teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as Mao Zedong Thought. The Communists also began to focus most of their energy on building up their sphere of influence wherever opportunities were presented, mainly through rural mass organizations, administrative, land and tax reform measures favouring poor peasants; while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence by military blockade of areas controlled by CCP and fighting the Japanese at the same time.
Entrance of the Western Allies
Japan had expected to extract economic benefits of its invasions of China and elsewhere, including in the form of fuel and raw material resources. As Japanese aggression continued, however, the United States responded with trade embargoes on various goods, including oil and petroleum (beginning December 1939) and scrap iron and munitions (beginning July 1940). The United States demanded that Japan withdraw from China and also refused to recognize Japan's occupations of the Indochinese countries. In spring 1941, trade negotiations between the United States and Japan failed. In July 1941, the United States froze Japanese financial assets and obtained Dutch and British agreements to also cut those countries' oil exports to Japan. This in turn prompted the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States declared war against Japan, and within days China joined the Allies in formal declaration of war against Japan, Germany and Italy. As the Western Allies entered the war against Japan, the Sino-Japanese War would become part of a greater conflict, the Pacific theatre of World War II. Japan's military action against the United States also restrained its capacity to conduct further offensive operations in China.
After the Lend-Lease Act was passed in 1941, American financial and military aid began to trickle in. Claire Lee Chennault commanded the 1st American Volunteer Group (nicknamed the Flying Tigers), with American pilots flying American warplanes which were painted with the Chinese flag to attack the Japanese. He headed both the volunteer group and the uniformed U.S. Army Air Forces units that replaced it in 1942. However, it was the Soviets that provided the greatest material help for China from 1937 into 1941, with fighter aircraft for the Nationalist Chinese Air Force and artillery and armour for the Chinese Army through the Sino-Soviet Treaty; Operation Zet also provided for a group of Soviet volunteer combat aviators to join the Chinese Air Force in the fight against the Japanese occupation from late 1937 through 1939. The United States embargoed Japan in 1941 depriving it of shipments of oil and various other resources necessary to continue the war in China. This pressure, which was intended to disparage a continuation of the war and bring Japan into negotiation, resulted in the Attack on Pearl Harbor and Japan's drive south to procure from the resource-rich European colonies in Southeast Asia by force the resources which the United States had denied to them.
Almost immediately, Chinese troops achieved another decisive victory in the Battle of Changsha, which earned the Chinese government much prestige from the Western Allies. President Franklin D. Roosevelt referred to the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China as the world's "Four Policemen"; his primary reason for elevating China to such a status was the belief that after the war it would serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.
Knowledge of Japanese naval movements in the Pacific was provided to the American Navy by the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) which was run by the Chinese intelligence head Dai Li. Philippine and Japanese ocean weather was affected by weather originating near northern China. The base of SACO was located in Yangjiashan.
Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive supplies from the United States. However, in contrast to the Arctic supply route to the Soviet Union which stayed open through most of the war, sea routes to China and the Yunnan–Vietnam Railway had been closed since 1940. Therefore, between the closing of the Burma Road in 1942 and its re-opening as the Ledo Road in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what could be flown in over "The Hump". In Burma, on 16 April 1942, 7,000 British soldiers were encircled by the Japanese 33rd Division during the Battle of Yenangyaung and rescued by the Chinese 38th Division. After the Doolittle Raid, the Imperial Japanese Army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of finding the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases. The operation started 15 May 1942, with 40 infantry battalions and 15–16 artillery battalions but was repelled by Chinese forces in September. During this campaign, the Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates allege that as many as 250,000 civilians, the vast majority of whom were destitute Tanka boat people and other pariah ethnicities unable to flee, may have died of disease. It caused more than 16 million civilians to evacuate far away deep inward China. 90% of Ningbo's population had already fled before battle started.
Most of China's industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union refused to allow the United States to supply China through the Kazakhstan into Xinjiang as the Xinjiang warlord Sheng Shicai had turned anti-Soviet in 1942 with Chiang's approval. For these reasons, the Chinese government never had the supplies and equipment needed to mount major counter-offensives. Despite the severe shortage of matériel, in 1943, the Chinese were successful in repelling major Japanese offensives in Hubei and Changde.
Chiang was named Allied commander-in-chief in the China theater in 1942. American general Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's chief of staff, while simultaneously commanding American forces in the China-Burma-India Theater. For many reasons, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down. Many historians (such as Barbara W. Tuchman) have suggested it was largely due to the corruption and inefficiency of the Kuomintang government, while others (such as Ray Huang and Hans van de Ven) have depicted it as a more complicated situation. Stilwell had a strong desire to assume total control of Chinese troops and pursue an aggressive strategy, while Chiang preferred a patient and less expensive strategy of out-waiting the Japanese. Chiang continued to maintain a defensive posture despite Allied pleas to actively break the Japanese blockade, because China had already suffered tens of millions of war casualties and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate in the face of America's overwhelming industrial output. For these reasons the other Allies gradually began to lose confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing an island hopping strategy.
Long-standing differences in national interest and political stance among China, the United States, and the United Kingdom remained in place. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was reluctant to devote British troops, many of whom had been routed by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to the reopening of the Burma Road; Stilwell, on the other hand, believed that reopening the road was vital, as all China's mainland ports were under Japanese control. The Allies' "Europe first" policy did not sit well with Chiang, while the later British insistence that China send more and more troops to Indochina for use in the Burma Campaign was seen by Chiang as an attempt to use Chinese manpower to defend British colonial possessions. Chiang also believed that China should divert its crack army divisions from Burma to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American bombers that he hoped would defeat Japan through bombing, a strategy that American general Claire Lee Chennault supported but which Stilwell strongly opposed. In addition, Chiang voiced his support of the Indian independence movement in a 1942 meeting with Mohandas Gandhi, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.
