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{{Short description|Pan-Islamic Sunni Jihadist organization (established 1988)}}
{{pp-semi-vandalism|small=yes}}
{{other uses}}
{{Infobox militant organization
{{Pp-semi-indef}}
|name = al-Qaeda<br />{{rtl-lang|ar|القاعدة}} </small>
{{Pp-move}}
|logo =
{{Pp-vandalism|small=yes}}
|caption =
{{Use American English|date=May 2015}}
|leader = ] <br /> ]
{{Use mdy dates|date=September 2024}}
|dates = 1988–present |
{{Infobox war faction
|area = ]
| name = Al-Qaeda
|ideology = ]<br/>]<br/>] ]<ref>{{Harvnb|Atwan|2006|p=40}}</ref><br/>]<br/>]<br/>]<br/>]
| native_name = {{Script|Arabic|القاعدة}}
|allies = Taliban, Hamid
| native_name_lang = ar
|opponents = United States, Israel, United Nations, United Kingdom, Afghan National Army, Iraqi Armed Forces, Coalition Forces/Tribes, Canada, NATO, European Union, ASEAN, African Union, etc.
| war = {{Collapsible list |title={{Nbsp}} |{{Plainlist|
|status = Designated as ] by the ]<ref name=USTerrorList>{{cite web|url=http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/12535.htm|title=Foreign Terrorist Organizations List|publisher=]|accessdate=2007-08-03}} – ]</ref><br />Designated as ] by the ] ]<ref name=UKTerrorList>{{cite web|url=http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000011.htm|title=Terrorism Act 2000|publisher=]|accessdate=2007-08-14}} – ]</ref><br />Designated as terrorist group by ] ]<ref name=EUTerrorList>{{cite web|url=http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45394.htm|title=Council Decision|publisher=]|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>
* ]
|size= 500 – 1,000 operatives (2001)<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.harpers.org/archive/2006/07/sb-al-qaeda-new-members-badly-needed-1151963690 |title=The Al Qaeda Clubhouse: Members lacking, By Ken Silverstein (Harper's Magazine) |publisher=Harpers.org |date= |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
}}
}}
| image = Flag of Jihad.svg
| caption = ] used by various Al-Qaeda factions
| founder = ]{{Assassinated|Killing of Osama bin Laden}}
| leaders = {{Plainlist|
* Osama bin Laden{{Assassinated|Killing of Osama bin Laden}}<br />(1988–2011)
* ]{{Assassinated|Killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri}}<br />(2011–2022)
* ]<br />(''de facto''; 2022–present)
}}
| active = {{nowrap|August 11, 1988 – present}}
| ideology = {{Collapsible list |title={{Nbsp}} | {{Plainlist|
* ]{{refn|name=Sunni Islamism|<ref name=gallagher14 /><ref name="Bokhari-Senzai 2013">{{cite book|editor1-last=Bokhari|editor1-first=Kamran|editor2-last=Senzai|editor2-first=Farid|year=2013|chapter=Rejector Islamists: al-Qaeda and Transnational Jihadism|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ThiuAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA101|title=Political Islam in the Age of Democratization|location=]|publisher=]|pages=101–118|doi=10.1057/9781137313492_6|isbn=978-1-137-31349-2}}</ref><ref name="Moussalli 2012">{{cite book|author-last=Moussalli|author-first=Ahmad S.|year=2012|chapter=Sayyid Qutb: Founder of Radical Islamic Political Ideology|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=D-LfCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA24|editor-last=Akbarzadeh|editor-first=Shahram|title=Routledge Handbook of Political Islam|location=] and ]|publisher=]|edition=1st|pages=24–26|isbn=978-1-138-57782-4|lccn=2011025970|access-date=October 25, 2021|archive-date=January 11, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230111173503/https://books.google.com/books?id=D-LfCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA24|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=MESR>{{cite book|last=O'Bagy|first=Elizabeth|title=Middle East Security Report: Al-Qaeda Sunni Islamist Rebels – Jihad in Syria|page=27|volume=6|url=http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jihad-In-Syria-17SEPT.pdf|year=2012|location=]|access-date=September 21, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140327163800/http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jihad-In-Syria-17SEPT.pdf|archive-date=March 27, 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref>}}
* ]<ref>{{cite book|title=US Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Al-Qaeda|first1=Joshua|last1=A. Geltzer|year=2010|publisher=Routledge|location=New York|isbn=978-0-203-87023-5|chapter=4: The al-Qaeda world-view|pages=83, 84}}</ref><ref name=Atwan />{{sfn|Gunaratna|2002|loc=''Introduction'', pp. 12, 87}}
* ]{{refn|name=Qutbism|<ref name="Moussalli 2012" /><ref>{{cite book|last=Aydınlı|first=Ersel|year=2018|title=Violent Non-State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists|chapter=The Jihadists pre-9/11|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hq1TDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA66|location=] and ]|publisher=]|edition=1st|series=Routledge Studies on Challenges, Crises, and Dissent in World Politics|page=66|isbn=978-1-315-56139-4|lccn=2015050373}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Wright|2006|p=79}}</ref><ref name=gallagher14>{{harvnb|Gallagher|Willsky-Ciollo|2021|p=14}}</ref>}}
* ]<ref>{{cite book|title=Jihadism in Pakistan|publisher=I.B. Tauris|first1=Antonio|last1=Giustozzi|isbn=978-0-7556-4735-4|location=New York|chapter=2: The strategies of global jihadists in Pakistan after 2001|pages=27–52|year=2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Al-Qaeda's Post-9/11 Devolution|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic|first1=Anthony|last1=Celso|isbn=978-1-4411-5589-4|location=New York|chapter=1: Al-Qaeda's Jihadist Worldview|pages=15–29|year=2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Al-Qaeda 2.0|publisher=Oxford University Press|first1=Donald|last1=Holbrook|isbn=9780190856441|location=New York|pages=viii, 2, 3|year=2017}}</ref>
* Muslim unity<ref>{{cite book|title=US Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Al-Qaeda|first1=Joshua|last1=A. Geltzer|year=2010|publisher=Routledge|location=New York|isbn=978-0-203-87023-5|quote=Al-Qaeda's ‘pan-Islamic ideology’ seeks to unify the umma not only by emphasising Islam over nationalism but also by specifically calling for unity among all Muslims, including the often hostile Sunnis and Shiites... ‘For an organization led by a Sunni fundamentalist’ to ‘make common cause with Shiite terrorists’, and then with potential Shiite supporters more broadly, was considered ‘extraordinary’—yet doing so was central to al-Qaeda's vision of Islamic unity against America.|chapter=4: The al-Qaeda world view|pages=83, 84}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement|first1=Daniel|last1=Byman|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2015|location=New York|isbn=978-0-19-021725-9|page=53|chapter=3: Strategy and Tactics}}</ref>{{sfn|Gunaratna|2002|p=87}}
* ]<ref name="Nabil">{{Cite web|last=Nabil|first=Rahmatullah|title=Iran, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban; Close Relations between Shiite and Sunni Fundamentalists: A Strategic Move or a Matter of Expediency?|url=https://aissonline.org/en/main-features/7|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230619143538/https://aissonline.org/en/main-features/7|archive-date=June 19, 2023|website=Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies|quote=Ayman Al-Zawahiri became the leader of Al-Qaeda—a leader who was “in favour of” forging an alliance between the Shia and the Sunni against their common enemy—Al-Qaeda developed deeper relations with the IRGC.}}
* {{Cite web|last=Aly Sergie|first=Mohammed|date=April 27, 2023|title=The Sunni-Shia Divide|url=https://www.cfr.org/article/sunni-shia-divide|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230610093711/https://www.cfr.org/article/sunni-shia-divide|archive-date=June 10, 2023|website=Council on Foreign Relations|quote=Sunni al-Qaeda and Shia Hezbollah, have not defined their movements in sectarian terms, and have favored using anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and anti-American frameworks to define their jihad, or struggle.}}
* {{Cite web|last=Lupsha|first=Jonny|date=December 8, 2022|title=What Is the Islamic State?|url=https://www.wondriumdaily.com/what-is-the-islamic-state/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230206201200/https://www.wondriumdaily.com/what-is-the-islamic-state/|archive-date=February 6, 2023|website=Wondrium Daily|quote=Bin Laden, a Sunni Muslim, saw cooperation between Islam's two sects—Sunni and Shia—as essential to Al-Qaeda's success.}}</ref><ref name="Devji 2005 53">{{Cite book|last=Devji|first=Faisal|title=Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity|publisher=Hurst & Co.|year=2005|isbn=1-85065-775-0|location=London|pages=53|quote=Al-Qaeda leaders like Osama Bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri have never been known either to preach or practice anti-Shia politics, indeed the opposite, with Bin Laden repeatedly urging Muslims to ignore internal differences and even appearing to uphold the religious credentials of Shiite Iran by comparing the longed-for-ouster of the Saudi monarch to the expulsion of the Shah}}
* {{Cite news|date=September 20, 2001|title=The spider in the web|newspaper=The Economist|url=https://www.economist.com/special-report/2001/09/20/the-spider-in-the-web|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230606223655/https://www.economist.com/special-report/2001/09/20/the-spider-in-the-web|archive-date=June 6, 2023|quote= has insisted that differences within the Islamic world should be set aside for the sake of the broader struggle against western and Jewish interests. American officials say there is clear evidence of tactical co-operation between his organisation, al-Qaeda, the government of Iran, and Iran's proxies in Lebanon, the Hizbullah group. From the early 1990s, members of his group and its Egyptian allies were being sent to Lebanon to receive training from Hizbullah: an unusual example of Sunni-Shia co-operation in the broader anti-western struggle.}}
* {{Cite book|last=al-Aloosy|first=Massaab|title=The changing ideology of Hezbollah|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2020|isbn=978-3-030-34846-5|page=79|quote=according to the 9/11 Commission Report, Hezbollah allowed Al-Qaeda activists to train in their camps involved in terrorist attacks against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in September 1998... Osama Bin Laden mentioned Hezbollah in a 2003 speech—or as he called them the resistance—in a positive light as the group that compelled the US marines to withdraw from Lebanon}}</ref>{{sfn|Gunaratna|2002|p=12}}
* ]<ref name="auto1">Bergen, Peter L., ''Holy war, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden'', New York: Free Press, 2001., pp. 70–71 {{ISBN?}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="ict.org.il">{{cite web|url=http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm|title=Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans|access-date=May 15, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060422210853/http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm|archive-date=April 22, 2006}}</ref>
* ]<ref>{{cite court|litigants=United States v. Usama bin Laden et al.|court=]|reporter=Cr.|vol=S (7) 98|opinion=1023|pinpoint=Testimony of Jamal Ahmed Mohamed al-Fadl|date=February 6, 2001|url=http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121024164934/http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>
* ]<ref>{{Cite book|last=Lawrence|first=Bruce|date=2005|title=Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden|url=https://www.versobooks.com/books/32-messages-to-the-world|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220408194547/https://www.versobooks.com/books/32-messages-to-the-world|archive-date=April 8, 2022|publisher=Verso|isbn=9781844670451}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Borowski|first=Audrey|year=2015|title=Al Qaeda and ISIS: From Revolution to Apocalypse|url=https://philosophynow.org/issues/111/Al_Qaeda_and_ISIS_From_Revolution_to_Apocalypse|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220526012524/https://philosophynow.org/issues/111/Al_Qaeda_and_ISIS_From_Revolution_to_Apocalypse|archive-date=May 26, 2022|website=Philosophy Now}}</ref>
* ]{{refn|name=Antisemitism|<ref name="Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders" /><ref name=Time1999 /><ref name=Letter2002>{{Cite web|url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130826184301/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver|url-status=dead|archive-date=August 26, 2013|title=Full text: bin Laden's 'letter to America'|work=The Observer|date=August 26, 2013}}</ref><ref name=May1998>{{cite news|url=http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/19990508145341/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html|title=frontline: the terrorist and the superpower: who is bin laden?: interview with osama bin laden (in May 1998)|newspaper=Frontline|archive-date=May 8, 1999|publisher=PBS}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.adl.org/blog/new-isis-and-al-qaeda-propaganda-prioritize-the-us-and-jews-as-targets|title=New ISIS and Al-Qaeda propaganda prioritize the US and Jews as targets|website=Anti-Defamation League|access-date=August 28, 2017|archive-date=August 23, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170823160548/https://www.adl.org/blog/new-isis-and-al-qaeda-propaganda-prioritize-the-us-and-jews-as-targets|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Voice of America">{{cite web|title=Al-Qaeda's Urges Muslims to Shun World Cup, Stops Short of Threats|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/al-qaida-urges-muslims-to-shun-world-cup-stops-short-of-threats-/6842183.html|publisher=Voice of America|date=November 19, 2022|quote=Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the militant group's Yemen-based branch, criticized Qatar for 'bringing immoral people, homosexuals, sowers of corruption and atheism into the Arabian Peninsula' and said the event served to divert attention from the 'occupation of Muslim countries and their oppression.'|access-date=November 20, 2022|archive-date=November 20, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221120190659/https://www.voanews.com/a/al-qaida-urges-muslims-to-shun-world-cup-stops-short-of-threats-/6842183.html|url-status=live}}</ref>}}
* ]<ref name="Inside Jabhat al Nusra">{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9716545/Inside-Jabhat-al-Nusra-the-most-extreme-wing-of-Syrias-struggle.html|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9716545/Inside-Jabhat-al-Nusra-the-most-extreme-wing-of-Syrias-struggle.html|archive-date=January 10, 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Inside the most extreme wing|date=December 2, 2012|access-date=December 2, 2012|work=]|location=London|first=Ruth|last=Sherlock}}{{cbignore}}</ref>
* ]<ref name=Time1999>{{cite magazine|url=https://content.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,17676,00.html|title=Conversation with Terror|magazine=Time|date=January 1999|access-date=March 22, 2015|archive-date=February 5, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160205200538/http://content.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,17676,00.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=Letter2002/><ref name="Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders">{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm|title=Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders|access-date=June 16, 2010|date=February 23, 1998|archive-date=April 21, 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100421110549/http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>
}}
'''Factions:'''| {{Plainlist|
* ]<ref>{{cite book|last1=Kiyici|first1=Hakan|title= Al-Qaedaism in the Context of Civil War|isbn=978-1-66692-402-2|year=2024|publisher=Lexington Books|location=London |pages=147}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Abou Zahab|first=Mariam|title=Pakistan|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2020|isbn=9780197534595|location=New York|pages=113|chapter=6: Salafism in Pakistan: The Ahl-e Hadith Movement}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Bennett|first=Clinton|title=Muslims and Modernity|publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing|year=2005|isbn=0-8264-5482-8|location=New York|pages=181, 182}}</ref>
* ]{{refn|name=Deobandism|<ref>{{cite book|last1=Kiyici|first1=Hakan|title= Al-Qaedaism in the Context of Civil War|isbn=978-1-66692-402-2|year=2024|publisher=Lexington Books|location=London |pages=146, 147|quote=The idea of Deobandism is the third doctrinal school for al-Qaedaism. It became popular within northern India in response to reactions against British colonial and imperial power in the nineteenth century.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban|first1=Syed Saleem|last1=Shahzad|year=2011|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|location=New York|pages=202–205|chapter=8: The Theater of War}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Columbus|first1=Frank|title=Asian Economic and Political Issues Volume 10|isbn=1-59454-089-6|year=2004|publisher=Nova Science Publishers|location=|pages=159, 160|chapter=9: Kashmiri Seperatists|first2=Kaia|last2=Leather}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Fischer|first1=Michael M. J.|title=Iran|isbn=0-299-18474-9|year=2003|publisher=University of Wisconsin Press|location=London |page=xxii}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Haqqani|first=Hussain|year=2005|title=The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups|url=https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Ideologies.pdf|journal=Current Trends in Islamist Ideology|volume=1|pages=13, 22|publisher=Hudson Institute|archive-date=July 3, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240703124805/https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Ideologies.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>}}
* ]<ref>Sources:
* {{Cite book|last=Fair|first=C. Christine|title=Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2014|isbn=978-0-19-989270-9|location=New York|pages=249, 250}}
* {{Cite book|last=Al Qurtuby|first=Sumanto|title=Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia|publisher=Springer Nature Singapore|year=2022|isbn=978-981-19-1336-5|location=Singapore |pages=217, 218}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|title=Pakistan's Enduring Challenges|publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press|year=2015|isbn=978-0-8122-4690-2|editor-last=Fair, J. Watson|editor-first=C. Christine, Sarah|location=Philadelphia|pages=4, 30, 33}}</ref><ref>Sources:
* {{Cite book|last=Brown, Rassler|first=Vahid, Don|title=Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2013|isbn=978-0-199-32798-0|location=New York|pages=3–14, 30, 37–39, 59–82|chapter=2: Birth of the Nexus: The Haqqani network, foreign Fighters and the origins of al-Qa'ida}}
* {{Cite book|last=Moj|first=Muhammad|title=The Deoband Madrassah Movement|publisher=Anthem Press|year=2015|isbn=978-1-78308-388-6|location=New York|pages=198, 199}}
* {{Cite web|last=Jamal|first=Arif|date=January 14, 2010|title=The Growth of the Deobandi Jihad in Afghanistan|url=https://jamestown.org/program/the-growth-of-the-deobandi-jihad-in-afghanistan/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240425023726/https://jamestown.org/program/the-growth-of-the-deobandi-jihad-in-afghanistan/|archive-date=April 25, 2024|website=The Jamestown Foundation|access-date=September 6, 2024|url-status=bot: unknown}}</ref>
* ]{{refn|name=Salafism|<ref name="Bokhari-Senzai 2013" /><ref name="Moussalli 2012" /><ref name="SalafistJidadism">{{cite web|title=Special Reports – The Salafist Movement: Al Qaeda's New Front|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html|last1=Livesey|first1=Bruce|author-link=Bruce Livesey (journalist)|work=PBS Frontline|publisher=WGBH|date=January 25, 2005|access-date=October 18, 2011|archive-date=June 28, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110628202818/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html|url-status=live}}<br />{{cite book|last1=Geltzer|first1=Joshua A.|title=US Counter-Terrorism Strategy and al-Qaeda: Signalling and the Terrorist World-View|date=2011|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-0-415-66452-3|page=83|edition=Reprint}}</ref><ref name="spiegel1">{{cite web|url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,369448,00.html|title=The Future of Terrorism: What al-Qaida Really Wants|work=Der Spiegel|date=August 12, 2005|access-date=October 18, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120307084609/http://www.spiegel.de/international/0%2C1518%2C369448%2C00.html|archive-date=March 7, 2012|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="PanIslamism">{{cite news|url=http://my.telegraph.co.uk/riteman/riteway/16309030/al-qaeda-seeks-global-dominance/|title=Al-Qaeda seeks global dominance|location=London|work=The Daily Telegraph|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120112142751/http://my.telegraph.co.uk/riteman/riteway/16309030/al-qaeda-seeks-global-dominance/|archive-date=January 12, 2012}}<br />{{cite web|url=http://www.thepolitic.com/archives/2005/07/27/jihadists-want-global-caliphate/|title=Jihadists Want Global Caliphate|publisher=ThePolitic.com|date=July 27, 2005|access-date=October 18, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110930020925/http://www.thepolitic.com/archives/2005/07/27/jihadists-want-global-caliphate/|archive-date=September 30, 2011|url-status=dead}}<br />{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/21/alqaida.terrorism|location=London|work=The Guardian|first1=Jason|last1=Burke|title=What exactly does al-Qaeda want?|date=March 21, 2004|access-date=December 10, 2016|archive-date=June 25, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220625022225/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/21/alqaida.terrorism|url-status=live}}</ref>}}
* ]{{refn|name=Salafi jihadism|<ref name="Bokhari-Senzai 2013" /><ref name="Moussalli 2012" /><ref name="Moghadam">{{cite book|last1=Moghadam|first1=Assaf|title=The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks|year=2008|publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press|isbn=978-0-8018-9055-0|page=48}}</ref><ref name="SalafistJidadism" />}}
* ]<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Ghanmi|first1=Elyès|last2=Punzet|first2=Agnieszka|date=June 11, 2013|title=The involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the support and supply of arms to rebel groups around the world|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457137/EXPO-AFET_ET(2013)457137_EN.pdf|journal=]|access-date=October 8, 2021|archive-date=June 24, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190624184433/http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457137/EXPO-AFET_ET(2013)457137_EN.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="The Hillary Doctrine">{{cite book|last1=Hudson|first1=Valerie|title=The Hillary Doctrine|publisher=Columbia University|page=154|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=j3apBgAAQBAJ&q=wahhabi+al+nusra&pg=PA154|access-date=January 15, 2016|isbn=978-0-231-53910-4|year=2015}}</ref>
* ] (alleged,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-ideology-strategy|title=Al Qaeda v ISIS: Ideology & Strategy|first=Cameron|last=Glenn|date=September 28, 2015|website=]|access-date=September 19, 2020|archive-date=July 16, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190716095127/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-ideology-strategy|url-status=live}}</ref> officially denied)<ref name="Shia Iran"/><ref name="Nabil"/><ref name="Devji 2005 53"/>
}}
}}
| allegiance =
| clans = {{Collapsible list |title={{Nbsp}} | {{Plainlist|
'''Main groups:'''
*{{Flagicon image|ShabaabFlag.svg}} ]
*{{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ]
*{{flagicon image|Flag of AQIS.svg}} ]
*{{flagicon image|Flag of Tanzim Hurras al-Din.svg}} ]
*{{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ]
----
'''Other groups:'''
*{{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ]
*{{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ]
*{{Flagicon image|Flag of Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind.svg}} ]
*{{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ]
*{{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ]
----
'''Former groups:'''
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2002)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2005)
* {{flagicon image|Flag of al-Qaeda in Iraq.svg}} ] (2004–2006)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2009)
* {{Flagicon image|Flag_of_Jihad.svg}} ] (until 2009)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2010)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2015)
*{{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (2007–2017)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2017)
* {{Flagicon image|Flag of the Al-Nusra Front.svg}} ] (2012–2017)
* {{Flagicon image|Flag_of_Jihad.svg}} ] (until 2017)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2017)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2018)
*{{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ]<br>(until 2022)
* {{Flagicon image|Flag_of_Jihad.svg}} ] (until 2018)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2018)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2019)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2019)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2016)
* {{Flagicon image|Flag_of_Jihad.svg}} ] (until 2012)
* {{Flagicon|Islamic State}} ] (until 2024)
}}
| area = Worldwide<br />{{nowrap|''']:'''}}<br />], ],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/somalia-war-map-al-shabaab-2013.html|title=War in Somalia: Map of Al Shabaab Control (June 2013)|date=May 31, 2013|access-date=August 18, 2014|publisher=Political Geography Now|first1=Evan|last1=Centanni|archive-date=August 19, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140819090518/http://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/somalia-war-map-al-shabaab-2013.html|url-status=live}}</ref> ]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/aden-intellgence-service-building-targeted-1.1570990|title=Aden intelligence service building targeted|date=August 22, 2015|access-date=August 22, 2015|agency=Agence France-Presse|work=Gulf News|archive-date=August 22, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150822162635/http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/aden-intellgence-service-building-targeted-1.1570990|url-status=live}}</ref>
}}
| size = {{Collapsible list |title={{Nbsp}} |{{Plainlist|
* In Afghanistan:<!--<100 (2011),<ref>{{cite web|first1=Bill|last1=Roggio|url=http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2011/04/how_many_al_qaeda_operatives_a.php|title=How many al Qaeda operatives are now left in Afghanistan?|publisher=Longwarjournal.org|date=April 26, 2011|access-date=April 10, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140706151045/http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2011/04/how_many_al_qaeda_operatives_a.php|archive-date=July 6, 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref> 300–3,000 (2012–2014),<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/21/al-qaeda-afghanistan-comeback_n_1997994.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121023084738/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/21/al-qaeda-afghanistan-comeback_n_1997994.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=October 23, 2012|title=Al Qaeda in Afghanistan Is Attempting A Comeback|work=HuffPost|date=October 21, 2012|access-date=April 10, 2014}}</ref><ref name="telegraph.co.uk">{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/10893889/Al-Qaeda-map-Isis-Boko-Haram-and-other-affiliates-strongholds-across-Africa-and-Asia.html|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/10893889/Al-Qaeda-map-Isis-Boko-Haram-and-other-affiliates-strongholds-across-Africa-and-Asia.html|archive-date=January 10, 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Al-Qaeda map: Isis, Boko Haram and other affiliates' strongholds across Africa and Asia|date=June 12, 2014|access-date=August 29, 2014|last1=Freeman|first1=Colin}}{{cbignore}}</ref>--> 400 (2023)<ref name=CFR2021/><ref>{{cite web|title=Terrorist Organizations|url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/references/terrorist-organizations/|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency|access-date=March 29, 2024|archive-date=January 27, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240127103841/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/references/terrorist-organizations/|url-status=live}}</ref>
* ]: 1,000–5,000 (2015)<ref>{{cite web|title=Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)|url=http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717|website=Council on Foreign Relations|date=March 27, 2015|access-date=July 2, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150511122144/http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717|archive-date=May 11, 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Profile: Al-Qaeda in North Africa|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17308138|publisher=BBC|date=January 17, 2013|access-date=July 2, 2015|archive-date=June 6, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210606034058/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17308138|url-status=live}}</ref>
* ]: 3,000 (2022)<ref name=Nordic2022/>
* ]: 7,000–12,000 (2023)<ref>{{cite web|title=S/2023/95|url=https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2023%2F95&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False|website=United Nations Security Council|access-date=February 15, 2023|archive-date=February 25, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230225222740/https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2023%2F95&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689|title=Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?|publisher=BBC News|date=December 22, 2017|access-date=June 9, 2018|archive-date=April 3, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403052911/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689|url-status=live}}</ref>
* ]: 1,000–3,000 (2019)<ref>{{cite web|url=https://syriadirect.org/news/is-hts-benefitting-from-coalition-airstrikes-against-foreign-jihadists-1/|title=Is HTS benefitting from Coalition airstrikes against foreign jihadists?|author=Mohammad Abdulssattar Ibrahim|work=Syria Direct|date=September 22, 2019|access-date=October 1, 2019|archive-date=September 24, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190924025913/https://syriadirect.org/news/is-hts-benefitting-from-coalition-airstrikes-against-foreign-jihadists-1/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=Nordic2022>{{cite web|title=UN report indicates al-Qaeda and ISIS enjoy safe haven in Turkish-controlled Idlib|url=https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/02/the-un-report-indicates-al-qaeda-and-isis-enjoys-safe-haven-in-turkish-controlled-idlib/|website=Nordic Monitor|date=February 9, 2022|access-date=February 15, 2022|last=Bozkurt|first=Abdullah|archive-date=February 15, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220215095304/https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/02/the-un-report-indicates-al-qaeda-and-isis-enjoys-safe-haven-in-turkish-controlled-idlib/|url-status=live}}</ref>
}}
}}
| predecessor = ]
| allies = {{Collapsible list |title={{Nbsp}}| '''State allies:'''
* {{Flag|Afghanistan|2021}} (], 2021–present){{refn|name=Afghanistan|<ref name="UN SC 2023">{{cite web|title=Fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team|work=UN Security Council|date=June 1, 2023|url=https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2093255/N2312536.pdf|pages=3–22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230712115015/https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2093255/N2312536.pdf|archive-date=July 12, 2023|quote=The link between the Taliban and both Al-Qaida and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains strong and symbiotic..The relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaida remained close and symbiotic, with Al-Qaida viewing Taliban-administered Afghanistan a safe haven. Al-Qaida still aims to strengthen its position in Afghanistan and has been interacting with the Taliban, supporting the regime and protecting senior Taliban figures. Al-Qaida maintains a low profile, focusing on using the country as an ideological and logistical hub to mobilize and recruit new fighters while covertly rebuilding its external operations capability|via=ecoi.net}}</ref><ref name="Dawn">{{cite news|title=UN report finds 'strong and symbiotic' links between Afghan Taliban, TTP|date=June 11, 2023|work=Dawn|url=https://www.dawn.com/news/1759180|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230611140432/https://www.dawn.com/news/1759180|archive-date=June 11, 2023}}</ref><ref name="Taliban relationship">{{cite web|last1=Mir|first1=Asfandyar|title=Afghanistan's Terrorism Challenge: The Political Trajectories of al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and the Islamic State|url=https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2020-10/Afghanistan%27s%20Terrorism%20Challenge.pdf|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2020-10/Afghanistan%27s%20Terrorism%20Challenge.pdf|archive-date=October 9, 2022|url-status=live|publisher=]|date=October 2020}}</ref><ref name="lwj02092021">{{cite web|last=Roggio|first=Bill|date=September 2, 2021|title=National Resistance Front repels multi-day Taliban assault on Panjshir {{!}} FDD's Long War Journal|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/09/national-resistance-front-repels-multi-day-taliban-assault-on-panjshir.php|url-status=live|access-date=September 3, 2021|website=www.longwarjournal.org|archive-date=September 3, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210903010009/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/09/national-resistance-front-repels-multi-day-taliban-assault-on-panjshir.php}}</ref>}}
* {{flag|Iran}} (alleged, but denied by Iran){{refn|name=Iran|<ref name="Shia Iran">{{cite web|title=Making Sense of Iran and al-Qaeda's Relationship|date=March 21, 2021|url=https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/making-sense-iran-and-al-qaedas-relationship|publisher=The Lawfare Institute|access-date=May 10, 2021|archive-date=January 13, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240113133918/https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/making-sense-iran-and-al-qaedas-relationship|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=The Growing Relationship between Iran and al-Shabab Movement in Somalia: Motives and Potential Consequences|url=https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/the-growing-relationship-between-iran-and-al-shabab-movement-in-somalia-motives-and-potential-consequences|publisher=Emirates Policy Center|access-date=July 27, 2020|archive-date=December 8, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221208153222/https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/the-growing-relationship-between-iran-and-al-shabab-movement-in-somalia-motives-and-potential-conseuences|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Saif">{{Cite web|last=Hussam Radman|first=Assim al-Sabri|date=February 28, 2023|title=Leadership from Iran: How Al-Qaeda in Yemen Fell Under the Sway of Saif al-Adel|url=https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/19623|access-date=April 4, 2023|website=Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies|archive-date=March 6, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306134007/https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/19623|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-alqaeda-idUSKCN1LN2LE|title=Study questions Iran-al Qaeda ties, despite U.S. allegations|work=Reuters|date=September 7, 2018|access-date=November 12, 2019|archive-date=August 15, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210815073228/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-alqaeda-idUSKCN1LN2LE|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/hp1360.aspx|title=Treasury Targets Al Qaida Operatives in Iran|website=treasury.gov|access-date=March 8, 2019|archive-date=April 29, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210429092946/https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1360.aspx|url-status=live}}</ref>}}
* {{flag|North Korea}} (alleged by the US)<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/26/afghanistan-war-logs-osama-bin-laden?intcmp=239|location=London|work=The Guardian|first=Simon|last=Tisdall|title=Afghanistan war logs reveal hand of Osama bin Laden|date=July 26, 2010|access-date=June 21, 2023|archive-date=August 24, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220824060622/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/26/afghanistan-war-logs-osama-bin-laden?intcmp=239|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|Pakistan}} (alleged, but denied by Pakistan)<ref>{{cite news|title=The 'airlift of evil'|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna3340165|date=December 11, 2003|publisher=]|access-date=April 14, 2022|archive-date=April 14, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220414221607/https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna3340165|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.dawn.com/2011/10/27/pakistan-military-denies-bbc-report-on-taliban-links/|title=Pakistan military denies BBC report on Taliban links|date=October 27, 2011|access-date=June 1, 2022|archive-date=June 25, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120625235558/http://dawn.com/2011/10/27/pakistan-military-denies-bbc-report-on-taliban-links/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/magazine/what-pakistan-knew-about-bin-laden.html|title=What Pakistan Knew About Bin Laden|newspaper=The New York Times|date=March 19, 2014|last1=Gall|first1=Carlotta|access-date=November 29, 2019|archive-date=August 13, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210813143216/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/magazine/what-pakistan-knew-about-bin-laden.html?_r=1|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|Qatar}} (alleged, but denied by Qatar)<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.795628|title=Fact Check: Is Qatar Supporting Terrorism? A Look at Its Ties to Iran, ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood|last1=Haaretz|first2=The Associated|last2=Press|date=July 11, 2017|newspaper=Haaretz|access-date=November 4, 2017|archive-date=January 14, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180114135452/https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.795628|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|Russia}} (alleged, but denied by Russia)<ref name="UPI: Russia">{{cite web|title=Al-Qaida Zawahiri trained by Russians|url=https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2005/07/19/Al-Qaida-Zawahiri-trained-by-Russians/58211121786326/|work=]|access-date=September 11, 2024|date=July 19, 2005}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|first1=Konstantin|last1=Preobrazhensky|author-link=Konstantin Preobrazhensky|title=Russia and Islam are not Separate: Why Russia backs Al-Qaeda|url=http://cicentre.com/Documents/russia_islam_not_separate.html|publisher=The Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies|access-date=September 11, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071219040336/http://cicentre.com/Documents/russia_islam_not_separate.html|archive-date=December 19, 2007|date=August 31, 2007}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last1=Stroilov|first1=Pavel|title=Moscow's jihadi|url=https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/moscow-s-jihadi/|website=]|access-date=September 11, 2024|date=June 25, 2011}}</ref>
* {{flag|Saudi Arabia}} (alleged, but denied by Saudi Arabia)<ref name="WT">{{cite news|last1=Thomas|first1=Carls|title=The Saudis channel the mafia: Fears of Saudi retaliation deter truth about 9/11|url=http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/18/cal-thomas-fears-of-saudi-retaliation-deter-truth-/|access-date=April 28, 2016|work=The Washington Times|archive-date=April 28, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160428151621/http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/18/cal-thomas-fears-of-saudi-retaliation-deter-truth-/|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{Flag|Sudan}} (1989–1996)<ref name="auto" />
* {{flagicon|Syria|1980}} ] (until 2024; alleged by the US)<ref>{{Cite news |last=Akkad |first=Dania |date=September 19, 2017 |title=Syrian state helped al-Qaeda bomb Jordan hotels, US court finds |work=] |url=https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-state-helped-al-qaeda-bomb-jordan-hotels-us-court-finds |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190706041730/https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-state-helped-al-qaeda-bomb-jordan-hotels-us-court-finds |archive-date=July 6, 2019 |access-date=January 2, 2025}}</ref>
* {{flag|Zimbabwe}} (alleged)<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://hsf.org.za/publications/focus/issue-34-second-quarter-2004/al-qaeda-and-the-zimbabwe-connection|title=al-Qaeda and the Zimbabwe connection|website=Helen Suzman Foundation}}</ref>
----
'''Non-state allies:'''
* {{Flag|Taliban}}<ref name="UN SC 2023"/><ref name="Dawn"/>
** {{flagicon image|Flag of the Taliban.svg}} ]
* {{flag|Hamas}}{{refn|name=Hamas|<ref>{{cite web|title=Bin Laden: Palestinian cause fuels terror war|date=May 15, 2008|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24656757|publisher=NBC News}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Alleged bin Laden tape urges Muslims to liberate Palestine|date=May 16, 2008|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/16/bin.laden.message/index.html|publisher=CNN|access-date=July 8, 2024|archive-date=July 8, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240708183908/https://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/16/bin.laden.message/index.html|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Hamas praises Osama bin Laden as holy warrior|date=May 2, 2011|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/02/hamas-osama-bin-laden|work=The Guardian}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Hamas condemns killing of 'holy warrior' bin Laden|date=May 2, 2011|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/stocks/hamas-condemns-killing-of-holy-warrior-bin-laden-idUSLDE74110O/|work=Reuters}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|date=October 13, 2023|title=Al-Qaeda's North and West African branches respond to the Hamas-led invasion of Israel|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/10/al-qaedas-north-and-west-african-branches-respond-to-the-hamas-led-invasion-of-israel.php|access-date=October 17, 2023|website=]|archive-date=October 19, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231019065324/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/10/al-qaedas-north-and-west-african-branches-respond-to-the-hamas-led-invasion-of-israel.php|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Al Shabaab jihadists praise Hamas' attack, Kenya's counter-terrorism unit is on alert|date=October 12, 2023|url=https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/Al-Shabaab-jihadists-praise-Hamas-attack-on-Kenyan-anti-terrorism-alert/|publisher=Agenzia Nova|access-date=October 12, 2023|archive-date=October 12, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231012235735/https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/Al-Shabaab-jihadists-praise-Hamas-attack-on-Kenyan-anti-terrorism-alert/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Somalia: Al-Shabaab praises Hamas attack on Israel|url=https://somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somalia-al-shabaab-praises-hamas-attack-on-israel/|website=Somali guardian|date=October 12, 2023|access-date=October 12, 2023|archive-date=October 12, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231012235740/https://somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somalia-al-shabaab-praises-hamas-attack-on-israel/|url-status=live}}</ref>}}
* {{Flagicon image|Ansarullah Flag Vector.svg}} ] (since 2023)<ref name="auto3">{{cite web|title=In rare admission, Yemen's Houthis confirm they released Al-Qaeda terrorists|url=https://www.arabnews.com/node/2254936/middle-east|website=Arab news|date=February 20, 2023|access-date=February 20, 2023|archive-date=April 4, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404055703/https://www.arabnews.com/node/2254936/middle-east|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Houthis team up with feared Al-Qaeda branch in new threat to Yemen|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/05/04/houthis-team-up-feared-al-qaeda-branch-new-threat-yemen/|website=The Telegraph|date=May 4, 2024|last1=Mohammed|first1=Ali|last2=Yan|first2=Sophia}}</ref>
* {{Flagicon image|InfoboxHez.PNG}} ] (sometimes)<ref>{{harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|pp=12, 86}}: "By forging a tactical relationship with Hezbollah, Al Qaeda mastered the art of bombing buildings."</ref>
* ]
* ]
* ] (1998–2015,<ref name="cisac"/> 2016<ref name="imusplinter">{{cite web|date=June 14, 2016|title=Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan faction emerges after group's collapse|url=http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-faction-emerges-after-groups-collapse.php|access-date=June 15, 2016|work=Long War Journal}}</ref>–present)
* ] ]
* ] ]
** ] ]
* ] ]
* ] ]
* ]
* ]
* {{flagicon image|Flag of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.svg}} ]
* {{flagicon image|Flag of Jihad.svg}} ]
* ] (until 2001)
* ] (until 2011)
* ] (until 2010s)
* ] (until 2014)
* {{flagicon image|Flag of Jihad.svg}} ] (until 2015)
* ] (until 2016)
* {{flagicon image|Flag of Jihad.svg}} ] ] (until 2024)<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-s-ji-terror-group-declares-dissolution-but-security-threat-remains-say-analysts|title=Indonesia's JI terror group declares dissolution, but security threat remains, say analysts|work=The Straits Times|date=July 3, 2024|access-date=July 4, 2024}}</ref><ref name="dissolution disband">{{Cite news|title=Southeast Asian militant group Jemaah Islamiyah to be disbanded, say its senior leaders|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/southeast-asian-militant-group-jemaah-islamiyah-be-disbanded-say-its-senior-2024-07-04|date=July 4, 2024|access-date=July 4, 2024|work=Reuters}}</ref>
}}
| opponents = {{Collapsible list |title={{Nbsp}}| '''State opponents:'''
* {{flag|Algeria}}
* {{Flag|China}}<ref name="uyg1"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130511024214/http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/648#tocto1n10 |date=May 11, 2013 }} Summary of</ref>
* {{flag|Egypt}}
* {{flag|France}}
* {{flag|India}}
* {{flagcountry|Iran}}<ref>{{cite news|last1=Andrew|first1=Jeong|title=Militant in Iran identified as al-Qaeda's probable new chief in U.N. report|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/15/al-qaeda-leader-saif-al-adel/|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=February 15, 2023|archive-date=February 15, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230215142558/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/15/al-qaeda-leader-saif-al-adel/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Iran denies U.S. claims linking Tehran to Al Qaeda's leader - foreign minister|date=February 16, 2023|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-denies-us-claims-linking-tehran-al-qaedas-leader-foreign-minister-2023-02-16/|work=Reuters|access-date=February 16, 2023|archive-date=March 12, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230312064322/https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-denies-us-claims-linking-tehran-al-qaedas-leader-foreign-minister-2023-02-16/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Shia Iran"/>
* {{flag|Iraq}}
* {{flag|Israel}}
* {{Flag|Lebanon}}
* {{Flag|Russia}}
* {{Flag|Saudi Arabia}}<ref>{{cite web|last1=Byman|first1=Daniel L.|title=The U.S.-Saudi Arabia counterterrorism relationship|url=https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-u-s-saudi-arabia-counterterrorism-relationship/|website=Brookings|date=November 30, 2001|access-date=June 8, 2021|quote=Saudi Arabia considers Al Qaeda to be a mortal enemy|archive-date=April 23, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200423023408/https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-u-s-saudi-arabia-counterterrorism-relationship/|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{Flag|Somalia}}
* {{flagicon image|Flag_of_the_Syrian_revolution.svg}} ]
* {{Flag|Turkey}}<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/why-is-al-qaeda-attacking-turkish-forces-46837|title=Why is Al Qaeda attacking Turkish forces?|website=Why is Al Qaeda attacking Turkish forces?|access-date=October 3, 2021|archive-date=October 3, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211003130940/https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/why-is-al-qaeda-attacking-turkish-forces-46837|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|United Arab Emirates}}<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-11/three-uae-troops-killed-in-somalia-attack-by-al-qaeda-affiliate|title=Four UAE Troops Dead in Somalia Attack by Al-Qaeda Affiliate|website=]|date=February 11, 2024}}</ref>
* {{Flag|United Kingdom}}
* {{Flag|United States}}
* {{flag|Uzbekistan}}
* {{flag|Yemen}}
----
Formerly:
* {{flagicon image|Flag of Afghanistan (1987–1992).svg}} {{flagicon image|Flag of Afghanistan (1992–2001).svg}} {{flagicon|Islamic Republic of Afghanistan}} ] (1988–1992; 1996–2001; 2002–2021)
* {{flagcountry|Soviet Union}} (1988–1989)
----
'''Non-state opponents:'''
* {{Flag|Islamic State}}
* {{Flagicon image|Ansarullah Flag Vector.svg}} ] (until 2023)<ref name="Saif"/><ref name="auto3"/>
* {{Flagicon image|InfoboxHez.PNG}} ] (sometimes)
* {{Flagicon image|Flag of Kurdistan.svg}} ]
* {{Flagicon image|People's Protection Units Flag.svg}} ]
* {{Flagicon image|Flag of South Yemen.svg}} ]
** ]
}}
| battles = {{Collapsible list |title={{Nbsp}}| ]<br />
In Afghanistan
* ]
** ]
* ]
* ]
In Tajikistan
* ]
In North-Caucasus
* ]
* ]
* ]
In Yemen
* ]
* ]
In the Maghreb
* ]
* ]
In Iraq
* ]
* ]
In Pakistan
* ]
In Somalia
* ]
* ]
In Syria
* ]
* ]
* ]
In Egypt
* ]
* ]
In India
* ]<ref>{{Cite web|title=Al-Qaeda calls for liberation of Kashmir|date=September 2021|via=YouTube|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5skKkj2eEv0|access-date=September 30, 2021|archive-date=October 8, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211008051735/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5skKkj2eEv0&ab_channel=WION|url-status=live}}</ref>
}}
| status =
| designated_as_terror_group_by = ]
}} }}
'''Al-Qaeda''' ({{pron-en|ælˈkaɪdə}} {{respell|al|KYE|də}} or {{IPA-en|ælˈkeɪdə|}} {{respell|al|KAY|də}}; {{lang-ar|القاعدة}}, ''al-qāʿidah'', "the base"), alternatively spelled '''Al-Qaida''' and sometimes '''Al-Qa'ida''', is an ] group founded sometime between August 1988<ref name=bergen75>{{Harvnb|Bergen|2006|p=75}}.</ref> and late 1989.<ref name="al-Fadl">{{cite web |url=http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm |title=Testimony of Jamal Ahmad Al-Fadl |date=February 6, 2001 |publisher=James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies |author=United States District Court, Southern District of New York |work=United States v. Usama bin Laden et al., defendants |accessdate=2008-09-03}}</ref> It operates as a network comprising both a multinational, stateless arm<ref>{{Harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|pp=95–96}}. "Al Qaeda's global network, as we know it today, was created while it was based in Khartoum, from December 1991 till May 1996. To coordinate its overt and covert operations as Al-Qaeda's ambitions and resources increased, it developed a decentralised, regional structure. As a global multinational, Al-Qaeda makes its constituent nationalities and ethnic groups, of which there are several dozen, responsible for a particular geograhic region. Although its ''modus operandi'' is cellular, familial relationships play a key role."<br/> See also:


'''Al-Qaeda''' ({{IPAc-en|audio=En-us-Al Qaeda pronunciation (Voice of America).ogg|æ|l|ˈ|k|aɪ|(|ə|)|d|ə}}; {{Langx|ar|القاعدة|translit=al-Qāʿidah|lit=the Base}}, {{IPA|ar|alˈqaː.ʕi.da|IPA}}) is a ] militant organization led by Sunni ] who self-identify as a vanguard spearheading a global ] to unite the ] under a supra-national ].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Klausen|first=Jytte|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=p7Q6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA53|title=Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2021|isbn=978-0-19-887079-1|location=Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, ox2 6dp, United Kingdom|pages=53–54|chapter=2: The Founder|access-date=March 18, 2023|archive-date=April 4, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404113004/https://books.google.com/books?id=p7Q6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA53|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last1=J. Tompkins, Crossett|first1=Paul, Chuck|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SPZdWxjMd6cC&pg=PA533|title=Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009|last2=Spitaletta, Marshal|first2=Jason, Shana|publisher=United States Army Special Operations Command|year=2012|location=Fort Liberty, North Carolina|pages=533, 544|chapter=19 – Al-Qaeda: 1988-2001|access-date=March 18, 2023|archive-date=April 4, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404113005/https://books.google.com/books?id=SPZdWxjMd6cC&pg=PA533|url-status=live}}</ref> Its membership is mostly composed of ]s but also includes people from other ethnic groups.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Immenkamp|first1=Beatrix|last2=Latici|first2=Tania|date=October 2021|title=Security situation in Afghanistan|url=https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698771/EPRS_BRI(2021)698771_EN.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220409111042/https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698771/EPRS_BRI(2021)698771_EN.pdf|archive-date=April 9, 2022|website=European Parliament}}</ref> Al-Qaeda has mounted attacks on civilian, economic and military targets of the U.S. and its allies; such as the ], the ], and the ].
*{{cite journal|last=Naím|first=Moisés|authorlink=Moisés Naím|title=The Five Wars of Globalization|journal=]|issue=134|pages=28–37|date=January/February 2003}}</ref> and a fundamentalist ] movement calling for global ].


The organization was founded in a series of meetings held in ] during 1988, attended by ], ], ], ] and other veterans of the ].<ref name="Klausen 2021 47–51">{{Cite book|last=Klausen|first=Jytte|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=p7Q6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA47|title=Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2021|isbn=978-0-19-887079-1|location=Oxford, UK|pages=47–51|chapter=2: The Founder|access-date=March 18, 2023|archive-date=April 4, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404113005/https://books.google.com/books?id=p7Q6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA47|url-status=live}}</ref> Building upon the networks of '']'', the founding members decided to create an organization named "''Al-Qaeda''" to serve as a "vanguard" for '']''.<ref name="Klausen 2021 47–51"/><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Mcgregor|first1=Andrew|year=2003|title="Jihad and the Rifle Alone": 'Abdullah 'Azzam and the Islamist Revolution|url=https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/jcs/2003-v23-n2-jcs23_2/jcs23_2art06/|journal=Journal of Conflict Studies|volume=23|issue=2|pages=92–113|access-date=December 12, 2022|archive-date=December 12, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221212183453/https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/jcs/2003-v23-n2-jcs23_2/jcs23_2art06/|url-status=live}}</ref> When ] ] in 1990, bin Laden offered to support ] by sending his '']'' fighters. His offer was rebuffed by the Saudi government, which instead sought the aid of the ]. The stationing of U.S. troops in the ] prompted bin Laden to declare a ''jihad'' against both the rulers of Saudi Arabia – whom he denounced as '']'' (apostates) – and against the US. From 1992, al-Qaeda established its headquarters in ] until it was expelled in 1996. It then shifted its base to the ]-ruled ] and later expanded to other parts of the world, primarily in the ] and ]. In 1996 and 1998, bin Laden issued two ] that demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia.
Al-Qaeda has attacked civilian and military targets in various countries, most notably, the ] on New York City and Washington, D.C. in 2001. The ] responded by launching the ].


In 1998, al-Qaeda conducted the ] in ] and ], which killed 224 people. The U.S. retaliated by launching ], against al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. In 2001, al-Qaeda carried out the ], resulting in nearly ], ], ], the triggering of ] as well as generating profound ]. The U.S. launched the ] in response and ] to depose the Taliban and destroy al-Qaeda. In 2003, a U.S.-led coalition ], overthrowing the ] which they ] of having ties with al-Qaeda. In 2004, al-Qaeda launched its ]. After ], the U.S. military ] in ] in May 2011.
Characteristic techniques include ]s and simultaneous bombings of different targets.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|pp=107–108, 185, 270–271}}</ref> Activities ascribed to it may involve members of the movement, who have taken a pledge of loyalty to ], or the much more numerous "al-Qaeda-linked" individuals who have undergone training in one of its camps in ] or ], but not taken any pledge.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=270}}.</ref>


Al-Qaeda members believe that a ] alliance (led by the ]) is waging a ] and conspiring to destroy ].<ref>Fu'ad Husayn 'Al-Zarqawi, "The Second Generation of al-Qa'ida, Part Fourteen," ''Al-Quds al-Arabi'', July 13, 2005</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last1=Wiktorowicz|first1=Quintan|last2=Kaltner|first2=John|year=2003|title=Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11|url=https://www.mafhoum.com/press5/147S29.htm|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210910185227/https://www.mafhoum.com/press5/147S29.htm|archive-date=September 10, 2021|access-date=September 10, 2021|website=mafhoum.com|publisher=Middle East Policy Council}}</ref> Al-Qaeda also opposes ]s, and seek to implement '']'' (Islamic law) in Muslim countries.<ref name="LT246">{{harvnb|Wright|2006|p=}}</ref> Al-Qaeda fighters characteristically deploy tactics such as ]s (] and ]i operations) involving simultaneous bombing of several ] in battle-zones.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|pp=107–108, 185, 270–271}}</ref> ], which later morphed into the ] after 2006, was responsible for numerous ] attacks against ] during its ].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Brahimi|first=Alia|url=https://archive.org/details/jihadjustwarinwa0000brah|title=Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0-19-956296-1|url-access=registration}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=March 20, 2006|title=Al Qaeda's hand in tipping Iraq toward civil war|url=http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0320/p09s01-coop.html|website=]|first=Abdel Bari|last=Atwan|author-link=Abdel Bari Atwan|access-date=May 7, 2011|archive-date=May 16, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110516010954/http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0320/p09s01-coop.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Al-Qaeda ideologues envision the violent removal of all foreign and ] influences in ], which it denounces as corrupt deviations.<ref name="spiegel1" /><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/al-qaidas-ideology.html|title=al Qaida's Ideology|publisher=MI5|access-date=May 19, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090228214557/http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/al-qaidas-ideology.html|archive-date=February 28, 2009}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|date=August 6, 2011|title=Dreaming of a caliphate|newspaper=The Economist|url=http://www.economist.com/node/21525400|url-status=live|url-access=subscription|access-date=May 19, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180821062637/https://www.economist.com/briefing/2011/08/06/dreaming-of-a-caliphate|archive-date=August 21, 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=February 4, 2005|title=Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology|url=https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL32759.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210910185227/https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL32759.html|archive-date=September 10, 2021|access-date=September 10, 2021|website=CRS Report}}</ref> Following the death of bin Laden in 2011, al-Qaeda vowed to avenge his killing. The group was then led by Egyptian ] until he too was ] in 2022. {{As of|2021|}}, they have reportedly suffered from a deterioration of central command over its regional operations.<ref name="Zakaria-10-years-29-4-21">{{cite news|last1=Zakaria|first1=Fareed|date=April 29, 2021|title=Opinion: Ten years later, Islamist terrorism isn't the threat it used to be|newspaper=The Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/ten-years-later-islamist-terrorism-isnt-the-threat-it-used-to-be/2021/04/29/deb88256-a91c-11eb-bca5-048b2759a489_story.html|url-status=live|url-access=subscription|access-date=May 4, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211116153800/https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/ten-years-later-islamist-terrorism-isnt-the-threat-it-used-to-be/2021/04/29/deb88256-a91c-11eb-bca5-048b2759a489_story.html|archive-date=November 16, 2021}}</ref>
Al-Qaeda ideologues envision a complete break from the foreign influences in ], and the creation of a new Islamic ]. Reported beliefs include that a ]-] alliance is conspiring to destroy Islam,<ref>Fu'ad Husayn `Al-Zarqawi ... "The Second Generation of al-Qa’ida, Part Fourteen," ''Al-Quds al-Arabi'', July 13, 2005</ref> which is largely embodied in the ], and that the killing of bystanders and civilians is religiously justified in jihad.


== Organization == == Organization ==
Al-Qaeda only indirectly controls its day-to-day operations. Its philosophy calls for the ] of decision making, while allowing for the ] of execution.<ref>al-Hammadi, Khalid, "The Inside Story of al-Qa'ida", part 4, ''Al-Quds al-Arabi'', March 22, 2005</ref> The top leaders of al-Qaeda have defined the organization's ideology and guiding strategy, and they have also articulated simple and easy-to-receive messages. At the same time, mid-level organizations were given autonomy, but they had to consult with top management before large-scale attacks and assassinations. Top management included the shura council as well as committees on military operations, finance, and information sharing. Through the information committees of al-Qaeda, Zawahiri placed special emphasis on communicating with his groups.<ref name=WilsonLeaders2015>{{Cite web|last=Glenn|first=Cameron|date=September 28, 2015|title=Al Qaeda v ISIS: Leaders & Structure|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-leaders-structure|access-date=March 3, 2021|website=Wilson Center|archive-date=March 8, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308155255/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-leaders-structure|url-status=live}}</ref> However, after the ], al-Qaeda's leadership has become isolated. As a result, the leadership has become decentralized, and the organization has become regionalized into several al-Qaeda groups.<ref>J. Feiser – {{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FH13Ak05.html|title=Evolution of the al-Qaeda brand name|work=Asia Times|date=August 13, 2004|access-date=March 22, 2010|archive-url=http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20050423141837/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FH13Ak05.html|archive-date=April 23, 2005|url-status=unfit}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Atran|first=Scott|date=Spring 2006|title=The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism|url=http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150623022648/http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf|archive-date=June 23, 2015|access-date=March 22, 2010}}</ref>


The group was initially dominated by ] and ], with some participation from ] and ]. Over time, it has evolved into a more international terrorist organization. While its core group originally shared a background in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, it has since attracted fighters from other Arab groups, including ], ], ], and ]. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, Muslims from non-Arab backgrounds, such as ], ], ], ], and ], have also joined the organization.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Steinberg|first=Guido|title=German Jihad: On the Internationalization of Islamist Terrorism|date=2013|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-50053-1|series=Columbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare|location=New York|pages=15, 17|chapter=Unlikely Internationalists: Putting German Jihadism into Perspective}}</ref>
Al-Qaeda's management philosophy has been described as "centralization of decision and decentralization of execution."<ref>al-Hammadi, Khalid, `The Inside Story of al-Qa'ida,` part 4, ''Al-Quds al-Arabi'', March 22, 2005</ref> Following the War on Terrorism, it is thought that al-Qaeda's leadership has "become geographically isolated", leading to the "emergence of decentralized leadership" of regional groups using the al-Qaeda "]."<ref>{{cite web|author=Aug 13, 2004 |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FH13Ak05.html |title=Evolution of the al-Qaeda brand name |publisher=Atimes.com |date=2004-08-13 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf |title=The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism – SPRING 2006 |format=PDF |date= |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>


Many terrorism experts do not believe that the global jihadist movement is driven at every level by Osama bin Laden and his followers. Although Osama bin Laden still has huge ideological sway over some Muslim extremists, experts argue that al-Qaeda has fragmented over the years into a variety of disconnected regional movements that have little connection with each other. ], a psychiatrist and former CIA officer, said that Al-Qaeda would now just be a "loose label for a movement that seems to target the west". "There is no umbrella organisation. We like to create a mythical entity called in our minds but that is not the reality we are dealing with."<ref name="FT Threat">{{cite news|last=Blitz|first=James|journal=Financial Times|title=A threat transformed|date=January 19, 2010|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af31e344-0499-11df-8603-00144feabdc0.html|accessdate=January 23, 2010}}</ref> Many Western analysts do not believe that the global jihadist movement is driven at every level by al-Qaeda's leadership. However, bin Laden held considerable ideological influence over revolutionary Islamist movements across the world. Experts argue that al-Qaeda has fragmented into a number of disparate regional movements, and that these groups bear little connection with one another.<ref name="FT Threat">{{Cite news|last1=Blitz|first1=James|date=January 19, 2010|title=A threat transformed|newspaper=]|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af31e344-0499-11df-8603-00144feabdc0.html|url-status=|url-access=subscription|access-date=December 11, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110502150747/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af31e344-0499-11df-8603-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1LCxJlXGb|archive-date=May 2, 2011}}</ref>


This view mirrors the account given by Osama bin Laden in his October 2001 interview with ]:
Others, however, see Al-Qaeda as an integrated network that is strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas and has a powerful strategic purpose. ], a terrorism expert at ], said "It amazes me that people don't think there is a clear adversary out there, and that our adversary does not have a strategic approach."<ref name="FT Threat"/>


{{blockquote| "this matter isn't about any specific person and{{spaces}}... is not about the al-Qa'idah Organization. We are the children of an Islamic Nation, with Prophet Muhammad as its leader, our Lord is one{{spaces}}... and all the true believers are brothers. So the situation isn't like the West portrays it, that there is an 'organization' with a specific name (such as 'al-Qa'idah') and so on. That particular name is very old. It was born without any intention from us. Brother Abu Ubaida{{spaces}}... created a military base to train the young men to fight against the vicious, arrogant, brutal, terrorizing Soviet empire{{spaces}}... So this place was called 'The Base' , as in a training base, so this name grew and became. We aren't separated from this nation. We are the children of a nation, and we are an inseparable part of it, and from those public demonstrations which spread from the far east, from the Philippines to Indonesia, to Malaysia, to India, to Pakistan, reaching Mauritania{{spaces}}... and so we discuss the conscience of this nation."<ref name=islamicawakening>{{cite web|url=http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewarticle.php?articleID=977&pageID=64|title=A Discussion on the New Crusader Wars: Tayseer Allouni with Usamah bin Laden|publisher=IslamicAwakening.com|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130621142756/http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewarticle.php?articleID=977&pageID=64|archive-date=June 21, 2013}}</ref>}}
==Etymology==
In ], ''al-Qaeda'' has four syllables ({{IPA-ar|ælˈqɑːʕɪdɐ}}). However, since two of the Arabic consonants in the name (the ] {{IPA|}} and the ] {{IPA|}}) are not ] found in the ], the closest naturalized ] include {{IPA-en|ælˈkaɪdə|}}, {{IPA|/ælˈkeɪdə/}}, and less commonly four syllables, {{IPA|/ˌælkɑːˈiːdə/}}.{{Citation needed|date=May 2009}} Al-Qaeda's name can also be ] as al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida, el-Qaida, or al Qaeda.<ref> (]).</ref>


{{as of|2010}} however, ] saw al-Qaeda as a cohesive network that was strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas.<ref name="FT Threat" />
The name comes from the Arabic noun ''qā'idah'', which means ''foundation'' or ''basis'' and can also refer to a military base. The initial ''al-'' is the Arabic ] ''the'', hence ''the base''.<ref>Arabic Computer Dictionary: English-Arabic, Arabic-English By Ernest Kay, Multi-lingual International Publishers, 1986.</ref>


] armed with a ], 2012]]
] explained the origin of the term in a videotaped interview with ] journalist ] in October 2001:
<blockquote>The name 'al-Qaeda' was established a long time ago by mere chance. The late ] established the training camps for our ] against Russia's terrorism. We used to call the training camp al-Qaeda. The name stayed.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/index.html |title=Transcript of Bin Laden's October interview |publisher=CNN |date=2002-02-05 |accessdate=2006-10-22}}</ref></blockquote>


=== Affiliates ===
It has been argued that two documents seized from the ] office of the ] prove that the name was not simply adopted by the mujahid movement and that a group called al-Qaeda was established in August 1988. Both of these documents contain minutes of meetings held to establish a new military group and contain the term "al-qaeda".<ref>{{Harvnb|Bergen|2006|p=75}}. Wright indirectly quotes one of the documents, based on an exhibit from the "Tareek Osama" document presented in <span class="plainlinks"></span>.</ref>
Al-Qaeda has the following direct affiliates:
{{Div col|colwidth=30em}}
* ] (AQAP)
* ] (AQIS)
* ] (AQIM)
* ]
* ]
* ] (JNIM)
{{div col end}}


The following are presently believed to be indirect affiliates of al-Qaeda:
Former ] ] ] wrote that the word Al Qaeda should be translated as "the database", and originally referred to the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen militants who were recruited and trained with CIA help to defeat the Russians.<ref>The Guardian, 8 July 2005, "The Struggle Against Terrorism Cannot Be Won by Military Means," Robin Cook, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jul/08/july7.development</ref>
{{Div col|colwidth=30em}}
In April 2002, the group assumed the name ''Qa'idat al-Jihad'', which means "the base of Jihad". According to ], this was "apparently as a result of the merger of the overseas branch of Egypt's ] (Egyptian Islamist Jihad, or EIJ) group, led by ], with the groups Bin Laden brought under his control after his return to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s."<ref>"", '']'', January 2–8, 2003 (Issue No. 619). Retrieved September 3, 2006.</ref>
* ]<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lebanon/u-s-designates-fatah-al-islam-terrorist-group-idUSN1334969020070813|date=August 13, 2007|title=U.S. designates Fatah al-Islam 'terrorist' group|work=Reuters|access-date=August 11, 2019|archive-date=December 16, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201216225141/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lebanon/u-s-designates-fatah-al-islam-terrorist-group-idUSN1334969020070813|url-status=live}}</ref>
* ]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/04/islamic-jihad-union-conducts-joint-raid-with-the-taliban.php|last1=Roggio|first1=Bill|last2=Weiss|first2=Caleb|date=April 10, 2018|title=Islamic Jihad Union conducts joint raid with the Taliban|website=Long War Journal|access-date=August 11, 2019|archive-date=December 16, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201216225214/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/04/islamic-jihad-union-conducts-joint-raid-with-the-taliban.php|url-status=live}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="cisac">{{Cite web|url=https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jaish-e-mohammed|title=Jaish-e-Mohammed|date=July 2018|publisher=Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University|access-date=August 11, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190717001529/https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jaish-e-mohammed|archive-date=July 17, 2019|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* ]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/07/pakistan-charges-13-lashkar-e-taiba-leaders-under-anti-terrorism-act.php|last1=Roggio|first1=Bill|date=July 12, 2019|title=Pakistan charges 13 Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders under Anti-Terrorism Act|website=Long War Journal|access-date=August 12, 2019|archive-date=December 16, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201216225208/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/07/pakistan-charges-13-lashkar-e-taiba-leaders-under-anti-terrorism-act.php|url-status=live}}</ref>
{{div col end}}


Al-Qaeda's former affiliates include the following:
==Ideology==
{{See also|Qutbism}}
{{Islamism sidebar}}
The radical Islamist movement in general and al-Qaeda in particular developed during the ] and ] of the last three decades of the 20th century along with less extreme movements.


{{Div col|colwidth=30em}}
Some have argued that "without the writings" of Islamic author and thinker ] "al-Qaeda would not have existed."<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=332}}.</ref> Qutb preached that because of the lack of ] law the Muslim world was no longer Muslim, having reverted to pre-Islamic ignorance known as ].
* ] (pledged allegiance to ] in 2014<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/375074/news/nation/biff-abu-sayyaf-pledge-allegiance-t-islamic-state-jihadists|title=BIFF, Abu Sayyaf pledge allegiance to Islamic State jihadists|work=GMA News Online|date=August 16, 2014|access-date=April 12, 2016}}</ref>)
* ] (dissolved)
* ] (dissolved)
* ]<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Gordon|first=David|year=2011|title=Jemaah Islamiyah|url=http://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/111101_Gordon_JemaahIslamiyah_WEB.pdf|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/111101_Gordon_JemaahIslamiyah_WEB.pdf|archive-date=October 9, 2022|url-status=live|journal=Homeland Security & Counterterrorism Program Transnational Threats Project|via=Center for Strategic & International Studies}}</ref> (dissolved in 2024)
* ]<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jesus|first1=Carlos Echeverria|date=March 2009|title=The Current State of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group|url=https://ctc.usma.edu/the-current-state-of-the-moroccan-islamic-combatant-group/|journal=CTC Sentinel|volume=2|issue=3|access-date=August 12, 2019|archive-date=December 16, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201216225208/https://ctc.usma.edu/the-current-state-of-the-moroccan-islamic-combatant-group/|url-status=dead}}</ref> (dissolved)
* ] (joined ] in 2017<ref name="JNIM">{{cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php|last1=Joscelyn|first1=Thomas|date=March 13, 2017|title=Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa|website=Long War Journal|access-date=August 16, 2019|archive-date=October 25, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191025023808/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php|url-status=live}}</ref>)
* ] (became the ], which later seceded from al-Qaeda and became ])
* ] (inactive since 2015<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://jamestown.org/program/electronic-jihad-nigeria-boko-haram-using-social-media/|title=Electronic Jihad in Nigeria: How Boko Haram Is Using Social Media|first1=Jacob|last1=Zenn|work=]|date=December 9, 2017|access-date=July 16, 2018|archive-date=July 16, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180716225757/https://jamestown.org/program/electronic-jihad-nigeria-boko-haram-using-social-media/|url-status=live}}</ref>)
* ] (majority merged with ] in 2014)
* ] (joined ] in 2017<ref name="JNIM" />)
* ] (became ])
* ] (merged with ] to form ] in 2013)
* ]<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Banlaoi|first1=Rommel C.|title=Media and Terrorism in the Philippines: The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement|journal=Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism|date=April 1, 2009|volume=4|issue=1|pages=64–75|doi=10.1080/18335300.2009.9686924|s2cid=144035702}}</ref>
* ] (dissolved in 2017, merged with other Islamist organizations to form ] and split ties){{div col end}}


=== Leadership ===
To restore Islam, a vanguard movement of righteous Muslims was needed to establish "true ]s", implement Sharia, and rid the Muslim world of any non-Muslim influences, such as concepts like ] or ]. Enemies of Islam included "treacherous Orientalists"<ref>{{Harvnb|Qutb|2003|pp=63, 69}}.</ref> and "world Jewry", who plotted "conspiracies" and "wicked" opposed Islam.
==== Osama bin Laden (1988 – May 2011) ====
]


] served as the emir of al-Qaeda from the organization's founding in 1988 until his assassination by US forces on May 1, 2011.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/al_qaeda_emir_osama.php|last1=Ardolino|first1=Bill|last2=Roggio|first2=Bill|date=May 1, 2011|title=Al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden confirmed killed by US forces in Pakistan|website=Long War Journal|access-date=August 5, 2019|archive-date=August 5, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190805214544/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/al_qaeda_emir_osama.php|url-status=live}}</ref> ] was alleged to be second in command prior to his death on August 22, 2011.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-official-al-qaidas-no-2-leader-atiyah-abd-al-rahman-killed-in-pakistan/2011/08/27/gIQABVppiJ_story.html|title=Al Qaidas No. 2 leader Atiyah Abd al-Rahman killed in Pakistan|newspaper=The Washington Post|first1=Dan|last1=Balz|date=August 27, 2011}}{{dead link|date=June 2021|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref>
In the words of ], a close college friend of Osama bin Laden: ''Islam is different from any other religion; it's a way of life. We were trying to understand what Islam has to say about how we eat, who we marry, how we talk. We read Sayyid Qutb. He was the one who most affected our generation.''<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=79}}.</ref>


Bin Laden was advised by a ], which consists of senior al-Qaeda members.<ref name=WilsonLeaders2015/> The group was estimated to consist of 20–30 people.
Qutb had an even greater influence on Osama bin Laden's mentor and another leading member of al-Qaeda,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/qutb_milest_influence_obl.html |title=How Did Sayyid Qutb Influence Osama bin Laden? |publisher=Gemsofislamism.tripod.com |date= |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref> ]. Zawahiri's uncle and maternal family patriarch, Mafouz Azzam, was Qutb's student, then protégé, then personal lawyer and finally executor of his estate—one of the last people to see Qutb before his execution. "Young Ayman al-Zawahiri heard again and again from his beloved uncle Mahfouz about the purity of Qutb's character and the torment he had endured in prison."<ref>Mafouz Azzam; cited in {{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=36}}.</ref> Zawahiri paid homage to Qutb in his work ''Knights under the Prophet's Banner.''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/milestones_qutb.html#footnote_24 |title=Sayyid Qutb's Milestones (footnote 24) |publisher=Gemsofislamism.tripod.com |date= |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>


==== After May 2011 ====
One of the most powerful effects of Qutb's ideas was the idea that many who said they were Muslims were not, i.e., they were ]s, which not only gave jihadists "a legal loophole around the prohibition of killing another Muslim," but made "it a religious obligation to execute" the self-professed Muslim. These alleged apostates included leaders of Muslim countries, since they failed to enforce sharia law.<ref> DALE C. EIKMEIER From ''Parameters'', Spring 2007, pp. 85–98.</ref>
] had been al-Qaeda's deputy emir and assumed the role of emir following bin Laden's death. Al-Zawahiri replaced ], who had served as interim commander.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/06/16/world/middleeast/AP-ML-Al-Qaida-Zawahri.html|title=Al-Qaida Says Al-Zawahri Has Succeeded Bin Laden|agency=Associated Press|work=The New York Times|date=June 16, 2011|access-date=June 6, 2011}}</ref>


On June 5, 2012, Pakistani intelligence officials announced that al-Rahman's alleged successor as second in command, ], had been killed in Pakistan.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/asia/qaeda-deputy-killed-in-drone-strike-in-pakistan.html|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220101/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/asia/qaeda-deputy-killed-in-drone-strike-in-pakistan.html|archive-date=January 1, 2022|url-access=limited|title=Drone Strike Killed No. 2 in Al Qaeda, U.S. Officials Say|date=June 5, 2012|work=The New York Times|first1=Declan|last1=Walsh|first2=Eric|last2=Schmitt}}{{cbignore}}</ref>
==History==
Researchers have described five distinct phases in the development of al-Qaeda: the beginning in the late 1980s, the "wilderness" period in 1990–1996, its "heyday" in 1996–2001, the network period 2001–2005, and a period of fragmentation from 2005 to today.<ref>{{cite news|author=Jason Burke and Paddy Allen |url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2009/sep/10/al-qaida-five-ages-terror-attacks |title="The five ages of al-Qaida" |publisher=Guardian |accessdate=2010-03-22 | location=London | date=2009-09-11}}</ref>


] was alleged to have become al-Qaeda's overall second in command and general manager in 2013. He was concurrently the leader of ] (AQAP) until he was killed by a US airstrike in Yemen in June 2015.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170225141425/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-yemen-nasser-al-wuhayshi-killed.html |date=February 25, 2017 }}, ''The New York Times'', Kareem Fahim, June 16, 2015</ref> ], Wuhayshi's alleged successor as the deputy to Ayman al-Zawahiri, was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in February 2017.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/zawahiris-deputy-sought-to-unify-syrian-rebels.php|last1=Joscelyn|first1=Thomas|date=March 3, 2017|title=Zawahiri's deputy sought to 'unify' Syrian rebels|website=Long War Journal|access-date=August 5, 2019|archive-date=September 13, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180913114337/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/zawahiris-deputy-sought-to-unify-syrian-rebels.php|url-status=live}}</ref> Al-Qaeda's next alleged number two leader, ], was killed by Israeli agents. His pseudonym was Abu Muhammad al-Masri, who was killed in November 2020 in Iran. He was involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.<ref>{{Cite web|date=November 15, 2020|title=Report: Israeli agents assassinated Al-Qaeda's No. 2 in Iran|url=https://www.jns.org/report-israeli-agents-assassinated-al-qaedas-no-2-in-iran/|access-date=March 3, 2021|website=]|archive-date=March 5, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210305155904/https://www.jns.org/report-israeli-agents-assassinated-al-qaedas-no-2-in-iran/|url-status=live}}</ref>
===Founding in Pakistan===
{{Expand section|date=September 2009}}
Notes of a meeting of bin Laden and others on August 20, 1988, indicate al-Qaeda was a formal group by that time: "basically an organized Islamic faction, its goal is to lift the word of God, to make His religion victorious." A list of requirements for membership itemized the following: listening ability, good manners, obedience and making a pledge (]) to follow one's superiors.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|pp=133–134}}.</ref>


{{anchor|Committees}}<!--linked from Abu-Zaid al Kuwaiti-->Al-Qaeda's network was built from scratch as a conspiratorial network which drew upon the leadership of a number of regional nodes.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|p=54}}.</ref> The organization divided itself into several committees, which include:
According to Wright, the group's real name wasn't used in public pronouncements because "its existence was still a closely held secret."<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=260}}.</ref> His research suggests that al-Qaeda was formed at an August 11, 1988, meeting between "several senior leaders" of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, ], and Osama bin Laden, where it was agreed to join bin Laden's money with the expertise of the Islamic Jihad organization and take up the jihadist cause elsewhere after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.<ref name="RebellionWright">{{Harvnb|Wright|2008}}.</ref>
* The Military Committee, which is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks.
* The Money/Business Committee, which funds the recruitment and training of operatives through the '']'' banking system. US-led efforts to eradicate the sources of "]"<ref>{{Harvnb|State 2003}}.</ref> were most successful in the year immediately following the September 11 attacks.<ref>{{Harvnb|Basile|2004|p=177}}.</ref> Al-Qaeda continues to operate through unregulated banks, such as the 1,000 or so ''hawaladars'' in Pakistan, some of which can handle deals of up to {{US$|10}}{{spaces}}million.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wechsler|2001|p=135}}; cited in {{Harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|p=63}}.</ref> The committee also procures false passports, pays al-Qaeda members, and oversees profit-driven businesses.<ref>Businesses are run from below, with the council only being consulted on new proposals and collecting funds.<br />See:
* {{Harvnb|Hoffman|2002}}.</ref> In the '']'', it was estimated that al-Qaeda required $30{{spaces}}million per year to conduct its operations.
* The Law Committee reviews ], and decides upon courses of action conform to it.
* The Islamic Study/'']'' Committee issues religious edicts, such as an edict in 1998 telling Muslims to kill Americans.
* The Media Committee ran the now-defunct newspaper ''Nashrat al Akhbar'' ({{langx|en|Newscast}}) and handled ].
* In 2005, al-Qaeda formed ], a media production house, to supply its video and audio materials.


==== After Al-Zawahiri (2022 – present) ====
===Jihad in Afghanistan===
Al-Zawahiri was killed on July 31, 2022, in a drone strike in Afghanistan.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Engelbrecht|first1=Cora|last2=Ward|first2=Euan|date=August 2, 2022|title=The Killing of Ayman al-Zawahri: What We Know|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/world/asia/al-qaeda-al-zawahri-killing.html|access-date=August 2, 2022|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=August 2, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220802205000/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/world/asia/al-qaeda-al-zawahri-killing.html|url-status=live}}</ref> In February 2023, a report from the United Nations, based on member state intelligence, concluded that de facto leadership of al-Qaeda had passed to ], who was operating out of Iran. Adel, a former Egyptian army officer, became a military instructor in al-Qaeda camps in the 1990s and was known for his involvement in the Battle of Mogadishu. The report stated that al-Adel's leadership could not officially be declared by al-Qaeda because of "political sensitivities" of ] in acknowledging the death of Al-Zawahiri as well as due to "theological and operational" challenges posed by the location of al-Adel in ].<ref>{{Cite news|last=Jeong|first=Andrew|title=Militant in Iran identified as al-Qaeda's probable new chief in U.N. report|newspaper=The Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/15/al-qaeda-leader-saif-al-adel/|access-date=February 15, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230215142558/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/15/al-qaeda-leader-saif-al-adel/|archive-date=February 15, 2023|issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|date=February 15, 2023|title=United Nations report identifies new al Qaeda leader with $10 million bounty|work=]|url=https://thehill.com/policy/international/3859954-united-nations-report-identifies-new-al-qaida-leader-with-10-million-bounty/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230215224549/https://thehill.com/policy/international/3859954-united-nations-report-identifies-new-al-qaida-leader-with-10-million-bounty/|archive-date=February 15, 2023}}</ref>
{{Main|Soviet war in Afghanistan|Islamic mujahid movement}}


=== Command structure ===
The origins of al-Qaeda as a network inspiring terrorism around the world and training operatives can be traced to the ]<ref>{{cite web|last=Cooley|first=John K.|authorlink=John K. Cooley|title=Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism|work=]|date=Spring 2003|url=http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200304/ai_n9199132|format=reprint}}</ref> (December 1979 – February 1989). The United States viewed the conflict in Afghanistan, with the Afghan Marxists and allied Soviet troops on one side and the native Afghan mujahideen on the other, as a blatant case of Soviet expansionism and aggression. The U.S. channelled funds through ]'s ] agency to the native Afghan mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation in a CIA program called ].<ref name=HOW-THE-CIA-CREATED-OSAMA-BIN-LADEN>{{cite news
Most of al-Qaeda's top leaders and operational directors were veterans who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were the leaders who were considered the operational commanders of the organization.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Al Qaeda|url=https://www.adl.org/resources/profiles/al-qaeda|access-date=March 3, 2021|website=Anti-Defamation League|archive-date=April 3, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210403025553/https://www.adl.org/resources/profiles/al-qaeda|url-status=live}}</ref> Nevertheless, al-Qaeda was not ] managed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Several operational groups exist, which consult with the leadership in situations where attacks are in preparation.<ref name=WilsonLeaders2015/> "...{{spaces}}Zawahiri does not claim to have direct hierarchical control over al Qaeda's vast, networked structure. Al Qaeda's core leadership seeks to centralize the organization's messaging and strategy rather than to manage the daily operations of its franchises. But formal affiliates are required to consult with al Qaeda's core leadership before carrying out large-scale attacks." Al-Qaeda central (AQC) is a conglomerate of expert committees, each in supervision of distinct tasks and objectives. Its membership is mostly composed of ] leaders who participated in the ] ]. Assisting them are hundreds of Islamic field operatives and commanders, based in various regions of the ]. The central leadership assumes control of the doctrinal approach and overall propaganda campaign; while the regional commanders were empowered with independence in military strategy and political maneuvering. This novel hierarchy made it possible for the organisation to launch wide-range offensives.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=J. Tompkins, Crossett|first1=Paul, Chuck|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SPZdWxjMd6cC|title=Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009|last2=Spitaletta, Marshal|first2=Jason, Shana|publisher=United States Army Special Operations Command|year=2012|location=Fort Liberty, North Carolina|pages=544, 545|chapter=19- Al-Qaeda: 1988–2001}}</ref>
|title=How the CIA created Osama bin Laden
|url=http://www.greenleft.org.au/2001/465/25199
|date=2001-09-19
|publisher=]
|accessdate=2007-01-09 }}</ref><ref name="1986-1992-CIA-AND-BRITISH-RECRUIT-AND-TRAIN-MILITANTS-WORLDWIDE-TO-HELP-FIGHT-AFGHAN-WAR">{{cite web
|title=1986–1992: CIA and British Recruit and Train Militants Worldwide to Help Fight Afghan War
|url=http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a86operationcyclone
|publisher=Cooperative Research History Commons
|accessdate=2007-01-09}}</ref>


When asked in 2005 about the possibility of al-Qaeda's connection to the ], ] ] said: "Al-Qaeda is not an organization. Al-Qaeda is a way of working{{spaces}}... but this has the hallmark of that approach{{spaces}}... Al-Qaeda clearly has the ability to provide training{{spaces}}... to provide expertise{{spaces}}... and I think that is what has occurred here."<ref name="foxnewsblair">{{Cite news|title=Cops: London Attacks Were Homicide Blasts|date=July 15, 2005|url=https://www.foxnews.com/story/cops-london-attacks-were-homicide-blasts|publisher=Fox News|access-date=June 15, 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080420155421/http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,162476,00.html|archive-date=April 20, 2008|url-status=live}}</ref> On August 13, 2005, '']'' newspaper, reported that the July{{spaces}}7 bombers had acted independently of an al-Qaeda mastermind.<ref>{{Cite news|title=London bombings: the truth emerges|url=http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article305547.ece|first1=Jason|last1=Bennetto|first2=Ian|last2=Herbert|work=The Independent|location=UK|date=August 13, 2005|access-date=December 3, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061026100045/http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article305547.ece|archive-date=October 26, 2006|url-status=dead}}</ref>
At the same time, a growing number of Arab mujahideen joined the jihad against the ], facilitated by international Muslim organizations, particularly the ],<ref name=MAKTAB-AL-KHIDAMAT-GLOBALSECURITY>{{cite web
|title=Maktab al-Khidamat
|url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/maktab_al-khidamat.htm
|publisher=]
|date=2006-01-11
|accessdate=2007-02-11 }}</ref> whose funds came from some of the $600 million a year donated to the jihad by the Saudi Arabia government and individual Muslims – particularly independent Saudi businessmen who were approached by Osama bin Laden.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006}}.</ref>{{page needed}}


Nasser al-Bahri, who was Osama bin Laden's bodyguard for four years in the run-up to 9/11 wrote in his memoir a highly detailed description of how the group functioned at that time. Al-Bahri described al-Qaeda's formal administrative structure and vast arsenal.<ref>Al-Bahri, Nasser, ''Guarding bin Laden: My Life in al-Qaeda''. p. 185. Thin Man Press. London. {{ISBN|9780956247360}}</ref> However, the author ] argued that the idea of al-Qaeda as a formal organization is primarily an American invention. Curtis contended the name "Al-Qaeda" was first brought to the attention of the public in the 2001 trial of bin Laden and the four men accused of the ] in East Africa. Curtis wrote:
Maktab al-Khidamat was established by ] and Bin Laden in ], ], in 1984. From 1986 it began to set up a network of recruiting offices in the United States, the hub of which was the ] at the Farouq Mosque in ]'s Atlantic Avenue. Among notable figures at the Brooklyn center were "double agent" ], whom FBI special agent Jack Cloonan called "bin Laden's first trainer,"<ref>, PBS, July 13, 2005.</ref> and "Blind Sheikh" ], a leading recruiter of ] for Afghanistan.