American and Canadian-born Chinese were recruited to act as covert operatives in Japanese-occupied China. Employing their racial background as a disguise, their mandate was to blend in with local citizens and wage a campaign of sabotage. Activities focused on destruction of Japanese transportation of supplies (signaling bomber destruction of railroads, bridges). Chinese forces advanced to northern Burma in late 1943, besieged Japanese troops in Myitkyina, and captured Mount Song. The British and Commonwealth forces had their operation in Mission 204 which attempted to provide assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Army. The first phase in 1942 under command of SOE achieved very little, but lessons were learned and a second more successful phase, commenced in February 1943 under British Military command, was conducted before the Japanese Operation Ichi-Go offensive in 1944 compelled evacuation.
1944 and Operation Ichi-Go
In 1944, the Communists launched counteroffensives from the liberated areas against Japanese forces.
Japan's 1944 Operation Ichi-Go was the largest military campaign of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The campaign mobilized 500,000 Japanese troops, 100,000 horses, 1,500 artillery pieces, and 800 tanks. The 750,000 casualty figure for Nationalist Chinese forces are not all dead and captured, Cox included in the 750,000 casualties that China incurred in Ichigo soldiers who simply "melted away" and others who were rendered combat ineffective besides killed and captured soldiers.
In late November 1944, the Japanese advanced slowed approximately 300 miles from Chongqing as it experienced shortages of trained soldiers and materiel. Although Operation Ichi-Go achieved its goals of seizing United States air bases and establishing a potential railway corridor from Manchukuo to Hanoi, it did so too late to impact the result of the broader war. American bombers in Chengdu were moved to the Mariana Islands where, along with bombers from bases in Saipan and Tinian, they could still bomb the Japanese home islands.
After Operation Ichigo, Chiang Kai-shek started a plan to withdraw Chinese troops from the Burma theatre against Japan in Southeast Asia for a counter offensive called "White Tower" and "Iceman" against Japanese soldiers in China in 1945.
The poor performance of Chiang Kai-shek's forces in opposing the Japanese advance during Operation Ichigo became widely viewed as demonstrating Chiang's incompetence. It irreparably damaged the Roosevelt administration's view of Chiang and the KMT. The campaign further weakened the Nationalist economy and government revenues. Because of the Nationalists' increasing inability to fund the military, Nationalist authorities overlooked military corruption and smuggling. The Nationalist army increasingly turned to raiding villages to press-gang peasants into service and force marching them to assigned units. Approximately 10% of these peasants died before reaching their units.
By the end of 1944, Chinese troops under the command of Sun Li-jen attacking from India, and those under Wei Lihuang attacking from Yunnan, joined forces in Mong-Yu, successfully driving the Japanese out of North Burma and securing the Ledo Road, China's vital supply artery. In Spring 1945 the Chinese launched offensives that retook Hunan and Guangxi. With the Chinese army progressing well in training and equipment, Wedemeyer planned to launch Operation Carbonado in summer 1945 to retake Guangdong, thus obtaining a coastal port, and from there drive northwards toward Shanghai. However, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Soviet invasion of Manchuria hastened Japanese surrender and these plans were not put into action.
Chinese industrial base and the CIC
Main articles: Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, History of the cooperative movement in China, and Gung-hoForeign aid
Further information: Japanese in the Chinese resistance to the Empire of JapanBefore the start of full-scale warfare of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Germany had since the time of the Weimar Republic, provided much equipment and training to crack units of the National Revolutionary Army of China, including some aerial-combat training with the Luftwaffe to some pilots of the pre-Nationalist Air Force of China. A number of foreign powers, including the Americans, Italians and Japanese, provided training and equipment to different air force units of pre-war China. With the outbreak of full-scale war between China and the Empire of Japan, the Soviet Union became the primary supporter for China's war of resistance through the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact from 1937 to 1941. When the Imperial Japanese invaded French Indochina, the United States enacted the oil and steel embargo against Japan and froze all Japanese assets in 1941, and with it came the Lend-Lease Act of which China became a beneficiary on 6 May 1941; from there, China's main diplomatic, financial and military supporter came from the U.S., particularly following the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Overseas Chinese
Over 3,200 overseas Chinese drivers and motor vehicle mechanics embarked to wartime China to support military and logistics supply lines, especially through Indo-China, which became of absolute tantamount importance when the Japanese cut-off all ocean-access to China's interior with the capture of Nanning after the Battle of South Guangxi. Overseas Chinese communities in the U.S. raised money and nurtured talent in response to Imperial Japan's aggressions in China, which helped to fund an entire squadron of Boeing P-26 fighter planes purchased for the looming war situation between China and the Empire of Japan; over a dozen Chinese-American aviators, including John "Buffalo" Huang, Arthur Chin, Hazel Ying Lee, Chan Kee-Wong et al., formed the original contingent of foreign volunteer aviators to join the Chinese air forces (some provincial or warlord air forces, but ultimately all integrating into the centralized Chinese Air Force; often called the Nationalist Air Force of China) in the "patriotic call to duty for the motherland" to fight against the Imperial Japanese invasion. Several of the original Chinese-American volunteer pilots were sent to Lagerlechfeld Air Base in Germany for aerial-gunnery training by the Chinese Air Force in 1936.
German
Main article: China-Germany relations (1912-1949)Prior to the war, Germany and China were in close economic and military cooperation, with Germany helping China modernize its industry and military in exchange for raw materials. Germany sent military advisers such as Alexander von Falkenhausen to China to help the KMT government reform its armed forces. Some divisions began training to German standards and were to form a relatively small but well trained Chinese Central Army. By the mid-1930s about 80,000 soldiers had received German-style training. After the KMT lost Nanjing and retreated to Wuhan, Hitler's government decided to withdraw its support of China in 1938 in favour of an alliance with Japan as its main anti-Communist partner in East Asia.
Soviet
After Germany and Japan signed the anti-communist Anti-Comintern Pact, the Soviet Union hoped to keep China fighting, in order to deter a Japanese invasion of Siberia and save itself from a two-front war. In September 1937, they signed the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and approved Operation Zet, the formation of a secret Soviet volunteer air force, in which Soviet technicians upgraded and ran some of China's transportation systems. Bombers, fighters, supplies and advisors arrived, headed by Aleksandr Cherepanov. Prior to the Western Allies, the Soviets provided the most foreign aid to China: some $250 million in credits for munitions and other supplies. The Soviet Union defeated Japan in the Battles of Khalkhin Gol in May – September 1939, leaving the Japanese reluctant to fight the Soviets again. In April 1941, Soviet aid to China ended with the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. This pact enabled the Soviet Union to avoid fighting against Germany and Japan at the same time. In August 1945, the Soviet Union annulled the neutrality pact with Japan and invaded Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, the Kuril Islands, and northern Korea. The Soviets also continued to support the Chinese Communist Party. In total, 3,665 Soviet advisors and pilots served in China, and 227 of them died fighting there.
The Soviet Union provided financial aid to both the Communists and the Nationalists.
United States
Further information: American Volunteer Group, Flying Tigers, and China Air Task ForceThe United States generally avoided taking sides between Japan and China until 1940, providing virtually no aid to China in this period. For instance, the 1934 Silver Purchase Act signed by President Roosevelt caused chaos in China's economy which helped the Japanese war effort. The 1933 Wheat and Cotton Loan mainly benefited American producers, while aiding to a smaller extent both Chinese and Japanese alike. This policy was due to US fear of breaking off profitable trade ties with Japan, in addition to US officials and businesses perception of China as a potential source of massive profit for the US by absorbing surplus American products, as William Appleman Williams states.
From December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on USS Panay and the Nanjing Massacre swung public opinion in the West sharply against Japan and increased their fear of Japanese expansion, which prompted the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to provide loan assistance for war supply contracts to China. Australia also prevented a Japanese government-owned company from taking over an iron mine in Australia, and banned iron ore exports in 1938. However, in July 1939, negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Khatira and the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Robert Craigie, led to an agreement by which the United Kingdom recognized Japanese conquests in China. At the same time, the US government extended a trade agreement with Japan for six months, then fully restored it. Under the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machine tools for aircraft factories, strategic materials (steel and scrap iron up to 16 October 1940, petrol and petroleum products up to 26 June 1941), and various other much-needed supplies.
In a hearing before the United States Congress House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on Wednesday, 19 April 1939, the acting chairman Sol Bloom and other Congressmen interviewed Maxwell S. Stewart, a former Foreign Policy Association research staff and economist who charged that America's Neutrality Act and its "neutrality policy" was a massive farce which only benefited Japan and that Japan did not have the capability nor could ever have invaded China without the massive amount of raw material America exported to Japan. America exported far more raw material to Japan than to China in the years 1937–1940. According to the United States Congress, the U.S.'s third largest export destination was Japan until 1940 when France overtook it due to France being at war too. Japan's military machine acquired war materials, automotive equipment, steel, scrap iron, copper, oil, that it wanted from the United States in 1937–1940 and was allowed to purchase aerial bombs, aircraft equipment, and aircraft from America up to the summer of 1938. A 1934 U.S. State Department memo even noted how Japan's business dealings with Standard Oil of New Jersey company, under the leadership of Walter Teagle, made United States oil the "major portion of the petroleum and petroleum products now imported into Japan." War essentials exports from the United States to Japan increased by 124% along with a general increase of 41% of all American exports from 1936 to 1937 when Japan invaded China. Japan's war economy was fueled by exports to the United States at over twice the rate immediately preceding the war. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Japan corresponded to the following share of American exports.
Japan invaded and occupied the northern part of French Indochina in September 1940 to prevent China from receiving the 10,000 tons of materials delivered monthly by the Allies via the Haiphong–Yunnan Fou Railway line.
On 22 June 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. In spite of non-aggression pacts or trade connections, Hitler's assault threw the world into a frenzy of re-aligning political outlooks and strategic prospects.
On 21 July, Japan occupied the southern part of French Indochina (southern Vietnam and Cambodia), contravening a 1940 gentlemen's agreement not to move into southern French Indochina. From bases in Cambodia and southern Vietnam, Japanese planes could attack Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. As the Japanese occupation of northern French Indochina in 1940 had already cut off supplies from the West to China, the move into southern French Indochina was viewed as a direct threat to British and Dutch colonies. Many principal figures in the Japanese government and military (particularly the navy) were against the move, as they foresaw that it would invite retaliation from the West.
On 24 July 1941, Roosevelt requested Japan withdraw all its forces from Indochina. Two days later the US and the UK began an oil embargo; two days after that the Netherlands joined them. This was a decisive moment in the Second Sino-Japanese War. The loss of oil imports made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China on a long-term basis. It set the stage for Japan to launch a series of military attacks against the Allies, including the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.
In mid-1941, the United States government financed the creation of the American Volunteer Groups (AVG), of which one the "Flying Tigers" reached China, to replace the withdrawn Soviet volunteers and aircraft. The Flying Tigers did not enter actual combat until after the United States had declared war on Japan. Led by Chennault, their early combat success of 300 kills against a loss of 12 of their newly introduced Curtiss P-40 Warhawk fighters heavily armed with six 0.50-inch caliber machine guns and very fast diving speeds earned them wide recognition at a time when the Chinese Air Force and Allies in the Pacific and SE Asia were suffering heavy losses, and soon afterwards their "boom and zoom" high-speed hit-and-run air combat tactics would be adopted by the United States Army Air Forces.
Disagreements existed both between the United States and the Nationalists, and within the United States military, about the form of aid. Chennault contended that aid should be in the form of building on the success of the Flying Tigers and go to the US Fourteenth Air Force in China. Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell, who was in charge of training Nationalist divisions equipped by the United States, became increasingly frustrated by the Nationalists' refusal to use them to fight the Japanese in Burma or in southeastern China.