{{blockquote|The reality was that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy. But there was no organization. These were militants who mostly planned their own operations and looked to bin Laden for funding and assistance. He was not their commander. There is also no evidence that bin Laden used the term "al-Qaeda" to refer to the name of a group until after September 11 attacks, when he realized that this was the term the Americans had given it.<ref name="The Power of Nightmares">, BBC Documentary.</ref>}}
Al-Qaeda evolved from the ], or the "Services Office", a Muslim organization founded in 1980 to raise and channel funds and recruit foreign ] for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was founded by ], a Palestinian Islamic scholar and member of the Muslim Brotherhood.


During the 2001 trial, the ] needed to show that bin Laden was the leader of a criminal organization in order to charge him ] under the ]. The name of the organization and details of its structure were provided in the testimony of ], who said he was a founding member of the group and a former employee of bin Laden.<ref>{{cite web|last1=McCloud|first1=Kimberly|title=WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden|url=http://cns.miis.edu/reports/binladen.htm|work=CNS Reports|publisher=James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies|access-date=May 4, 2011|author2=Osborne, Matthew|date=March 7, 2001|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110506145417/http://cns.miis.edu/reports/binladen.htm|archive-date=May 6, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> Questions about the reliability of al-Fadl's testimony have been raised by a number of sources because of his history of dishonesty, and because he was delivering it as part of a ] agreement after being convicted of conspiring to attack US military establishments.<ref name="first informant">{{Harvnb|McGeary|2001}}.</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/02/13/Embassy.bombings.trial/|title=Witness: Bin Laden planned attack on U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia|publisher=CNN|date=February 13, 2001|access-date=June 12, 2007|archive-date=January 4, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070104203956/http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/02/13/Embassy.bombings.trial/|url-status=live}}</ref> Sam Schmidt, a defense attorney who defended al-Fadl, said:
MAK organized ] in Peshawar, near the Afghan border, and gathered supplies for the construction of paramilitary training camps to prepare foreign recruits for the Afghan war front. Azzam persuaded Bin Laden to join MAK.{{When|date=September 2009}} Bin Laden became a "major financier" of the mujahideen, spending his own money and using his connections with "the Saudi royal family and the petro-billionaires of the Gulf" in order to improve public opinion of the war and raise more funds.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|p=19}}. Quotes taken from {{Harvnb|Riedel|2008|p=42}} and {{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=103}}.</ref>


{{blockquote|There were selective portions of al-Fadl's testimony that I believe was false, to help support the picture that he helped the Americans join together. I think he lied in a number of specific testimony about a unified image of what this organization was. It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists. It made them identifiable as a group and therefore made it easier to prosecute any person associated with al-Qaeda for any acts or statements made by bin Laden.<ref name="The Power of Nightmares" />}}
Beginning in 1987, Azzam and bin Laden started creating camps inside Afghanistan.<ref>{{Harvnb|Sageman|2004|p=35}}.</ref> The role played by MAK and foreign mujahideen volunteers, or "Afghan Arabs", in the war was not a major one. While over 250,000 Afghan mujahideen fought the Soviets and the communist Afghan government, it is estimated that were never more than 2,000 foreign mujahideen in the field at any one time.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=137}}.</ref> Nonetheless, foreign mujahideen volunteers came from 43 countries and the total number that participated in the Afghan movement between 1982 and 1992 is reported to have been 35,000.<ref name=THE-WAR-ON-TERROR-AND-THE-POLITICS-OF-VIOLENCE-IN-PAKISTAN>{{cite web
|title=The War on Terror and the Politics of Violence in Pakistan
|url=http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=54
|date=2004-07-02
|publisher=]
|accessdate=2007-01-09}}</ref>


=== Field operatives ===
] finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. To the surprise of many, ]'s communist Afghan government hung on for three more years before being overrun by elements of the mujahideen. With mujahideen leaders unable to agree on a structure for governance, chaos ensued, with constantly reorganizing alliances fighting for control of ill-defined territories, leaving the country devastated.
] interviewing ] in Afghanistan, 1997]]


The number of individuals in the group who have undergone proper military training, and are capable of commanding insurgent forces, is largely unknown. Documents captured in the raid on bin Laden's compound in 2011 show that the core al-Qaeda membership in 2002 was 170.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180627064136/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/9243503/Secret-Osama-bin-Laden-files-reveal-al-Qaeda-membership.html |date=June 27, 2018 }}, ''The Telegraph'' accessed July 26, 2013</ref> In 2006, it was estimated that al-Qaeda had several thousand commanders embedded in 40 countries.<ref name="Cassidy">{{Harvnb|Cassidy|2006|p=9}}.</ref> {{as of|2009}}, it was believed that no more than 200–300 members were still active commanders.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.slate.com/id/2211994/|title=The Terrorists-Are-Dumb Theory: Don't mistake these guys for criminal masterminds|first1=Timothy|last1=Noah|author-link=Timothy Noah|work=Slate|date=February 25, 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090227091408/http://www.slate.com/id/2211994/|archive-date=February 27, 2009}}</ref>
===Expanding operations===
{{rquote|right|...the correlation between the words and deeds of bin Laden, his lieutenants and their allies was close to perfect – if they said they were going to do something, they were much more than likely to try to do it. Their record in this regard puts Western leaders to shame.|], CIA Station Chief<ref name="schu">Scehuer, Michael. "Marching Towards Hell", 2008. p. 10</ref>}}
Toward the end of the ] mission in Afghanistan, some mujahideen wanted to expand their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world, such as Israel and Kashmir. A number of overlapping and interrelated organizations were formed to further those aspirations.


According to the 2004 BBC documentary '']'', al-Qaeda was so weakly linked together that it was hard to say it existed apart from bin Laden and a small clique of close associates. The lack of any significant numbers of convicted al-Qaeda members, despite a large number of arrests on terrorism charges, was cited by the documentary as a reason to doubt whether a widespread entity that met the description of al-Qaeda existed.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Gerges|first1=Fawaz A|title=The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global|publisher=Cambridge University Press|date=2005|isbn=0-521-79140-5|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/farenemywhyjihad0000gerg}}</ref> al-Qaeda's commanders, as well as its sleeping agents, are hiding in different parts of the world to this day. They are mainly hunted by the American and Israeli secret services.
One of these was the organization that would eventually be called al-Qaeda, formed by Osama bin Laden with an initial meeting held on August 11, 1988.<ref name=THE-OSAMA-BIN-LADEN-I-KNOW>{{cite web
|title=The Osama bin Laden I know
|url=http://www.tpmcafe.com/story/2006/1/18/13810/7770
|date=2006-01-18
|accessdate=2007-01-09 }}</ref> Bin Laden wished to establish nonmilitary operations in other parts of the world; Azzam, in contrast, wanted to remain focused on military campaigns. After Azzam was assassinated in 1989, the MAK split, with a significant number joining bin Laden's organization.


=== Insurgent forces ===
In November 1989, ], a former ] Sergeant stationed at ], ], left military service and moved to ]. He traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan and became "deeply involved with bin Laden's plans."<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=181}}.</ref>
According to author Robert Cassidy, al-Qaeda maintains two separate forces which are deployed alongside insurgents in Iraq and Pakistan. The first, numbering in the tens of thousands, was "organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces" in the Soviet–Afghan war.<ref name="Cassidy" /> The force was composed primarily of foreign ''mujahideen'' from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Many of these fighters went on to fight in Bosnia and Somalia for global ''jihad''. Another group, which numbered 10,000 in 2006, live in the West and have received rudimentary combat training.<ref name="Cassidy" />


Other analysts have described al-Qaeda's rank and file as being "predominantly Arab" in its first years of operation, but that the organization also includes "other peoples" {{as of|2007|lc=y}}.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070704191032/http://www.meforum.org/article/1710 |date=July 4, 2007 }} by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, ''Middle East Quarterly'', Summer 2007</ref> It has been estimated that 62 percent of al-Qaeda members have a university education.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=c841b52c-b2e7-4e41-b27e-33d10245b935&k=0|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929120758/http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=c841b52c-b2e7-4e41-b27e-33d10245b935&k=0|url-status=dead|archive-date=September 29, 2007|title=Today's jihadists: educated, wealthy and bent on killing?|publisher=Canada.com|date=July 3, 2007|access-date=March 22, 2010}}</ref> In 2011 and the following year, the Americans successfully settled accounts with Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, the organization's chief propagandist, and Abu Yahya al-Libi's deputy commander. The optimistic voices were already saying it was over for al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, it was around this time that the Arab Spring greeted the region, the turmoil of which came great to al-Qaeda's regional forces. Seven years later, Ayman al-Zawahiri became arguably the number one leader in the organization, implementing his strategy with systematic consistency. Tens of thousands loyal to al-Qaeda and related organizations were able to challenge local and regional stability and ruthlessly attack their enemies in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe and Russia alike. In fact, from Northwest Africa to South Asia, al-Qaeda had more than two dozen "franchise-based" allies. The number of al-Qaeda militants was set at 20,000 in Syria alone, and they had 4,000 members in Yemen and about 7,000 in Somalia. The war was not over.<ref name=CFR2021>{{Cite web|title=Al-Qaeda's Resurrection|url=https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection|access-date=March 3, 2021|website=Council on Foreign Relations|archive-date=August 23, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210823041933/https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection|url-status=live}}</ref>
A year later, on November 8, 1990, the FBI raided the New Jersey home of Mohammed's associate ], discovering a great deal of evidence of terrorist plots, including plans to blow up New York City skyscrapers.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tkb.org/CaseHome.jsp?caseid=332 |title=MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base |publisher=Tkb.org |date= |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref> Nosair was eventually convicted in connection to the 1993 ], and for the murder of ] ] on November 5, 1990. In 1991, Ali Mohammed is said to have helped orchestrate Osama bin Laden's relocation to Sudan.<ref>{{cite web
|title=Osama bin Laden: The Past
|url=http://www.iacsp.com/itobli3.html
|accessdate=2007-01-12 }}</ref>


In 2001, al-Qaeda had around 20 functioning cells and 70,000 insurgents spread over sixty nations.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=J. Tompkins, Crossett|first1=Paul, Chuck|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SPZdWxjMd6cC|title=Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962-2009|last2=Spitaletta, Marshal|first2=Jason, Shana|publisher=United States Army Special Operations Command|year=2012|location=Fort Liberty, North Carolina|pages=544|chapter=19- Al-Qaeda: 1988–2001}}</ref> According to latest estimates, the number of active-duty soldiers under its command and allied militias have risen to approximately 250,000 by 2018.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Klausen|first=Jytte|title=Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2021|isbn=978-0-19-887079-1|location=United Kingdom|pages=1|chapter=1: Introduction}}</ref>
===Gulf War and the start of U.S. enmity===
{{Main|Gulf War}}


=== Financing ===
Following the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. The ]i ] in August 1990 had put the kingdom and its ruling ] at risk. The world's most valuable ]s were within easy striking distance of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and Saddam's call to pan-Arab/Islamism could potentially rally internal dissent.


Al-Qaeda usually does not disburse funds for attacks, and very rarely makes wire transfers.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Eichenwald|first1=Kurt|author-link=Kurt Eichenwald|title=A Nation Challenged: The Money; Terror Money Hard to Block, Officials Find|work=The New York Times|date=December 10, 2001|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/10/world/a-nation-challenged-the-money-terror-money-hard-to-block-officials-find.html|access-date=May 4, 2011|archive-date=February 19, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110219091943/http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/10/world/a-nation-challenged-the-money-terror-money-hard-to-block-officials-find.html|url-status=live}}</ref> In the 1990s, financing came partly from the personal wealth of Osama bin Laden.<ref name="Forbes_May_5_2011"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170729115149/https://www.forbes.com/2001/09/14/0914whoisobl.html |date=July 29, 2017 }}. Retrieved May 5, 2011</ref> Other sources of income included the ] and donations from supporters in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic ].<ref name="Forbes_May_5_2011" /> A 2009 ] stated that "terrorist funding emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern."<ref>Eric Lichtbau and Eric Schmitt {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170307185846/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/world/middleeast/06wikileaks-financing.html|date=March 7, 2017 }} '']'', December 5, 2010</ref>
In the face of a seemingly massive Iraqi military presence, Saudi Arabia's own forces were well armed but far outnumbered. Bin Laden offered the services of his mujahideen to ] to protect Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi army. The Saudi monarch refused bin Laden's offer, opting instead to allow U.S. and allied forces to deploy troops into Saudi territory.<ref>{{cite news | last = Jehl | first = Douglas | title = A Nation Challenged: Holy war lured Saudis as rulers looked away | work = The New York Times | date = 2001-12-27 | pages = A1, B4 | url = http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/27/world/a-nation-challenged-saudi-arabia-holy-war-lured-saudis-as-rulers-looked-away.html | accessdate = 2009-09-05}}</ref>


Among the first pieces of evidence regarding Saudi Arabia's support for al-Qaeda was the so-called "]", a list of early al-Qaeda funders seized during a 2002 raid in Sarajevo by Bosnian police.<ref name="history commons">{{cite web|url=http://www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=al-qaeda%20saudi%20arabia&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go|title=History Commons|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160805191322/http://www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=al-qaeda%20saudi%20arabia&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go|archive-date=August 5, 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref> The hand-written list was validated by al-Qaeda defector Jamal al-Fadl, and included the names of both donors and beneficiaries.<ref name="history commons" /><ref name="auto"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150710090442/https://en.wikisource.org/United_States_of_America_v._Usama_bin_Laden/Day_2_6_February_2001 |date=July 10, 2015 }}. Wikisource. Retrieved June 10, 2016.</ref> Osama bin-Laden's name appeared seven times among the beneficiaries, while 20 Saudi and Gulf-based businessmen and politicians were listed among the donors.<ref name="history commons" /> Notable donors included Adel Batterjee, and ]. Batterjee was designated as a terror financier by the US Department of the Treasury in 2004, and Julaidan is recognized as one of al-Qaeda's founders.<ref name="history commons" />
The deployment angered Bin Laden, as he believed the presence of foreign troops in the "land of the two mosques" (] and ]) profaned sacred soil. After speaking publicly against the Saudi government for harboring American troops, he was banished and forced to live in exile in Sudan.


Documents seized during the 2002 Bosnia raid showed that al-Qaeda widely exploited charities to channel financial and material support to its operatives across the globe.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB104794563734573400|title=List of Early al Qaeda Donors Points to Saudi Elite, Charities|first1=Glenn R.|last1=Simpson|date=March 19, 2003|access-date=June 21, 2016|newspaper=The Wall Street Journal|archive-date=August 22, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190822011925/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB104794563734573400|url-status=live}}</ref> Notably, this activity exploited the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Muslim World League (MWL). The IIRO had ties with al-Qaeda associates worldwide, including al-Qaeda's deputy Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri's brother worked for the IIRO in Albania and had actively recruited on behalf of al-Qaeda.<ref name="steve emerson">Emerson, Steve (2006). ''Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US''. Prometheus Books. p. 382.</ref> The MWL was openly identified by al-Qaeda's leader as one of the three charities al-Qaeda primarily relied upon for funding sources.<ref name="steve emerson" />
===Sudan===
From around 1992 to 1996, al-Qaeda and bin Laden based themselves in ] at the invitation of Islamist theoretician ]. The move followed an Islamist coup d'état in Sudan, led by Colonel ], who professed a commitment to reordering Muslim political values. During this time, bin Laden assisted the Sudanese government, bought or set up various business enterprises, and established camps where insurgents trained.


==== Allegations of Qatari support ====
A key turning point for bin Laden, further pitting him against the Sauds, occurred in 1993 when Saudi Arabia gave support for the ] which set a path for peace between ] and ].<ref>{{Harvnb|Riedel|2008|p=52}}.</ref>


{{See also|Qatar and state-sponsored terrorism|Qatar diplomatic crisis}}
Zawahiri and the EIJ, who served as the core of al-Qaeda but also engaged in separate operations against the Egyptian government, had bad luck in Sudan. In 1993, a young schoolgirl was killed in an unsuccessful EIJ attempt on the life of the Egyptian prime minister, ]. Egyptian public opinion turned against Islamist bombings and<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=186}}.</ref> the police arrested 280 more of al-Jihad's members and executed six.
Several Qatari citizens have been accused of funding al-Qaeda. This includes ], a Qatari citizen and a human-rights activist who founded the Swiss-based ] (NGO) ]. On December 18, 2013, the ] designated Nuaimi as a terrorist for his activities supporting al-Qaeda.<ref name="treasury press">{{cite web|url=https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx|title=Treasury Designates Al-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=May 8, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190508002454/https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2249.aspx|url-status=live}}</ref> The US Treasury has said Nuaimi "has facilitated significant financial support to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and served as an interlocutor between al-Qaeda in ] and Qatar-based donors".<ref name="treasury press" />


Nuaimi was accused of overseeing a $2{{spaces}}million monthly transfer to al-Qaeda in Iraq as part of his role as ] between Iraq-based al-Qaeda senior officers and Qatari citizens.<ref name="treasury press" /><ref name="fiscal times qatar">{{cite web|url=http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/12/29/How-Qatar-Funding-al-Qaeda-and-Why-Could-Help-US|title=How Qatar Is Funding al-Qaeda – and Why That Could Help the US|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=January 23, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190123003345/http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/12/29/How-Qatar-Funding-al-Qaeda-and-Why-Could-Help-US|url-status=live}}</ref> Nuaimi allegedly entertained relationships with Abu-Khalid al-Suri, al-Qaeda's top envoy in Syria, who processed a $600,000 transfer to al-Qaeda in 2013.<ref name="treasury press" /><ref name="fiscal times qatar" /> Nuaimi is also known to be associated with Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani, a ]i politician and founding member of ], who was listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the US Treasury in 2013.<ref name="bin ki moon">{{cite web|url=http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/ban-ki-moon-shakes-hands-with-alleged-al-qaeda-emir.php|title=Ban Ki-Moon shakes hands with alleged al Qaeda emir|website=The Long War Journal|date=June 23, 2015|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=May 19, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190519235851/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/ban-ki-moon-shakes-hands-with-alleged-al-qaeda-emir.php|url-status=live}}</ref> The US authorities claimed that Humayqani exploited his role in Alkarama to fundraise on behalf of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).<ref name="treasury press" /><ref name="bin ki moon" /> A prominent figure in AQAP, Nuaimi was also reported to have facilitated the flow of funding to AQAP affiliates based in Yemen. Nuaimi was also accused of investing funds in the charity directed by Humayqani to ultimately fund AQAP.<ref name="treasury press" /> About ten months after being sanctioned by the US Treasury, Nuaimi was also restrained from doing business in the UK.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11172244/Terrorist-paymaster-targeted-by-Britain.html|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11172244/Terrorist-paymaster-targeted-by-Britain.html|archive-date=January 10, 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Terrorist paymaster targeted by Britain|date=October 18, 2014|access-date=June 21, 2016}}{{cbignore}}</ref>
Due to bin Laden's continuous verbal assault on King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, on 5 March 1994 Fahd sent an emissary to Sudan demanding bin Laden's passport; bin Laden's Saudi citizenship was also revoked. His family was persuaded to cut off his monthly stipend, the equivalent of $7 million a year, and his Saudi assets were frozen.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=195}}.</ref><ref name=OSAMA-BIN-LADEN-A-CHRONOLOGY-OF-HIS-POLITICAL-LIFE>{{cite web
|title=Osama bin Laden: A Chronology of His Political Life
|publisher=]
|url=http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline///shows/binladen/etc/cron.html
|accessdate=2007-01-12 }}</ref> His family publicly disowned him. There is controversy over whether and to what extent he continued to garner support from members of his family and/or the Saudi government.<ref name=CONTEXT-OF-SHORTLLY-AFTER-APRIL-1994>{{cite web
|title=Context of 'Shortly After April 1994'
|url=http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a94familydisown
|publisher=]
|accessdate=2007-01-12 }}</ref>


Another Qatari citizen, Kalifa Mohammed Turki Subayi, was sanctioned by the US Treasury on June 5, 2008, for his activities as a "Gulf-based Al-Qaeda financier". Subayi's name was added to the ]'s Sanctions List in 2008 on charges of providing financial and material support to al-Qaeda senior leadership.<ref name="fiscal times qatar" /><ref name="un press">{{cite web|url=https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11790.doc.htm|title=Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends One Entry on Its Sanctions List – Meetings Coverage and Press Releases|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=November 5, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161105193910/http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11790.doc.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> Subayi allegedly moved al-Qaeda recruits to South Asia-based training camps.<ref name="fiscal times qatar" /><ref name="un press" /> He also financially supported Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Pakistani national and senior al-Qaeda officer who is believed to be the mastermind behind the September 11 attack according to the '']''.<ref name="9-11commission.gov">{{Cite web|url=http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf|archive-date=October 9, 2022|url-status=live|title=The 9/11 Commission Report<!--bot generated title-->}}</ref>
In June 1995 an even more ill-fated ] led to the expulsion of EIJ, and in May 1996, of bin Laden, by the Sudanese government.


Qataris provided support to al-Qaeda through the country's largest NGO, the ]. Al-Qaeda defector al-Fadl, who was a former member of Qatar Charity, testified in court that Abdullah Mohammed Yusef, who served as Qatar Charity's director, was affiliated to al-Qaeda and simultaneously to the ], a political group that gave al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden harbor in ] in the early 1990s.<ref name="auto" />
According to ] businessman ], the Sudanese government offered the ] numerous opportunities to arrest bin Laden. Those opportunities were met positively by Secretary of State ] but spurned when ] and counter-terrorism czar ] persuaded National Security Advisor ] to overrule Albright.


It was alleged that in 1993 ] was using ] based ] charities to channel financial support to al-Qaeda operatives overseas. The same documents also report Bin Laden's complaint that the failed assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had compromised the ability of al-Qaeda to exploit charities to support its operatives to the extent it was capable of before 1995.<ref>{{Cite web|date=January 1, 2024|title=Osama bin Laden {{!}} Biography, al-Qaeda, Terrorist Attacks, Death, & Facts|url=https://www.britannica.com/biography/Osama-bin-Laden|access-date=January 28, 2024|website=Encyclopædia Britannica|archive-date=June 16, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150616235439/https://www.britannica.com/biography/Osama-bin-Laden|url-status=live}}</ref>
Ijaz’s claims in this regard appeared in numerous Op-Ed pieces including one in the Los Angeles Times
<ref>{{cite web|url=http://articles.latimes.com/2001/dec/05/opinion/oe-ijaz05 |title=Clinton Let Bin Laden Slip Away and Metastasize – Los Angeles Times |publisher=Articles.latimes.com |date=2001-12-05 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref> and one in the Washington Post co-written with former Ambassador to Sudan Timothy Carney .<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A64828-2002Jun29|title=Intelligence Failure? Let's Go Back to Sudan|last=Carney |first=Timothy|coauthor=Mansoor Ijaz|date=June 30, 2002|publisher=Washington Post|accessdate=2008-12-01}}</ref>


Qatar financed al-Qaeda's enterprises through al-Qaeda's former affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. The funding was primarily channeled through ] for ransom.<ref name="funding al nusra">{{cite web|url=http://stopterrorfinance.org/blog/510652383-funding-al-nusra-through-ransom-qatar-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-principle|archive-url=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20171009203031/http://stopterrorfinance.org/stories/510652383-funding-al-nusra-through-ransom-qatar-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-principle|url-status=dead|archive-date=October 9, 2017|title=Funding Al Nusra Through Ransom: Qatar and the Myth of 'Humanitarian Principle'|first1=CATF|last1=Reports|website=stopterrorfinance.org|access-date=June 6, 2017}}</ref> The Consortium Against Terrorist Finance (CATF) reported that the Gulf country has funded al-Nusra since 2013.<ref name="funding al nusra" /> In 2017, '']'' estimated that Qatar had disbursed $25{{spaces}}million in support of al-Nusra through kidnapping for ransom.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://aawsat.com/home/article/510121/%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-25-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%80%C2%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9%C2%BB-%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84|title=صفقة العسكريين: 25 مليون دولار لـ"النصرة"... وهامش تحرك في عرسال|website=الشرق الأوسط|access-date=November 12, 2019|archive-date=November 12, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191112020038/https://aawsat.com/home/article/510121/%25D8%25B5%25D9%2581%25D9%2582%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25B9%25D8%25B3%25D9%2583%25D8%25B1%25D9%258A%25D9%258A%25D9%2586-25-%25D9%2585%25D9%2584%25D9%258A%25D9%2588%25D9%2586-%25D8%25AF%25D9%2588%25D9%2584%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B1-%25D9%2584%25D9%2580%25C2%25AB%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D9%2586%25D8%25B5%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A9%25C2%25BB-%25D9%2588%25D9%2587%25D8%25A7%25D9%2585%25D8%25B4-%25D8%25AA%25D8%25AD%25D8%25B1%25D9%2583-%25D9%2581%25D9%258A-%25D8%25B9%25D8%25B1%25D8%25B3%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584|url-status=live}}</ref> In addition, Qatar has launched fundraising campaigns on behalf of al-Nusra. Al-Nusra acknowledged a Qatar-sponsored campaign "as one of the preferred conduits for donations intended for the group".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-conflict-said-to-fuel-sectarian-tensions-in-persian-gulf/2013/12/18/e160ad82-6831-11e3-8b5b-a77187b716a3_story.html|title=Syrian conflict said to fuel sectarian tensions in Persian Gulf|newspaper=]|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=January 26, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126131441/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-conflict-said-to-fuel-sectarian-tensions-in-persian-gulf/2013/12/18/e160ad82-6831-11e3-8b5b-a77187b716a3_story.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/08/analysis-qatar-still-negligent-on-terror-finance.php|title=Analysis: Qatar still negligent on terror finance – The Long War Journal|date=August 19, 2015|access-date=June 21, 2016|archive-date=April 17, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417142200/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/08/analysis-qatar-still-negligent-on-terror-finance.php|url-status=live}}</ref>
Similar allegations have been made by Vanity Fair contributing editor David Rose<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2002/01/osama200201?currentPage=1|title=The Osama Files|last=Rose|first=David|date=January, 2002|publisher='']''|accessdate=2008-12-01}}</ref> and ], author of ''Losing bin Laden'', in a November 2003 interview with '']''.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.worldmag.com/articles/8206|title='Clinton did not have the will to respond'|last=Belz|first=Mindy|date=November 1, 2003|publisher='']''|accessdate=2008-12-01}}</ref>


== Strategy ==
Several sources dispute Ijaz's claim, including the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (the 9–11 Commission) which concluded in part “Sudan's minister of defense, Fatih Erwa, has claimed that Sudan offered to hand Bin Ladin over to the United States. The Commission has found no credible evidence that this was so. Ambassador Carney had instructions only to push the Sudanese to expel Bin Ladin. Ambassador Carney had no legal basis to ask for more from the Sudanese since, at the time, there was no indictment out-standing.” <ref>{{cite web|url=http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch4.htm |title=National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States |publisher=Govinfo.library.unt.edu |date= |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>
{{Update section|date=August 2016}}


In the disagreement over whether al-Qaeda's objectives are religious or political, Mark Sedgwick describes al-Qaeda's strategy as political in the immediate term but with ultimate aims that are religious.<ref name="SEDGWICK">{{cite journal|last1=Sedgwick |first1=Mark|title=Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism|journal=Terrorism and Political Violence|date=August 10, 2010|volume=16|issue=4|pages=795–814|doi=10.1080/09546550590906098|s2cid=143323639}}</ref>
===Refuge in Afghanistan===
On March 11, 2005, '']'' published extracts from ]'s document "Al Qaeda's Strategy to the Year 2020".<ref name=Atwan>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/secrethistoryofa0000atwa|url-access=registration|first1=Abdel Bari|last1=Atwan|title=The Secret History of Al Qaeda|page=|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=0-520-24974-7|via=Internet Archive|date=March 11, 2005|access-date=May 8, 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnewstt_news&#93;=181&tx_ttnewsbackPid&#93;=238&no_cache=1|title=single – The Jamestown Foundation|access-date=April 12, 2016}}{{dead link|date=November 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> ] summarizes this strategy as comprising five stages to rid the ] from all forms of oppression:
{{Main|Background of the Taliban's rise to power|Al-Qaeda training camps}}
# Provoke the United States and the West into invading a Muslim country by staging a massive attack or string of attacks on US soil that results in massive civilian casualties.
# Incite local resistance to occupying forces.
# Expand the conflict to neighboring countries and engage the US and its allies in a long war of attrition.
# Convert al-Qaeda into an ideology and set of operating principles that can be loosely franchised in other countries without requiring direct command and control, and via these franchises incite attacks against the US and countries allied with the US until they withdraw from the conflict, as happened with the ], but which did not have the same effect with the ].
# The US economy will finally collapse by 2020, under the strain of multiple engagements in numerous places. This will lead to a collapse in the worldwide economic system, and lead to global political instability. This will lead to a global jihad led by al-Qaeda, and a ] ] will then be installed across the world.


Atwan noted that, while the plan is unrealistic, "it is sobering to consider that this virtually describes the ]."<ref name=Atwan />
After the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan was effectively ungoverned for seven years and plagued by constant infighting between former allies and various mujahideen groups.


According to ], a Jordanian journalist and author who has spent time in prison with Al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda's strategy consists of seven phases and is similar to the plan described in al-Qaeda's Strategy to the year 2020. These phases include:<ref>{{cite news|last1=Musharbash|first1=Yassir|title=The Future of Terrorism: What al-Qaida Really Wants|url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-future-of-terrorism-what-al-qaida-really-wants-a-369448.html|access-date=January 15, 2015|work=Der Spiegel|date=August 12, 2005|archive-date=January 20, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150120022303/http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-future-of-terrorism-what-al-qaida-really-wants-a-369448.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
Throughout the 1990s, a new force began to emerge. The origins of the ] (literally "students") lay in the children of Afghanistan, many of them orphaned by the war, and many of whom had been educated in the rapidly expanding network of Islamic schools (]s) either in ] or in the refugee camps on the Afghan-Pakistani border.
# "The Awakening." This phase was supposed to last from 2001 to 2003. The goal of the phase is to provoke the United States to attack a Muslim country by executing an attack that kills many civilians on US soil.
# "Opening Eyes." This phase was supposed to last from 2003 to 2006. The goal of this phase was to recruit young men to the cause and to transform the al-Qaeda group into a movement. Iraq was supposed to become the center of all operations with financial and military support for bases in other states.
# "Arising and Standing up", was supposed to last from 2007 to 2010. In this phase, al-Qaeda wanted to execute additional attacks and focus their attention on Syria. Hussein believed other countries in the ] were also in danger.
# Al-Qaeda expected a steady growth among their ranks and territories due to the declining power of the regimes in the Arabian Peninsula. The main focus of attack in this phase was supposed to be on oil suppliers and ], targeting the US economy and military infrastructure.
# The declaration of an Islamic Caliphate, which was projected between 2013 and 2016. In this phase, al-Qaeda expected the resistance from Israel to be heavily reduced.
# The declaration of an "Islamic Army" and a "fight between believers and non-believers", also called "total confrontation".
# "Definitive Victory", projected to be completed by 2020.


According to the seven-phase strategy, the war is projected to last less than two years.
According to ], five leaders of the Taliban were graduates of ], a madrassa in the small town of Akora Khattak.<ref name="Harvnb|Rashid|2002">{{Harvnb|Rashid|2002}}.</ref> The town is situated near ] in Pakistan but largely attended by ].<ref name="Harvnb|Rashid|2002"/> This institution reflected Salafi beliefs in its teachings, and much of its funding came from private donations from wealthy Arabs. Bin Laden's contacts were still laundering most of these donations, using "unscrupulous" Islamic banks to transfer the money to an "array" of charities which serve as front groups for al-Qaeda or transporting cash-filled suitcases straight into Pakistan.<ref>{{Harvnb|Napoleoni|2003|pp=121–123}}; {{Harvnb|Akacem|2005}} (<small>" does a decent job of covering al-Qaida and presents some numbers and estimates that are of value ."</small>).</ref> Another four of the Taliban's leaders attended a similarly funded and influenced madrassa in Kandahar, Afghanistan.


According to Charles Lister of the ] and Katherine Zimmerman of the ], the new model of al-Qaeda is to "socialize communities" and build a broad territorial base of operations with the support of local communities, also gaining income independent of the funding of sheiks.<ref>{{Cite news|date=April 5, 2016|title=What has happened to al-Qaeda?|publisher=]|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35967409|access-date=August 29, 2022|archive-date=August 29, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220829074753/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35967409|url-status=live}}</ref>
Many of the mujahideen who later joined the Taliban fought alongside Afghan warlord ]'s Harkat i Inqilabi group at the time of the Russian invasion. This group also enjoyed the loyalty of most Afghan Arab fighters.


== Name ==
The continuing internecine strife between various factions, and accompanying lawlessness following the Soviet withdrawal, enabled the growing and well-disciplined Taliban to expand their control over territory in Afghanistan, and they came to establish an enclave which it called the ]. In 1994, they captured the regional center of ], and after making rapid territorial gains thereafter, conquered the capital city ] in September 1996.
The English name of the organization is a simplified ] of the Arabic noun ''{{transliteration|ar|DIN|al-qāʿidah}}'' ({{wikt-lang|ar|القاعدة}}), which means "the foundation" or "the base". The initial ''al-'' is the Arabic ] "the", hence "the base".<ref>Arabic Computer Dictionary: English-Arabic, Arabic-English By Ernest Kay, Multi-lingual International Publishers, 1986.</ref> In Arabic, ''al-Qaeda'' has four syllables ({{IPA|/alˈqaː.ʕi.da/}}).<!--This is a phonemic transcription that differs somewhat from the transcription system described at ].--> However, since two of the Arabic consonants in the name are not ] found in the English language, the common naturalized ] include {{IPAc-en|æ|l|ˈ|k|aɪ|d|ə}}, {{IPAc-en|æ|l|ˈ|k|eɪ|d|ə}} and {{IPAc-en|ˌ|æ|l|k|ɑː|ˈ|iː|d|ə}}. Al-Qaeda's name can also be ] as ''al-Qaida'', ''al-Qa'ida'', or ''el-Qaida''.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://ibb7.ibb.gov/pronunciations/sounds/2930.ra|title=Listen to the U.S. pronunciation|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051211020849/http://ibb7.ibb.gov/pronunciations/sounds/2930.ra|archive-date=December 11, 2005|format=]}}</ref>


The doctrinal concept of "''al-Qaeda''" was first coined by the ] ] scholar and ] leader ] in an April 1988 issue of ''Al-Jihad'' magazine to describe a religiously committed vanguard of Muslims who wage armed '']'' globally to liberate oppressed ] from foreign invaders, establish '']'' (Islamic law) across the ] by overthrowing the ruling ]; and thus restore the past Islamic prowess. This was to be implemented by establishing an ] that would nurture generations of Muslim soldiers that would perpetually attack United States and its allied governments in the Muslim World. Numerous historical models were cited by Azzam as successful examples of his call; starting from the ] of the 7th century to the recent ] ] of the 1980s.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Haniff Hassan|first=Muhammad|title=The Father of Jihad: 'Abd Allah 'Azzam's Jihad Ideas and Implications to National Security|publisher=Imperial College Press|year=2014|isbn=978-1-78326-287-8|location=London|pages=133–134}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|last=Aboul–Enein|first=Youssef|date=January 1, 2008|title=The Late Sheikh Abdullah Azzam's Books: Part III: Radical Theories on Defending Muslim Land through Jihad|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05601|publisher=Combating Terrorism Center|access-date=August 4, 2022|archive-date=August 31, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220831200647/https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05601|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Paz 2001">{{Cite web|last=Paz|first=Reuven|year=2001|title=The Brotherhood of Global Jihad|url=https://old.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/books/global/paz.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220804141316/https://old.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/books/global/paz.htm#4|archive-date=August 4, 2022|website=SATP|access-date=August 4, 2022|url-status=bot: unknown}}</ref> According to Azzam's world-view: <blockquote>It is about time to think about a state that would be a solid base for the distribution of the (Islamic) creed, and a fortress to host the preachers from the hell of the '']'' .<ref name="Paz 2001"/></blockquote>
After the Sudanese made it clear, in May 1996, that bin Laden would never be welcome to return,{{Clarify|date=September 2009}} Taliban-controlled Afghanistan—with previously established connections between the groups, administered with a shared militancy,<ref>{{Harvnb|Kronstadt|Katzman|2008}}.</ref> and largely isolated from American political influence and military power—provided a perfect location for al-Qaeda to relocate its headquarters. Al-Qaeda enjoyed the Taliban's protection and a measure of legitimacy as part of their Ministry of Defense, although only ], ], and the ] recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.


Bin Laden explained the origin of the term in a videotaped interview with ] journalist ] in October 2001:
By the end of 2008, the Taliban had severed any remaining ties with al-Qaeda.<ref>{{cite web|author=By Nic Robertson CNN Senior International Correspondent |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/10/06/afghan.saudi.talks/?iref=mpstoryview |title=CNN.com |publisher=Edition.cnn.com |date= |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref> According to senior U.S. military intelligence officials, there are fewer than 100 members of Al-Qaeda remaining in Afghanistan.<ref>Partlow, Joshua. November 11, 2009</ref>
{{blockquote|The name 'al-Qaeda' was established a long time ago by mere chance. The late ] established the training camps for our ''mujahedeen'' against Russia's terrorism. We used to call the training camp al-Qaeda. The name stayed.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/index.html|title=Transcript of Bin Laden's October interview|publisher=CNN|date=February 5, 2002|access-date=October 22, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061206081331/http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/index.html|archive-date=December 6, 2006|url-status=dead|df=mdy-all}}</ref>}}


It has been argued that two documents seized from the ] office of the ] prove the name was not simply adopted by the ''mujahideen'' movement and that a group called al-Qaeda was established in August 1988. Both of these documents contain minutes of meetings held to establish a new military group, and contain the term "al-Qaeda".<ref>{{Harvnb|Bergen|2006|p=75}}. Wright indirectly quotes one of the documents, based on an exhibit from the "Tareek Osama" document presented in <span class="plainlinks"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160203110416/http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/bif/usarnaout10603prof.pdf |date=February 3, 2016 }}</span>.</ref>
===The call for a global jihad===
{{Expand section|date=September 2009}}
Around 1994, the Salafi groups waging "]" in Bosnia entered into a seemingly irreversible decline. As they grew less and less aggressive, groups such as EIJ began to drift away from the Salafi cause in Europe. Al-Qaeda decided to step in and assumed control of around 80% of the terrorist cells in Bosnia in late 1995.


Former British Foreign Secretary ] wrote that the word al-Qaeda should be translated as "the database", because it originally referred to the computer file of the thousands of ''mujahideen'' militants who were recruited and trained with CIA help to defeat the Russians.<ref>{{cite news|first1=Robin|last1=Cook|url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/08/july7.development|title=Robin Cook: The struggle against terrorism cannot be won by military means|work=The Guardian|location=UK|date=July 8, 2005|access-date=May 8, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110514051125/http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jul/08/july7.development|archive-date=May 14, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> In April 2002, the group assumed the name ''Qa'idat al-Jihad'' ({{lang|ar|قاعدة الجهاد}} ''{{transliteration|ar|DIN|qāʿidat al-jihād}}''), which means "the base of Jihad". According to ], this was "apparently as a result of the merger of the overseas branch of Egypt's ], which was led by ], with the groups Bin Laden brought under his control after his return to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s."<ref>" {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130514233523/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/619/op13.htm |date=May 14, 2013 }}", '']'', January 2–8, 2003 (Issue No. 619). Retrieved September 3, 2006.</ref>
At the same time, al-Qaeda ideologues instructed the network's recruiters to look for '']'', Muslims who believed that jihad must be fought on a global level. The concept of a "global Salafi jihad" had been around since at least the early 1980s. Several groups had formed for the explicit purpose of driving non-Muslims out of every Muslim land, at the same time and with maximum carnage. This was, however, a fundamentally defensive strategy.


== Ideology ==
Al-Qaeda sought to open the "offensive phase" of the global Salafi jihad.<ref>{{Harvnb|Sageman|2004|pp=48, 51}}.</ref> Bosnian Islamists today call for "solidarity with Islamic causes around the world", supporting the insurgents in Kashmir and Iraq as well as the groups fighting for a Palestinian state.<ref>{{Harvnb|Trofimov|2006|p=282}}.</ref>
{{Main|Jihadism}}
{{Further|Qutbism|Islamic extremism in the 20th-century Egypt|label2=Egyptian Islamism}}{{Islamism sidebar}}
], the Egyptian Islamic scholar and Jihadist theorist who inspired al-Qaeda]]


The ] militant movement of al-Qaeda developed amid the rise of ]ist and ]s after the ] (1978–1979) and during the ] (1979–1989). The writings of Egyptian Islamist scholar and revolutionary ideologue ] strongly inspired the founding leaders of al-Qaeda.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=332}}.</ref> In the 1950s and 1960s, Qutb preached that because of the lack of '']'' law, the ] was no longer ], and had reverted to the pre-Islamic ignorance known as '']''. To restore ], Qutb argued that a vanguard of righteous ] was needed in order to establish "true ]", implement ''sharia'', and rid the Muslim world of any non-Muslim influences. In Qutb's view, the enemies of Islam included "]", which "plotted ]" and opposed Islam.<ref>{{Harvnb|Qutb|2003|pp=63, 69}}.</ref> Qutb envisioned this vanguard to march forward to wage armed ''Jihad'' against tyrannical regimes after purifying from the wider ''Jahili'' societies and organising themselves under a righteous Islamic leadership; which he viewed as the model of early Muslims in the ] under the leadership of the ]. This idea would directly influence many Islamist figures such as ] and ]; and became the core rationale for the formulation of "al-Qaeda" concept in the near future.<ref name="auto2">{{Cite book|last=R. Halverson , Goodall, Jr., R. Corman|first=Jeffry, H. L., and Steven|title=Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2011|isbn=978-0-230-10896-7|location=New York|chapter=3:The Jahiliyya|pages=45–46}}</ref> Outlining his strategy to topple the existing secular orders, Qutb argued in '']'': <blockquote> a ] to come into existence which believes that ‘''there is no deity except God'',’ which commits itself to obey none but God, denying all other authority, and which challenges the legality of any law which is not based on this belief.. . It should come into the battlefield with the determination that its strategy, its social organization, and the relationship between its individuals should be firmer and more powerful than the existing ''jahili'' system.<ref name="auto2"/><ref>{{Cite book|last1=Qutb|first1=Sayyid|last2=Al-Mehri|first2=A.B|title=Milestones (Ma'alim fi'l-tareeq)|publisher=Maktabah Book Sellers and Publishers|year=2006|isbn=0-9548665-1-7|location=England|pages=46, 57}}</ref></blockquote>
===Fatwas===
In the words of ], a close college friend of bin Laden: {{blockquote|Islam is different from any other ]; it's a way of life. We were trying to understand what Islam has to say about how we eat, who we marry, how we talk. We read Sayyid Qutb. He was the one who most affected our generation.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=79}}.</ref>}}
In 1996, al-Qaeda announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interests from what they considered Islamic lands. Bin Laden issued a fatwa,<ref>{{cite news
|title=Bin Laden's Fatwa
|url=http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html
|publisher=]
|date=August 1996
|accessdate=2007-01-09}}</ref> which amounted to a public declaration of war against the United States of America and any of its allies, and began to refocus al-Qaeda's resources towards large-scale, propagandist strikes. Also occurring on June 25, 1996, was the bombing of the Khobar towers, located in Khobar, Saudi Arabia.


Qutb also influenced ].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/qutb_milest_influence_obl.html|title=How Did Sayyid Qutb Influence Osama bin Laden?|publisher=Gemsofislamism.tripod.com|access-date=March 22, 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101017060150/http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/qutb_milest_influence_obl.html|archive-date=October 17, 2010|url-status=dead}}</ref> Zawahiri's uncle and maternal family patriarch, Mafouz Azzam, was Qutb's student, protégé, personal lawyer, and an executor of his estate. Azzam was one of the last people to see Qutb alive before his execution.<ref>Mafouz Azzam; cited in {{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=36}}.</ref> Zawahiri paid homage to Qutb in his work ''Knights under the Prophet's Banner''.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/milestones_qutb.html#footnote_24|title=Sayyid Qutb's Milestones (footnote 24)|publisher=Gemsofislamism.tripod.com|access-date=March 22, 2010|archive-date=October 4, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061004095024/http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/milestones_qutb.html#footnote_24|url-status=live}}</ref>
On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden and ], a leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, along with three other Islamist leaders, co-signed and issued a fatwa (binding religious edict) calling on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies where they can, when they can.<ref>Summary taken from bin Laden's May 26, 1998 interview with American journalist ]. Most recently broadcast in the documentary ''Age of Terror'', part 4, with translations checked by Barry Purkis (archive researcher).</ref> Under the banner of the ] they declared:


Qutb argued that many Muslims were not true Muslims. Some Muslims, Qutb argued, were ]. These alleged apostates included leaders of Muslim countries, since they failed to enforce ''sharia'' law.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07spring/eikmeier.htm|title=Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism|first1=Dale C.|last1=Eilmeier |work=Parameters|date=Spring 2007|pages=85–98|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609120804/http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/07spring/eikmeier.htm|archive-date=June 9, 2007}}</ref> He also alleged that the ] approaches the Muslim World with a "crusading spirit"; in spite of the decline of religious values in the 20th century Europe. According to Qutb; the hostile and imperialist attitudes exhibited by Europeans and Americans towards Muslim countries, their support for Zionism, etc. reflected hatred amplified over a millennia of wars such as the ] and was born out of ] ] and ] outlooks that viewed the world in monetary terms.<ref>{{Cite book|last=R. Halverson , Goodall, Jr., R. Corman|first=Jeffry, H. L., and Steven|title=Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2011|isbn=978-0-230-10896-7|location=New York|pages=114–122|chapter=9: The Infidel Invaders}}</ref>
<blockquote>he ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, 'and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,' and 'fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah'.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm|title=Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans|accessdate=2006-05-15}}</ref></blockquote>


=== Formation ===
Neither bin Laden nor al-Zawahiri possessed the traditional Islamic scholarly qualifications to issue a fatwa of any kind; however, they rejected the authority of the contemporary ] (seen as the paid servants of '']'' rulers) and took it upon themselves.<ref>{{Harvnb|Benjamin|Simon|2002|p=117}}. "By issuing fatwas, bin Laden and his followers are acting out a kind of self-appointment as alim: they are asserting their rights as interpreters of Islamic law."</ref>{{Verify credibility|reason=questionable statement as at least one of the other signers of the fatwa may have indeed been able to issue such an edict – bin Laden and al-Zawahiri were co-signers|date=May 2009}} Assassinated former FSB agent ] alleged that the Russian ] trained al-Zawahiri in a camp in Dagestan eight months before the 1998 fatwa.<ref>{{cite web| last = Nyquist| first = J.R. | title = Is Al Qaeda a Kremlin Proxy?| work = | publisher = jrnyquist.com| date = August 13, 2005| url = http://www.jrnyquist.com/nyquist_2005_0813.htm| accessdate = 2008-04-17 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news| title = Obituary: Alexander Litvinenko | publisher = BBC News| date = November 24, 2006| url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6163502.stm| accessdate = 2008-04-16 }}</ref>
{{See also|Afghan Jihad}}
The ] against the ] further developed the ] movement which inspired al-Qaeda.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Kepel|first1=Gilles|title=Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam|url=https://archive.org/details/jihad00gill_0|url-access=registration|date=2002|publisher=Harvard University Press|ref=GKJTPI2002|isbn=978-0-674-01090-1}}</ref> During this period, al-Qaeda embraced the ideals of the Indian Muslim militant revivalist ] (d. 1831) who led a ] against ] from the frontiers of ] and ] in the early 19th century. Al-Qaeda readily adopted Sayyid Ahmad's doctrines such as returning to the purity of early generations ('']''), antipathy towards ] and restoration of Islamic political power.<ref name="Haqqani 2005 13">{{Cite journal|last=Haqqani|first=Hussain|year=2005|title=The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups|url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/1437302091|journal=Current Trends in Islamist Ideology|volume=1|pages=13|id={{ProQuest|1437302091}}|via=ProQuest|access-date=March 16, 2022|archive-date=February 28, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230228163319/https://www.proquest.com/docview/1437302091|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Marquardt, Heffelfinger 2008 37–38, 42, 150–151, 153">{{Cite book|last=Marquardt, Heffelfinger|first=Erich, Christopher|title=Terrorism & Political Islam: Origins, Ideologies, and Methods; a Counter Terrorism Textbook; 2nd Edition|publisher=Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences|year=2008|pages=37–38, 42, 150–151, 153|asin=B004LJQ8O8}}</ref> According to ] journalist ], {{blockquote|Sayyid Ahmed's revival of the ideology of jihad became the prototype for subsequent Islamic militant movements in South and Central Asia and is also the main influence over the jihad network of Al Qaeda and its associated groups in the region.<ref name="Haqqani 2005 13"/><ref name="Marquardt, Heffelfinger 2008 37–38, 42, 150–151, 153"/>}}


===Way to Somalia and Yemen=== === Objectives ===
The long-term objective of al-Qaeda is to unite the Muslim World under a supra-national ] known as the '']'' (Caliphate), headed by an elected ] descended from the '']'' (Muhammad's family). The immediate objectives include the expulsion of American troops from the Arabian Peninsula, waging armed ] to topple US-allied governments in the region, etc.<ref name="Klausen 2021 53–54">{{Cite book|last=Klausen|first=Jytte|title=Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2021|isbn=978-0-19-887079-1|location=Oxford, UK|pages=53–54|chapter=2: The Founder}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last1=J. Tompkins, Crossett|first1=Paul, Chuck|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SPZdWxjMd6cC|title=Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009|last2=Spitaletta, Marshal|first2=Jason, Shana|publisher=United States Army Special Operations Command|year=2012|location=Fort Liberty, North Carolina|pages=543–544|chapter=19 – Al-Qaeda: 1988–2001}}</ref>
While Al Qaeda leaders are hiding in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the middle-tier of the extremist movement display heightened activity in Somalia and Yemen.
“We know that South Asia is no longer their primary base,” a source in the US defense agency said to the Washington Times. “They are looking for a hide-out in other parts of the world and continue to expand their organization.“
In Somalia, Al Qaeda agents closely collaborate with the Shahab group, actively recruit children for suicide-bomber training and export young people to participate in military actions against Americans at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
In January 2009, Al Qaeda’s division in Saudi Arabia merged with its Yemeni wing to form ].<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8437724.stm |title=NEWS.BBC.co.uk |publisher=NEWS.BBC.co.uk |date=2010-01-03 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>
Centered in Yemen, the group takes advantage of the country's poor economy, demography and domestic security. In August 2009, they made the first assassination attempt against a member of the Saudi royal dynasty in decades.
President Obama in a letter asked his Yemen counterpart Ali Abdullah Saleh to ensure closer cooperation with the USA in the struggle against the growing activity of Al Qaeda in Yemen’s territory, and promised to send additional international aid.
Because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is unable to pay sufficient attention to Somalia and Yemen, which may cause the US some serious problems in the near future.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/terror/109278-0/|title=Al-Qaeda Slowly Makes Its Way to Somalia and Yemen |accessdate=2009-09-23|publisher=Pravda.ru}}</ref>
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the 2009 bombing attack on ] by ].<ref>{{cite web|author=Font size Print E-mail Share 1 Comment |url=http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/28/cbsnews_investigates/main6031295.shtml |title=CBS News Dec. 28, 2009 Al Qaeda: We Planned Flight 253 Bombing Terrorist Group Says It Was In Retaliation for U.S. Operation in Yemen; Obama Orders Reviews of Watchlist and Air Safety |publisher=Cbsnews.com |date=2009-12-28 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref> The group released photos of Nigerian ] smiling in a white shirt and white Islamic skullcap with the Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula banner in the background.


The following are the goals and some of the general policies outlined in al-Qaeda's Founding Charter "''Al-Qaeda's Structure and Bylaws''" issued in the meetings in ] in 1988:<ref name="ctc">{{Cite web|title=Al-Qa'ida's Structure and Bylaws|url=https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Al-Qa%E2%80%99ida%E2%80%99s-Structure-and-Bylaws-Translation1.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221013055746/https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Al-Qa%E2%80%99ida%E2%80%99s-Structure-and-Bylaws-Translation1.pdf|archive-date=October 13, 2022|website=CTC}}</ref><ref name="Klausen 2021 53–54"/>
===American operations===
]]]
In December 1998, the ] Counterterrorist Center reported to the president that al-Qaeda was preparing for attacks in the USA, including the training of personal to hijack aircraft.<ref>{{Cite web
| title = Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks
| date = 1998-12-04
| accessdat = 2010-04-18
| publisher = ]
| url = http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001110635/0001110635_0001.gif }}</ref>


{{Blockquote|text=
]'', November 10, 2009, accessed November 12, 2009]</ref> Awlaki's sermons in the United States were attended by three of the ] hijackers, as well as accused ] ]. US intelligence intercepted emails from Hasan to Awlaki between December 2008 and early 2009. On his website, Awlaki has praised Hasan's actions in the Fort Hood shooting.<ref name="abcnews.go.com">]'', November 9, 2009, accessed November 12, 2009]</ref>
"'''General Goals'''<br />
i. To promote '']'' awareness in the ]<br />
ii. To prepare and equip the cadres for the Islamic world through trainings and by participating in actual combat<br />
iii. To support and sponsor the ] as much as possible<br />
iv. To coordinate Jihad movements around the world in an effort to create a unified international Jihad movement.


'''General Policies'''<br />
An unnamed official claimed there was good reason to believe Awlaki "has been involved in very serious terrorist activities since leaving the United States , including plotting attacks against America and our allies.”<ref>
1. Complete commitment to the governing rules and controls of '']'' in all the beliefs and actions and according to the book ]''] and '']'' as well as per the interpretation of the nation's ] who serve in this domain<br />
February 27, 2008 Imam From Va. Mosque Now Thought to Have Aided Al-Qaeda.</ref> He has most recently been associated with ] in ] where he currently resides. The university's students have allegedly been linked to assassinations, and it is headed by ], who appears on US and ] lists as being associated with Al-Qaeda, and is wanted for questioning in connection with the ] attack in Yemen.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/01/21/monitor/entry4745907.shtml |title=CBS News January 21, 2009 7:44 PM Al Qaeda Unveils Plan To Strike Supply Lines to U.S. Forces in The Arab "Zindani, who is wanted for questioning by the FBI over the attack on USS Cole" |publisher=Cbsnews.com |date=2009-01-21 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>
2. Commitment to Jihad as a fight for God's cause and as an agenda of change and to prepare for it and apply it whenever we find it possible...<br />
4. Our position with respect to the tyrants of the world, ] and ] parties and the like is not to associate with them, to discredit them and to be their constant enemy till they believe in God alone. We shall not agree with them on half-solutions and there is no way to negotiate with them or appease them<br />
5. Our relationships with truthful Islamic jihadist movements and groups is to cooperate under the umbrella of faith and belief and we shall always attempt to at uniting and integrating with them...<br />
6. We shall carry a relationship of love and affection with the Islamic movements who are not aligned with Jihad...<br />
7. We shall sustain a relationship of respect and love with active scholars...<br />
9. We shall reject the regional fanatics and will pursue Jihad in an Islamic country as needed and when possible<br />
10. We shall care about the role of ] in the Jihad and we shall attempt to recruit them...<br />
11. We shall maintain our economic independence and will not rely on others to secure our resources.<br />
12. Secrecy is the main ingredient of our work except for what the need deems necessary to reveal<br />
13. Our policy with the ] is support, advise and coordination with the Islamic Establishments in Jihad arenas in a manner that conforms with our policies"|title=Al-Qa`ida's Structure and Bylaws, p.2|source=<ref name="ctc" /><ref name="Klausen 2021 53–54"/>}}


=== Theory of Islamic State ===
==Organization structure==
{{See also|Islamic state|label1=Islamic State Theory}}
<!-- Commented out: ] -->
Al-Qaeda aims to establish an ] in the ], modelled after the ], by initiating a global Jihad against the "International Jewish-Crusader Alliance" led by the United States, which it sees as the "external enemy" and against the secular governments in ], that are described as "the apostate domestic enemy".<ref name="McCants 2011">{{Cite journal|last=McCants|first=William|date=September 2011|title=Al Qaeda's Challenge: The Jihadists' War With Islamist Democrats|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23041773|journal=Foreign Affairs|volume=90|issue=5|pages=20–32|jstor=23041773|quote=Two months before 9/11, Zawahiri, who had become al Qaeda's second-in-command, published Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, which offers insight into why al Qacda decided to attack the United States within its borders. In it, he stated that al Qaeda aimed to establish an Islamic state in the Arab world: Just as victory is not achieved for an army unless its foot soldiers occupy land, the mujahid Islamic movement will not achieve victory against the global infdel alliance unless it possesses a base in the heart of the Islamic world. Every plan and method we consider to rally and mobilize the ummab will be hanging in the air with no concrete result or tangible return unless it leads to the establishment of the caliphal state in the heart of the Islamic world. Achieving this goal, Zawahiri explained elsewhere in the book, would require a global jihad: It is not possible to incite a conflict for the establishment of a Muslim state if it is a regional conflict.... The international Jewish-Crusader alliance, led by America, will not allow any Muslim force to obtain power in any of the Muslim lands. ... It will impose sanctions on whoever helps it, even if it does not declare war against them altogether. Therefore, to adjust to this new reality, we must prepare ourselves for a battle that is not confined to a single region but rather includes the apostate domestic enemy and the Jewish-Crusader external enemy. To confront this insidious alliance, Zawahiri argued, al Qaeda had to first root out U.S. influence in the region...|access-date=November 13, 2021|archive-date=November 13, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211113164716/https://www.jstor.org/stable/23041773|url-status=live}}</ref> Once foreign influences and the secular ruling authorities are removed from ] through ]; al-Qaeda supports elections to choose the rulers of its proposed ]s. This is to be done through representatives of leadership councils ('']'') that would ensure the implementation of '']'' (Islamic law). However, it opposes elections that institute parliaments which empower Muslim and non-Muslim legislators to collaborate in making laws of their own choosing.<ref name="McCants 2011"/> In the second edition of his book ''Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet'', ] writes:
Though the current structure of al-Qaeda is unknown, information mostly acquired from ] provided American authorities with a rough picture of how the group was organized. While the veracity of the information provided by al-Fadl and the motivation for his cooperation are both disputed, American authorities base much of their current knowledge of al-Qaeda on his testimony.<ref name="first informant">{{Harvnb|McGeary|2001}}.</ref>
{{blockquote|We demand... the government of the rightly guiding caliphate, which is established on the basis of the sovereignty of ''sharia'' and not on the whims of the majority. Its '']'' chooses its rulers....If they deviate, the ''ummah'' brings them to account and removes them. The ''ummah'' participates in producing that government's decisions and determining its direction. ... commands the right and forbids the wrong and engages in ] to liberate Muslim lands and to free all humanity from all oppression and ignorance.<ref name="McCants 2011"/>}}
<!-- Deleted image removed: ] -->


===Leadership=== === Grievances ===
A recurring theme in al-Qaeda's ideology is the perpetual grievance over the violent subjugation of Islamic dissidents by the authoritarian, ] regimes allied to the West. Al-Qaeda denounces these ] governments as a system led by ] elites designed to advance ] and maintain ] over the Muslim World. The most prominent topic of grievance is over the ]; especially over its strong economic and military support to ]. Other concerns of resentment include presence of ] troops to support allied regimes; injustices committed against Muslims in ], ], ], ], ], ] etc.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=J. Tompkins, Crossett|first1=Paul, Chuck|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SPZdWxjMd6cC|title=Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009|last2=Spitaletta, Marshal|first2=Jason, Shana|publisher=United States Army Special Operations Command|year=2012|location=Fort Liberty, North CarolinaA|pages=539–544|chapter=19- Al-Qaeda: 1988–2001}}</ref>
] is the ] and Senior Operations Chief of al-Qaeda (although originally this role may have been filled by ]). Bin Laden is advised by a Shura Council, which consists of senior al-Qaeda members, estimated by Western officials at about twenty to thirty people.
] is al-Qaeda's Deputy Operations Chief, ] was the senior leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, but his safehouse was hit with missiles and ] has possibly succeeded him.


== Religious compatibility ==
Al-Qaeda's network was built ''ex nihilo'' (from scratch) as a conspiratorial network that draws on leaders of all its regional nodes "as and when necessary to serve as an integral part of its high command."<ref>{{Harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|p=54}}.</ref>
] wrote that:
{{blockquote|While the leadership's own theological platform is essentially Salafi, the organization's umbrella is sufficiently wide to encompass various schools of thought and political leanings. Al-Qaeda counts among its members and supporters people associated with ], ]sm, ]sm, and ]sm. There are even some Al-Qaeda members whose beliefs and practices are directly at odds with Salafism, such as ], one of the leaders of the Afghan mujahedin. He was a mystic who visited the tombs of saints and sought their blessings{{snd}}practices inimical to bin Laden's Wahhabi-Salafi school of thought. The only exception to this pan-Islamic policy is ]. Al-Qaeda seems implacably opposed to it, as it holds Shi'ism to be heresy. In Iraq it has openly declared war on the Badr Brigades, who have fully cooperated with the US, and now considers even Shi'i civilians to be legitimate targets for acts of violence.<ref name=AbdelBariAtwan>Abdel Bari Atwan. ''The Secret History of Al Qaeda'', p. 233. University of California Press, 2006. {{ISBN|0-520-24974-7}}</ref>}}On the other hand, Professor ] states that Al-Qaeda follows a pragmatic policy in forming its local affiliates, with various cells being sub-contracted to ] and non-Muslim members. The top-down chain of command means that each unit is answerable directly to central leadership, while they remain ignorant of their counterparts' presence or activities. These transnational networks of autonomous supply chains, financiers, underground militias and political supporters were set up during the 1990s, when Bin Laden's immediate aim was the expulsion of American troops from the ].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Mandaville|first=Peter|title=Islam and Politics|publisher=Routledge|year=2014|isbn=978-0-415-78256-2|edition=2nd|location=New York|pages=344–347}}</ref>


=== Attacks on civilians ===
* The Military Committee is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks.
Under the leadership of ] and ], al-Qaeda organization adopted the strategy of targeting ] civilians of enemy states that indiscriminately attacked Muslims. Following the ], al-Qaeda provided a justification for the killing of non-combatants/civilians, entitled, "A Statement from Qaidat al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington". According to a couple of critics, Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, it provides "ample theological justification for killing civilians in almost any imaginable situation."<ref name="Wiktorowicz-2003-86">{{cite journal|last1=Wiktorowicz|first1=Quintan|last2=Kaltner|first2=John|title=Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11|journal=Middle East Policy|date=Summer 2003|volume=X|issue=2|page=86|url=https://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM001177.pdf|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/https://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM001177.pdf|archive-date=October 9, 2022|url-status=live|access-date=August 12, 2019}}</ref>
* The Money/Business Committee funds the recruitment and training of operatives through the '']'' banking system. U.S-led efforts to eradicate the sources of terrorist financing<ref>{{Harvnb|White House|2003}}.</ref> were most successful in the year immediately following September 11;<ref>{{Harvnb|Basile|2004|p=177}}.</ref> al-Qaeda continues to operate through unregulated banks, such as the one thousand or so ''hawaladars'' in Pakistan, some of which can handle deals of up to $10 million.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wechsler|2001|p=135}}; cited in {{Harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|p=63}}.</ref> It also provides air tickets and false ]s, pays al-Qaeda members, and oversees profit-driven businesses.<ref>Businesses are run from below, with the council only being consulted on new proposals and collecting funds.<br/> See:


Among these justifications are that America is leading the west in waging a ] so that attacks on America are a defense of Islam and any treaties and agreements between Muslim majority states and Western countries that would be violated by attacks are null and void. According to the tract, several conditions allow for the killing of civilians including:
*{{Harvnb|Hoffman|2002}}.</ref> In the 9/11 Commission Report, it is estimated that al-Qaeda requires $30 million per year to conduct its operations.
* retaliation for the American war on Islam which al-Qaeda alleges has targeted "Muslim women, children and elderly";
* The Law Committee reviews Islamic law and decides if particular courses of action conform to the law.
* when it is too difficult to distinguish between non-combatants and combatants when attacking an enemy "stronghold" (''hist'') or non-combatants remain in enemy territory, killing them is allowed;
* The Islamic Study/Fatwah Committee issues religious edicts, such as an edict in 1998 telling Muslims to kill Americans.
* those who assist the enemy "in deed, word, mind" are eligible for killing, and this includes the general population in democratic countries because civilians can vote in elections that bring enemies of Islam to power;
* In the late 1990s there was a publicly known Media Committee, which ran the now-defunct newspaper ''Nashrat al Akhbar (Newscast)'' and handled ].
* the necessity of killing in the war to protect Islam and Muslims;
* In 2005, al Qaeda formed ], a media production house, to supply its video and audio materials.
* Muhammad, when asked whether the Muslim fighters could use the catapult against the village of ], replied affirmatively, even though the enemy fighters were mixed with a civilian population;
* if the women, children and other protected groups serve as human shields for the enemy;
* if the enemy has broken a treaty, killing of civilians is permitted.<ref name="Wiktorowicz-2003-86" />
Under the leadership of ], al-Qaeda's strategy has undergone transformation and the organization has officially renounced the tactic of attacking civilian targets of enemies. In his book ''Free Reading of 33 Strategies of War'' published in 2023, Sayf al-Adel counselled ] fighters to prioritize attacking the police forces, military soldiers, state assets of enemy governments, etc. which he described as acceptable targets in military operations. Asserting that attacking women and children of enemies are contrary to Islamic values, Sayf al-Adel asked: "If we target the general public, how can we expect their people to accept our call to ]?"<ref>{{Cite news|last=Haid|first=Haid|date=September 26, 2023|title=A book by al-Qaeda's new leader reveals shifting strategies|work=Al Majalla|url=https://en.majalla.com/node/300646/opinion/book-al-qaedas-new-leader-reveals-shifting-strategies|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028132542/https://en.majalla.com/node/300646/opinion/book-al-qaedas-new-leader-reveals-shifting-strategies|archive-date=October 28, 2023}}</ref>


== History ==
====Command structure====
{{main|History of al-Qaeda}}
When asked about the possibility of Al Qaeda's connection to the ] in 2005, Metropolitan Police Commissioner ] said: "Al Qaeda is not an organization. Al Qaeda is a way of working ... but this has the hallmark of that approach ... Al Qaeda clearly has the ability to provide training ... to provide expertise ... and I think that is what has occurred here."<ref name='foxnewsblair'>{{cite news | first= | last= | coauthors= | title=Cops: London Attacks Were Homicide Blasts | date= | publisher= | url =http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,162476,00.html | work =] | pages = | accessdate = 2008-06-15 | language = }}</ref>


== Attacks ==
However, on August 13, 2005 ''The Independent'' newspaper reported, quoting police and ] investigations, that the 7 July bombers acted independently of an al-Qaeda terror mastermind some place abroad.<ref>{{cite news | title= London bombings: the truth emerges | url=http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article305547.ece | first=Jason | last=Bennetto | coauthors=Ian Herbert | work=The Independent | date=2005-08-13 | accessdate=2006-12-03}}</ref>
{{For timeline|Timeline of al-Qaeda attacks}}
[[File:RecentAlQaedaAttacks.svg|thumb|upright=1.65|
]: August 7, 1998<br />
]: August 7, 1998<br />
]: October 12, 2000<br />
]: September 11, 2001<br />
]: September 11, 2001<br />
]: November 15 and 20, 2003]]


Al-Qaeda has carried out a total of six major attacks, four of them in its jihad against America. In each case the leadership planned the attack years in advance, arranging for the shipment of weapons and explosives and using its businesses to provide operatives with safehouses and false identities.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/twenty-years-war/496736/|title=Al-Qaeda Has Been at War With the United States for 20 Years|first=Dominic|last=Tierney|date=August 23, 2016|website=The Atlantic|access-date=March 29, 2024|archive-date=August 24, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160824134716/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/twenty-years-war/496736/|url-status=live}}</ref>
What exactly al-Qaeda is, or was, remains in dispute. Author and journalist ] contends that the idea of al-Qaeda as a formal organization is primarily an American invention. Curtis contends the name "al-Qaeda" was first brought to the attention of the public in the 2001 trial of Osama bin Laden and the four men accused of the ] in East Africa:


=== 1991 ===
<blockquote>The reality was that bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy. But there was no organization. These were militants who mostly planned their own operations and looked to bin Laden for funding and assistance. He was not their commander. There is also no evidence that bin Laden used the term "al-Qaeda" to refer to the name of a group until after September the 11th, when he realized that this was the term the Americans had given it.<ref name="The Power of Nightmares">, BBC Documentary.</ref></blockquote>
To prevent the former Afghan king ] from coming back from exile and possibly becoming head of a new government, bin Laden instructed a Portuguese convert to ], Paulo Jose de Almeida Santos, to assassinate Zahir Shah. On November 4, 1991, Santos entered the king's villa in ] posing as a journalist and tried to stab him with a dagger. A tin of ]s in the king's breast pocket deflected the blade and saved Zahir Shah's life, although the king was also stabbed several times in the neck and was taken to hospital, later recovering from the attack. Santos was apprehended by General Abdul Wali, a former commander of the ], and jailed for 10 years in Italy.<ref>{{cite book|last=Bergen|first=Peter|author-link=Peter Bergen|date=2021|title=The Rise and Fall of Osama bin Laden|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mWI7EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA60|location=New York|publisher=Simon & Schuster|isbn=978-1-982170-52-3|pages=60–61}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=April 14, 2002|title=Bin Laden 'tried to kill king'|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1390843/Bin-Laden-tried-to-kill-king.html|access-date=April 8, 2024|website=The Telegraph}}</ref>


=== 1992 ===
As a matter of law, the ] needed to show that Osama bin Laden was the leader of a criminal organization in order to charge him '']'' under the ], also known as the RICO statutes. The name of the organization and details of its structure were provided in the testimony of ], who claimed to be a founding member of the organization and a former employee of Osama bin Laden.<ref>{{dead link|date=March 2010}}</ref>
On December 29, 1992, al-Qaeda launched the ]. Two bombs were detonated in ], Yemen. The first target was the Movenpick Hotel and the second was the parking lot of the Goldmohur Hotel.<ref name="wright174">{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=174}}.</ref>


The bombings were an attempt to eliminate American soldiers on their way to Somalia to take part in the international famine relief effort, ]. Internally, al-Qaeda considered the bombing a victory that frightened the Americans away, but in the US, the attack was barely noticed. No American soldiers were killed because no soldiers were staying in the hotel at the time it was bombed, however, an Australian tourist and a Yemeni hotel worker were killed in the bombing. Seven others, who were mostly Yemeni, were severely injured.<ref name="wright174" /> Two fatwas are said to have been appointed by al-Qaeda's members, ], to justify the killings according to Islamic law. Salim referred to a famous fatwa appointed by ], a 13th-century scholar admired by Wahhabis, which sanctioned resistance by any means during the Mongol invasions.<ref>{{Harvnb|Jansen|1997}}.</ref>{{Unreliable source?|date=September 2009}}
Questions about the reliability of al-Fadl's testimony have been raised by a number of sources because of his history of dishonesty and because he was delivering it as part of a plea bargain agreement after being convicted of conspiring to attack U.S. military establishments.<ref name="first informant"/><ref>{{cite web
|url=http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/02/13/Embassy.bombings.trial/
|title=Witness: Bin Laden planned attack on U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia
|publisher=CNN
|date=2001-02-13
|accessdate=2007-06-12}}</ref> Sam Schmidt, a defense lawyer from the trial, had the following to say about al-Fadl's testimony:


=== Late 1990s ===
<blockquote>There were selective portions of al-Fadl's testimony that I believe was false, to help support the picture that he helped the Americans join together. I think he lied in a number of specific testimony about a unified image of what this organization was. It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists. It made them identifiable as a group and therefore made it easier to prosecute any person associated with al-Qaeda for any acts or statements made by bin Laden.<ref name="The Power of Nightmares"/></blockquote>
]]]
{{Main|1998 United States embassy bombings|2000 millennium attack plots|USS Cole bombing}}
In 1996, bin Laden personally engineered a plot to assassinate United States President ] while the president was in ] for the ]. However, intelligence agents intercepted a message before the motorcade was to leave, and alerted the ]. Agents later discovered a bomb planted under a bridge.<ref>{{Cite news|title=Osama bin Laden came within minutes of killing Bill Clinton|first1=Tom|last1=Leonard|newspaper=]|date=December 25, 2009|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/6867331/Osama-bin-Laden-came-within-minutes-of-killing-Bill-Clinton.html|access-date=December 25, 2009|location=London|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091225150252/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/6867331/Osama-bin-Laden-came-within-minutes-of-killing-Bill-Clinton.html|archive-date=December 25, 2009|url-status=live}}</ref>


On August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda ], killing 224 people, including 12 Americans. In retaliation, a barrage of ]s launched by the US military devastated an al-Qaeda base in ], Afghanistan. The network's capacity was unharmed. In late 1999 and 2000, al-Qaeda planned ], masterminded by ] and involving ], which would include the bombing of Christian holy sites in Jordan, the bombing of ] by ], and the bombing of the {{USS|The Sullivans|DDG-68}}.
===Field operatives===
The number of individuals in the organization who have undergone proper military training, and are capable of commanding insurgent forces, is largely unknown. In 2006, it was estimated that al-Qaeda had several thousand commanders embedded in forty different countries.<ref name="Cassidy">{{Harvnb|Cassidy|2006|p=9}}.</ref> As of 2009, it is believed no more than two hundred to three hundred members are still active commanders.<ref>{{cite web
|url=http://www.slate.com/id/2211994/
|title=The Terrorists-Are-Dumb Theory: Don't mistake these guys for criminal masterminds
|first=Timothy
|last=Noah
|authorlink=Timothy Noah
|publisher=Slate
|date=2009-02-25}}</ref>


On October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda militants in Yemen ] the ] '']'' in a suicide attack, killing 17 US servicemen and damaging the vessel while it lay offshore. Inspired by the success of such a brazen attack, al-Qaeda's command core began to prepare for an attack on the US itself.
According to the award winning ] documentary '']'', al-Qaeda is so weakly linked together that it is hard to say it exists apart from Osama bin Laden and a small clique of close associates.


=== September 11 attacks ===
The lack of any significant numbers of convicted al-Qaeda members despite a large number of arrests on terrorism charges is cited by the documentary as a reason to doubt whether a widespread entity that meets the description of al-Qaeda exists at all. Therefore the extent and nature of al-Qaeda remains a topic of dispute.<ref>{{cite book
{{Main|September 11 attacks}}
| last = Gerges
{{Further|Motives for the September 11 attacks}}
| first = Fawaz A
]
| authorlink =
]
| coauthors =
The September 11 attacks on America by al-Qaeda killed 2,996 people{{snd}}2,507 civilians, 343 firefighters, 72 law enforcement officers, 55 military personnel as well as 19 hijackers who committed murder-suicide. Two commercial airliners were deliberately flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, a third into the Pentagon, and a fourth, originally intended to target either the ] or the ], crashed in a field in Stonycreek Township near ] after passengers revolted. It was the deadliest foreign attack on American soil since the ] on December 7, 1941, and to this day remains the deadliest terrorist attack in human history.
| title = The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global
| publisher = Cambridge University Press
|date= 2005-09-05
| isbn = 0-521-79140-5}}</ref>


The attacks were conducted by al-Qaeda, acting in accord with the ] issued against the US and its allies by persons under the command of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and others.<ref name="Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders" /> Evidence points to suicide squads led by al-Qaeda military commander ] as the culprits of the attacks, with bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, ], and ] as the key planners and part of the political and military command.
===Insurgent forces===
According to ], al-Qaeda controls two separate forces deployed alongside insurgents in Iraq and Pakistan.


Messages issued by bin Laden after September 11, 2001, praised the attacks, and explained their motivation while denying any involvement.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/inv.binladen.denial/|title=Bin Laden says he wasn't behind attacks|publisher=CNN|access-date=July 6, 2006|date=September 17, 2001|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060705161654/http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/inv.binladen.denial/|archive-date=July 5, 2006|url-status=live}}</ref> Bin Laden strongly supported the attacks by identifying numerous grievances of Muslims, such as the general perception that the US was actively oppressing Muslims.<ref>{{Harvnb|Esposito|2002|p=22}}.</ref> In his "''Letter to the American people''" published in 2002, Osama Bin Laden stated: <blockquote>Why are we fighting and opposing you? The answer is very simple:
The first, numbering in the tens of thousands, was "organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces" in the Soviet-Afghan war.<ref name="Cassidy"/> It was made up primarily of foreign mujahideen from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Many went on to fight in Bosnia and Somalia, where their deeds helped raise the banner of global jihad.
(1) Because you attacked us and continue to attack us. ....