The Sino-American Cooperative Organization was an organization created by the SACO Treaty signed by the Republic of China and the United States of America in 1942 that established a mutual intelligence gathering entity in China between the respective nations against Japan. It operated in China jointly along with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America's first intelligence agency and forerunner of the CIA while also serving as joint training program between the two nations. Among all the wartime missions that Americans set up in China, SACO was the only one that adopted a policy of "total immersion" with the Chinese. The "Rice Paddy Navy" or "What-the-Hell Gang" operated in the China-Burma-India theater, advising and training, forecasting weather and scouting landing areas for USN fleet and Gen Claire Chennault's 14th AF, rescuing downed American flyers, and intercepting Japanese radio traffic. An underlying mission objective during the last year of war was the development and preparation of the China coast for Allied penetration and occupation. Fujian was scouted as a potential staging area and springboard for the future military landing of the Allies of World War II in Japan.
United Kingdom
Further information: Mission 204 and British Army Aid GroupAfter the Tanggu Truce of 1933, Chiang Kai-Shek and the British government would have more friendly relations but were uneasy due to British foreign concessions there. During the Second Sino-Japanese War the British government would initially have an impartial viewpoint toward the conflict urging both to reach an agreement and prevent war. British public opinion would swing in favor of the Chinese after Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen's car which had Union Jacks on it was attacked by Japanese aircraft with Hugessen being temporarily paralyzed with outrage against the attack from the public and government. The British public were largely supportive of the Chinese and many relief efforts were untaken to help China. Britain at this time was beginning the process of rearmament and the sale of military surplus was banned but there was never an embargo on private companies shipping arms. A number of unassembled Gloster Gladiator fighters were imported to China via Hong Kong for the Chinese Air Force. Between July 1937 and November 1938 on average 60,000 tons of munitions were shipped from Britain to China via Hong Kong. Attempts by the United Kingdom and the United States to do a joint intervention were unsuccessful as both countries had rocky relations in the interwar era.
In February 1941 a Sino-British agreement was forged whereby British troops would assist the Chinese "Surprise Troops" units of guerrillas already operating in China, and China would assist Britain in Burma.
When Hong Kong was overrun in December 1941, the British Army Aid Group (B.A.A.G.) was set up and headquartered in Guilin, Guangxi. It's aim was to assist prisoners of war and internees to escape from Japanese camps. This led to the formation of the Hong Kong Volunteer Company which later fought in Burma. B.A.A.G. also sent agents to gather intelligence – military, political and economic in Southern China, as well as giving medical and humanitarian assistance to Chinese civilians and military personnel.
A British-Australian commando operation, Mission 204 (Tulip Force), was initialized to provide training to Chinese guerrilla troops. The mission conducted two operations, mostly in the provinces of Yunnan and Jiangxi.
The first operation commenced in February 1942 from Burma on a long journey to the Chinese front. Due to issues with supporting the Chinese and gradual disease and supply issues, the first phase achieved very little and the unit was withdrawn in September.
Another phase was set up with lessons learned from the first. Commencing in February 1943 this time valid assistance was given to the Chinese 'Surprise Troops' in various actions against the Japanese. These involved ambushes, attacks on airfields, blockhouses, and supply depots. The unit operated successfully before withdrawal in November 1944.
Commandos and members of SOE who had formed Force 136, worked with the Free Thai Movement who also operated in China, mostly while on their way into Thailand.
After the Japanese blocked the Burma Road in April 1942, and before the Ledo Road was finished in early 1945, the majority of US and British supplies to the Chinese had to be delivered via airlift over the eastern end of the Himalayan Mountains known as "The Hump". Flying over the Himalayas was extremely dangerous, but the airlift continued daily to August 1945, at great cost in men and aircraft.
French Indochina
See also: Japanese invasion of French Indochina and Japanese coup d'état in French IndochinaThe Chinese Kuomintang also supported the Vietnamese Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (VNQDD) in its battle against French and Japanese imperialism. In Guangxi, Chinese military leaders were organizing Vietnamese nationalists against the Japanese. The VNQDD had been active in Guangxi and some of their members had joined the KMT army. Under the umbrella of KMT activities, a broad alliance of nationalists emerged. With Ho at the forefront, the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnamese Independence League, usually known as the Viet Minh) was formed and based in the town of Jingxi. The pro-VNQDD nationalist Ho Ngoc Lam, a KMT army officer and former disciple of Phan Bội Châu, was named as the deputy of Phạm Văn Đồng, later to be Ho's Prime Minister. The front was later broadened and renamed the Viet Nam Giai Phong Dong Minh (Vietnam Liberation League).
The Viet Nam Revolutionary League was a union of various Vietnamese nationalist groups, run by the pro Chinese VNQDD. Chinese KMT General Zhang Fakui created the league to further Chinese influence in Indochina, against the French and Japanese. Its stated goal was for unity with China under the Three Principles of the People, created by KMT founder Dr. Sun and opposition to Japanese and French Imperialists. The Revolutionary League was controlled by Nguyen Hai Than, who was born in China and could not speak Vietnamese. General Zhang shrewdly blocked the Communists of Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh from entering the league, as Zhang's main goal was Chinese influence in Indochina. The KMT utilized these Vietnamese nationalists during World War II against Japanese forces. Franklin D. Roosevelt, through General Stilwell, privately made it clear that they preferred that the French not reacquire French Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) after the war was over. Roosevelt offered Chiang Kai-shek control of all of Indochina. It was said that Chiang Kai-shek replied: "Under no circumstances!"
After the war, 200,000 Chinese troops under General Lu Han were sent by Chiang Kai-shek to northern Indochina (north of the 16th parallel) to accept the surrender of Japanese occupying forces there, and remained in Indochina until 1946, when the French returned. The Chinese used the VNQDD, the Vietnamese branch of the Chinese Kuomintang, to increase their influence in French Indochina and to put pressure on their opponents. Chiang Kai-shek threatened the French with war in response to maneuvering by the French and Ho Chi Minh's forces against each other, forcing them to come to a peace agreement. In February 1946, he also forced the French to surrender all of their concessions in China and to renounce their extraterritorial privileges in exchange for the Chinese withdrawing from northern Indochina and allowing French troops to reoccupy the region. Following France's agreement to these demands, the withdrawal of Chinese troops began in March 1946.