The American government and press still refuses to answer the question:
Another group, approximately ten thousand strong, live in Western states and have received rudimentary combat training.<ref name="Cassidy"/>
Why did they attack us in New York and Washington?
If ] is a man of peace in the eyes of ], then we are also men of peace!!! America does not understand the language of manners and principles, so we are addressing it using the language it understands.<ref name=Letter2002 /><ref>{{cite web|title=Full text: bin Laden's 'letter to America'|url=https://scholarship.tricolib.brynmawr.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/218e2431-0b76-43ff-8ac5-284ae73d29ad/content|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231014061421/https://scholarship.tricolib.brynmawr.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/218e2431-0b76-43ff-8ac5-284ae73d29ad/content|archive-date=14 October 2023}}</ref></blockquote>


Bin Laden asserted that America was massacring Muslims in "], ], ] and ]" and Muslims should retain the "right to attack in reprisal". He also claimed the 9/11 attacks were not targeted at people, but "America's icons of military and economic power", despite the fact he planned to attack in the morning when most of the people in the intended targets were present and thus generating the maximum number of human casualties.<ref>Hamid Miir 'Osama claims he has nukes: If U.S. uses N-arms it will get the same response' "Dawn: the Internet Edition" November 10, 2001</ref>
Other analysts have described al-Qaeda's rank and file as changing from being "predominantly Arab," in its first years of operation, to "largely Pakistani," as of 2007.<ref> by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, ''Middle East Quarterly'', Summer 2007</ref> It has been estimated that 62% of al-Qaeda members have university education.<ref>{{cite web|author=July 3, 2007 |url=http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=c841b52c-b2e7-4e41-b27e-33d10245b935&k=0 |title=Today's jihadists: educated, wealthy and bent on killing? |publisher=Canada.com |date=2007-07-03 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>


Evidence later came to light that the original targets for the attack may have been nuclear power stations on the US East Coast. The targets were later altered by al-Qaeda, as it was feared that such an attack "might get out of hand".<ref name="AL-QAIDA-LEADERS-SAY-NUCLEAR-POWER-STATIONS-WERE-ORIGINAL-TARGETS">{{Cite news|title=Al-Qaida leaders say nuclear power stations were original targets|url=https://www.theguardian.com/afghanistan/story/0,1284,788431,00.html|work=The Guardian|location=UK|date=September 9, 2002|access-date=January 11, 2007|first1=Giles|last1=Tremlett|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070122160702/http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0%2C1284%2C788431%2C00.html|archive-date=January 22, 2007|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Al-Qaeda-SCALED-BACK-10-PLANE-PLOT">{{Cite news|title=Al Qaeda Scaled Back 10-Plane Plot|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45853-2004Jun16_2.html|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=June 17, 2004|access-date=January 11, 2007|archive-date=October 10, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171010144832/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45853-2004Jun16_2.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
==Attacks==
{{Main|Timeline of al-Qaeda attacks}}
[[Image:RecentAlQaedaAttacks.svg|thumb|400px|Map of recent major attacks attributed to al-Qaeda:<br />
1. ] – Sep 11, 2001<br />
2. ] – Sep 11, 2001<br />
3. ] – Nov 15, 2003; Nov 20, 2003<br />
4. ] – Oct 12, 2000<br />
5. ] – Aug 7, 1998<br />
6. ] – Aug 7, 1998]]
Al-Qaeda has carried out a total of six major terrorist attacks, four of them in its jihad against America. In each case the leadership planned the attack years in advance, arranging for the shipment of weapons and explosives and using its privatized businesses to provide operatives with safehouses and false identities.


== Designation as a terrorist group ==
Al-Qaeda usually does not disburse funds for attacks, and very rarely makes wire transfers.<ref>{{cite news | last = Eichenwald | first = Kurt | authorlink = Kurt Eichenwald | title = A Nation Challenged: Terror money hard to block, officials find | work = The New York Times | date = 2001-12-10 | pages = A1, B4 | url = http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/10/international/10MONE.html | accessdate = 2009-09-04}}</ref>
Al-Qaeda is deemed a ] by the following countries and international organizations:
{{Div col|colwidth=15em}}
* {{flag|Australia}}<ref name="Australia">{{cite web|url=http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB057CA3DECF30CA256FAB001F7FBD?OpenDocument|title=Listing of Terrorist Organisations|access-date=July 3, 2006|publisher=Australian Government|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140204040731/http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB057CA3DECF30CA256FAB001F7FBD?OpenDocument|archive-date=February 4, 2014}}</ref>
* {{flag|Azerbaijan}}<ref name=terrorlist>{{cite web|title=Armed group neutralized in Azerbaijan linked to Al-Qaeda|url=http://en.trend.az/news/politics/2016022.html|website=en.trend.az|access-date=June 21, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121201073423/http://en.trend.az/news/politics/2016022.html|archive-date=December 1, 2012|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* {{BHR}}<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.mofa.gov.bh/Default.aspx?tabid=12342&language=en-US|title=Bahrain Terrorist List (individuals – entities)|website=mofa.gov.bh|access-date=August 21, 2020|archive-date=October 17, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201017055422/https://www.mofa.gov.bh/Default.aspx?tabid=12342&language=en-US|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|Belarus}}<ref>{{cite web|url=https://belarusdigest.com/story/is-radical-islam-a-threat-for-belarus/|title=Is Radical Islam a Threat for Belarus? – BelarusDigest|access-date=January 11, 2019|archive-date=April 25, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190425062631/https://belarusdigest.com/story/is-radical-islam-a-threat-for-belarus/|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* {{flag|Brazil}}<ref name="Brazil">{{cite web|url=http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/opiniao/colunistas/o-brasil-e-o-terrorismo-internacional/|title=O Brasil e o terrorismo internacional|access-date=February 22, 2014|first1=Alfredo|last1=Sirkis|date=June 2011|archive-date=August 11, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140811105544/http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/opiniao/colunistas/o-brasil-e-o-terrorismo-internacional/|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|Canada}}<ref name="Canada">{{cite web|url=http://www.psepc.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp|title=Entities list|access-date=July 3, 2006|website=Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061119150657/http://www.psepc.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp|archive-date=November 19, 2006}}</ref>
* {{flag|China}}<ref name="uyg1" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t819914.shtml|title=Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Remarks on the Killing of Al-Qaeda Leader Bin Laden in Pakistan|website=fmprc.gov.cn|access-date=November 12, 2019|archive-date=May 25, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190525101605/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t819914.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|European Union}}<ref name="EU">{{cite web|url=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0700en01.doc|archive-url=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20070614032134/http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0700en01.doc|url-status=dead|archive-date=June 14, 2007|title=Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament|author=Commission of the European Communities|date=October 20, 2004|access-date=June 11, 2007|format=DOC|author-link=Commission of the European Communities}}</ref>
* {{flag|France}}<ref name="fr-report">{{cite web|url=http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/cgi-bin/brp/telestats.cgi?brp_ref=064000275&brp_file=0000.pdf|title=La France face au terrorisme|publisher=Secrétariat général de la défense nationale (France)|language=fr|access-date=August 6, 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110807105500/http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/064000275/0000.pdf|archive-date=August 7, 2011}}</ref>
* {{flag|India}}<ref name="The Hindu : Centre bans Al-Qaeda">{{cite web|url=http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/04/09/stories/2002040903651100.htm|title=The Hindu : Centre bans Al-Qaeda|publisher=Hinduonnet.com|date=April 9, 2002|access-date=March 22, 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090427232058/http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/04/09/stories/2002040903651100.htm|archive-date=April 27, 2009|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* {{flag|Indonesia}}<ref>{{cite magazine|url=https://time.com/4181557/jakarta-terrorist-attacks-indonesia-isis/|title=Indonesia's Long Battle With Islamic Extremism|magazine=Time|access-date=January 11, 2019|archive-date=February 19, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200219035550/https://time.com/4181557/jakarta-terrorist-attacks-indonesia-isis/|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|Iran}}<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/06/12/iran-wants-to-talk-with-us-just-not-about-nukes/|title=Iran Wants to Talk With U.S.; Just Not About Nukes|last1=Moody|first1=John|date=June 12, 2007|publisher=]|access-date=July 31, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131225195502/http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/06/12/iran-wants-to-talk-with-us-just-not-about-nukes/|archive-date=December 25, 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* {{flag|Ireland}}<ref name="Department of Justice Ireland">{{cite web|title=Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005|url=http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2005/en/act/pub/0002/|work=2005|publisher=Department of Justice Ireland|access-date=May 26, 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140527215313/http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2005/en/act/pub/0002/|archive-date=May 27, 2014}}</ref>
* {{flag|Israel}}<ref name="Israel">{{cite web|url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fundamentalism-/Summary+of+indictments+against+Al-Qaeda+terrorists+in+Samaria+21-Mar-2006.htm|title=Summary of indictments against Al-Qaeda terrorists in Samaria|date=March 21, 2006|access-date=May 4, 2011|publisher=Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs|archive-date=June 21, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170621152347/http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fundamentalism-/Summary+of+indictments+against+Al-Qaeda+terrorists+in+Samaria+21-Mar-2006.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="justice.gov.il">{{cite web|url=http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/9C960928-70AB-428A-BCCC-2E6091F2BDE3/40880/impa_terror_eng_17012013.doc|title=List of Declaration and Orders – Unofficial Translation|access-date=August 9, 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140810135338/http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/9C960928-70AB-428A-BCCC-2E6091F2BDE3/40880/impa_terror_eng_17012013.doc|archive-date=August 10, 2014}}</ref>
* {{flag|Japan}}<ref name="Japan">{{cite web|url=http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/chap1-b.pdf|title=B. Terrorist Attacks in the United States and the Fight Against Terrorism|author=Diplomatic Bluebook|year=2002|access-date=June 11, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070614032134/http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/chap1-b.pdf|archive-date=June 14, 2007|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|Kazakhstan}}<ref name="Mfa-kazakhstan">{{cite web|url=http://mfa.gov.kz/index.php/en/foreign-policy/current-issues-of-kazakhstan-s-foreign-policy/counteraction-to-new-challenges/fight-against-terrorism-and-extremism-in-kazakhstan|title=Fight against terrorism and extremism in Kazakhstan|publisher=Mfa.gov.kz|access-date=November 23, 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151114002653/http://mfa.gov.kz/index.php/en/foreign-policy/current-issues-of-kazakhstan-s-foreign-policy/counteraction-to-new-challenges/fight-against-terrorism-and-extremism-in-kazakhstan|archive-date=November 14, 2015}}</ref>
* {{flag|Kyrgyzstan}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2017/04/12/feature-01|title=Kyrgyzstan to publicise list of banned terrorist groups|last=Caravanserai|website=Caravanserai|access-date=January 11, 2019|archive-date=September 19, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180919094559/http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2017/04/12/feature-01|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|NATO}}<ref name="NATOQaeda">{{cite web|url=http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011122b.htm|title=Press Conference with NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson|access-date=October 23, 2006|author=NATO|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061026040125/http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011122b.htm|archive-date=October 26, 2006|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nato.int/structur/library/bibref/them0305.pdf|title=Al Qaeda|author=NATO Library|year=2005|access-date=June 11, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070614032137/http://www.nato.int/structur/library/bibref/them0305.pdf|archive-date=June 14, 2007|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{MYS}}<ref>{{cite web|title=List if Individuals, Entities and Other Groups and Undertakings Declared but the Minister if Home Affairs as Specified Under Section 66B(1)|url=http://www.moha.gov.my/images/maklumat_bahagian/KK/kdndomestic.pdf|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://www.moha.gov.my/images/maklumat_bahagian/KK/kdndomestic.pdf|archive-date=October 9, 2022|url-status=live|website=Ministry of Home Affairs – Malaysia|pages=7–10|date=May 31, 2019}}</ref>
* {{flag|Netherlands}}<ref name="Netherlands">{{cite web|url=http://ftp.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/aivd2004-eng.pdf|title=Annual Report 2004|access-date=June 11, 2007|author=General Intelligence and Security Service|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070614032136/http://ftp.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/aivd2004-eng.pdf|archive-date=June 14, 2007|url-status=dead|author-link=General Intelligence and Security Service}}</ref>
* {{flag|New Zealand}}<ref name="New Zealand">{{cite web|url=http://www.police.govt.nz/service/counterterrorism/designated-terrorists.html|title=New Zealand's designated terrorist individuals and organisations|access-date=October 7, 2008|author=New Zealand Government|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081007014045/http://www.police.govt.nz/service/counterterrorism/designated-terrorists.html|archive-date=October 7, 2008}}</ref>
* {{flag|Pakistan}}<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://tribune.com.pk/story/456294/list-of-banned-organisations-in-pakistan/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121026232240/http://tribune.com.pk/story/456294/list-of-banned-organisations-in-pakistan/|archive-date=October 26, 2012|title=List of banned organisations in Pakistan|date=October 24, 2012}}</ref>
* {{flag|Philippines}}<ref name="newsflashabus">{{cite news|title=Abus, al-Qaeda Tagged in Wednesday Night Zamboanga Bombing |url=http://www.newsflash.org/2002/09/hl/hl016645.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20021113152915/http://www.newsflash.org/2002/09/hl/hl016645.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=November 13, 2002|work=newsflash|date=October 4, 2002|access-date=March 22, 2010}}</ref>
* {{flag|Russia}}<ref name="Russia">{{Cite news|url=http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/07/28/russiaterrorlist.shtml|archive-url=https://archive.today/20061114154904/http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/07/28/russiaterrorlist.shtml|url-status=usurped|archive-date=November 14, 2006|title=Russia Outlaws 17 Terror Groups; Hamas, Hezbollah Not Included}}</ref>
* {{KSA}}<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?newsid=1206711|title=سياسي / وزارة الداخلية: بيان بالمحظورات الأمنية والفكرية على المواطن والمقيم ، وإمهال المشاركين بالقتال خارج المملكة 15 يوما إضافية لمراجعة النفس والعودة إلى وطنهم / إضافة أولى وكالة الأنباء السعودية|website=spa.gov.sa|access-date=August 21, 2020|archive-date=October 22, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201022233244/https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?newsid=1206711|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* {{flag|South Korea}}<ref name="Korea">{{Cite news|url=http://www.korea.net/news/news/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20070813015&part=102|title=Seoul confirms release of two Korean hostages in Afghanistan|date=August 14, 2007|access-date=September 16, 2007|author=Korean Foreign Ministry|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071215153000/http://www.korea.net/news/news/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20070813015&part=102|archive-date=December 15, 2007}}</ref>
* {{flag|Sweden}}<ref name="Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden">{{cite web|url=http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/06/12/67/01b99143.pdf|title=Radical Islamist Movements in the Middle East|author=Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden|date=March–June 2006|access-date=June 11, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070614032136/http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/06/12/67/01b99143.pdf|archive-date=June 14, 2007|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* {{flag|Switzerland}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.efv.admin.ch/d/dokumentation/downloads/themen/finanzkrimi/CH_UNTerror_1201_e.pdf|title=Report on counter-terrorism submitted by Switzerland to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001)|date=December 20, 2001|access-date=June 11, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609153811/http://www.efv.admin.ch/d/dokumentation/downloads/themen/finanzkrimi/CH_UNTerror_1201_e.pdf|archive-date=June 9, 2007|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* {{flag|Tajikistan}}<ref>''Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia'', page 8</ref>
* {{flag|Turkey}} designated Al-Qaeda's Turkish branch<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/terorgrup1.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130114042731/http://www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/terorgrup1.html|title=Terörle Mücadele ve Harekat Dairesi Başkanlığı|archive-date=January 14, 2013|access-date=April 12, 2016}}</ref>
* {{flag|United Arab Emirates}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.wam.ae/ar/news/emirates-arab-international/1395272465559.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141117230142/http://www.wam.ae/ar/news/emirates-arab-international/1395272465559.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=November 17, 2014|title=مجلس الوزراء يعتمد قائمة التنظيمات الإرهابية. – WAM|date=November 17, 2014}}</ref>
* {{flag|United Kingdom}}<ref>{{cite act|title=Terrorism Act 2000|chapter=Schedule 2: Proscribed Organisations|reporter=UK Public General Acts|volume=2000 c. 11|date=July 20, 2000|chapter-url=http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/2|access-date=April 25, 2024|title-link=Terrorism Act 2000}} {{Cite web|url=http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/2|title=Terrorism Act 2000|access-date=April 28, 2018|archive-date=January 21, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130121085241/http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/2|url-status=bot: unknown}}</ref>
* {{flagdeco|United Nations}} ]<ref name="UNSC-WORK-RELATED-TO-RESOLUTION-1267">{{cite web|title=Security Council Resolutions Related to the Work of the Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities|publisher=]|url=https://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ResEng.htm|access-date=January 9, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070112115326/http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ResEng.htm|archive-date=January 12, 2007|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* {{flag|United States}}<ref name="US">{{cite web|url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm|title=Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)|access-date=July 3, 2006|author=United States Department of State|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171117015042/https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm|archive-date=November 17, 2017|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* {{flag|Uzbekistan}}<ref name=CRISIS> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061016211249/http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=236626 |date=October 16, 2006 }} Jamestown Foundation</ref><ref name=CORNELL> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040404040430/http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8147-18.cfm |date=April 4, 2004 }} Center for Defense Information</ref>
* {{flag|Vietnam}}<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/1957304/vietnamese-born-al-qaeda-recruit-sentenced-40-years|title=Vietnamese-born al-Qaeda recruit sentenced to 40 years in US over plot to bomb Heathrow|date=May 28, 2016|website=South China Morning Post|access-date=January 11, 2019|archive-date=September 13, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180913192111/https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/1957304/vietnamese-born-al-qaeda-recruit-sentenced-40-years|url-status=live}}</ref>
{{div col end}}


===1992=== == War on terror ==
{{Main|War on terror|List of wars and battles involving al-Qaeda}}
On December 29, 1992, al-Qaeda's first terrorist attack took place as two bombs were detonated in ], ]. The first target was the Movenpick Hotel and the second was the parking lot of the Goldmohur Hotel.
]


In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US government ], and began to prepare its ] to overthrow the Taliban, which it believed was harboring al-Qaeda. The US offered Taliban leader ] a chance to surrender bin Laden and his top associates. The first forces to be inserted into Afghanistan were paramilitary officers from the CIA's elite ] (SAD).
The bombings were an attempt to eliminate American soldiers on their way to Somalia to take part in the international famine relief effort, ]. Internally, al-Qaeda considered the bombing a victory that frightened the Americans away, but in the United States the attack was barely noticed.


The ] offered to turn over bin Laden to a ] for trial if the US would provide evidence of bin Laden's complicity in the attacks. US President ] responded by saying: "We know he's guilty. Turn him over",<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20011015-NEWS-310159983|title=US Jets Pound Targets Around Kabul|work=]|date=October 15, 2001|access-date=July 25, 2012|archive-date=May 15, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130515161128/http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20011015-NEWS-310159983|url-status=live}}</ref> and British Prime Minister ] warned the Taliban regime: "Surrender bin Laden, or surrender power."<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/blair-to-taliban-surrender-bin-laden-or-surrender-power-1.295241|title=Blair to Taliban: Surrender bin Laden or surrender power|publisher=]|date=October 3, 2001|access-date=March 22, 2010|archive-date=January 28, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110128192016/http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2001/10/02/blair_war011002.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
No Americans were killed because the soldiers were staying in a different hotel altogether, and they went on to Somalia as scheduled. However little noticed, the attack was pivotal as it was the beginning of al-Qaeda's change in direction, from fighting armies to killing ]s.<ref name=wright174>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=174}}.</ref> Two people were killed in the bombing, an Australian tourist and a Yemeni hotel worker. Seven others, mostly Yemenis, were severely injured.


Soon thereafter the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan, and together with the ] removed the Taliban government as part of the ]. As a result of the US ] and ] for the Northern Alliance ground forces, a number of Taliban and ] were destroyed, and much of the operating structure of al-Qaeda is believed to have been disrupted. After being driven from their key positions in the ] area of Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda fighters tried to regroup in the rugged ] region of the nation.
Two fatwas are said to have been appointed by the most theologically knowledgeable of al-Qaeda's members, ], to justify the killings according to Islamic law. Salim referred to a famous fatwa appointed by ], a thirteenth-century scholar much admired by Wahhabis, which sanctioned resistance by any means during the Mongol invasions.<ref>{{Harvnb|Jansen|1997}}.</ref>{{Verify credibility|date=September 2009}}


] after his arrest in ], Pakistan, in March 2003]]
===1993 World Trade Center bombing===
{{Main|World Trade Center bombing}}


By early 2002, al-Qaeda had been dealt a serious blow to its operational capacity, and the Afghan invasion appeared to be a success. Nevertheless, a significant ] remained in Afghanistan.
In 1993, ] used a truck bomb to attack the ] in ]. The attack was intended to break the foundation of Tower One knocking it into Tower Two, bringing the entire complex down.


Debate continued regarding the nature of al-Qaeda's role in the 9/11 attacks. The ] released a ] showing bin Laden speaking with a small group of associates somewhere in Afghanistan shortly before the Taliban was removed from power.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2001/b12132001_bt630-01.html|title=U.S. Releases Videotape of Osama Bin Laden|access-date=July 4, 2006|date=December 13, 2001|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060625223529/http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2001/b12132001_bt630-01.html|archive-date=June 25, 2006}}</ref> Although its authenticity has been questioned by a couple of people,<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/september11/story/0,11209,619188,00.html|author=Morris, Steven|title=US urged to detail origin of tape|work=The Guardian|location=UK|access-date=July 11, 2006|date=December 15, 2001}}</ref> the tape definitively implicates bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the September 11 attacks. The tape was aired on many ], with an accompanying English translation provided by the ].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/12/13/tape.transcript/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070202084109/http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/12/13/tape.transcript/|archive-date=February 2, 2007|title=Transcript of Osama bin Laden videotape}}</ref>
Yousef hoped this would kill 250,000 people. The towers shook and swayed but the foundation held and he succeeded in killing only six people (although he injured 1,042 others and caused nearly $300 million in property damage).<ref name=yousef>{{Harvnb|Wright|2006|p=178}}; {{Harvnb|Reeve|1999}}.</ref><ref name=miis>{{cite web
|url=http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/wtc93.htm
|title=February 1993 Bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City
|publisher=]
|date=2001-11-12
|accessdate=2007-01-09}}</ref>{{page needed|reason=nobody has confirmed what Reeve says}}


In September 2004, the ] officially concluded that the attacks were conceived and implemented by al-Qaeda operatives.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.9-11commission.gov/|title=National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States|access-date=April 27, 2006|date=September 20, 2004|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060427220632/http://www.9-11commission.gov/|archive-date=April 27, 2006|url-status=live}}</ref> In October 2004, bin Laden appeared to claim responsibility for the attacks in a ] released through Al Jazeera, saying he was inspired by Israeli attacks on high-rises in the 1982 ]: "As I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind and that we should destroy towers in America in order that they taste some of what we tasted and so that they be deterred from killing our women and children."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-2BC36E87F61F.htm|title=Full transcript of bin Ladin's speech|publisher=Al Jazeera|access-date=July 12, 2006|date=November 1, 2004|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060711055450/http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-2BC36E87F61F.htm|archive-date=July 11, 2006|url-status=dead}}</ref>
After the attack, Yousef fled to Pakistan and later moved to ]. There he began developing the ] plans to blow up a dozen American airliners simultaneously, to assassinate Pope ] and President ], and to crash a private plane into CIA headquarters. He was later captured in Pakistan.<ref name=yousef/>


By the end of 2004, the US government proclaimed that two-thirds of the most senior al-Qaeda figures from 2001 had been captured and interrogated by the CIA: ], ] and ] in 2002;<ref name="martinez interrogations">{{Cite news|last1=Shane|first1=Scott|title=Inside the interrogation of a 9/11 mastermind|work=The New York Times|date=June 22, 2008|pages=A1, A12–A13|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/washington/22ksm.html|access-date=September 5, 2009|archive-date=April 2, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190402075657/https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/washington/22ksm.html|url-status=live}}</ref> ] in 2003;<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article209722184.html|title=Lawyers: Scan suggests alleged 9/11 plotter suffered head injury in CIA custody|last1=Rosenberg|first1=Carol|date=April 30, 2018|newspaper=]|access-date=February 2, 2019|archive-date=February 2, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190202095528/https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article209722184.html|url-status=live}}</ref> and ] in 2004.{{sfn|Gunaratna|2002|p=147|ps=: "The Al Qaeda team included Abu Talha al-Sudani, Saif al-Islam el-Masry, Salem el-Masry, Saif al-Adel and other trainers, including Abu Jaffer el-Masry, the explosives expert who ran the Jihad Wal camp Afghanistan. In addition to developing this capability with Iranian assistance, Al Qaeda also received a large amount of explosives from Iran that were used in the bombing of the East African targets. The training team brought Hezbollah training and propaganda videos with the intention of passing on their knowledge to other Al Qaeda members and Islamist groups."}} ] and several others were killed.<!--Despite this, the US government continues to warn that the organization is not yet defeated and battles between US forces and al-Qaeda-related groups continue.
None of the U.S. government's indictments against Osama bin Laden have suggested that he had any connection with this bombing, but Ramzi Yousef is known to have attended a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. After his capture, Yousef declared that his primary justification for the attack was to punish the United States for its support for the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and made no mention of any religious motivations.<ref name=miis/>


By the end of 2008, the Taliban had severed any remaining ties with al-Qaeda.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/10/06/afghan.saudi.talks/?iref=mpstoryview|title=Sources: Taliban split with al Qaeda, seek peace|publisher=CNN}}</ref> According to senior US military intelligence officials, there are fewer than 100 members of al-Qaeda remaining in Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/10/AR2009111019644.html|title=In Afghanistan, Taliban leaving al-Qaeda behind|first=Joshua|last=Partlow|date=November 11, 2009|work=The Washington Post}}</ref>
===Late 1990s===
{{Main|1998 United States embassy bombings|USS Cole bombing}}
In 1996, bin Laden personally engineered a plot to assassinate Clinton while the president was in ] for the ]. However, intelligence agents intercepted a message just minutes before the motorcade was to leave, and alerted the ]. Agents later discovered a bomb planted under a bridge.<ref>{{cite news |title=Osama bin Laden came within minutes of killing Bill Clinton |author=Tom Leonard |newspaper=] |date=2009-12-25 |url=http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/6867331/Osama-bin-Laden-came-within-minutes-of-killing-Bill-Clinton.html |accessdate=2009-12-25 | location=London}}</ref>


WP article "FBI, CIA Debate Significance of Terror Suspect"--> The West was criticized for not being able to handle al-Qaeda despite a decade of the war.<ref>{{cite web|first1=Paul|last1=Rogers|url=http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/articles_multimedia/al_qaida_multiform_idea|title=Al-Qaida – A Multiform Idea|publisher=Oxford Research Group|date=August 8, 2013|access-date=November 10, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131110090613/http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/articles_multimedia/al_qaida_multiform_idea|archive-date=November 10, 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref>
The ] in East Africa, resulting in upward of 300 deaths, mostly locals. A barrage of ]s launched by the U.S. military in response devastated an al-Qaeda base in ], Afghanistan, but the network's capacity was unharmed.


== Activities ==
In October 2000, al-Qaeda militants in ] bombed the missile ] ] in a suicide attack, killing 17 U.S. servicemen and damaging the vessel while it lay offshore. Inspired by the success of such a brazen attack, al-Qaeda's command core began to prepare for an attack on the United States itself.
{{wide image|Main countries of activity of Al-Qaeda.png|400px|Main countries of activity of al-Qaeda}}


===September 11 attacks=== === Africa ===
{{Main|September 11 attacks}} {{Main|Al-Qaeda involvement in Africa}}
{{See also|Responsibility for the September 11 attacks}}
]
The September 11 attacks were the most devastating terrorist acts in ] history, killing approximately 3,000 people. Two commercial airliners were deliberately flown into the ] towers, a third into ], and a fourth, originally intended to target the ], crashed in Pennsylvania.
<!-- Deleted image removed: ] burning. ] struck the ], left, then ] hit the ], right. {{puic|WTC en llamas.jpg|2009 May 2}}]] -->


] (formerly ]) area of operations]]
The attacks were conducted by al-Qaeda, acting in accord with the ] issued against the United States and its allies by military forces under the command of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and others.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm|title=Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans| accessdate=2006-07-05| date=February 23, 1998}}</ref> Evidence points to suicide squads led by al-Qaeda military commander ] as the culprits of the attacks, with ], ], ], and ] as the key planners and part of the political and military command.


] has included a number of bombing attacks in North Africa, while supporting parties in civil wars in Eritrea and Somalia. From 1991 to 1996, bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders were based in Sudan.
Messages issued by bin Laden after September 11, 2001, praised the attacks, and explained their motivation while denying any involvement.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/inv.binladen.denial/| title=Bin Laden says he wasn't behind attacks| publisher=CNN| accessdate=2006-07-06| date=September 17, 2001}}</ref> Bin Laden legitimized the attacks by identifying grievances felt by both mainstream and Islamist Muslims, such as the general perception that the United States was actively oppressing Muslims.<ref>{{Harvnb|Esposito|2002|p=22}}.</ref>


Islamist rebels in the ] calling themselves ] have stepped up their violence in recent years.<ref name="Trofimov 2009">{{Cite news|last1=Trofimov|first1=Yaroslav|author1-link=Yaroslav Trofimov|title=Islamic rebels gain strength in the Sahara|work=The Wall Street Journal|volume=254|issue=39|date=August 15, 2009|page=A9|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125030117348933737|access-date=September 15, 2009|archive-date=May 14, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130514132756/http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125030117348933737.html|url-status=live}}</ref> French officials say the rebels have no real links to the al-Qaeda leadership, but this has been disputed. It seems likely that bin Laden approved the group's name in late 2006, and the rebels "took on the al Qaeda franchise label", almost a year before the violence began to escalate.<ref>{{Harvnb|Riedel|2008|p=126}}.</ref>
Bin Laden asserted that America was massacring Muslims in '], ], ] and ]' and that Muslims should retain the 'right to attack in reprisal'. He also claimed the 9/11 attacks were not targeted at women and children, but 'America's icons of military and economic power'.<ref>Hamid Miir 'Osama claims he has nukes: If U.S. uses N-arms it will get the same response' "Dawn: the Internet Edition" November 10, 2001</ref>


In Mali, the ] faction was also reported as an ally of al-Qaeda in 2013.<ref>Baba Ahmed and Jamey Keaten, Associated Press (January 12, 2013) {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171009223902/https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/11/french-action-against-mali/1828181/ |date=October 9, 2017 }}. ''USA Today''. Retrieved August 4, 2013</ref> The Ansar al Dine faction aligned themselves with the ].<ref>. Google Books. Retrieved August 4, 2013</ref>
Evidence has since come to light that the original targets for the attack may have been nuclear power stations on the east coast of the U.S. The targets were later altered by al-Qaeda, as it was feared that such an attack "might get out of hand".<ref name=AL-QAIDA-LEADERS-SAY-NUCLEAR-POWER-STATIONS-WERE-ORIGINAL-TARGETS>{{cite news
|title=Al-Qaida leaders say nuclear power stations were original targets
|url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,788431,00.html
|publisher=The Guardian
|date=2002-09-09
|accessdate=2007-01-11 | location=London | first=Giles | last=Tremlett}}</ref><ref name=Al-Qaeda-SCALED-BACK-10-PLANE-PLOT>{{cite news
|title=Al Qaeda Scaled Back 10-Plane Plot
|url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45853-2004Jun16_2.html
|publisher=Washington Post
|date=2004-06-17
|accessdate=2007-01-11 }}</ref>


In 2011, al-Qaeda's North African wing condemned Libyan leader ] and declared support for the ].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-alqaeda-idUKTRE71N12X20110224|title=Al Qaeda backs Libyan protesters, condemns Gaddafi|work=Reuters|date=February 24, 2011|access-date=March 29, 2024|archive-date=March 26, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326133358/https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-alqaeda-idUKTRE71N12X20110224|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8344417/Libya-al-Qaeda-backs-protesters.html|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8344417/Libya-al-Qaeda-backs-protesters.html|archive-date=January 10, 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Libya: al-Qaeda backs protesters|website=The Telegraph|date=February 24, 2011}}{{cbignore}}</ref>
==Designation as terrorist organization==
Al-Qaeda has been designated a '']'' by a number of organizations, including:
* ]<ref name=UNSC-WORK-RELATED-TO-RESOLUTION-1267>{{cite web|title=Security Council Resolutions Related to the Work of the Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities|publisher=]|url=http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ResEng.htm|accessdate=2007-01-09 }}</ref>
* ]<ref name="NATOQaeda">{{cite web|url=http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011122b.htm|title=Press Conference with NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson|accessdate=2006-10-23|author=NATO}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nato.int/structur/library/bibref/them0305.pdf|title=AL QAEDA|author=NATO Library|year=2005|accessdate=2007-06-11|format=PDF}}</ref>
* ] of the European Union<ref name="EU">{{cite web|url=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0700en01.doc|title=Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament|author=]|date=2004-10-20|accessdate=2007-06-11|format=DOC}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="US">{{cite web|url=http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm|title=Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)|accessdate = 2006-07-03|author=United States Department of State}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="Australia">{{cite web|url=http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB057CA3DECF30CA256FAB001F7FBD?OpenDocument|title = Listing of Terrorist Organisations|accessdate=2006-07-03|author=Australian Government}}</ref>
* ]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/04/09/stories/2002040903651100.htm |title=The Hindu : Centre bans Al-Qaeda |publisher=Hinduonnet.com |date=2002-04-09 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="Canada">{{cite web|url=http://www.psepc.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp|title=Entities list|accessdate=2006-07-03|author=Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="Israel">{{cite web|url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fundamentalism-/Summary+of+indictments+against+Al-Qaeda+terrorists+in+Samaria+March 21, 2006.htm|title=Summary of indictments against Al-Qaeda terrorists in Samaria|date=March 21, 2006|accessdate=2007-06-10|author=Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="Japan">{{cite web|url=http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/chap1-b.pdf|title=B. Terrorist Attacks in the United States and the Fight Against Terrorism|author=Diplomatic Bluebook|year=2002|accessdate = 2007-06-11|format=PDF}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="Korea">{{cite news|url=http://www.korea.net/news/news/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20070813015&part=102|title=Seoul confirms release of two Korean hostages in Afghanistan|date=August 14, 2007 |accessdate = 2007-09-16|author = Korean Foreign Ministry}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="fr-report">{{cite web|url=http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/cgi-bin/brp/telestats.cgi?brp_ref=064000275&brp_file=0000.pdf|title=La France face au terrorisme|publisher=Secrétariat général de la défense nationale (France)|language={{fr}}|accessdate=2009-08-06}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="Netherlands">{{cite web|url=http://ftp.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/aivd2004-eng.pdf|title=Annual Report 2004|accessdate=2007-06-11|author = ]|format=PDF}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="UK">{{cite web|url=http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act/proscribed-groups|title=Proscribed terrorist groups|accessdate=2006-07-03|author=United Kingdom Home Office}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="Russia">{{cite news| url=http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/07/28/russiaterrorlist.shtml| archiveurl=http://web.archive.org/web/20061114154904/http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/07/28/russiaterrorlist.shtml| archivedate=2006-11-14|title=Russia Outlaws 17 Terror Groups; Hamas, Hezbollah Not Included}}</ref>
* ]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/06/12/67/01b99143.pdf|title=Radical Islamist Movements in the Middle East|author=Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden|date=March – June 2006|accessdate = 2007-06-11|format=PDF}}</ref>
* ]<ref name="Emniyet">{{cite web|author= |url=http://www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/terorgrup1.html |title="Türkiye'de halen faaliyetlerine devam eden başlıca terör örgütleri listesi" (Emniyet Genel Müdürlügü) |publisher=Egm.gov.tr |date= |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>
* ]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.efv.admin.ch/d/dokumentation/downloads/themen/finanzkrimi/CH_UNTerror_1201_e.pdf|title=Report on counter-terrorism submitted by Switzerland to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001)|date = December 20, 2001|accessdate=2007-06-11|format=PDF}}</ref>


Following the ], the removal of Gaddafi and the ensuing period of ], various ] militant groups affiliated with al-Qaeda were able to expand their operations in the region.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8860684/Libya-revolutionaries-turn-on-each-other-as-fears-grow-for-law-and-order.html|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8860684/Libya-revolutionaries-turn-on-each-other-as-fears-grow-for-law-and-order.html|archive-date=January 10, 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Libya: revolutionaries turn on each other as fears grow for law and order|work=The Daily Telegraph|date=October 31, 2011|access-date=November 10, 2013|location=London|first1=Nick|last1=Meo}}{{cbignore}}</ref> The ], which resulted in the death of ] ] and three other Americans, is suspected of having been carried out by various ] networks, such as ], ] and several other al-Qaeda affiliated groups.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.foxnews.com/world/libyans-storm-ansar-al-shariah-compound-in-backlash-after-attack-on-us-consulate/|title=Libyans storm Ansar Al-Shariah compound in backlash after attack on US Consulate|publisher=Fox News|date=September 21, 2012|access-date=November 10, 2013|archive-date=September 26, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120926021008/http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/09/21/libyans-storm-ansar-al-sharia-compound-in-backlash-attack-on-us-consulate/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/world/africa/us-libya-benghazi-suspects|title=Sources: 3 al Qaeda operatives took part in Benghazi attack|publisher=CNN|date=May 4, 2013|access-date=November 10, 2013|archive-date=May 13, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130513205605/http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/world/africa/us-libya-benghazi-suspects|url-status=live}}</ref> The capture of ], a senior al-Qaeda operative wanted by the United States for his involvement in the ], on October 5, 2013, by ], ] and ] agents illustrates the importance the US and other Western allies have placed on North Africa.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/05/world/africa/us-forces-africa-terrorist-raids/index.html|title=U.S. forces raid terror targets in Libya, Somalia|publisher=CNN|date=October 6, 2013|access-date=November 10, 2013|archive-date=November 10, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131110025849/http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/05/world/africa/us-forces-africa-terrorist-raids/index.html?|url-status=live}}</ref>
==War on Terrorism==
{{Main|War on Terrorism}}
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the United States government ], and began to prepare its ] to overthrow the Taliban regime it believed was harboring al-Qaeda. Before the United States attacked, it offered Taliban leader ] a chance to surrender bin Laden and his top associates. The first forces to be inserted into Afghanistan were Paramilitary Officers from the CIA's elite ] (SAD).


=== Europe ===
The ] offered to turn over bin Laden to a ] for trial if the United States would provide evidence of bin Laden's complicity in the attacks. ] ] responded by saying: "We know he's guilty. Turn him over",<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.seacoastonline.com/2001news/10_15_w1.htm| title=U.S. Jets Pound Targets Around Kabul| work=]| date=October 15, 2001|accessdate=2006-07-06}}</ref> and British Prime Minister ] warned the Taliban regime: "Surrender bin Laden, or surrender power".<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2001/10/02/blair_war011002.html |title=Blair to Taliban: Surrender bin Laden or surrender power |publisher=Cbc.ca |date=2001-10-03 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>
{{Main|Al-Qaeda activities in Europe}}


Prior to the ], ] was present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its members were mostly veterans of the ] detachment of the Bosnian Muslim ]. Three al-Qaeda operatives carried out the ] in 1997. The operatives were closely linked to and financed by the ] founded by then-prince King ].{{citation needed|date=January 2019|reason=for the whole paragraph}}
Soon thereafter the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan, and together with the ] removed the Taliban government in the ].


Before the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, westerners who had been recruits at al-Qaeda training camps were sought after by al-Qaeda's military wing. Language skills and knowledge of Western culture were generally found among recruits from Europe, such was the case with ], an Egyptian national studying in Germany at the time of his training, and other members of the ]. ] and ] would later designate Atta as the ringleader of the ]. Following the attacks, Western intelligence agencies determined that al-Qaeda cells operating in Europe had aided the hijackers with financing and communications with the central leadership based in Afghanistan.<ref name="9-11commission.gov" /><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/30/terrorism.september113|title=Last words of a terrorist &#124; The Observer|work=The Guardian|date=September 30, 2001|access-date=November 10, 2013|archive-date=August 25, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130825155640/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/30/terrorism.september113|url-status=live}}</ref>
]
As a result of the ] using its ] and providing ] for the ] ], both ] and ] were destroyed, and much of the operating structure of al-Qaeda is believed to have been disrupted. After being driven from their key positions in the ] area of ], many al-Qaeda fighters tried to regroup in the rugged ] region of the nation.


In 2003, Islamists carried out a series of bombings in ] killing fifty-seven people and injuring seven hundred. Seventy-four people were charged by the Turkish authorities. Some had previously met bin Laden, and though they specifically declined to pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda they asked for its blessing and help.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021201715_pf.html|title=al-Qaeda's Hand in Istanbul Plot|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=March 22, 2010|archive-date=October 10, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171010145110/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021201715_pf.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna3735645|title=Msn News – Bin Laden allegedly planned attack in Turkey – Stymied by tight security at U.S. bases, militants switched targets|publisher=NBC News|date=December 17, 2003|access-date=March 22, 2010|archive-date=December 6, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131206130743/http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3735645|url-status=live}}</ref>
Again, under the cover of intense ], U.S. ] and local Afghan forces attacked, shattering the al-Qaeda position and killing or capturing many of the militants. By early 2002, al-Qaeda had been dealt a serious blow to its operational capacity, and the Afghan invasion appeared an initial success. Nevertheless, a significant ] remains in ], and al-Qaeda's top two leaders, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, evaded capture.


In 2009, three Londoners, Tanvir Hussain, Assad Sarwar and Ahmed Abdullah Ali, were convicted of ]. The ] investigation regarding the plot involved more than a year of surveillance work conducted by over two hundred officers.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Gardham|first1=Duncan|title=Gang is brought to justice by most complex operation since the war|work=The Daily Telegraph|location=London|date=September 8, 2009|page=2|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6152185/Airline-bomb-plot-investigation-one-of-biggest-since-WW2.html|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6152185/Airline-bomb-plot-investigation-one-of-biggest-since-WW2.html|archive-date=January 10, 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|access-date=September 15, 2009}}{{cbignore}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last1=Gardham|first1=Duncan|title=Complex operation brings gang to justice|work=The Weekly Telegraph|edition=Australian|issue=947|date=September 16, 2009|page=9}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last1=Milmo|first1=Cahal|title=Police watched the plot unfold, then pounced|work=The Independent|location=London|date=September 8, 2009|pages=2–4|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-watched-the-plot-unfold-then-pounced-1783388.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090910200749/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-watched-the-plot-unfold-then-pounced-1783388.html|archive-date=September 10, 2009|url-access=limited|url-status=live|access-date=September 15, 2009}}</ref> British and US officials said the plot{{snd}}unlike many similar homegrown European Islamic militant plots{{snd}}was directly linked to al-Qaeda and guided by senior al-Qaeda members in Pakistan.<ref>{{cite web|agency=Associated Press|url=http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1251804512098&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110512043550/http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1251804512098&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull|url-status=dead|archive-date=May 12, 2011|title=UK court convicts 3 of plot to blow up airliners|work=The Jerusalem Post|date=September 7, 2009|access-date=May 8, 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Sandford|first1=Daniel|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8221375.stm|title=UK &#124; Airline plot: Al-Qaeda connection|publisher=BBC News|date=September 7, 2009|access-date=March 22, 2010|archive-date=March 20, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230320035501/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8221375.stm|url-status=live}}</ref>
Debate raged about the exact nature of al-Qaeda's role in the 9/11 attacks, and after the U.S. invasion began, the ] also released a ] showing bin Laden speaking with a small group of associates somewhere in Afghanistan shortly before the Taliban was removed from power.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2001/b12132001_bt630-01.html| title=U.S. Releases Videotape of Osama Bin Laden| accessdate=2006-07-04| date=December 13, 2001}}</ref> Although its authenticity has been questioned by some,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/september11/story/0,11209,619188,00.html| author=Morris, Steven| title=US urged to detail origin of tape| publisher=The Guardian| accessdate=2006-07-11| date=December 15, 2001 | location=London}}</ref> the tape appears to implicate bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the September 11 attacks and was aired on many ] all over the world, with an accompanying provided by the ].


In 2012, Russian Intelligence indicated that al-Qaeda had given a call for "forest jihad" and has been starting massive forest fires as part of a strategy of "thousand cuts".<ref>{{cite news|last1=Elder|first1=Miriam|title=Russia accuses al-Qaida of 'forest jihad' in Europe|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/03/russia-al-qaida-forest-jihad|access-date=November 6, 2012|newspaper=The Guardian|date=October 3, 2012|location=London|archive-date=January 7, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140107063338/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/03/russia-al-qaida-forest-jihad|url-status=live}}</ref>
In September 2004, the ] investigating the September 11 attacks officially concluded that the attacks were conceived and implemented by al-Qaeda operatives.<ref>{{cite web| url=http://www.9-11commission.gov/| title=National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States| accessdate=2006-04-27| date=September 20, 2004}}</ref> In October 2004, bin Laden appeared to claim responsibility for the attacks in a ] released through Al Jazeera, saying he was inspired by Israeli attacks on ]s in the 1982 ]: "As I looked at those demolished towers in ], it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind and that we should destroy towers in America in order that they taste some of what we tasted and so that they be deterred from killing our women and children."<ref>{{cite web| url=http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-2BC36E87F61F.htm| title=Full transcript of bin Ladin's speech| publisher=Al Jazeera| accessdate=2006-07-12| date=November 1, 2004}}</ref>


=== Arab world ===
By the end of 2004, the U.S. government proclaimed that two-thirds of the most senior al-Qaeda figures from 2001 had been captured and interrogated by the CIA: ], ] and ] in 2002;<ref name="martinez interrogations">{{cite news | last = Shane | first = Scott | title = Inside the interrogation of a 9/11 mastermind | work = The New York Times | date = 2008-06-22 | pages = A1, A12–A13 | url = http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/washington/22ksm.html | accessdate = 2009-09-05}}</ref> ] in 2003; and ] in 2004.{{Citation needed|date=September 2009}} ] and several others were killed. <!-- Despite this, the U.S. government continues to warn that the organization is not yet defeated and battles between U.S. forces and al-Qaeda-related groups continue.
{{Main|Al-Qaeda involvement in Asia|Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb|Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula|USS Cole bombing}}
] after the October 2000 attack]]


Following ] in 1990, Wahhabi networks began moving missionaries into the country. Although it is unlikely bin Laden or Saudi al-Qaeda were directly involved, the personal connections they made would be established over the next decade and used in the ].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Weir|first1=Shelagh|date=July–September 1997|title=A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen|journal=]|publisher=]|issue=204|pages=22–26|doi=10.2307/3013139|jstor=3013139|url=http://www.merip.org/mer/mer204/weir.htm|access-date=January 19, 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081003091516/http://www.merip.org/mer/mer204/weir.htm|archive-date=October 3, 2008|url-status=dead|df=mdy-all}}; cited in {{Cite book|last1=Burke|first1=Jason|author-link=Jason Burke|title=Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror|pages=|publisher=I.B. Tauris|year=2003|location=New York|isbn=1-85043-396-8|url=https://archive.org/details/alqaedacastingsh00burk/page/128}}</ref> Concerns grew over al-Qaeda's group in ].<ref>" ". CBS News. October 30, 2010</ref>
By the end of 2008, the Taliban had severed any remaining ties with al-Qaeda.<ref>http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/10/06/afghan.saudi.talks/?iref=mpstoryview</ref> According to senior U.S. military intelligence officials, there are fewer than 100 members of Al-Qaeda remaining in Afghanistan.<ref>Partlow, Joshua. November 11, 2009</ref>


In Iraq, al-Qaeda forces loosely associated with the leadership were embedded in the ] group commanded by ]. Specializing in suicide operations, they have been a "key driver" of the ].<ref>{{Harvnb|Riedel|2008|p=100}}.</ref> Although they played a small part in the overall insurgency, between 30% and 42% of all suicide bombings which took place in the early years were claimed by Zarqawi's group.<ref>See the works cited in {{Harvnb|Riedel|2008|p=101}} {{Harvnb|Hafez|2007|pp=97–98}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last1=Al-Shishani|first1=Murad Batal|title=Al-Zarqawi's Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets|work=Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor|volume=3|issue=22|date=November 17, 2005}}</ref> Reports have indicated that oversights such as the failure to control access to the Qa'qaa munitions factory in ] have allowed large quantities of munitions to fall into the hands of al-Qaida.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/07/iraq-weapons-factory-al-qaida-us-failure|title=How the US let al-Qaida get its hands on an Iraqi weapons factory|work=The Guardian|location=UK|access-date=January 7, 2011|first1=Dominic|last1=Streatfeild|author1-link=Dominic Streatfeild|date=January 7, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110107134826/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/07/iraq-weapons-factory-al-qaida-us-failure|archive-date=January 7, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> In November 2010, the militant group ], which is linked to al-Qaeda in Iraq, threatened to "exterminate all ]".<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/csi-urges-obama-to-protect-iraqs-endangered-christian-community-106490518.html|title=CSI Urges Obama to Protect Iraq's Endangered Christian Community|date=November 1, 2010|agency=PR Newswire|access-date=July 6, 2014|archive-date=July 14, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714163040/http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/csi-urges-obama-to-protect-iraqs-endangered-christian-community-106490518.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>" ". CBS News. November 1, 2010.</ref>
WP article "FBI, CIA Debate Significance of Terror Suspect" -->


Al-Qaeda did not begin training ] until the late 1990s.<ref name="palestinian operatives">{{Harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|p=150}}.</ref> Large groups such as ] and ] have rejected an alliance with al-Qaeda, fearing that al-Qaeda will co-opt their cells. This may have changed recently. The Israeli security and intelligence services believe al-Qaeda has managed to infiltrate operatives from the Occupied Territories into Israel, and is waiting for an opportunity to attack.<ref name="palestinian operatives" />
==Activities==
===Africa===
{{Main|Al-Qaeda involvement in Africa}}
]'' on the eighth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. The article claimed that al-Qaeda's activity is "increasingly dispersed to 'affiliates' or 'franchises' in Yemen and North Africa."<ref>{{cite news | last = Black | first = Ian | authorlink = Ian Black (journalist) | last2 = Norton-Taylor | first2 = Richard | authorlink2 = Richard Norton-Taylor | title = Al-Qaida weakened by global recruitment woes | work = The Guardian Weekly | volume = 181 | issue = 14 | date = 2009-09-18 | pages = 1–2 | url = http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/10/al-qaida-recruitment-crisis | accessdate = 2009-09-19 | location=London}}</ref>]]
] has included a number of bombing attacks in ], as well as supporting parties in civil wars in ] and ]. From 1991 to 1996, ] and other Al-Qaeda leaders were based in ].


{{as of|2015}}, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are openly supporting the ],<ref name="weekly">" {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150919055514/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/12392/21/Gulf-allies-and-%E2%80%98Army-of-Conquest%E2%80%99.aspx |date=September 19, 2015 }}". '']''. May 28, 2015.</ref><ref>" {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304223037/http://news.yahoo.com/army-conquest-rebel-alliance-pressures-syria-regime-090529121.html |date=March 4, 2016 }}". Yahoo News. April 28, 2015.</ref> an umbrella rebel group fighting in the ] against the Syrian government that reportedly includes an al-Qaeda linked ] and another ] coalition known as ].<ref name="independent">{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-turkey-and-saudi-arabia-shock-western-countries-by-supporting-antiassad-jihadists-10242747.html|title=Turkey and Saudi Arabia alarm the West by backing Islamist extremists the Americans had bombed in Syria|first1=Kim|last1=Sengupta|newspaper=The Independent|date=May 12, 2015|access-date=August 23, 2017|archive-date=May 13, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150513214636/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-turkey-and-saudi-arabia-shock-western-countries-by-supporting-antiassad-jihadists-10242747.html|url-status=dead}}</ref>
Islamist rebels in the ] calling themselves ] have stepped up their violence in recent years.<ref>
*{{cite news | last = Trofimov | first = Yaroslav | title = Islamic rebels gain strength in the Sahara | work = The Wall Street Journal | volume = 254 | issue = 39 | date = 2009-08-15 | page = A9 | url = http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125030117348933737.html | accessdate = 2009-09-15}}
*{{cite news | last = Trofimov | first = Yaroslav | title = Islamic rebels gain strength in the Sahara | work = The Wall Street Journal Europe | volume = 27 | issue = 136 | date = 2009-08-17 | page = 12}}
*{{cite news | last = Trofimov | first = Yaroslav | title = Islamic rebels gain in the Sahara | work = The Wall Street Journal Asia | volume = 33 | issue = 245 | date = 2009-08-18 | page = 12}}</ref> French officials{{Citation needed|date=September 2009}} say the rebels have no real links to the al-Qaeda leadership, but this is a matter of some dispute in the international press and amongst security analysts. It seems likely that bin Laden approved the group's name in late 2006, and the rebels "took on the al Qaeda franchise label", almost a year before the violence began to escalate.<ref>{{Harvnb|Riedel|2008|p=126}}.</ref>


===Europe=== === Kashmir ===
{{Main|Kashmir conflict}}
{{Main|Al-Qaeda involvement in Europe|2003 Istanbul bombings|2006 transatlantic aircraft plot}}
In 2003, Islamists carried out a series of bombings in ] killing fifty-seven people and injuring seven hundred. Seventy-four people were charged by the Turkish authorities. Some had previously met Osama Bin Laden, and although they specifically declined to pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda they asked for its blessing and help.<ref>{{cite web|author=View all comments that have been posted about this article. |url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021201715_pf.html |title=Washington Post – Al-Qaeda's Hand In Istanbul Plot |publisher=Washingtonpost.com |date= |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=8:51 a.m. ET |url=http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3735645/ |title=Msn News – Bin Laden allegedly planned attack in Turkey – Stymied by tight security at U.S. bases, militants switched targets |publisher=MSNBC |date=2003-12-17 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>


Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri consider India to be a part of an alleged Crusader-Zionist-Hindu conspiracy against the Islamic world.<ref> {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111111191820/http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2008/1130_india_terrorism_riedel.aspx |date=November 11, 2011 }}, ], November 30, 2008</ref> According to a 2005 report by the ], bin Laden was involved in training militants for Jihad in Kashmir while living in Sudan in the early 1990s. By 2001, Kashmiri militant group ] had become a part of the al-Qaeda coalition.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150508044340/http://fas.org/irp/crs/RS22049.pdf |date=May 8, 2015 }}, ], February 10, 2005</ref> According to the ] (UNHCR), al-Qaeda was thought to have established bases in ] (in ], and to some extent in ]) during the 1999 ] and continued to operate there with tacit approval of Pakistan's Intelligence services.<ref>{{cite web|author=United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees|url=http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,469f2dcf2,487ca21a2a,0.html|title=Freedom in the World 2008 – Kashmir Pakistan|publisher=United Nations High Commission for Refugees|date=July 2, 2008|access-date=May 8, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110512172350/http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic%2C463af2212%2C469f2dcf2%2C487ca21a2a%2C0.html|archive-date=May 12, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref>
In 2009, three Londoners, ], ] and ], were convicted of conspiring to detonate bombs disguised as soft drinks on seven airplanes bound for Canada and the United States. The massively complex police and ] investigation of the plot involved more than a year of surveillance work conducted by over two hundred officers.<ref>
*{{cite news | last = Gardham | first = Duncan | title = Gang is brought to justice by most complex operation since the war | work = The Daily Telegraph | date = 2009-09-08 | page = 2 | url = http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6152185/Airline-bomb-plot-investigation-one-of-biggest-since-WW2.html | accessdate = 2009-09-15 | location=London}}
*{{cite news | last = Gardham | first = Duncan | title = Complex operation brings gang to justice | work = The Weekly Telegraph | place = Australian edition, issue 947 | date = 2009-09-16 | page = 9}}</ref><ref>{{cite news | last = Milmo | first = Cahal | title = Police watched the plot unfold, then pounced | work = The Independent | date = 2009-09-08 | pages = 2–4 | url = http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-watched-the-plot-unfold-then-pounced-1783388.html | accessdate = 2009-09-15 | location=London}}</ref> British and U.S. officials said the plan—unlike many recent homegrown European terrorist plots—was directly linked to al-Qaeda and guided by senior Islamic militants in Pakistan.<ref></ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Sandford |first=Daniel |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8221375.stm |title=UK &#124; Airline plot: Al-Qaeda connection |publisher=BBC News |date=2009-09-07 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>


Many of the militants active in Kashmir were trained in the same ]hs as ] and al-Qaeda. ] of Kashmiri militant group ] was a signatory of al-Qaeda's 1998 declaration of ] against America and its allies.<ref name=CFRKashmir> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070214103922/http://www.cfr.org/publication/9135/ |date=February 14, 2007 }}, ], July 9, 2009</ref> In a 'Letter to American People' (2002), bin Laden wrote that one of the reasons he was fighting America was because of its support to India on the Kashmir issue.<ref name=Letter2002 /> In November 2001, ] airport went on high alert after threats that bin Laden planned to hijack a plane and crash it into a target in New Delhi.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/10/int3.htm|title=Osama men plan to target Delhi: Kathmandu receives threat|work=]|date=November 10, 2001|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020418160409/http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/10/int3.htm|archive-date=April 18, 2002}}</ref> In 2002, US Secretary of Defense ], on a trip to Delhi, suggested that al-Qaeda was active in Kashmir though he did not have any evidence.<ref>, ], June 13, 2002</ref><ref name=SMH>, ], June 14, 2002</ref> Rumsfeld proposed hi-tech ground sensors along the ] to prevent militants from infiltrating into Indian-administered Kashmir.<ref name=SMH />
===Middle East===
An investigation in 2002 found evidence that al-Qaeda and its affiliates were prospering in Pakistan-administered Kashmir with tacit approval of Pakistan's ].<ref>, ], July 2, 2002</ref> In 2002, a special team of ] and ] was sent into ] to hunt for bin Laden after receiving reports that he was being sheltered by Kashmiri militant group ], which had been responsible for ].<ref>, ], February 23, 2002</ref> Britain's highest-ranking al-Qaeda operative ] had previously fought in Kashmir with the group ] and spent time in Indian prison after being captured in Kashmir.<ref>, '']''. December 18, 2008</ref>
{{Main|Al-Qaeda involvement in the Middle East}}


US officials believe al-Qaeda was helping organize attacks in Kashmir in order to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan.<ref>, ], June 12, 2002</ref> Their strategy was to force Pakistan to move its troops to the border with India, thereby relieving pressure on al-Qaeda elements hiding in northwestern Pakistan.<ref>, '']'', May 29, 2002</ref> In 2006 al-Qaeda claimed they had established a wing in Kashmir.<ref name="CFRKashmir" /><ref>, '']'', 2006-07-13</ref> However Indian Army General ] argued that the army had ruled out the presence of al-Qaeda in Indian-administered ]. Panag also said al-Qaeda had strong ties with Kashmiri militant groups ] and ] based in Pakistan.<ref>, '']'', 2007-06-18</ref> It has been noted that ] has become a battlefield for Kashmiri militants fighting ] in support of al-Qaeda and Taliban.<ref>{{Dead link|date=October 2022 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}, '']'', September 18, 2009 {{dead link|date=June 2016|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref><ref> {{dead link|date=November 2017}}{{cbignore}}, ], November 24, 2008</ref><ref> ], November 26, 2008</ref> ], who wrote the ''Army of Madinah in Kashmir''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Barot/ArmyMadinahinKashmir.pdf|title=Army of Madinah in Kashmir|website=nefafoundation.org|publisher=]|access-date=June 6, 2017|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120503125705/http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Barot/ArmyMadinahinKashmir.pdf|archive-date=May 3, 2012}}</ref> and was an al-Qaeda operative convicted for involvement in the ], had received training in weapons and explosives at a militant training camp in Kashmir.<ref>, '']'', November 7, 2006</ref>
Following the ] in 1990, Wahhabi networks began moving missionaries into the country in an effort to subvert the capitalist north. Although it is unlikely bin Laden or Saudi al-Qaeda were directly involved, the personal connections they made would be established over the next decade and used in the USS ''Cole'' bombing.<ref>{{Citation
| last = Weir
| first = Shelagh
| authorlink =
| publication-date = July/September 1997
| title = A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen
| series = Middle East Report
| publisher = ]
| issue = 204
| url = http://www.merip.org/mer/mer204/weir.htm
| accessdate = 2009-01-19
| ref = none
}}; cited in {{cite book
| last = Burke
| first = Jason
| authorlink = Jason Burke
| title = Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror
| pages = 128–129
| publisher = I.B. Tauris
| year = 2003
| location = New York
| isbn = 1850433968}}</ref>{{Citation needed|date=May 2009}}


<!--left off here-->
In ], al-Qaeda forces loosely associated with the leadership were embedded in the ] organization commanded by ]. Specializing in suicide operations, they have been a "key driver" of the ].<ref>{{Harvnb|Riedel|2008|p=100}}.</ref> Although they played a small part in the overall insurgency, between 30% and 42% of all suicide bombings which took place in the early years were claimed by Zarqawi's organization.<ref>See the following works cited in {{Harvnb|Riedel|2008|p=101}}:<br/>
], the founder of Kashmiri group ], is believed to have met bin Laden several times and received funding from him.<ref name=CFRKashmir /> In 2002, ] organized the kidnapping and murder of ] in an operation run in conjunction with al-Qaeda and funded by bin Laden.<ref>, '']'', October 2004</ref> According to American ] expert ], al-Qaeda and Taliban were closely involved in the 1999 hijacking of ] to ] which led to the release of ] and ] from an Indian prison. This hijacking, Riedel said, was rightly described by then Indian Foreign Minister ] as a 'dress rehearsal' for September 11 attacks.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/05terrorism_riedel.aspx|title=Al Qaeda Strikes Back|first1=Bruce|last1=Riedel|work=The Brookings Institution|access-date=April 12, 2016|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605132922/http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/05terrorism_riedel.aspx|archive-date=June 5, 2011}}</ref> Bin Laden personally welcomed Azhar and threw a lavish party in his honor after his release.<ref>, '']'', September 18, 2006</ref><ref>, '']'', September 18, 2006</ref> Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, who had been in prison for his role in the ], went on to murder ] and was sentenced to death in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda operative ], who was one of the accused in ], was related to Maulana Masood Azhar by marriage.<ref>, '']'', November 22, 2008</ref>
*{{Harvnb|Hafez|2007|pp=97–98}}
*{{cite news | last = Al-Shishani | first = Murad Batal | authorlink = Murad Batal al-Shishani | title = Al-Zarqawi's Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets | work = Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor | volume = 3 | issue = 22 | date = 2005-11-17}}</ref>


], a Kashmiri militant group which is thought to be behind ], is also known to have strong ties to senior al-Qaeda leaders living in Pakistan.<ref>LeT, which is based at Muridke, near Lahore in Pakistan, has networks throughout India and its leadership has close links with core al-Qaeda figures living in Pakistan , '']'', November 28, 2008</ref> In late 2002, top al-Qaeda operative ] was arrested while being sheltered by ] in a safe house in ].<ref name=WSJ20081204> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170708220351/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122834970727777709 |date=July 8, 2017 }}, '']'', December 4, 2008</ref> The FBI believes al-Qaeda and Lashkar have been 'intertwined' for a long time while the CIA has said that al-Qaeda funds Lashkar-e-Taiba.<ref name=WSJ20081204 /> ] told Reuters in 2009 that "Lashkar-e-Taiba is no longer a Pakistani movement with only a Kashmir political or military agenda. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a member of al-Qaeda."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/03-lashkar-e-taiba-threat-revived-after-chicago-arrest-ss-09|title=Lashkar-e-Taiba threat revived after Chicago arrest|work=]|date=November 20, 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091123124223/http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/03-lashkar-e-taiba-threat-revived-after-chicago-arrest-ss-09|archive-date=November 23, 2009}}</ref><ref>, ], November 13, 2009</ref>
Significantly, it was not until the late 1990s that al-Qaeda began training Palestinians. This is not to suggest that resistance fighters are underrepresented in the network as a number of Palestinians, mostly coming from Jordan, wanted to join and have risen to serve high-profile roles in Afghanistan.<ref name="palestinian operatives">{{Harvnb|Gunaratna|2002|p=150}}.</ref> Rather, large groups such as ] and ]—which cooperate with al-Qaeda in many respects—have had difficulties accepting a strategic alliance, fearing that Al-Qaeda will co-opt their smaller cells. This may have changed recently, as Israeli security and intelligence services believe al-Qaeda has managed to infiltrate operatives from the Occupied Territories into Israel, and is waiting for the right time to mount an attack.<ref name="palestinian operatives"/>


In a video released in 2008, American-born senior al-Qaeda operative ] said that "victory in Kashmir has been delayed for years; it is the liberation of the jihad there from this interference which, Allah willing, will be the first step towards victory over the Hindu occupiers of that Islam land."<ref>, ], October 4, 2008</ref>
===Kashmir===
{{main|Kashmir Conflict}}


In September 2009, a US ] reportedly killed ] who was the chief of ], a Kashmiri militant group associated with al-Qaeda.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/12-us+drones+killed+two+terrorist+leaders+in+pak--bi-10|title=US drones killed two terrorist leaders in Pak|work=]|date=September 17, 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090923225021/http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/12-us%2Bdrones%2Bkilled%2Btwo%2Bterrorist%2Bleaders%2Bin%2Bpak--bi-10|archive-date=September 23, 2009|url-status=dead}}</ref> Kashmiri was described by ] as a 'prominent' al-Qaeda member<ref> {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110924002003/http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1215_terrorism_riedel.aspx |date=September 24, 2011 }}, ], December 15, 2009</ref> while others have described him as head of military operations for al-Qaeda.<ref>, '']'', October 15, 2009</ref><ref>, '']'' {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140107012334/http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-102709-rana-headley%2C0%2C5879769.htmlpage |date=January 7, 2014 }}</ref> Kashmiri was also charged by the US in a plot against ], the Danish newspaper which was at the center of ].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/04-ilyas-kashmiri-danish-plot-qs-04|title=US charges Ilyas Kashmiri in Danish newspaper plot|work=]|date=January 15, 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100118131229/http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/04-ilyas-kashmiri-danish-plot-qs-04|archive-date=January 18, 2010|url-status=dead}}</ref> US officials also believe that Kashmiri was involved in the ] against the CIA.<ref>{{cbignore}}, '']'', January 6, 2010</ref> In January 2010, Indian authorities notified Britain of an al-Qaeda plot to hijack an Indian airlines or Air India plane and crash it into a British city. This information was uncovered from interrogation of Amjad Khwaja, an operative of ], who had been arrested in India.<ref>, '']'', January 24, 2010</ref>
Bin Laden and ] consider India to be a part of the ‘Crusader-Zionist-Hindu’ conspiracy against the Islamic world.<ref>, ], 2008-11-30</ref> According to the 2005 report 'Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment' by ], ] was involved in training militants for Jihad in Kashmir while living in Sudan in the early nineties. By 2001 Kashmiri militant group ] had become a part of the Al-Qaeda coalition.<ref>,], 2005-02-10</ref> According to the ] Al-Qaeda is thought to have established bases in ] during the 1999 ] and continues to operate there with tacit approval of Pakistan's Intelligence services.<ref>], 2008-07-02</ref>


In January 2010, US Defense secretary ], while on a visit to Pakistan, said that al-Qaeda was seeking to destabilize the region and planning to provoke a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/03-al-qaeda-could-provoke-new-india-pakistan-war-gates-ss-02|title=Al Qaeda could provoke new India-Pakistan war: Gates|work=]|date=January 20, 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100123140217/http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/03-al-qaeda-could-provoke-new-india-pakistan-war-gates-ss-02|archive-date=January 23, 2010}}</ref>
Many of the militants active in Kashmir were trained in the same ]s as ] and Al-Qaeda. Fazlur Rehman Khalil of Kashmiri militant group ] was a signatory of Al-Qaeda's 1998 declaration of ] against America and its allies.<ref name=CFRKashmir>, ], 2009-07-09</ref> In a 'Letter to American People' written by ] in 2002 he stated that one of the reasons he was fighting America is because of her support to India on the Kashmir issue.<ref>, ], 2002-11-20</ref><ref>, ], 2002-11-24</ref> In November 2001 ] airport went on high alert after threats that Osama Bin Laden planned to hijack a plane from there and crash it into a target in New Delhi.<ref>, ], 2001-11-10</ref> In 2002 U.S. Secretary of Defense ] on a trip to Delhi suggested that Al-Qaeda was active in Kashmir though he did not have any hard evidence.<ref>, ], 2002-06-13</ref><ref name=SMH>, ], 2002-06-14</ref> He proposed hi tech ground sensors along the line of control to prevent militants from infiltrating into Indian administered Kashmir.<ref name=SMH/>
An investigation in 2002 unearthed evidence that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates were prospering in ] with tacit approval of Pakistan's National Intelligence agency ]<ref>, ], 2002-07-02</ref> In 2002 a special team of ] and ] was sent into ] to hunt for Osama Bin Laden after reports that he was being sheltered by Kashmiri militant group ] which had previously been responsible for ].<ref>, ], 2002-02-23</ref> Britain's highest ranking Al-qaeda operative ] had previously fought in Kashmir with the group ] and spent time in Indian prison after being captured in Kashmir.<ref>, ]. 2008-12-18</ref>


=== Internet ===
U.S. officials believe that Al-Qaeda was helping organize a campaign of terror in Kashmir in order to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan.<ref>, ], 2002-06-12</ref> Their strategy was to force Pakistan to move its troops to the border with India thereby relieving pressure on Al-Qaeda elements hiding in northwestern Pakistan.<ref>, ], 2002-05-29</ref> In 2006 Al-Qaeda claim they have established wing in Kashmir this has worried the Indian government.<ref name="CFRKashmir"/><ref>, ],2006-07-13</ref> However the Indian Army Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag, GOC-in-C Northern Command said to reporters that the army has ruled out the presence of Al Qaeda in Indian administered ] furthermore he said that there is nothing that can verify reports from the media of Al Qaeda presence in the state. He however stated that Alqaeda had strong ties with Kashmir militant groups ] and ] based in Pakistan.<ref>, ],2007-06-18</ref> It has been noted that ] has now become the new battlefield for Kashmiri militants who were now fighting ] in support of Al-Qaeda and Taliban.<ref>, ], 2009-09-18</ref><ref>, ], 2008-11-24</ref><ref>, ], 2008-11-26</ref> ] who wrote he ''Army of Madinah In Kashmir''<ref>, ]</ref> was an Al-Qaeda operative convicted for involvement in ] had received training in weapons and explosives at a militant training camp in Kashmir.<ref>, ], 2006-11-07</ref>
Al-Qaeda and its successors have migrated online to escape detection in an atmosphere of increased international vigilance. The group's use of the Internet has grown more sophisticated, with online activities that include financing, recruitment, networking, mobilization, publicity, and information dissemination, gathering and sharing.<ref>{{cite web|first1=Timothy|last1=Thomas|url=http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/thomas.pdf|title=Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of Cyberplanning|date=February 14, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030326120423/http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03spring/thomas.pdf|archive-date=March 26, 2003}}</ref>


]'s al-Qaeda movement in Iraq regularly releases short videos glorifying the activity of jihadist suicide bombers. In addition, both before and after the death of ] (the former leader of ]), the umbrella organization to which al-Qaeda in Iraq belongs, the ], has a regular ].
] the founder of another Kashmiri group ] is believed to have met Osama bin laden several times and received funding from him.<ref name=CFRKashmir/> In 2002 ] organized the kidnapping and murder of ] in an operation run in conjunction with Al-qaeda and funded by Bin Laden.<ref>, ], October 2004</ref> According to American counter terrorism expert ] Al-Qaeda and Taliban were closely involved in the 1999 hijacking of ] to ] which led to release of ] & ] from an Indian prison in exchange for the passengers. This hijacking Riedel stated was rightly described by then Indian Foreign minister ] as a 'dress rehearsal' for ] <ref>, ]</ref> Osama Bin laden personally welcomed Azhar and threw a lavish party in his honor after his release, according to ] bodyguard of Bin Laden.<ref>, ], 2006-09-18</ref><ref>, ], 2006-09-18</ref> Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh who had been in Indian prison for his role in ] went on to murder of ] and was sentenced to death by Pakistan. Al-Qaeda operative ] who was one of the accused in ] was related to Maulana Masood Azhar by marriage.<ref>, ], 2008-11-22</ref>


The range of multimedia content includes guerrilla training clips, stills of victims about to be murdered, testimonials of suicide bombers, and videos that show participation in jihad through stylized portraits of mosques and musical scores. A website associated with al-Qaeda posted a video of captured American entrepreneur ] being decapitated in Iraq. Other decapitation videos and pictures, including those of ], ] (posted on websites),<ref>{{Cite web|date=July 24, 2004|title=U.S.-Based Al Qaeda Websites Operate Freely; Shocking Pix! – Jeremy Reynalds – MensNewsDaily.com™|url=http://www.mensnewsdaily.com/archive/r/reynalds/04/reynalds072204.htm|access-date=May 22, 2024|archive-date=July 24, 2004|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040724075824/http://www.mensnewsdaily.com/archive/r/reynalds/04/reynalds072204.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref> and ] obtained by investigators, have taken place.<ref>{{Cite web|title= Major Business News|url=https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/pearl-022102.htm|access-date=May 22, 2024|website=The Wall Street Journal}}</ref>
] a Kashmiri militant group which is thought to be behind ] is also known to have strong ties to senior Al-qaeda leaders living in Pakistan.<ref>LeT, which is based at Muridke, near Lahore in Pakistan, has networks throughout India and its leadership has close links with core al-Qaeda figures living in Pakistan , ], 2008-11-28</ref> In Late 2002 top Al-Qaeda operative ] was arrested while being sheltered by ] in a safe house in ].<ref name=WSJ20081204>, ], 2008-12-04</ref> FBI believes that Al-Qaeda and Lashkar have been 'intertwined' for a long time while CIA has said that Al-Qaeda funds Lashkar-e-Taiba.<ref name=WSJ20081204/> French investigating magistrate ] who was the top French counter terrorism official told Reuters in 2009 that 'Lashkar-e-Taiba is no longer a Pakistani movement with only a Kashmir political or military agenda. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a member of al Qaeda.'<ref>, ], 2009-11-20</ref><ref>, ], 2009-11-13</ref>


In December 2004 an audio message claiming to be from bin Laden was posted directly to a website, rather than sending a copy to ] as he had done in the past. Al-Qaeda turned to the Internet for release of its videos in order to be certain they would be available unedited, rather than risk the possibility of al Jazeera editing out anything critical of the ].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373884|title=Bin Laden Identifies Saudi Arabia as the Enemy of Mujahideen Unity|author=Scheuer, Michael|date=January 2008|work=Terrorism Focus|publisher=Jamestown Foundation|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070625152714/http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373884|archive-date=June 25, 2007}}</ref>
In a video releases in 2008 senior Al-Qaeda operative ] stated that "victory in Kashmir has been delayed for years, it is the liberation of the jihad there from this interference which, Allah willing, will be the first step towards victory over the Hindu occupiers of that Islam land."<ref>, ], 2008-10-04</ref>


].com and Jehad.net were perhaps the most significant al-Qaeda websites. Alneda was initially taken down by American Jon Messner, but the operators resisted by shifting the site to various servers and strategically shifting content.{{citation needed|date=January 2019|reason=The whole paragraph}}
On September 2009 U.S. ] reportedly killed ] who was the chief of ] a Kashmiri militant group associated with Al Qaeda.<ref>, ], 20009-09-17</ref> Kashmiri was described by ] as a 'prominent' Al-qaeda member.<ref>, ], 2009-12-15</ref> while others have described him as head of military operations for Al-Qaeda.<ref>, ], 2009-10-15</ref><ref>, ]</ref> Kashmiri was also charged by U.S. in a plot against ] the Danish newspaper which was at the center of ].<ref>, ], 2010-01-15</ref> U.S. officials also believe that Kashmiri was involved in the ] against CIA.<ref>, ], 2010-01-06</ref> In January 2010 Indian authorities notified Britain of an Al-qaeda plot to hijack and Indian airlines or Air India plane and crash it into a British city. This information was uncovered from interrogation of Amjad Khwaja on operative of ] who had been arrested in India.<ref>, ], 2010-01-24</ref>


The US government charged a British information technology specialist, ], with terrorist offences related to his operating a network of English-language al-Qaeda websites, such as Azzam.com. He was convicted and sentenced to {{frac|12|1|2}} years in prison.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Whitlock|first1=Craig|author-link=Craig Whitlock|title=Briton Used Internet As His Bully Pulpit|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=August 8, 2005|page=A1|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/07/AR2005080700890.html|access-date=September 4, 2009}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Babar Ahmad Indicted on Terrorism Charges|publisher=United States Attorney's Office District of Connecticut|date=October 6, 2004|url=http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ct/Press2004/20041006.html|access-date=May 29, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060526115318/http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ct/Press2004/20041006.html|archive-date=May 26, 2006}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28335976|title=British cyber-jihadist Babar Ahmad jailed in US|publisher=BBC News|access-date=July 6, 2015}}</ref>
In January 2010 U.S. Defense secretary ] while on a visit to Pakistan stated that Al-qaeda was seeking to destabilize the region and planning to provoke a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.<ref>, ], 2010-01-20</ref>


==== Online communications ====
===Internet===
In 2007, al-Qaeda released '']'', encryption software used for online and cellular communications. A later version, '']'', was released in 2008.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://nytimes.com/2013/09/30/us/qaeda-plot-leak-has-undermined-us-intelligence.html|work=The New York Times|first1=Eric|last1=Schmitt|first2=Michael S.|last2=Schmidt|title=Qaeda Plot Leak Has Undermined U.S. Intelligence|date=September 29, 2013}}</ref>
Timothy L. Thomas claims that in the wake of its evacuation from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and its successors have migrated online to escape detection in an atmosphere of increased international vigilance. As a result, the organization's use of the Internet has grown more sophisticated, encompassing financing, recruitment, networking, mobilization, publicity, as well as information dissemination, gathering and sharing.<ref>Timothy Thomas, . Retrieved February 14, 2007.</ref>


=== Aviation network ===
]’s al-Qaeda movement in ] regularly releases short videos glorifying the activity of jihadist suicide bombers. In addition, both before and after the death of ] (the former leader of ]), the umbrella organization to which al-Qaeda in Iraq belongs, the ], has a regular ].
Al-Qaeda is believed to be operating a clandestine aviation network including "several ] aircraft", ] and ]s, according to a 2010 ] story. Based on a US ] report, the story said al-Qaeda is possibly using aircraft to transport drugs and weapons from South America to various unstable countries in West Africa. A Boeing 727 can carry up to ten tons of cargo. The drugs eventually are smuggled to Europe for distribution and sale, and the weapons are used in conflicts in Africa and possibly elsewhere. Gunmen with links to al-Qaeda have been increasingly ] Europeans for ransom. The profits from the drug and weapon sales, and kidnappings can, in turn, fund more militant activities.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Gaynor|first1=Tim|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60C3E820100113?type=politicsNews|title=Al Qaeda linked to rogue aviation network|work=Reuters|date=January 13, 2010|access-date=May 8, 2011}}</ref>
The range of multimedia content includes guerrilla training clips, stills of victims about to be murdered, testimonials of suicide bombers, and videos that sho participation in jihad through stylized portraits of mosques and musical scores. A website associated with al-Qaeda posted a video of captured American entrepreneur ] being decapitated in Iraq. Other decapitation videos and pictures, including those of ], ], and ], were first posted on jihadist websites.