Central Asian rebellions
In 1937, then pro-Soviet General Sheng Shicai invaded Dunganistan accompanied by Soviet troops to defeat General Ma Hushan of the KMT 36th Division. General Ma expected help from Nanjing, but did not receive it. The Nationalist government was forced to deny these maneuvers as "Japanese propaganda", as it needed continued military supplies from the Soviets.
As the war went on, Nationalist General Ma Buqing was in virtual control of the Gansu corridor. Ma had earlier fought against the Japanese, but because the Soviet threat was great, Chiang in July 1942 directed him to move 30,000 of his troops to the Tsaidam marsh in the Qaidam Basin of Qinghai. Chiang further named Ma as Reclamation Commissioner, to threaten Sheng's southern flank in Xinjiang, which bordered Tsaidam.
The Ili Rebellion broke out in Xinjiang when the Kuomintang Hui Officer Liu Bin-Di was killed while fighting Turkic Uyghur rebels in November 1944. The Soviet Union supported the Turkic rebels against the Kuomintang, and Kuomintang forces fought back.
Ethnic minorities
Main article: Chinese ethnic minorities in the Second Sino-Japanese WarJapan attempted to reach out to Chinese ethnic minorities in order to rally them to their side against the Han Chinese, but only succeeded with certain Manchu, Mongol, Uyghur, and Tibetan elements.
The Japanese attempt to get the Muslim Hui people on their side failed, as many Chinese generals such as Bai Chongxi, Ma Hongbin, Ma Hongkui, and Ma Bufang were Hui. The Japanese attempted to approach Ma Bufang but were unsuccessful in making any agreement with him. Ma Bufang ended up supporting the anti-Japanese Imam Hu Songshan, who prayed for the destruction of the Japanese. Ma became chairman (governor) of Qinghai in 1938 and commanded a group army. He was appointed because of his anti-Japanese inclinations, and was such an obstruction to Japanese agents trying to contact the Tibetans that he was called an "adversary" by a Japanese agent.
Hui Muslims
Hui cemeteries were destroyed for military reasons. Many Hui fought in the war against the Japanese such as Bai Chongxi, Ma Hongbin, Ma Hongkui, Ma Bufang, Ma Zhanshan, Ma Biao, Ma Zhongying, Ma Buqing and Ma Hushan. Qinghai Tibetans served in the Qinghai army against the Japanese. The Qinghai Tibetans view the Tibetans of Central Tibet (Tibet proper, ruled by the Dalai Lamas from Lhasa) as distinct and different from themselves, and even take pride in the fact that they were not ruled by Lhasa ever since the collapse of the Tibetan Empire.
Xining was subjected to aerial bombardment by Japanese warplanes in 1941, causing all ethnicities in Qinghai to unite against the Japanese. General Han Youwen directed the defense of the city of Xining during air raids by Japanese planes. Han survived an aerial bombardment by Japanese planes in Xining while he was being directed via telephone by Ma Bufang, who hid in an air-raid shelter in a military barracks. The bombing resulted in Han being buried in rubble, though he was later rescued.
John Scott reported in 1934 that there was both strong anti-Japanese feeling and anti-Bolshevik among the Muslims of Gansu and he mentioned the Muslim generals Ma Fuxiang, Ma Qi, Ma Anliang and Ma Bufang who was chairman of Qinghai province when he stayed in Xining.
Conclusion and aftermath
End of the Pacific War and the surrender of Japanese troops in China
Main articles: Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Soviet invasion of Manchuria, and Japanese Instrument of SurrenderDuring the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese had consistent tactical successes but failed to achieve strategic results. Although it seized the majority of China's industrial capacity, occupied most major cities, and rarely lost a battle, Japan's occupation of China was costly. Japan had approximately 50,000 military fatalities each year and 200,000 wounded per year.
In less than two weeks the Kwantung Army, which was the primary Japanese fighting force, consisting of over a million men but lacking in adequate armour, artillery, or air support, had been destroyed by the Soviets. Japanese Emperor Hirohito officially capitulated to the Allies on 15 August 1945. The official surrender was signed aboard the battleship USS Missouri on 2 September 1945, in a ceremony where several Allied commanders including Chinese general Hsu Yung-chang were present.
After the Allied victory in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur ordered all Japanese forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Taiwan and French Indochina north of 16° north latitude to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek, and the Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on 9 September 1945, at 9:00. The ninth hour of the ninth day of the ninth month was chosen in echo of the Armistice of 11 November 1918 (on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month) and because "nine" is a homophone of the word for "long lasting" in Chinese (to suggest that the peace won would last forever).
Chiang relied on American help in transporting Nationalist troops to regain control of formerly Japanese-occupied areas. Non-Chinese generally viewed the behavior of these troops as undercutting Nationalist legitimacy, and these troops engaged in corruption and looting, leading to widespread views of a "botched liberation".
The Nationalist government seized Japanese-held businesses at the time of the Japanese surrender. The Nationalist government made little effort to return these businesses to their original Chinese owners. A mechanism existed through which Chinese and foreign owners could petition for the return of their former property. In practice, the Nationalist government and its officials retained a great deal of the seized property and embezzling property, particularly from warehouses, was common. Nationalist officials sometimes extorted money from individuals in liberated territories under threat of labeling them as Japanese collaborators.
Chiang's focus on his communist opponents prompted him to leave Japanese troops or troops of the Japanese puppet regimes to remain on duty in occupied areas so as to avoid their surrender to Communist forces.
Post-war struggle and resumption of the civil war
Main article: Chinese Civil WarIn 1945, China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but economically weak and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy was sapped by the military demands of a long costly war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by corruption in the Nationalist government that included profiteering, speculation and hoarding.
The poor performance of Nationalist forces opposing the Ichi-go campaign was largely viewed as reflecting poorly on Chiang's competence. Chiang blamed the failure on the United States, particularly Stilwell, who had used Chinese forces in the Burma Campaign and in Chiang's view, left China insufficiently defended.
As part of the Yalta Conference, which allowed a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, the Soviets dismantled and removed more than half of the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese before handing over Manchuria to China. Large swathes of the prime farming areas had been ravaged by the fighting and there was starvation and famine in the wake of the war. Many towns and cities were destroyed, and millions were rendered homeless by floods.
The problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction after the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, and the war left the Nationalists severely weakened, and their policies left them unpopular. Meanwhile, the war strengthened the Communists both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At Yan'an and elsewhere in the communist controlled areas, Mao Zedong was able to adapt Marxism–Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts.
In Japanese-occupied areas, the Communists had established military and political bases from which it carried out guerilla warfare. The Communists built popular support in these areas, returning land to poor peasants, reducing peasant's rent, and arming the people. By Spring 1945, there were 19 Communist-governed areas in China in which 95 million people lived. In Fall 1945, the Communist armies had 1.27 million men and were supported by 2.68 million militia members.
Mao also began to execute his plan to establish a new China by rapidly moving his forces from Yan'an and elsewhere to Manchuria. This opportunity was available to the Communists because although Nationalist representatives were not invited to Yalta, they had been consulted and had agreed to the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in the belief that the Soviet Union would cooperate only with the Nationalist government after the war.
However, the Soviet occupation of Manchuria was long enough to allow the Communist forces to move in en masse and arm themselves with the military hardware surrendered by the Imperial Japanese Army, quickly establish control in the countryside and move into position to encircle the Nationalist government army in major cities of northeast China. Following that, the Chinese Civil War broke out between the Nationalists and Communists, which concluded with the Communist victory in mainland China and the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan in 1949.
Aftermath
The Nationalists suffered higher casualties because they were the main combatants opposing the Japanese in each of the 22 major battles (involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides) between China and Japan. The Communist forces, by contrast, usually avoided pitched battles with the Japanese, in which their guerrilla tactics were less effective, and generally limited their combat to guerrilla actions (the Hundred Regiments Offensive and the Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions). The Nationalists committed their strongest divisions in early battle against the Japanese (including the 36th, 87th, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend Shanghai and continued to deploy most of their forces to fight the Japanese even as the Communists changed their strategy to engage mainly in a political offensive against the Japanese while declaring that the CCP should "save and preserve our strength and wait for favourable timing" by the end of 1941.
Legacy
China-Japan relations
Today, the war is a major point of contention and resentment between China and Japan. The war remains a major roadblock for Sino-Japanese relations. Issues regarding the current historical outlook on the war exist. For example, the Japanese government has been accused of historical revisionism by allowing the approval of a few school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past, although the most recent controversial book, the New History Textbook was used by only 0.039% of junior high schools in Japan and despite the efforts of the Japanese nationalist textbook reformers, by the late 1990s the most common Japanese schoolbooks contained references to, for instance, the Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731, and the comfort women of World War II, all historical issues which have faced challenges from ultranationalists in the past.
In 2005, a history textbook prepared by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform which had been approved by the government in 2001, sparked huge outcry and protests in China and Korea. It referred to the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities such as the Manila massacre as an "incident", glossed over the issue of comfort women, and made only brief references to the death of Chinese soldiers and civilians in Nanjing. A copy of the 2005 version of a junior high school textbook titled New History Textbook found that there is no mention of the "Nanjing Massacre" or the "Nanjing Incident". Indeed, the only one sentence that referred to this event was: "they occupied that city in December".
Taiwan
Main article: Legal status of TaiwanTaiwan and the Penghu islands were put under the administrative control of the Republic of China (ROC) government in 1945 by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The ROC proclaimed Taiwan Retrocession Day on 25 October 1945. However, due to the unresolved Chinese Civil War, neither the newly established People's Republic of China in mainland China nor the Nationalist ROC that retreated to Taiwan was invited to sign the Treaty of San Francisco, as neither had shown full and complete legal capacity to enter into an international legally binding agreement. Since China was not present, the Japanese only formally renounced the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan and Penghu islands without specifying to which country Japan relinquished the sovereignty, and the treaty was signed in 1951 and came into force in 1952.
In 1952, the Treaty of Taipei was signed separately between the ROC and Japan that basically followed the same guideline of the Treaty of San Francisco, not specifying which country has sovereignty over Taiwan. However, Article 10 of the treaty states that the Taiwanese people and the juridical person should be the people and the juridical person of the ROC. Both the PRC and ROC governments base their claims to Taiwan on the Japanese Instrument of Surrender which specifically accepted the Potsdam Declaration which refers to the Cairo Declaration. Disputes over the precise de jure sovereign of Taiwan persist to the present. On a de facto basis, sovereignty over Taiwan has been and continues to be exercised by the ROC. Japan's position has been to avoid commenting on Taiwan's status, maintaining that Japan renounced all claims to sovereignty over its former colonial possessions after World War II, including Taiwan.
Traditionally, the Republic of China government has held celebrations marking the Victory Day on 9 September (now known as Armed Forces Day) and Taiwan's Retrocession Day on 25 October. However, after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential election in 2000, these national holidays commemorating the war have been cancelled as the pro-independent DPP does not see the relevancy of celebrating events that happened in mainland China.
Meanwhile, many KMT supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the 60th anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of KMT stronghold Taipei held a series of talks in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall regarding the war and post-war developments, while the KMT held its own exhibit in the KMT headquarters. Whereas the KMT won the presidential election in 2008, the ROC government resumed commemorating the war.
Japanese women left in China
Main article: Japanese people in ChinaSeveral thousand Japanese who were sent as colonizers to Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia were left behind in China. The majority of these were women, and they married mostly Chinese men and became known as "stranded war wives" (zanryu fujin).
Korean women left in China
Main article: Koreans in ChinaIn China some Korean comfort women stayed behind instead of going back to their native land. Most Korean comfort women who were left behind in China married Chinese men.
Commemorations
Three major museums in China commemorate China's War of Resistance, including the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.
Casualties
The conflict lasted eight years, two months and two days (from 7 July 1937, to 9 September 1945). The total number of casualties that resulted from this war (and subsequently theater) equaled more than half the total number of casualties that later resulted from the entire Pacific War.
Chinese
- Duncan Anderson, Head of the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, UK, writing for BBC states that the total number of casualties was around 20 million.