=== Involvement in military conflicts ===
In December 2004 an audio message claiming to be from Bin Laden was posted directly to a website, rather than sending a copy to ] as he had done in the past.
{{Multiple issues|section=yes|
{{Original research section|date=August 2013}}
{{More citations needed section|date=April 2021}}
}}
The following is a list of military conflicts in which al-Qaeda and its direct affiliates have taken part militarily.
{|class="wikitable sortable"
|-
! scope="col" | Start of conflict
! scope="col" | End of conflict
! scope="col" | Conflict
! scope="col" | Continent
! scope="col" | Location
! scope="col" | Branches involved
|-
! scope="row" align=center|1991
|align=center|ongoing
|]
|Africa
|Somalia
|]
|-
! scope="row" align=center|1992
|align=center|1996
|]
|Asia
|]
|Al-Qaeda Central
|-
! scope="row" align=center|1992
|align=center|ongoing
|]
|Asia
|Yemen
|]
|-
! scope="row" align=center|1996
|align=center|2001
|]
|Asia
|]
|Al-Qaeda Central
|-
! scope="row" align=center|2001
|align=center|2021
|]
|Asia
|Afghanistan
|Al-Qaeda Central
|-
! scope="row" align=center|2002
|align=center|ongoing
|]
|Africa
|Algeria<br />Chad<br />Mali<br />Mauritania<br />Morocco<br />Niger<br />Tunisia
|]
|-
! scope="row" align=center|2003
|align=center|2011
|]
|Asia
|Iraq
|]
]
|-
! scope="row" align=center|2004
|align=center|ongoing
|]
|Asia
|Pakistan
|Al-Qaeda Central
|-
! scope="row" align=center|2009
|align=center|2017
|]
|Asia
|Russia
|]
|-
! scope="row" align=center|2011
|align=center|ongoing
|]
|Asia
|Syria
|]
|-
! scope="row" align=center|2015
|align=center|ongoing
|]
|Asia
|Yemen
|]<ref name="al-Qaeda">{{cite news|title=Report: Saudi-UAE coalition 'cut deals' with al-Qaeda in Yemen|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/report-saudi-uae-coalition-cut-deals-al-qaeda-yemen-180806074659521.html|publisher=Al Jazeera|date=August 6, 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=US allies, Al Qaeda battle rebels in Yemen|url=https://www.foxnews.com/world/us-allies-al-qaeda-battle-rebels-in-yemen/|publisher=Fox News|date=August 7, 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Allies cut deals with al Qaeda in Yemen to serve larger fight with Iran|url=https://www.sfgate.com/world/article/Allies-cut-deals-with-al-Qaeda-in-Yemen-to-serve-13135822.php|work=San Francisco Chronicle|date=August 6, 2018}}</ref>
|}


== Broader influence ==
Al Qaeda turned to the Internet for release of its videos in order to be certain it would be available unedited, rather than risk the possibility of al Jazeera editors editing the videos and cutting out anything critical of the ].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373884 |title=Bin Laden Identifies Saudi Arabia as the Enemy of Mujahideen Unity |author=Scheuer, Michael |month=January | year=2008 |work=Terrorism Focus |publisher=Jamestown Foundation}}</ref> Bin Laden's December 2004 message was much more vehement than usual in this speech, lasting over an hour.
], the perpetrator of the ], was inspired by al-Qaeda, calling it "the most successful revolutionary movement in the world." While admitting different aims, he sought to "create a European version of Al-Qaida."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2112701,00.html|title=Breivik Studied al-Qaeda Attacks|newspaper=Time|date=April 20, 2012|access-date=May 8, 2012|last1=Ritter|first1=Karl|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120525123005/http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0%2C8599%2C2112701%2C00.html|archive-date=May 25, 2012|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/21/world/europe/norway-anders-breivik-studied-al-qaeda.html|title=Norway: Militant Studied Al Qaeda|newspaper=The New York Times|date=April 20, 2012|access-date=May 8, 2012}}</ref>


The appropriate response to offshoots is a subject of debate. A journalist reported in 2012 that a senior US military planner had asked: "Should we resort to drones and Special Operations raids every time some group raises the black banner of al Qaeda? How long can we continue to chase offshoots of offshoots around the world?"<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.newsweek.com/will-obama-end-war-terror-63627|title=Will Obama End the War on Terror?|last1=Klaidman|first1=Daniel|date=December 17, 2012|website=Newsweek|access-date=February 12, 2020}}</ref>
In the past, ] and ] were perhaps the most significant al-Qaeda websites. Alneda was initially taken down by American ], but the operators resisted by shifting the site to various servers and strategically shifting content.


== Criticism ==
The U.S. is currently attempting to extradite a British information technology specialist, ], on charges of operating a network of English-language al-Qaeda websites, such as Azzam.com.<ref>{{cite news | last = Whitlock | first = Craig | authorlink = Craig Whitlock | title = Briton Used Internet As His Bully Pulpit | work = The Washington Post | date = 2005-08-08 | page = A1 | url = http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/07/AR2005080700890.html | accessdate=2009-09-04}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | title = Babar Ahmad Indicted on Terrorism Charges | publisher = United States Attorney's Office District of Connecticut | date = 2004-10-06 | url=http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ct/Press2004/20041006.html|accessdate=2006-05-29}}</ref> Ahmad's extradition is opposed by various British Muslim organizations, such as the ].


According to ] journalists ] and Paul Cruickshank, a number of "religious scholars, former fighters and militants" who previously supported ] (ISI) had turned against the al-Qaeda-supported ] in 2008; due to ISI's indiscriminate attacks against civilians while targeting ] forces. American military analyst ] wrote in 2008 that "a wave of revulsion" arose against ISI, which enabled US-allied ] faction to turn various tribal leaders in the ] against the Iraqi insurgency. In response, Bin Laden and Zawahiri issued public statements urging Muslims to rally behind ISI leadership and support the armed struggle against American forces.<ref>{{Harvnb|Bergen|Cruickshank|2008}}; {{Harvnb|Wright|2008}}. Quotes taken from {{Harvnb|Riedel|2008|pp=106–107}} and {{Harvnb|Bergen|Cruickshank|2008}}.</ref>
===Aviation Network===


In November 2007, former ] (LIFG) member ] responded with a public, open letter of criticism to Ayman al-Zawahiri, after persuading the imprisoned senior leaders of his former group to enter into peace negotiations with the Libyan regime. While Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the affiliation of the group with al-Qaeda in November 2007, the Libyan government released 90 members of the group from prison several months after "they were said to have renounced violence."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/AA64F530-BCA8-40B0-8226-22154CCD1032.htm|title=Libya releases scores of prisoners|publisher=English.aljazeera.net|date=April 9, 2008|access-date=March 22, 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080718232829/http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/AA64F530-BCA8-40B0-8226-22154CCD1032.htm|archive-date=July 18, 2008}}</ref>
Al-Qaeda is believed to be operating a clandestine ] network including “several ] aircraft”, ] and ]s, according to a ] story. Based on a US ] report, the story said that Al-Qaeda is possibly using aircraft to transport drugs and weapons from ] to various unstable countries in ]. A Boeing 727 can carry up to 10 tons of cargo. The drugs eventually are smuggled to Europe for distribution and sale, and the weapons are used in conflicts in Africa and possibly elsewhere. Gunmen with links to Al-Qaeda have been increasingly ] some ]ans for ransom. The profits from the drug and weapon sales, and kidnappings can, in turn, fund more terrorism activities.<ref>Reuters, Al Qaeda linked to rogue aviation network, Jan 13 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60C3E820100113?type=politicsNews</ref>


In 2007, on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks,{{sfn|Wright|2008}} the Saudi sheikh ] delivered a personal rebuke to bin Laden. Al-Ouda addressed al-Qaeda's leader on television asking him:
==Alleged CIA involvement==
{{blockquote|My brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed{{spaces}}... in the name of al-Qaeda? Will you be happy to meet God Almighty carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands or millions on your back?<ref name=theunraveling>{{Harvnb|Bergen|Cruickshank|2008}}.</ref>}}
{{Main|Allegations of CIA assistance to Osama bin Laden}} Experts debate whether or not the al-Qaeda attacks were ] from the American ]'s "]" program to help the Afghan ]. ], British Foreign Secretary from 1997 to 2001, has written that al-Qaeda and Bin Laden were "a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies", and that "Al-Qaida, literally "the database", was originally the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,1523838,00.html|title=The struggle against terrorism cannot be won by military means|author=Cook, Robin|publisher=Guardian Unlimited|accessdate=2005-07-08 | location=London | date=2005-07-08}}</ref></blockquote>


According to Pew polls, support for al-Qaeda had dropped in the Muslim world in the years before 2008.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/05/taking_stock_in_the_war_on_ter.html|title=Taking Stock of the War on Terror|publisher=Realclearpolitics.com|date=May 22, 2008|access-date=March 22, 2010}}</ref> In Saudi Arabia, only ten percent had a favorable view of al-Qaeda, according to a December 2007 poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington-based ].<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/12/17/saudi.poll/index.html|title=December 18, 2007 Poll: Most Saudis oppose al Qaeda|publisher=CNN|date=December 18, 2007|access-date=March 22, 2010}}</ref>
], ] from 2002 to 2008, wrote in a letter published in the ] on January 19, 2008:
<blockquote>The strategy to support the Afghans against Soviet military intervention was evolved by several intelligence agencies, including the C.I.A. and Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI. After the Soviet withdrawal, the Western powers walked away from the region, leaving behind 40,000 militants imported from several countries to wage the anti-Soviet jihad. Pakistan was left to face the blowback of extremism, drugs and guns.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/19/opinion/lweb22pakistan.html?_r=1&ref=opinion
|accessdate=2009-10-17
|title=Pakistan, Terrorism and Drugs
|section=Opinion
|work=]
|first=Munir
|last=Akram
|date=2008-01-19
}}</ref></blockquote>


In 2007, the imprisoned ], who was an influential ] and former associate of ], withdrew his support from al-Qaeda and criticized the organization in his book '']'' ({{langx|en|Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World}}). In response, Al-Zawahiri accused Dr. Fadl of promoting "an Islam without jihad" that aligns with Western interests and wrote a nearly two hundred pages long treatise, titled "''The Exoneration''" which appeared on the Internet in March 2008. In his treatise, Zawahiri justified military strikes against US targets as retaliatory attacks to defend ] against American aggression.{{sfn|Wright|2008}}
A variety of sources—] journalist ], ] Brigadier ], and CIA operatives involved in the Afghan program, such as ]—deny that the CIA or other American officials had contact with the foreign mujahideen or Bin Laden, let alone armed, trained, coached or indoctrinated them.


In an online town hall forum conducted in December 2007, Zawahiri denied that al-Qaeda deliberately targeted innocents and accused the American coalition of killing innocent people.<ref>{{harvnb|Wright|2008}}: 'In December, in order to stanch the flow of criticism, Zawahiri boldly initiated a virtual town-hall meeting... Zawahiri protested that Al Qaeda had not killed innocents. "In fact, we fight those who kill innocents. Those who kill innocents are the Americans... and their agents."'</ref> Although once associated with al-Qaeda, in September 2009 ] completed a new "code" for jihad, a 417-page religious document entitled "Corrective Studies". Given its credibility and the fact that several other prominent Jihadists in the Middle East have turned against al-Qaeda, the LIFG's reversal may be an important step toward staunching al-Qaeda's recruitment.<ref>, Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, ], November 10, 2009</ref>
This runs counter to the account of ], the CIA Field Officer for Afghanistan from 1985 to 1989, who distinctly recalls the unease he used to feel when meeting the Jihadi fighters: "The only times that I ran into any real trouble in Afghanistan was when I ran into 'these guys' – You know there'd be kind of a 'moment' or two that would look a little bit like the bar scene in Star Wars, ya know. Each group kinda jockeying around and finally somebody has to {{sic|diffuse}} the situation."<ref>''The Power of Nightmares'', part 2.</ref>


=== Other criticisms ===
But Bergen and others argue that there was no need to recruit foreigners unfamiliar with the local language, customs or lay of the land since there were a quarter of a million local Afghans willing to fight;<ref>{{Harvnb|Coll|2005|pp=145–146, 155–156}}.</ref> that foreign mujahideen themselves had no need for American funds since they received several hundred million dollars a year from non-American, Muslim sources; that Americans could not have trained mujahideen because Pakistani officials would not allow more than a handful of them to operate in Pakistan and none in Afghanistan; and that the Afghan Arabs were almost invariably militant Islamists reflexively hostile to Westerners whether or not the Westerners were helping the Muslim Afghans.
Bilal Abdul Kareem, an American journalist based in Syria created a documentary about ], al-Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia. The documentary included interviews with former members of the group who stated their reasons for leaving al-Shabab. The members made accusations of segregation, lack of religious awareness and internal corruption and favoritism. In response to Kareem, the ] condemned Kareem, called him a liar, and denied the accusations from the former fighters.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://jihadology.net/2017/06/06/new-release-from-the-global-islamic-media-front-lies-in-disguise-a-response-from-the-deep-heart-of-a-mujahid-of-the-lions-of-islam-in-somalia/|title=New release from the Global Islamic Media Front: 'Lies in Disguise: A Response From the Deep Heart of a Mujāhid of the Lions of Islām in Somalia'|date=June 6, 2017}}</ref>


In mid-2014 after the ] declared that they had restored the ], an audio statement was released by the then-spokesman of the group ] claiming that "the legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the Caliphate's authority." The speech included a religious refutation of al-Qaeda for being too lenient regarding ] and their refusal to recognize the authority ], al-Adnani specifically noting: "It is not suitable for a state to give allegiance to an organization." He also recalled a past instance in which ] called on al-Qaeda members and supporters to give allegiance to ] when the group was still solely operating in Iraq, as the ], and condemned ] for not making this same claim for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Zawahiri was encouraging factionalism and division between former allies of ISIL such as the ].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/isis-spokesman-declares-caliphate-rebrands-group-as-islamic-state.html|title=ISIS Spokesman Declares Caliphate, Rebrands Group as 'Islamic State'|last=SiteIntelGroup|website=news.siteintelgroup.com|date=June 29, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://jihadology.net/2014/06/29/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-audio-message-from-the-islamic-states-shaykh-abu-mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-al-adnani-al-shami-this-is-the-promise-of-god/|title=al-Furqān Media presents a new audio message from the Islamic State's Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al 'Adnānī al-Shāmī: 'This Is the Promise of God'|date=June 29, 2014}}</ref>
According to ], known for conducting the first television interview with Osama bin Laden in 1997, the idea that "the CIA funded bin Laden or trained bin Laden ... a folk myth. There's no evidence of this. ... Bin Laden had his own money, he was anti-American and he was operating secretly and independently. ... The real story here is the CIA didn't really have a clue about who this guy was until 1996 when they set up a unit to really start tracking him."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/08/15/bergen.answers/index.html|title= Bergen: Bin Laden, CIA links hogwash|author=Bergen, Peter|publisher=CNN|accessdate=2006-08-15}}</ref> But as Bergen himself admitted, in one "strange incident" the CIA ''did'' appear to give visa help to ]-recruiter ].<ref>{{Harvnb|Bergen|2001|pp=72–73}}.</ref>


==Criticism== == See also ==
{{div col|colwidth=22em}}
According to a number of sources there has been a "wave of revulsion" against Al Qaeda and its affiliates by "religious scholars, former fighters and militants" alarmed by Al Qaeda's ] and killing of Muslims in Muslim countries, especially Iraq.<ref>{{Harvnb|Bergen|Cruickshank|2008}}; {{Harvnb|Wright|2008}}. Quotes taken from {{Harvnb|Riedel|2008|pp=106–107}} and {{Harvnb|Bergen|Cruickshank|2008}}.</ref>
* ]

], a former Afghan Arab and militant of the ], went public with an open letter of criticism to ] in November 2007 after persuading imprisoned senior leadership of his former group to enter into peace negotiations with the Libyan regime. While Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the affiliation of the group with Al Qaeda in November 2007, the Libyan government released 90 members of the group from prison several months later after "they were said to have renounced violence."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/AA64F530-BCA8-40B0-8226-22154CCD1032.htm |title=Libya releases scores of prisoners APRIL 9, 2008 |publisher=English.aljazeera.net |date=2008-04-09 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>

In 2007, around the sixth anniversary of September 11 and a couple of months before ''Rationalizing Jihad'' first appeared in the newspapers,<ref name="RebellionWright"/> the Saudi sheikh ] delivered a personal rebuke to bin Laden. Al-Ouda, a religious scholar and one of the fathers of the Sahwa, the fundamentalist awakening movement that swept through Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, is a widely respected critic of jihadism.{{Citation needed|date=September 2009}} Al-Ouda addressed Al Qaeda's leader on television asking him
<blockquote>My brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed ... in the name of Al Qaeda? Will you be happy to meet God Almighty carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands or millions on your back?<ref name=theunraveling>{{Harvnb|Bergen|Cruickshank|2008}}.</ref></blockquote>

According to Pew polls, support for Al Qaeda has been dropping around the Muslim world in the years leading to 2008.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/05/taking_stock_in_the_war_on_ter.html |title=Taking Stock of the War on Terror |publisher=Realclearpolitics.com |date=2008-05-22 |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref> The numbers supporting suicide bombings in Indonesia, Lebanon, and Bangladesh, for instance, have dropped by half or more in the last five years. In Saudi Arabia, only 10&nbsp;percent now have a favorable view of Al Qaeda, according to a December poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington-based ].<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/12/17/saudi.poll/index.html |title=December 18, 2007 Poll: Most Saudis oppose al Qaeda |publisher=Cnn.com |date= |accessdate=2010-03-22}}</ref>

In 2007, the imprisoned ], an influential Afghan Arab, "ideological godfather of Al Qaeda", and former supporter of takfir, sensationally withdrew his support from al Qaeda with a book '']'' (''Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World'').

Although once associated with al-Qaeda, in September 2009 ] completed a new "code" for jihad, a 417-page religious document entitled "Corrective Studies". Given its credibility and the fact that several other prominent Jihadists in the Middle East have turned against al Qaeda, the LIFG's about face may be an important step toward staunching al Qaeda's recruitment.<ref>, Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, '']'', November 10, 2009</ref>

==See also==
{{col-start}}{{col-break}}
{{Wikinews|Internally distributed DHS memo: al-Qaeda and Hezbollah may attack U.S. within three years}}
{{col-break}}
{{Wikinews|DHS video confirms details of leaked internal memo on al-Qaeda threat, and more}}
{{col-break}}
{{Wikiquote}}
{{col-end}}
{{col-start}}
{{col-break}}
* ]
* ] – (Arabic: آدم يحيى غدن‎; born<br /> September 1, 1978) is an American-born member of<br /> the al-Qaeda organization
* ] * ]
* ] (former CIA unit for tracking Osama Bin Laden) * ]
* ]
* ]
* ] (former CIA unit for tracking bin Laden)
* ]
* ] * ]
* ]
* ]
* ] (])
* ]
* ]
{{col-break}}
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ] * ]
* ] * ]
* ] * ]
* ] * ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
{{div col end}}
* ]
{{col-end}}


'''Publications:''' === Publications ===
* '']'' * '']''
* '']'' * '']''


==Notes== == References ==
{{Reflist}}
{{reflist|colwidth=30em}}


==References== == Sources ==
{{Main|List of books about al-Qaeda}}
===Bibliography===
{{refbegin|colwidth=20em}}
* {{cite book
| last = Atwan
| first = Abdel Bari
| authorlink = Abd al-Bari Atwan
| title = The Secret History of al Qaeda
| publisher = University of California Press
| year = 2006
| location = Berkeley, CA
| isbn = 9780520249745
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite journal
| last = Basile
| first = Mark
| title = Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing
| journal = ]
| volume = 27
| issue = 3
| month = May
| year = 2004
| pages = 169–185
| doi = 10.1080/10576100490438237
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Benjamin
| first = Daniel
| authorlink = Daniel Benjamin
| last2 = Simon
| first2 = Steven
| title = The Age of Sacred Terror
| publisher = Random House
| year = 2002
| edition = 1st
| location =
| isbn = 0375508597
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Bergen
| first = Peter
| authorlink = Peter Bergen
| title = Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden
| publisher = Free Press
| year = 2001
| edition = 1st
| location = New York
| isbn = 0743234952
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Bergen
| first = Peter
| title = The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader
| publisher = Free Press
| year = 2006
| edition = 2nd
| location = New York
| isbn = 0743278925
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite news
| last = Bergen
| first = Peter
| last2 = Cruickshank
| first2 = Paul
| authorlink2 = Paul Cruickshank
| title = The Unraveling: The jihadist revolt against bin Laden
| work = ]
| volume = 238
| issue = 10
| date = 2008-06-11
| pages = 16–21
| url = http://www.tnr.com/toc/story.html?id=702bf6d5-a37a-4e3e-a491-fd72bf6a9da1
| accessdate = 2009-05-12
| ref = harv
}}<!-- this ref has been graded, confirmed cover story -->
* {{cite book
| last = Bin Laden
| first = Osama
| authorlink = Osama bin Laden
| editor-last = Lawrence
| editor-first = Bruce
| editor-link = Bruce Lawrence
| title = Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden
| year = 2005
| publisher = Verso
| isbn = 1844670457
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Cassidy
| first = Robert M.
| authorlink = Robert Cassidy
| title = Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War
| publisher = Praeger Security International
| year = 2006
| location = Westport, CT
| isbn = 0275989909
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Coll
| first = Steve
| authorlink = Steve Coll
| title = Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
| edition = 2nd
| year = 2005
| publisher = Penguin Books
| isbn = 0143034669
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Esposito
| first = John L.
| authorlink = John L. Esposito
| title = Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam
| publisher = Oxford University Press
| year = 2002
| location = New York
| isbn = 0195154355
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Gunaratna
| first = Rohan
| authorlink = Rohan Gunaratna
| title = Inside Al Qaeda
| publisher = C. Hurst & Co.
| year = 2002
| edition = 1st
| location = London
| isbn = 1850656711
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite journal
| last = Hafez
| first = Mohammed M.
| authorlink = Mohammed Hafez
| title = Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies
| journal = ]
| volume = 19
| issue = 1
| date = March 2007
| year = 2007
| pages = 95–115
| doi = 10.1080/09546550601054873
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Hoffman
| first = Bruce
| authorlink = Bruce Hoffman
| contribution = The Emergence of the New Terrorism
| editor-last = Tan
| editor-first = Andrew
| editor2-last = Ramakrishna
| editor2-first = Kumar
| title = The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends, and Counter-Strategies
| pages = 30–49
| publisher = Eastern Universities Press
| year = 2002
| location = Singapore
| isbn = 9812102108
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Jansen
| first = Johannes J.G.
| authorlink = Johannes J.G. Jansen
| title = The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism
| publisher = Cornell University Press
| year = 1997
| location = Ithaca, NY
| isbn = 080143338X
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite news
| last = McGeary
| first = Johanna
| title = A Traitor's Tale
| work = ]
| volume = 157
| issue = 7
| date = 2001-02-19
| pages = 36–37
| url = http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,999237,00.html
| accessdate = 2009-09-15
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Napoleoni
| first = Loretta
| authorlink = Loretta Napoleoni
| title = Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks
| publisher = Pluto Press
| year = 2003
| location = London
| ref = harv
| isbn = 0745321178}}
* {{cite book
| last = Qutb
| first = Sayyid
| authorlink = Sayyid Qutb
| title = ]
| publisher = Kazi Publications
| year = 2003
| location = Chicago
| isbn = 0911119426
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Rashid
| first = Ahmed
| authorlink = Ahmed Rashid
| title = Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
| publisher = Yale University Press
| year = 2002
| location =
| isbn = 1860648304
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Reeve
| first = Simon
| authorlink = Simon Reeve (UK television presenter)
| title = The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism
| publisher = Northeastern University Press
| year = 1999
| location = Boston
| isbn = 1555534074
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Riedel
| first = Bruce
| authorlink = Bruce Riedel
| title = The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future
| publisher = Brookings Institution Press
| year = 2008
| location = Washington, D.C.
| isbn = 9780815774143
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Sageman
| first = Marc
| authorlink = Marc Sageman
| title = Understanding Terror Networks
| publisher = University of Pennsylvania Press
| year = 2004
| location = Philadelphia
| isbn = 0812238087
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Trofimov
| first = Yaroslav
| authorlink = Yaroslav Trofimov
| title = Faith At War: A Journey On the Frontlines of Islam, From Baghdad to Timbuktu
| publisher = Picador
| year = 2006
| location = New York
| isbn = 9780805077544
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Wechsler
| first = William F.
| contribution = Strangling The Hydra: Targeting Al Qaeda's Finances
| editor-last = Hoge
| editor-first = James
| editor-link = James F. Hoge, Jr.
| editor2-last = Rose
| editor2-first = Gideon
| editor2-link = Gideon Rose
| title = How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War
| publisher = PublicAffairs
| year = 2001
| location = New York
| pages = 129–143
| isbn = 1586481304
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite book
| last = Wright
| first = Lawrence
| authorlink = Lawrence Wright
| title = The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11
| publisher = Knopf
| year = 2006
| location = New York
| isbn = 037541486X
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite news
| last = Wright
| first = Lawrence
| title = The Rebellion Within
| work = ]
| volume = 84
| issue = 16
| date = 2008-06-02
| pages = 36–53
| url = http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?currentPage=all
| accessdate = 2009-09-15
| ref = harv
}}
{{refend}}


===Reviews=== === Bibliography ===
{{Refbegin|colwidth=20em}}
{{refbegin}}
* {{Cite book|last1=Mura|first1=Andrea|url=https://www.routledge.com/products/9781472443892|title=The Symbolic Scenarios of Islamism: A Study in Islamic Political Thought|publisher=Routledge|year=2015|location=London}}
* {{cite journal
* {{Cite book|last1=Al-Bahri|first1=Nasser|title=Guarding bin Laden: My Life in Al-Qaeda|publisher=Thin Man Press|year=2013|isbn=978-0-9562473-6-0|location=London|author-link=Nasser al-Bahri}}
| last = Akacem
* {{Cite book|last1=Atran|first1=Scott|title=Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (un)making of Terrorists|publisher=Ecco Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0-06-134490-9|location=New York|author-link=Scott Atran}}
| first = Mohammed
* {{Cite book|last1=Atwan|first1=Abdel Bari|url=https://archive.org/details/secrethistoryofa0000atwa|title=The Secret History of al Qaeda|publisher=University of California Press|year=2006|isbn=978-0-520-24974-5|location=Berkeley, CA|author-link=Abdel Bari Atwan|url-access=registration}}
| title = Review: Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks
* {{Cite book|last1=Atwan|first1=Abdel Bari|url=https://archive.org/details/afterbinladenalq0000atwa|title=After Bin Laden: Al-Qaeda, The Next Generation|publisher=Saqi Books (London)/ New Press (New York)|year=2012|isbn=978-0-86356-419-2|location=London/New York|author-link=Abdel Bari Atwan|url-access=registration}}
| journal = ]
* {{Cite journal|last1=Basile|first1=Mark|date=May 2004|title=Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing|journal=Studies in Conflict and Terrorism|volume=27|issue=3|pages=169–185|doi=10.1080/10576100490438237|s2cid=109768129}}
| volume = 37
* {{Cite book|last1=Benjamin|first1=Daniel|url=https://archive.org/details/ageofsacredterro00benj|title=The Age of Sacred Terror|last2=Simon|first2=Steven|publisher=Random House|year=2002|isbn=0-375-50859-7|edition=1st|location=New York|author-link=Daniel Benjamin}}
| issue = 3
* {{Cite book|last1=Bergen|first1=Peter|url=https://archive.org/details/holywarincinside00berg_0|title=Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden|publisher=Free Press|year=2001|isbn=0-7432-3495-2|edition=1st|location=New York|author-link=Peter Bergen}}
| date = August 2005
* {{Cite book|last1=Bergen|first1=Peter|title=The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader|publisher=Free Press|year=2006|isbn=0-7432-7892-5|edition=2nd|location=New York}}
| year = 2005
* {{Cite magazine|last1=Bergen|first1=Peter|last2=Cruickshank|first2=Paul|date=June 11, 2008|title=The Unraveling: The jihadist revolt against bin Laden|volume=238|pages=16–21|magazine=]|issue=10|url=http://www.tnr.com/article/the-unraveling|access-date=May 4, 2011}}
| pages = 444–445
* {{Cite book|last1=Bergen|first1=Peter|title=The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and al-Qaeda|publisher=Free Press|year=2011|isbn=978-0-7432-7893-5|location=New York}}
| doi = 10.1017/S0020743805362143
* {{Cite book|last1=Bin Laden|first1=Osama|url=https://archive.org/details/messagestoworlds00binl|title=Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden|publisher=Verso|year=2005|isbn=1-84467-045-7|editor-last=Lawrence|editor-first=Bruce|editor-link=Bruce Lawrence|location=London|author-link=Osama bin Laden}}
| ref = harv
* {{Cite book|last1=Cassidy|first1=Robert M.|title=Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War|publisher=Praeger Security International|year=2006|isbn=0-275-98990-9|location=Westport, CT}}
}}
* {{Cite book|last1=Coll|first1=Steve|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780141020808|title=Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001|publisher=Penguin Books|year=2005|isbn=0-14-303466-9|edition=2nd|location=New York|author-link=Steve Coll}}
* {{cite journal
* {{Cite book|author-last=Dalacoura|author-first=Katerina|year=2012|chapter=Transnational Islamist Terrorism: Al Qaeda|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PlTKrMFyawoC&pg=PA40|title=Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East|location=]|publisher=]|pages=40–65|doi=10.1017/CBO9780511977367.003|isbn=978-0-511-97736-7|lccn=2010047275|s2cid=128049972}}
| last = Bale
* {{Cite book|last1=Esposito|first1=John L.|title=Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2002|isbn=0-19-515435-5|location=New York|author-link=John L. Esposito}}
| first = Jeffrey M.
* {{Cite book|editor1-last=Gallagher|editor1-first=Eugene V.|editor2-last=Willsky-Ciollo|editor2-first=Lydia|editor1-link=Eugene V. Gallagher|year=2021|chapter=Al-Qaeda|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Id4aEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA13|title=New Religions: Emerging Faiths and Religious Cultures in the Modern World|location=]|publisher=]|volume=1|pages=13–15|isbn=978-1-4408-6235-9}}
| title = Deciphering Islamism and Terrorism
* {{Cite book|last1=Gunaratna|first1=Rohan|title=Inside Al Qaeda|publisher=C. Hurst & Co.|year=2002|isbn=1-85065-671-1|edition=1st|location=London|author-link=Rohan Gunaratna}}
| journal = ]
* {{Cite journal|last1=Hafez|first1=Mohammed M.|author-link=Mohammed Hafez (academic)|date=March 2007|title=Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies|journal=]|volume=19|issue=1|pages=95–115|doi=10.1080/09546550601054873|s2cid=145808052}}
| volume = 60
* {{Cite book|last1=Hoffman|first1=Bruce|title=The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends, and Counter-Strategies|publisher=Eastern Universities Press|year=2002|isbn=981-210-210-8|editor-last=Tan|editor-first=Andrew|location=Singapore|pages=30–49|chapter=The Emergence of the New Terrorism|author-link=Bruce Hoffman|editor2-last=Ramakrishna|editor2-first=Kumar}}
| issue = 4
* {{Cite book|last1=Jansen|first1=Johannes J.G.|url=https://archive.org/details/dualnatureofisla00jans|title=The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism|publisher=Cornell University Press|year=1997|isbn=0-8014-3338-X|location=Ithaca, NY|author-link=Johannes J.G. Jansen}}
| date = October 2006
* {{Cite magazine|last1=McGeary|first1=Johanna|date=February 19, 2001|title=A Traitor's Tale|volume=157|pages=36–37|magazine=Time|issue=7|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,999237,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071121221657/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,999237,00.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=November 21, 2007|access-date=September 15, 2009}}
| year = 2006
* {{Cite book|last1=Napoleoni|first1=Loretta|url=https://archive.org/details/modernjihadtraci0000napo|title=Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks|publisher=Pluto Press|year=2003|isbn=0-7453-2117-8|location=London|author-link=Loretta Napoleoni|url-access=registration}}
| pages = 777–788
* {{Cite book|last1=Qutb|first1=Sayyid|title=Milestones|title-link=Ma'alim fi al-Tariq|publisher=Kazi Publications|year=2003|isbn=0-911119-42-6|location=Chicago|author-link=Sayyid Qutb}}
}}
* {{Cite book|last1=Rashid|first1=Ahmed|title=Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia|publisher=Yale University Press|year=2002|isbn=1-86064-830-4|location=New Haven|author-link=Ahmed Rashid|orig-year=2000}}
{{refend}}
* {{Cite book|last1=Reeve|first1=Simon|url=https://archive.org/details/newjackalsramziy00reev|title=The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism|publisher=Northeastern University Press|year=1999|isbn=1-55553-407-4|location=Boston|author-link=Simon Reeve (UK television presenter)}}
* {{Cite book|last1=Riedel|first1=Bruce|url=https://archive.org/details/searchforalqaeda00ried|title=The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future|publisher=Brookings Institution Press|year=2008|isbn=978-0-8157-7414-3|location=Washington, D.C.|author-link=Bruce Riedel}}
* {{Cite book|last1=Sageman|first1=Marc|url=https://archive.org/details/understandingter00sage|title=Understanding Terror Networks|journal=International Journal of Emergency Mental Health|publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press|year=2004|isbn=0-8122-3808-7|volume=7|location=Philadelphia|pages=5–8|pmid=15869076|author-link=Marc Sageman|issue=1}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Schmid|first1=Alex|year=2014|title=Al Qaeda's "Single Narrative" and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives|journal=Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies|doi=10.19165/2014.1.01|doi-broken-date=December 9, 2024 |issn=2468-0664|doi-access=free}}
* {{Cite book|last1=Trofimov|first1=Yaroslav|url=https://archive.org/details/faithatwarjourne00trof|title=Faith at War: A Journey On the Frontlines of Islam, From Baghdad to Timbuktu|publisher=Picador|year=2006|isbn=978-0-8050-7754-4|location=New York|author-link=Yaroslav Trofimov}}
* {{Cite book|last1=Wechsler|first1=William F.|chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/howdidthishappen00hoge/page/129|title=How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War|publisher=PublicAffairs|year=2001|isbn=1-58648-130-4|editor-last=Hoge|editor-first=James|editor-link=James F. Hoge, Jr.|location=New York|pages=|chapter=Strangling The Hydra: Targeting Al Qaeda's Finances|editor2-last=Rose|editor2-first=Gideon|editor-link2=Gideon Rose}}
* {{Cite book|last1=Wright|first1=Lawrence|url=https://archive.org/details/loomingtoweralqa00wrig|title=The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11|publisher=Knopf|year=2006|isbn=0-375-41486-X|location=New York|author-link=Lawrence Wright}}
* {{Cite magazine|last1=Wright|first1=Lawrence|date=June 2, 2008|title=The Rebellion Within|volume=84|pages=36–53|magazine=The New Yorker|issue=16|url=https://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?currentPage=all|access-date=September 15, 2009}}
{{Refend}}


===Government reports=== === Reviews ===
{{refbegin}} {{Refbegin}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Akacem|first1=Mohammed|date=August 2005|title=Review: Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks|journal=]|volume=37|issue=3|pages=444–445|doi=10.1017/S0020743805362143|s2cid=162390565}}
* {{cite web
* {{Cite journal|last1=Bale|first1=Jeffrey M.|date=October 2006|title=Deciphering Islamism and Terrorism|journal=]|volume=60|issue=4|pages=777–788}}
| author = White House
* {{Cite journal|last1=Shaffer|first1=R|year=2015|title=The Terrorism, Ideology, and Transformations of Al-Qaeda|journal=Terrorism and Political Violence|volume=27|issue=3|pages=581–590|doi=10.1080/09546553.2015.1055968|s2cid=147008765}}
| title = Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism
{{Refend}}
| publisher = ]
| date = September 2003
| year = 2003
| url = http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/24087.htm
| archiveurl = http://web.archive.org/web/20030922090723/http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/24087.htm
| archivedate = 2003-09-22
| ref = harv
}}
* {{cite web
| last = Kronstadt
| first = K. Allen
| last2 = Katzman
| first2 = Kenneth
| title = Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy
| publisher = ]
| date = November 2008
| year = 2008
| url = http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113202.pdf
| format = PDF
| ref = harv
}}
{{refend}}


===Films=== === Government reports ===
{{refbegin}} {{Refbegin}}
* {{Cite web|title=Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy|url=https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113202.pdf|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113202.pdf|archive-date=October 9, 2022|url-status=live|last1=Kronstadt|first1=K. Allen|last2=Katzman|first2=Kenneth|date=November 2008|publisher=]}}
* {{cite video | people = ] |date = 2004 | title = ] | publisher = BBC}}
* {{Cite web|title=Global Al-Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges|url=https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo41268|date=July 18, 2013|publisher=Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131202233951/http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg81977/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg81977.pdf|archive-date=December 2, 2013}}
* ]. (2007). "". ''Age of Terror'', No. 4, series 1. BBC.
* {{Cite web|title=Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism|url=https://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/24087.htm|date=September 2003|publisher=]|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030922090723/http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/24087.htm|archive-date=September 22, 2003|ref={{harvid|State 2003}}}}
* {{cite video | people = Various commentators |date = 2007 | title = ] | publisher = Quixotic Media}}
{{refend}} {{Refend}}

==Further reading==
{{See|List of books about Al-Qaeda}}


==External links== ==External links==
{{Sister project links|auto=1}}
* U.S. Dept. of Justice,
* {{cite web|publisher=US Department of Justice|url=http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm|title=Al Qaeda Training Manual|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050331091340/http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm|archive-date=March 31, 2005}}
*
*
*
* ongoing news coverage from '']'' * , ] profile
*
* from '']'', January 2005
* {{cite web|url=http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501704_162-57427765/bin-laden-documents-at-a-glance/|title=Bin Laden documents at a glance|publisher=]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120511070217/http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501704_162-57427765/bin-laden-documents-at-a-glance|archive-date=May 11, 2012}}
* a BBC documentary that describe the origins of Al Qaeda in Qutbism


'''Media'''
* ]. (2007). "". ''Age of Terror'', No. 4, series 1. BBC.
* , ]
* {{Cite video|people=]|year=2004|title=]|publisher=BBC}}
* from '']'', January 2005
* {{Cite web|title=Inside al Qaeda (National Geographic)|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zUUUS_wRKLo|url-status=bot: unknown|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220207133356/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zUUUS_wRKLo|archive-date=February 7, 2022|access-date=September 20, 2021|via=]|date=August 20, 2007}}
* {{Guardian topic|2=Al-Qaida}}
* {{NYTtopic|organizations/a/al_qaeda|al-Qaeda}}

{{Al-Qaeda}}
{{Osama bin Laden}}
{{Islamism}} {{Islamism}}
{{War on Terrorism}} {{US War on Terror}}
{{Authority control}}


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Latest revision as of 21:34, 21 January 2025

Pan-Islamic Sunni Jihadist organization (established 1988) For other uses, see Al-Qaeda (disambiguation).

Al-Qaeda
القاعدة‎
Flag used by various Al-Qaeda factions
FounderOsama bin Laden X
Leaders
Dates of operationAugust 11, 1988 – present
Group(s)  
Ideology  
Size  
Allies  
Opponents  
Battles and wars  
Designated as a terrorist group bySee below
Preceded by
Maktab al-Khidamat

Al-Qaeda (/ælˈkaɪ(ə)də/ ; Arabic: القاعدة, romanized: al-Qāʿidah, lit. 'the Base', IPA: [alˈqaː.ʕi.da]) is a pan-Islamist militant organization led by Sunni jihadists who self-identify as a vanguard spearheading a global Islamist revolution to unite the Muslim world under a supra-national Islamic caliphate. Its membership is mostly composed of Arabs but also includes people from other ethnic groups. Al-Qaeda has mounted attacks on civilian, economic and military targets of the U.S. and its allies; such as the 1998 US embassy bombings, the USS Cole bombing, and the September 11 attacks.

The organization was founded in a series of meetings held in Peshawar during 1988, attended by Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Muhammad Atef, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other veterans of the Soviet–Afghan War. Building upon the networks of Maktab al-Khidamat, the founding members decided to create an organization named "Al-Qaeda" to serve as a "vanguard" for jihad. When Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden offered to support Saudi Arabia by sending his Mujahideen fighters. His offer was rebuffed by the Saudi government, which instead sought the aid of the United States. The stationing of U.S. troops in the Arabian Peninsula prompted bin Laden to declare a jihad against both the rulers of Saudi Arabia – whom he denounced as murtadd (apostates) – and against the US. From 1992, al-Qaeda established its headquarters in Sudan until it was expelled in 1996. It then shifted its base to the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and later expanded to other parts of the world, primarily in the Middle East and South Asia. In 1996 and 1998, bin Laden issued two fatāwā that demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia.

In 1998, al-Qaeda conducted the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 people. The U.S. retaliated by launching Operation Infinite Reach, against al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. In 2001, al-Qaeda carried out the September 11 attacks, resulting in nearly 3,000 deaths, long-term health consequences of nearby residents, damage to global economic markets, the triggering of drastic geo-political changes as well as generating profound cultural influence across the world. The U.S. launched the war on Terror in response and invaded Afghanistan to depose the Taliban and destroy al-Qaeda. In 2003, a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, overthrowing the Ba'athist regime which they falsely accused of having ties with al-Qaeda. In 2004, al-Qaeda launched its Iraqi regional branch. After pursuing him for almost a decade, the U.S. military killed bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011.