- The official PRC statistics for China's civilian and military casualties in the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945 are 20 million dead and 15 million wounded. The figures for total military casualties, killed and wounded are: NRA 3.2 million; People's Liberation Army 500,000.
- The official account of the war published in Taiwan reported that the Nationalist Chinese Army lost 3,238,000 men (1,797,000 wounded, 1,320,000 killed, and 120,000 missing) and 5,787,352 civilians casualties putting the total number of casualties at 9,025,352. The Nationalists fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes. The Chinese reported their yearly total battle casualties as 367,362 for 1937, 735,017 for 1938, 346,543 for 1939, and 299,483 for 1941.
- An academic study published in the United States in 1959 estimates military casualties: 1.5 million killed in battle, 750,000 missing in action, 1.5 million deaths due to disease and 3 million wounded; civilian casualties: due to military activity, killed 1,073,496 and 237,319 wounded; 335,934 killed and 426,249 wounded in Japanese air attacks.
- According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at least 2.7 million civilians died during the "kill all, loot all, burn all" operation (Three Alls Policy, or sanko sakusen) implemented in May 1942 in north China by general Yasuji Okamura and authorized on 3 December 1941, by Imperial Headquarter Order number 575.
- The property loss suffered by the Chinese was valued at 383 billion US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times the gross domestic product of Japan at that time (US$7.7 billion).
- In addition, the war created 95 million refugees.
- Rudolph Rummel gave a figure of 3,949,000 people in China murdered directly by the Japanese army while giving a figure of 10,216,000 total dead in the war with the additional millions of deaths due to indirect causes like starvation, disease and disruption but not direct killing by Japan. China suffered from famines during the war caused by drought affected both China and India, Chinese famine of 1942–43 in Henan that led to starvation deaths of 2 to 3 million people, Guangdong famine caused more than 3 million people to flee or die, and the 1943–1945 Indian famine in Bengal that killed about 3 million Indians in Bengal and parts of Southern India.
Japanese
The Japanese recorded around 1.1 to 1.9 million military casualties during all of World War II (which include killed, wounded and missing). The official death toll of Japanese men killed in China, according to the Japan Defense Ministry, is 480,000. Based on the investigation of the Japanese Yomiuri Shimbun, the military death toll of Japan in China is about 700,000 since 1937 (excluding the deaths in Manchuria).
Another source from Hilary Conroy claims that a total of 447,000 Japanese soldiers died or went missing in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Of the 1,130,000 Imperial Japanese Army soldiers who died during World War II, 39 percent died in China.
Then in War Without Mercy, John W. Dower claims that a total of 396,000 Japanese soldiers died in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Of this number, the Imperial Japanese Army lost 388,605 soldiers and the Imperial Japanese Navy lost 8,000 soldiers. Another 54,000 soldiers also died after the war had ended, mostly from illness and starvation. Of the 1,740,955 Japanese soldiers who died during World War II, 22 percent died in China.
Japanese statistics, however, lack complete estimates for the wounded. From 1937 to 1941, 185,647 Japanese soldiers were killed in China and 520,000 were wounded. Disease also incurred critical losses on Japanese forces. From 1937 to 1941, 430,000 Japanese soldiers were recorded as being sick. In North China alone, 18,000 soldiers were evacuated back to Japan for illnesses in 1938, 23,000 in 1939, and 15,000 in 1940. From 1941 to 1945: 202,958 dead; another 54,000 dead after war's end. Chinese forces also report that by May 1945, 22,293 Japanese soldiers were captured as prisoners. Many more Japanese soldiers surrendered when the war ended.
Contemporary studies from the Beijing Central Compilation and Translation Press state that the Japanese suffered a total of 2,227,200 casualties, including 1,055,000 dead and 1,172,341 injured. This Chinese publication analyzes statistics provided by Japanese publications and claimed these numbers were largely based on Japanese publications.
Both Nationalist and Communist Chinese sources report that their respective forces were responsible for the deaths of over 1.7 million Japanese soldiers. Nationalist War Minister He Yingqin himself contested the Communists' claims, finding it impossible for a force of "untrained, undisciplined, poorly equipped" guerrillas of Communist forces to have killed so many enemy soldiers.
The Nationalist Chinese authorities ridiculed Japanese estimates of Chinese casualties. In 1940, the National Herald stated that the Japanese exaggerated Chinese casualties, while deliberately concealing the true number of Japanese casualties, releasing false figures that made them appear much lower. The article reports on the casualty situation of the war up to 1940.
Use of chemical and biological weapons
Despite Article 23 of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, article V of the Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles and a resolution adopted by the League of Nations on 14 May 1938, condemning the use of poison gas by the Empire of Japan, the Imperial Japanese Army frequently used chemical weapons during the war.
According to Walter E. Grunden, history professor at Bowling Green State University, Japan permitted the use of chemical weapons in China because the Japanese concluded that Chinese forces did not possess the capacity to retaliate in kind. The Japanese incorporated gas warfare into many aspects of their army, which includes special gas troops, infantry, artillery, engineers and air force; the Japanese were aware of basic gas tactics of other armies, and deployed multifarious gas warfare tactics in China. The Japanese were very dependent on gas weapons when they were engaged in chemical warfare.
Japan used poison gas at Hankow during the Battle of Wuhan to break fierce Chinese resistance after conventional Japanese assaults were repelled by Chinese defenders. Rana Mitter writes,
Under General Xue Yue, some 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back Japanese forces at Huangmei. At the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands of men fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory assured only with the use of poison gas.
According to Freda Utley, during the battle at Hankow, in areas where Japanese artillery or gunboats on the river could not reach Chinese defenders on hilltops, Japanese infantrymen had to fight Chinese troops on the hills. She noted that the Japanese were inferior at hand-to-hand combat against the Chinese, and resorted to deploying poison gas to defeat the Chinese troops. She was told by General Li Zongren that the Japanese consistently used tear gas and mustard gas against Chinese troops. Li also added that his forces could not withstand large scale deployments of Japanese poison gas. Since Chinese troops did not have gas-masks, the poison gases provided enough time for Japanese troops to bayonet debilitated Chinese soldiers.
During the battle in Yichang of October 1941, Japanese troops used chemical munitions in their artillery and mortar fire, and warplanes dropped gas bombs all over the area; since the Chinese troops were poorly equipped and without gas-masks, they were severely gassed, burned and killed.
According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, the chemical weapons were authorized by specific orders given by Hirohito himself, transmitted by the Imperial General Headquarters. For example, the Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions during the Battle of Wuhan from August to October 1938. They were also used during the invasion of Changde. Those orders were transmitted either by Prince Kan'in Kotohito or General Hajime Sugiyama. Gases manufactured in Okunoshima were used more than 2,000 times against Chinese soldiers and civilians in the war in China in the 1930s and 1940s
Bacteriological weapons provided by Shirō Ishii's units were also profusely used. For example, in 1940, the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force bombed Ningbo with fleas carrying the bubonic plague. During the Khabarovsk War Crime Trials the accused, such as Major General Kiyashi Kawashima, testified that, in 1941, some 40 members of Unit 731 air-dropped plague-contaminated fleas on Changde. These attacks caused epidemic plague outbreaks. In the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, of the 10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with the disease, about 1,700 Japanese troops died when the biological weapons rebounded on their own forces.
Japan gave its own soldiers methamphetamines in the form of Philopon.
Use of suicide attacks
Chinese armies deployed "dare to die corps" (traditional Chinese: 敢死隊; simplified Chinese: 敢死队; pinyin: gǎnsǐduì) or "suicide squads" against the Japanese.
Suicide bombing was also used against the Japanese. A Chinese soldier detonated a grenade vest and killed 20 Japanese at Sihang Warehouse. Chinese troops strapped explosives, such as grenade packs or dynamite to their bodies and threw themselves under Japanese tanks to blow them up. This tactic was used during the Battle of Shanghai, where a Chinese suicide bomber stopped a Japanese tank column by exploding himself beneath the lead tank, and at the Battle of Taierzhuang, where dynamite and grenades were strapped on by Chinese troops who rushed at Japanese tanks and blew themselves up. During one incident at Taierzhuang, Chinese suicide bombers destroyed four Japanese tanks with grenade bundles.
Combatants
Main article: Combatants of the Second Sino-Japanese WarSee also
Portals:- Aviation Martyrs' Cemetery
- Japan during World War II
- Japanese war crimes
- List of military engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War
- Mao Zedong thanking Japan controversy
- Timeline of events leading to World War II in Asia
- Timeline of events preceding World War II
- War crimes in World War II#Crimes perpetrated by Japan
- Women in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War
Notes
- This number does not include the casualties of the large numbers of Chinese collaborator government troops fighting on the Japanese side.
References
Citations
- Hsiung 1992, p. 171.
- Horner, David Murray (24 July 2003). The Second World War: The Pacific. Taylor & Francis. pp. 14–15. ISBN 978-0-415-96845-4. Retrieved 6 March 2011.
- Hsiung, James C. (1992). China's Bitter Victory. Routledge. p. 79. ISBN 978-1-56324-246-5.
- 八路军·表册 (in Chinese). 中国人民解放军历史资料丛书编审委员会. 1994. p. 3. ISBN 978-7-506-52290-8.
- 丁星, 《新四军初期的四个支队—新四军组织沿革简介(2)》【J】, 铁军, 2007年第2期, 38–40页
- Hsiung 1992.
- Hsu, p. 535.
- Black, Jeremy (2012). Avoiding Armageddon: From the Great Wall to the Fall of France, 1918–40. A&C Black. p. 171. ISBN 978-1-4411-2387-9.
- RKKA General Staff, 1939 Archived 25 April 2016 at the Wayback Machine. Retrieved 17 April 2016
- Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1964 Archived 11 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine Retrieved 11 March 2016
- Jowett, p. 72.
- Liu Tinghua (刘庭华) (1995). 中国抗日战争与第二次世界大战系年要录·统计荟萃 1931–1945 (in Chinese). Haichao chubanshe. pp. 312−314. ISBN 7-80054-595-4.
- Hsu.
- ^ Clodfelter, Micheal "Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference", Vol. 2, pp. 956. Includes civilians who died due to famine and other environmental disasters caused by the war. Only includes the 'regular' Chinese army; does NOT include guerrillas and does not include Chinese casualties in Manchuria or Burma.
- 國史館檔案史料文物查詢系統,抗戰期間陸軍動員人數統計表,典藏號:008-010701-00015-046
- 國史館檔案史料文物查詢系統,民國二十六年七月至三十四年八月止抗戰軍事損失統計表(陸軍部門),典藏號:008-010701-00015-052
- 國史館檔案史料文物查詢系統,中日戰爭損失統計(三),典藏號:020-010116-0004
- "抗日战争时期国民党军队逃兵人数考". 2018. Retrieved 9 January 2025.
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External links
- Biographical Dictionary of Occupied China
- Full text of the Chinese declaration of war against Japan on Wikisource
- "CBI Theater of Operations" – IBIBLIO World War II: China Burma India Links to selected documents, photos, maps, and books.
- "World War II Newspaper Archives – War in China, 1937–1945". Archived from the original on 29 November 2003. Retrieved 2004-08-19.
- Annals of the Flying Tigers
- Perry–Castañeda Library Map Collection, China 1:250,000, Series L500, U.S. Army Map Service, 1954– . Topographic Maps of China during the Second World War.
- Perry–Castañeda Library Map Collection Manchuria 1:250,000, Series L542, U.S. Army Map Service, 1950– . Topographic Maps of Manchuria during the Second World War.
- "Joint Study of the Sino-Japanese War, Harvard University". Archived from the original on 13 July 2001. Retrieved 2007-07-07. Multi-year project seeks to expand research by promoting cooperation among scholars and institutions in China, Japan, the United States, and other nations. Includes extensive bibliographies.
- Photographs of the war from a Presbyterian mission near Canton
- "The Route South"
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