Al-Qaeda members believe that a Judeo-Christian alliance (led by the United States) is waging a war against Islam and conspiring to destroy Islam. Al-Qaeda also opposes man-made laws, and seek to implement sharīʿah (Islamic law) in Muslim countries. Al-Qaeda fighters characteristically deploy tactics such as suicide attacks (Inghimasi and Istishhadi operations) involving simultaneous bombing of several targets in battle-zones. Al-Qaeda's Iraq branch, which later morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq after 2006, was responsible for numerous sectarian attacks against Shias during its Iraqi insurgency. Al-Qaeda ideologues envision the violent removal of all foreign and secularist influences in Muslim countries, which it denounces as corrupt deviations. Following the death of bin Laden in 2011, al-Qaeda vowed to avenge his killing. The group was then led by Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri until he too was killed by the United States in 2022. As of 2021, they have reportedly suffered from a deterioration of central command over its regional operations.

Organization

Al-Qaeda only indirectly controls its day-to-day operations. Its philosophy calls for the centralization of decision making, while allowing for the decentralization of execution. The top leaders of al-Qaeda have defined the organization's ideology and guiding strategy, and they have also articulated simple and easy-to-receive messages. At the same time, mid-level organizations were given autonomy, but they had to consult with top management before large-scale attacks and assassinations. Top management included the shura council as well as committees on military operations, finance, and information sharing. Through the information committees of al-Qaeda, Zawahiri placed special emphasis on communicating with his groups. However, after the war on terror, al-Qaeda's leadership has become isolated. As a result, the leadership has become decentralized, and the organization has become regionalized into several al-Qaeda groups.

The group was initially dominated by Egyptians and Saudis, with some participation from Yemenis and Kuwaitis. Over time, it has evolved into a more international terrorist organization. While its core group originally shared a background in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, it has since attracted fighters from other Arab groups, including North Africans, Jordanians, Palestinians, and Iraqis. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, Muslims from non-Arab backgrounds, such as Pakistanis, Afghans, Turks, Kurds, and European converts to Islam, have also joined the organization.

Many Western analysts do not believe that the global jihadist movement is driven at every level by al-Qaeda's leadership. However, bin Laden held considerable ideological influence over revolutionary Islamist movements across the world. Experts argue that al-Qaeda has fragmented into a number of disparate regional movements, and that these groups bear little connection with one another.

This view mirrors the account given by Osama bin Laden in his October 2001 interview with Tayseer Allouni:

"this matter isn't about any specific person and ... is not about the al-Qa'idah Organization. We are the children of an Islamic Nation, with Prophet Muhammad as its leader, our Lord is one ... and all the true believers are brothers. So the situation isn't like the West portrays it, that there is an 'organization' with a specific name (such as 'al-Qa'idah') and so on. That particular name is very old. It was born without any intention from us. Brother Abu Ubaida ... created a military base to train the young men to fight against the vicious, arrogant, brutal, terrorizing Soviet empire ... So this place was called 'The Base' , as in a training base, so this name grew and became. We aren't separated from this nation. We are the children of a nation, and we are an inseparable part of it, and from those public demonstrations which spread from the far east, from the Philippines to Indonesia, to Malaysia, to India, to Pakistan, reaching Mauritania ... and so we discuss the conscience of this nation."

As of 2010 however, Bruce Hoffman saw al-Qaeda as a cohesive network that was strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas.

Al-Qaeda militant in Sahel armed with a Type 56 assault rifle, 2012

Affiliates

Al-Qaeda has the following direct affiliates:

The following are presently believed to be indirect affiliates of al-Qaeda:

Al-Qaeda's former affiliates include the following:

Leadership

Osama bin Laden (1988 – May 2011)

Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri photographed in 2001
Osama bin Laden (left) and Ayman al-Zawahiri (right) photographed in 2001

Osama bin Laden served as the emir of al-Qaeda from the organization's founding in 1988 until his assassination by US forces on May 1, 2011. Atiyah Abd al-Rahman was alleged to be second in command prior to his death on August 22, 2011.

Bin Laden was advised by a Shura Council, which consists of senior al-Qaeda members. The group was estimated to consist of 20–30 people.

After May 2011

Ayman al-Zawahiri had been al-Qaeda's deputy emir and assumed the role of emir following bin Laden's death. Al-Zawahiri replaced Saif al-Adel, who had served as interim commander.

On June 5, 2012, Pakistani intelligence officials announced that al-Rahman's alleged successor as second in command, Abu Yahya al-Libi, had been killed in Pakistan.

Nasir al-Wuhayshi was alleged to have become al-Qaeda's overall second in command and general manager in 2013. He was concurrently the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) until he was killed by a US airstrike in Yemen in June 2015. Abu Khayr al-Masri, Wuhayshi's alleged successor as the deputy to Ayman al-Zawahiri, was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in February 2017. Al-Qaeda's next alleged number two leader, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, was killed by Israeli agents. His pseudonym was Abu Muhammad al-Masri, who was killed in November 2020 in Iran. He was involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Al-Qaeda's network was built from scratch as a conspiratorial network which drew upon the leadership of a number of regional nodes. The organization divided itself into several committees, which include:

  • The Military Committee, which is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks.
  • The Money/Business Committee, which funds the recruitment and training of operatives through the hawala banking system. US-led efforts to eradicate the sources of "terrorist financing" were most successful in the year immediately following the September 11 attacks. Al-Qaeda continues to operate through unregulated banks, such as the 1,000 or so hawaladars in Pakistan, some of which can handle deals of up to US$10 million. The committee also procures false passports, pays al-Qaeda members, and oversees profit-driven businesses. In the 9/11 Commission Report, it was estimated that al-Qaeda required $30 million per year to conduct its operations.
  • The Law Committee reviews Sharia law, and decides upon courses of action conform to it.
  • The Islamic Study/Fatwah Committee issues religious edicts, such as an edict in 1998 telling Muslims to kill Americans.
  • The Media Committee ran the now-defunct newspaper Nashrat al Akhbar (English: Newscast) and handled public relations.
  • In 2005, al-Qaeda formed As-Sahab, a media production house, to supply its video and audio materials.

After Al-Zawahiri (2022 – present)

Al-Zawahiri was killed on July 31, 2022, in a drone strike in Afghanistan. In February 2023, a report from the United Nations, based on member state intelligence, concluded that de facto leadership of al-Qaeda had passed to Saif al-Adel, who was operating out of Iran. Adel, a former Egyptian army officer, became a military instructor in al-Qaeda camps in the 1990s and was known for his involvement in the Battle of Mogadishu. The report stated that al-Adel's leadership could not officially be declared by al-Qaeda because of "political sensitivities" of Afghan government in acknowledging the death of Al-Zawahiri as well as due to "theological and operational" challenges posed by the location of al-Adel in Iran.

Command structure

Most of al-Qaeda's top leaders and operational directors were veterans who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were the leaders who were considered the operational commanders of the organization. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda was not operationally managed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Several operational groups exist, which consult with the leadership in situations where attacks are in preparation. "... Zawahiri does not claim to have direct hierarchical control over al Qaeda's vast, networked structure. Al Qaeda's core leadership seeks to centralize the organization's messaging and strategy rather than to manage the daily operations of its franchises. But formal affiliates are required to consult with al Qaeda's core leadership before carrying out large-scale attacks." Al-Qaeda central (AQC) is a conglomerate of expert committees, each in supervision of distinct tasks and objectives. Its membership is mostly composed of Egyptian Islamist leaders who participated in the anti-communist Afghan Jihad. Assisting them are hundreds of Islamic field operatives and commanders, based in various regions of the Muslim World. The central leadership assumes control of the doctrinal approach and overall propaganda campaign; while the regional commanders were empowered with independence in military strategy and political maneuvering. This novel hierarchy made it possible for the organisation to launch wide-range offensives.

When asked in 2005 about the possibility of al-Qaeda's connection to the July 7, 2005 London bombings, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair said: "Al-Qaeda is not an organization. Al-Qaeda is a way of working ... but this has the hallmark of that approach ... Al-Qaeda clearly has the ability to provide training ... to provide expertise ... and I think that is what has occurred here." On August 13, 2005, The Independent newspaper, reported that the July 7 bombers had acted independently of an al-Qaeda mastermind.

Nasser al-Bahri, who was Osama bin Laden's bodyguard for four years in the run-up to 9/11 wrote in his memoir a highly detailed description of how the group functioned at that time. Al-Bahri described al-Qaeda's formal administrative structure and vast arsenal. However, the author Adam Curtis argued that the idea of al-Qaeda as a formal organization is primarily an American invention. Curtis contended the name "Al-Qaeda" was first brought to the attention of the public in the 2001 trial of bin Laden and the four men accused of the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa. Curtis wrote:

The reality was that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy. But there was no organization. These were militants who mostly planned their own operations and looked to bin Laden for funding and assistance. He was not their commander. There is also no evidence that bin Laden used the term "al-Qaeda" to refer to the name of a group until after September 11 attacks, when he realized that this was the term the Americans had given it.

During the 2001 trial, the US Department of Justice needed to show that bin Laden was the leader of a criminal organization in order to charge him in absentia under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The name of the organization and details of its structure were provided in the testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, who said he was a founding member of the group and a former employee of bin Laden. Questions about the reliability of al-Fadl's testimony have been raised by a number of sources because of his history of dishonesty, and because he was delivering it as part of a plea bargain agreement after being convicted of conspiring to attack US military establishments. Sam Schmidt, a defense attorney who defended al-Fadl, said:

There were selective portions of al-Fadl's testimony that I believe was false, to help support the picture that he helped the Americans join together. I think he lied in a number of specific testimony about a unified image of what this organization was. It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists. It made them identifiable as a group and therefore made it easier to prosecute any person associated with al-Qaeda for any acts or statements made by bin Laden.

Field operatives

Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir interviewing Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, 1997

The number of individuals in the group who have undergone proper military training, and are capable of commanding insurgent forces, is largely unknown. Documents captured in the raid on bin Laden's compound in 2011 show that the core al-Qaeda membership in 2002 was 170. In 2006, it was estimated that al-Qaeda had several thousand commanders embedded in 40 countries. As of 2009, it was believed that no more than 200–300 members were still active commanders.

According to the 2004 BBC documentary The Power of Nightmares, al-Qaeda was so weakly linked together that it was hard to say it existed apart from bin Laden and a small clique of close associates. The lack of any significant numbers of convicted al-Qaeda members, despite a large number of arrests on terrorism charges, was cited by the documentary as a reason to doubt whether a widespread entity that met the description of al-Qaeda existed. al-Qaeda's commanders, as well as its sleeping agents, are hiding in different parts of the world to this day. They are mainly hunted by the American and Israeli secret services.

Insurgent forces

According to author Robert Cassidy, al-Qaeda maintains two separate forces which are deployed alongside insurgents in Iraq and Pakistan. The first, numbering in the tens of thousands, was "organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces" in the Soviet–Afghan war. The force was composed primarily of foreign mujahideen from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Many of these fighters went on to fight in Bosnia and Somalia for global jihad. Another group, which numbered 10,000 in 2006, live in the West and have received rudimentary combat training.

Other analysts have described al-Qaeda's rank and file as being "predominantly Arab" in its first years of operation, but that the organization also includes "other peoples" as of 2007. It has been estimated that 62 percent of al-Qaeda members have a university education. In 2011 and the following year, the Americans successfully settled accounts with Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, the organization's chief propagandist, and Abu Yahya al-Libi's deputy commander. The optimistic voices were already saying it was over for al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, it was around this time that the Arab Spring greeted the region, the turmoil of which came great to al-Qaeda's regional forces. Seven years later, Ayman al-Zawahiri became arguably the number one leader in the organization, implementing his strategy with systematic consistency. Tens of thousands loyal to al-Qaeda and related organizations were able to challenge local and regional stability and ruthlessly attack their enemies in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe and Russia alike. In fact, from Northwest Africa to South Asia, al-Qaeda had more than two dozen "franchise-based" allies. The number of al-Qaeda militants was set at 20,000 in Syria alone, and they had 4,000 members in Yemen and about 7,000 in Somalia. The war was not over.

In 2001, al-Qaeda had around 20 functioning cells and 70,000 insurgents spread over sixty nations. According to latest estimates, the number of active-duty soldiers under its command and allied militias have risen to approximately 250,000 by 2018.

Financing

Al-Qaeda usually does not disburse funds for attacks, and very rarely makes wire transfers. In the 1990s, financing came partly from the personal wealth of Osama bin Laden. Other sources of income included the heroin trade and donations from supporters in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic Gulf states. A 2009 leaked diplomatic cable stated that "terrorist funding emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern."

Among the first pieces of evidence regarding Saudi Arabia's support for al-Qaeda was the so-called "Golden Chain", a list of early al-Qaeda funders seized during a 2002 raid in Sarajevo by Bosnian police. The hand-written list was validated by al-Qaeda defector Jamal al-Fadl, and included the names of both donors and beneficiaries. Osama bin-Laden's name appeared seven times among the beneficiaries, while 20 Saudi and Gulf-based businessmen and politicians were listed among the donors. Notable donors included Adel Batterjee, and Wael Hamza Julaidan. Batterjee was designated as a terror financier by the US Department of the Treasury in 2004, and Julaidan is recognized as one of al-Qaeda's founders.

Documents seized during the 2002 Bosnia raid showed that al-Qaeda widely exploited charities to channel financial and material support to its operatives across the globe. Notably, this activity exploited the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Muslim World League (MWL). The IIRO had ties with al-Qaeda associates worldwide, including al-Qaeda's deputy Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri's brother worked for the IIRO in Albania and had actively recruited on behalf of al-Qaeda. The MWL was openly identified by al-Qaeda's leader as one of the three charities al-Qaeda primarily relied upon for funding sources.

Allegations of Qatari support

See also: Qatar and state-sponsored terrorism and Qatar diplomatic crisis

Several Qatari citizens have been accused of funding al-Qaeda. This includes Abd Al-Rahman al-Nuaimi, a Qatari citizen and a human-rights activist who founded the Swiss-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Alkarama. On December 18, 2013, the US Treasury designated Nuaimi as a terrorist for his activities supporting al-Qaeda. The US Treasury has said Nuaimi "has facilitated significant financial support to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and served as an interlocutor between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Qatar-based donors".

Nuaimi was accused of overseeing a $2 million monthly transfer to al-Qaeda in Iraq as part of his role as mediator between Iraq-based al-Qaeda senior officers and Qatari citizens. Nuaimi allegedly entertained relationships with Abu-Khalid al-Suri, al-Qaeda's top envoy in Syria, who processed a $600,000 transfer to al-Qaeda in 2013. Nuaimi is also known to be associated with Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani, a Yemeni politician and founding member of Alkarama, who was listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the US Treasury in 2013. The US authorities claimed that Humayqani exploited his role in Alkarama to fundraise on behalf of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). A prominent figure in AQAP, Nuaimi was also reported to have facilitated the flow of funding to AQAP affiliates based in Yemen. Nuaimi was also accused of investing funds in the charity directed by Humayqani to ultimately fund AQAP. About ten months after being sanctioned by the US Treasury, Nuaimi was also restrained from doing business in the UK.

Another Qatari citizen, Kalifa Mohammed Turki Subayi, was sanctioned by the US Treasury on June 5, 2008, for his activities as a "Gulf-based Al-Qaeda financier". Subayi's name was added to the UN Security Council's Sanctions List in 2008 on charges of providing financial and material support to al-Qaeda senior leadership. Subayi allegedly moved al-Qaeda recruits to South Asia-based training camps. He also financially supported Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Pakistani national and senior al-Qaeda officer who is believed to be the mastermind behind the September 11 attack according to the 9/11 Commission Report.

Qataris provided support to al-Qaeda through the country's largest NGO, the Qatar Charity. Al-Qaeda defector al-Fadl, who was a former member of Qatar Charity, testified in court that Abdullah Mohammed Yusef, who served as Qatar Charity's director, was affiliated to al-Qaeda and simultaneously to the National Islamic Front, a political group that gave al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden harbor in Sudan in the early 1990s.

It was alleged that in 1993 Osama bin Laden was using Middle East based Sunni charities to channel financial support to al-Qaeda operatives overseas. The same documents also report Bin Laden's complaint that the failed assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had compromised the ability of al-Qaeda to exploit charities to support its operatives to the extent it was capable of before 1995.

Qatar financed al-Qaeda's enterprises through al-Qaeda's former affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. The funding was primarily channeled through kidnapping for ransom. The Consortium Against Terrorist Finance (CATF) reported that the Gulf country has funded al-Nusra since 2013. In 2017, Asharq Al-Awsat estimated that Qatar had disbursed $25 million in support of al-Nusra through kidnapping for ransom. In addition, Qatar has launched fundraising campaigns on behalf of al-Nusra. Al-Nusra acknowledged a Qatar-sponsored campaign "as one of the preferred conduits for donations intended for the group".

Strategy

This section needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (August 2016)

In the disagreement over whether al-Qaeda's objectives are religious or political, Mark Sedgwick describes al-Qaeda's strategy as political in the immediate term but with ultimate aims that are religious. On March 11, 2005, Al-Quds Al-Arabi published extracts from Saif al-Adel's document "Al Qaeda's Strategy to the Year 2020". Abdel Bari Atwan summarizes this strategy as comprising five stages to rid the Ummah from all forms of oppression:

  1. Provoke the United States and the West into invading a Muslim country by staging a massive attack or string of attacks on US soil that results in massive civilian casualties.
  2. Incite local resistance to occupying forces.
  3. Expand the conflict to neighboring countries and engage the US and its allies in a long war of attrition.
  4. Convert al-Qaeda into an ideology and set of operating principles that can be loosely franchised in other countries without requiring direct command and control, and via these franchises incite attacks against the US and countries allied with the US until they withdraw from the conflict, as happened with the 2004 Madrid train bombings, but which did not have the same effect with the July 7, 2005 London bombings.
  5. The US economy will finally collapse by 2020, under the strain of multiple engagements in numerous places. This will lead to a collapse in the worldwide economic system, and lead to global political instability. This will lead to a global jihad led by al-Qaeda, and a Wahhabi Caliphate will then be installed across the world.

Atwan noted that, while the plan is unrealistic, "it is sobering to consider that this virtually describes the downfall of the Soviet Union."

According to Fouad Hussein, a Jordanian journalist and author who has spent time in prison with Al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda's strategy consists of seven phases and is similar to the plan described in al-Qaeda's Strategy to the year 2020. These phases include:

  1. "The Awakening." This phase was supposed to last from 2001 to 2003. The goal of the phase is to provoke the United States to attack a Muslim country by executing an attack that kills many civilians on US soil.
  2. "Opening Eyes." This phase was supposed to last from 2003 to 2006. The goal of this phase was to recruit young men to the cause and to transform the al-Qaeda group into a movement. Iraq was supposed to become the center of all operations with financial and military support for bases in other states.
  3. "Arising and Standing up", was supposed to last from 2007 to 2010. In this phase, al-Qaeda wanted to execute additional attacks and focus their attention on Syria. Hussein believed other countries in the Arabian Peninsula were also in danger.
  4. Al-Qaeda expected a steady growth among their ranks and territories due to the declining power of the regimes in the Arabian Peninsula. The main focus of attack in this phase was supposed to be on oil suppliers and cyberterrorism, targeting the US economy and military infrastructure.
  5. The declaration of an Islamic Caliphate, which was projected between 2013 and 2016. In this phase, al-Qaeda expected the resistance from Israel to be heavily reduced.
  6. The declaration of an "Islamic Army" and a "fight between believers and non-believers", also called "total confrontation".
  7. "Definitive Victory", projected to be completed by 2020.

According to the seven-phase strategy, the war is projected to last less than two years.

According to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute and Katherine Zimmerman of the American Enterprise Institute, the new model of al-Qaeda is to "socialize communities" and build a broad territorial base of operations with the support of local communities, also gaining income independent of the funding of sheiks.

Name

The English name of the organization is a simplified transliteration of the Arabic noun al-qāʿidah (‏القاعدة‎), which means "the foundation" or "the base". The initial al- is the Arabic definite article "the", hence "the base". In Arabic, al-Qaeda has four syllables (/alˈqaː.ʕi.da/). However, since two of the Arabic consonants in the name are not phones found in the English language, the common naturalized English pronunciations include /ælˈkaɪdə/, /ælˈkeɪdə/ and /ˌælkɑːˈiːdə/. Al-Qaeda's name can also be transliterated as al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida, or el-Qaida.

The doctrinal concept of "al-Qaeda" was first coined by the Palestinian Islamist scholar and Jihadist leader Abdullah Azzam in an April 1988 issue of Al-Jihad magazine to describe a religiously committed vanguard of Muslims who wage armed Jihad globally to liberate oppressed Muslims from foreign invaders, establish sharia (Islamic law) across the Islamic World by overthrowing the ruling secular governments; and thus restore the past Islamic prowess. This was to be implemented by establishing an Islamic state that would nurture generations of Muslim soldiers that would perpetually attack United States and its allied governments in the Muslim World. Numerous historical models were cited by Azzam as successful examples of his call; starting from the early Muslim conquests of the 7th century to the recent anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad of the 1980s. According to Azzam's world-view:

It is about time to think about a state that would be a solid base for the distribution of the (Islamic) creed, and a fortress to host the preachers from the hell of the Jahiliyyah .

Bin Laden explained the origin of the term in a videotaped interview with Al Jazeera journalist Tayseer Alouni in October 2001:

The name 'al-Qaeda' was established a long time ago by mere chance. The late Abu Ebeida El-Banashiri established the training camps for our mujahedeen against Russia's terrorism. We used to call the training camp al-Qaeda. The name stayed.

It has been argued that two documents seized from the Sarajevo office of the Benevolence International Foundation prove the name was not simply adopted by the mujahideen movement and that a group called al-Qaeda was established in August 1988. Both of these documents contain minutes of meetings held to establish a new military group, and contain the term "al-Qaeda".

Former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook wrote that the word al-Qaeda should be translated as "the database", because it originally referred to the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen militants who were recruited and trained with CIA help to defeat the Russians. In April 2002, the group assumed the name Qa'idat al-Jihad (قاعدة الجهاد qāʿidat al-jihād), which means "the base of Jihad". According to Diaa Rashwan, this was "apparently as a result of the merger of the overseas branch of Egypt's al-Jihad, which was led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, with the groups Bin Laden brought under his control after his return to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s."

Ideology

Main article: Jihadism Further information: Qutbism and Egyptian Islamism
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Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian Islamic scholar and Jihadist theorist who inspired al-Qaeda

The pan-Islamist militant movement of al-Qaeda developed amid the rise of Islamic revivalist and Jihadist movements after the Iranian Revolution (1978–1979) and during the Afghan Jihad (1979–1989). The writings of Egyptian Islamist scholar and revolutionary ideologue Sayyid Qutb strongly inspired the founding leaders of al-Qaeda. In the 1950s and 1960s, Qutb preached that because of the lack of sharia law, the Muslim world was no longer Muslim, and had reverted to the pre-Islamic ignorance known as jahiliyyah. To restore Islam, Qutb argued that a vanguard of righteous Muslims was needed in order to establish "true Islamic states", implement sharia, and rid the Muslim world of any non-Muslim influences. In Qutb's view, the enemies of Islam included "world Jewry", which "plotted conspiracies" and opposed Islam. Qutb envisioned this vanguard to march forward to wage armed Jihad against tyrannical regimes after purifying from the wider Jahili societies and organising themselves under a righteous Islamic leadership; which he viewed as the model of early Muslims in the Islamic State of Medina under the leadership of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. This idea would directly influence many Islamist figures such as Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden; and became the core rationale for the formulation of "al-Qaeda" concept in the near future. Outlining his strategy to topple the existing secular orders, Qutb argued in Milestones:

a Muslim community to come into existence which believes that ‘there is no deity except God,’ which commits itself to obey none but God, denying all other authority, and which challenges the legality of any law which is not based on this belief.. . It should come into the battlefield with the determination that its strategy, its social organization, and the relationship between its individuals should be firmer and more powerful than the existing jahili system.

In the words of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a close college friend of bin Laden:

Islam is different from any other religion; it's a way of life. We were trying to understand what Islam has to say about how we eat, who we marry, how we talk. We read Sayyid Qutb. He was the one who most affected our generation.

Qutb also influenced Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri's uncle and maternal family patriarch, Mafouz Azzam, was Qutb's student, protégé, personal lawyer, and an executor of his estate. Azzam was one of the last people to see Qutb alive before his execution. Zawahiri paid homage to Qutb in his work Knights under the Prophet's Banner.

Qutb argued that many Muslims were not true Muslims. Some Muslims, Qutb argued, were apostates. These alleged apostates included leaders of Muslim countries, since they failed to enforce sharia law. He also alleged that the West approaches the Muslim World with a "crusading spirit"; in spite of the decline of religious values in the 20th century Europe. According to Qutb; the hostile and imperialist attitudes exhibited by Europeans and Americans towards Muslim countries, their support for Zionism, etc. reflected hatred amplified over a millennia of wars such as the Crusades and was born out of Roman materialist and utilitarian outlooks that viewed the world in monetary terms.

Formation

See also: Afghan Jihad

The Afghan jihad against the pro-Soviet government further developed the Salafist Jihadist movement which inspired al-Qaeda. During this period, al-Qaeda embraced the ideals of the Indian Muslim militant revivalist Syed Ahmad Barelvi (d. 1831) who led a Jihad movement against British India from the frontiers of Afghanistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkwa in the early 19th century. Al-Qaeda readily adopted Sayyid Ahmad's doctrines such as returning to the purity of early generations (Salaf as-Salih), antipathy towards Western influences and restoration of Islamic political power. According to Pakistani journalist Hussain Haqqani,

Sayyid Ahmed's revival of the ideology of jihad became the prototype for subsequent Islamic militant movements in South and Central Asia and is also the main influence over the jihad network of Al Qaeda and its associated groups in the region.

Objectives

The long-term objective of al-Qaeda is to unite the Muslim World under a supra-national Islamic state known as the Khilafah (Caliphate), headed by an elected Caliph descended from the Ahl al-Bayt (Muhammad's family). The immediate objectives include the expulsion of American troops from the Arabian Peninsula, waging armed Jihad to topple US-allied governments in the region, etc.

The following are the goals and some of the general policies outlined in al-Qaeda's Founding Charter "Al-Qaeda's Structure and Bylaws" issued in the meetings in Peshawar in 1988:

"General Goals

i. To promote jihad awareness in the Islamic world
ii. To prepare and equip the cadres for the Islamic world through trainings and by participating in actual combat
iii. To support and sponsor the jihad movement as much as possible
iv. To coordinate Jihad movements around the world in an effort to create a unified international Jihad movement.

General Policies
1. Complete commitment to the governing rules and controls of Shari‘a in all the beliefs and actions and according to the book and Sunna as well as per the interpretation of the nation's scholars who serve in this domain
2. Commitment to Jihad as a fight for God's cause and as an agenda of change and to prepare for it and apply it whenever we find it possible...
4. Our position with respect to the tyrants of the world, secular and national parties and the like is not to associate with them, to discredit them and to be their constant enemy till they believe in God alone. We shall not agree with them on half-solutions and there is no way to negotiate with them or appease them
5. Our relationships with truthful Islamic jihadist movements and groups is to cooperate under the umbrella of faith and belief and we shall always attempt to at uniting and integrating with them...
6. We shall carry a relationship of love and affection with the Islamic movements who are not aligned with Jihad...
7. We shall sustain a relationship of respect and love with active scholars...
9. We shall reject the regional fanatics and will pursue Jihad in an Islamic country as needed and when possible
10. We shall care about the role of Muslim people in the Jihad and we shall attempt to recruit them...
11. We shall maintain our economic independence and will not rely on others to secure our resources.
12. Secrecy is the main ingredient of our work except for what the need deems necessary to reveal

13. Our policy with the Afghani Jihad is support, advise and coordination with the Islamic Establishments in Jihad arenas in a manner that conforms with our policies"

— Al-Qa`ida's Structure and Bylaws, p.2,

Theory of Islamic State

See also: Islamic State Theory

Al-Qaeda aims to establish an Islamic state in the Arab World, modelled after the Rashidun Caliphate, by initiating a global Jihad against the "International Jewish-Crusader Alliance" led by the United States, which it sees as the "external enemy" and against the secular governments in Muslim countries, that are described as "the apostate domestic enemy". Once foreign influences and the secular ruling authorities are removed from Muslim countries through Jihad; al-Qaeda supports elections to choose the rulers of its proposed Islamic states. This is to be done through representatives of leadership councils (Shura) that would ensure the implementation of Shari'a (Islamic law). However, it opposes elections that institute parliaments which empower Muslim and non-Muslim legislators to collaborate in making laws of their own choosing. In the second edition of his book Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, Ayman Al Zawahiri writes:

We demand... the government of the rightly guiding caliphate, which is established on the basis of the sovereignty of sharia and not on the whims of the majority. Its ummah chooses its rulers....If they deviate, the ummah brings them to account and removes them. The ummah participates in producing that government's decisions and determining its direction. ... commands the right and forbids the wrong and engages in jihad to liberate Muslim lands and to free all humanity from all oppression and ignorance.

Grievances

A recurring theme in al-Qaeda's ideology is the perpetual grievance over the violent subjugation of Islamic dissidents by the authoritarian, secularist regimes allied to the West. Al-Qaeda denounces these post-colonial governments as a system led by Westernised elites designed to advance neo-colonialism and maintain Western hegemony over the Muslim World. The most prominent topic of grievance is over the American foreign policy in the Arab World; especially over its strong economic and military support to Israel. Other concerns of resentment include presence of NATO troops to support allied regimes; injustices committed against Muslims in Kashmir, Chechnya, Xinjiang, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq etc.

Religious compatibility

Abdel Bari Atwan wrote that:

While the leadership's own theological platform is essentially Salafi, the organization's umbrella is sufficiently wide to encompass various schools of thought and political leanings. Al-Qaeda counts among its members and supporters people associated with Wahhabism, Shafi'ism, Malikism, and Hanafism. There are even some Al-Qaeda members whose beliefs and practices are directly at odds with Salafism, such as Yunis Khalis, one of the leaders of the Afghan mujahedin. He was a mystic who visited the tombs of saints and sought their blessings – practices inimical to bin Laden's Wahhabi-Salafi school of thought. The only exception to this pan-Islamic policy is Shi'ism. Al-Qaeda seems implacably opposed to it, as it holds Shi'ism to be heresy. In Iraq it has openly declared war on the Badr Brigades, who have fully cooperated with the US, and now considers even Shi'i civilians to be legitimate targets for acts of violence.

On the other hand, Professor Peter Mandaville states that Al-Qaeda follows a pragmatic policy in forming its local affiliates, with various cells being sub-contracted to Shia Muslim and non-Muslim members. The top-down chain of command means that each unit is answerable directly to central leadership, while they remain ignorant of their counterparts' presence or activities. These transnational networks of autonomous supply chains, financiers, underground militias and political supporters were set up during the 1990s, when Bin Laden's immediate aim was the expulsion of American troops from the Arabian Peninsula.

Attacks on civilians

Under the leadership of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda organization adopted the strategy of targeting non-combatant civilians of enemy states that indiscriminately attacked Muslims. Following the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda provided a justification for the killing of non-combatants/civilians, entitled, "A Statement from Qaidat al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington". According to a couple of critics, Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, it provides "ample theological justification for killing civilians in almost any imaginable situation."

Among these justifications are that America is leading the west in waging a War on Islam so that attacks on America are a defense of Islam and any treaties and agreements between Muslim majority states and Western countries that would be violated by attacks are null and void. According to the tract, several conditions allow for the killing of civilians including:

  • retaliation for the American war on Islam which al-Qaeda alleges has targeted "Muslim women, children and elderly";
  • when it is too difficult to distinguish between non-combatants and combatants when attacking an enemy "stronghold" (hist) or non-combatants remain in enemy territory, killing them is allowed;
  • those who assist the enemy "in deed, word, mind" are eligible for killing, and this includes the general population in democratic countries because civilians can vote in elections that bring enemies of Islam to power;
  • the necessity of killing in the war to protect Islam and Muslims;
  • Muhammad, when asked whether the Muslim fighters could use the catapult against the village of Taif, replied affirmatively, even though the enemy fighters were mixed with a civilian population;
  • if the women, children and other protected groups serve as human shields for the enemy;
  • if the enemy has broken a treaty, killing of civilians is permitted.

Under the leadership of Sayf al-Adel, al-Qaeda's strategy has undergone transformation and the organization has officially renounced the tactic of attacking civilian targets of enemies. In his book Free Reading of 33 Strategies of War published in 2023, Sayf al-Adel counselled Islamist fighters to prioritize attacking the police forces, military soldiers, state assets of enemy governments, etc. which he described as acceptable targets in military operations. Asserting that attacking women and children of enemies are contrary to Islamic values, Sayf al-Adel asked: "If we target the general public, how can we expect their people to accept our call to Islam?"

History

Main article: History of al-Qaeda

Attacks

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of al-Qaeda attacks.
Nairobi, Kenya: August 7, 1998
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: August 7, 1998
Aden, Yemen: October 12, 2000
World Trade Center, US: September 11, 2001
The Pentagon, US: September 11, 2001
Istanbul, Turkey: November 15 and 20, 2003

Al-Qaeda has carried out a total of six major attacks, four of them in its jihad against America. In each case the leadership planned the attack years in advance, arranging for the shipment of weapons and explosives and using its businesses to provide operatives with safehouses and false identities.

1991

To prevent the former Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah from coming back from exile and possibly becoming head of a new government, bin Laden instructed a Portuguese convert to Islam, Paulo Jose de Almeida Santos, to assassinate Zahir Shah. On November 4, 1991, Santos entered the king's villa in Rome posing as a journalist and tried to stab him with a dagger. A tin of cigarillos in the king's breast pocket deflected the blade and saved Zahir Shah's life, although the king was also stabbed several times in the neck and was taken to hospital, later recovering from the attack. Santos was apprehended by General Abdul Wali, a former commander of the Royal Afghan Army, and jailed for 10 years in Italy.

1992

On December 29, 1992, al-Qaeda launched the 1992 Yemen hotel bombings. Two bombs were detonated in Aden, Yemen. The first target was the Movenpick Hotel and the second was the parking lot of the Goldmohur Hotel.

The bombings were an attempt to eliminate American soldiers on their way to Somalia to take part in the international famine relief effort, Operation Restore Hope. Internally, al-Qaeda considered the bombing a victory that frightened the Americans away, but in the US, the attack was barely noticed. No American soldiers were killed because no soldiers were staying in the hotel at the time it was bombed, however, an Australian tourist and a Yemeni hotel worker were killed in the bombing. Seven others, who were mostly Yemeni, were severely injured. Two fatwas are said to have been appointed by al-Qaeda's members, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, to justify the killings according to Islamic law. Salim referred to a famous fatwa appointed by Ibn Taymiyyah, a 13th-century scholar admired by Wahhabis, which sanctioned resistance by any means during the Mongol invasions.

Late 1990s

1998 Nairobi embassy bombing
Main articles: 1998 United States embassy bombings, 2000 millennium attack plots, and USS Cole bombing

In 1996, bin Laden personally engineered a plot to assassinate United States President Bill Clinton while the president was in Manila for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. However, intelligence agents intercepted a message before the motorcade was to leave, and alerted the US Secret Service. Agents later discovered a bomb planted under a bridge.

On August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda bombed the US embassies in East Africa, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans. In retaliation, a barrage of cruise missiles launched by the US military devastated an al-Qaeda base in Khost, Afghanistan. The network's capacity was unharmed. In late 1999 and 2000, al-Qaeda planned attacks to coincide with the millennium, masterminded by Abu Zubaydah and involving Abu Qatada, which would include the bombing of Christian holy sites in Jordan, the bombing of Los Angeles International Airport by Ahmed Ressam, and the bombing of the USS The Sullivans (DDG-68).

On October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda militants in Yemen bombed the missile destroyer USS Cole in a suicide attack, killing 17 US servicemen and damaging the vessel while it lay offshore. Inspired by the success of such a brazen attack, al-Qaeda's command core began to prepare for an attack on the US itself.

September 11 attacks

Main article: September 11 attacks Further information: Motives for the September 11 attacks
Aftermath of the September 11 attacks
Mohamed Atta, the pilot hijacker of American Airlines Flight 11 and leader of the September 11 attacks

The September 11 attacks on America by al-Qaeda killed 2,996 people – 2,507 civilians, 343 firefighters, 72 law enforcement officers, 55 military personnel as well as 19 hijackers who committed murder-suicide. Two commercial airliners were deliberately flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, a third into the Pentagon, and a fourth, originally intended to target either the United States Capitol or the White House, crashed in a field in Stonycreek Township near Shanksville, Pennsylvania after passengers revolted. It was the deadliest foreign attack on American soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and to this day remains the deadliest terrorist attack in human history.

The attacks were conducted by al-Qaeda, acting in accord with the 1998 fatwa issued against the US and its allies by persons under the command of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and others. Evidence points to suicide squads led by al-Qaeda military commander Mohamed Atta as the culprits of the attacks, with bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Hambali as the key planners and part of the political and military command.

Messages issued by bin Laden after September 11, 2001, praised the attacks, and explained their motivation while denying any involvement. Bin Laden strongly supported the attacks by identifying numerous grievances of Muslims, such as the general perception that the US was actively oppressing Muslims. In his "Letter to the American people" published in 2002, Osama Bin Laden stated:

Why are we fighting and opposing you? The answer is very simple:

(1) Because you attacked us and continue to attack us. ....

The American government and press still refuses to answer the question: Why did they attack us in New York and Washington?

If Sharon is a man of peace in the eyes of Bush, then we are also men of peace!!! America does not understand the language of manners and principles, so we are addressing it using the language it understands.

Bin Laden asserted that America was massacring Muslims in "Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq" and Muslims should retain the "right to attack in reprisal". He also claimed the 9/11 attacks were not targeted at people, but "America's icons of military and economic power", despite the fact he planned to attack in the morning when most of the people in the intended targets were present and thus generating the maximum number of human casualties.

Evidence later came to light that the original targets for the attack may have been nuclear power stations on the US East Coast. The targets were later altered by al-Qaeda, as it was feared that such an attack "might get out of hand".

Designation as a terrorist group

Al-Qaeda is deemed a designated terrorist group by the following countries and international organizations:

War on terror

Main articles: War on terror and List of wars and battles involving al-Qaeda
US troops in Afghanistan

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US government responded, and began to prepare its armed forces to overthrow the Taliban, which it believed was harboring al-Qaeda. The US offered Taliban leader Mullah Omar a chance to surrender bin Laden and his top associates. The first forces to be inserted into Afghanistan were paramilitary officers from the CIA's elite Special Activities Division (SAD).

The Taliban offered to turn over bin Laden to a neutral country for trial if the US would provide evidence of bin Laden's complicity in the attacks. US President George W. Bush responded by saying: "We know he's guilty. Turn him over", and British Prime Minister Tony Blair warned the Taliban regime: "Surrender bin Laden, or surrender power."

Soon thereafter the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan, and together with the Afghan Northern Alliance removed the Taliban government as part of the war in Afghanistan. As a result of the US special forces and air support for the Northern Alliance ground forces, a number of Taliban and al-Qaeda training camps were destroyed, and much of the operating structure of al-Qaeda is believed to have been disrupted. After being driven from their key positions in the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda fighters tried to regroup in the rugged Gardez region of the nation.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed after his arrest in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003

By early 2002, al-Qaeda had been dealt a serious blow to its operational capacity, and the Afghan invasion appeared to be a success. Nevertheless, a significant Taliban insurgency remained in Afghanistan.

Debate continued regarding the nature of al-Qaeda's role in the 9/11 attacks. The US State Department released a videotape showing bin Laden speaking with a small group of associates somewhere in Afghanistan shortly before the Taliban was removed from power. Although its authenticity has been questioned by a couple of people, the tape definitively implicates bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the September 11 attacks. The tape was aired on many television channels, with an accompanying English translation provided by the US Defense Department.

In September 2004, the 9/11 Commission officially concluded that the attacks were conceived and implemented by al-Qaeda operatives. In October 2004, bin Laden appeared to claim responsibility for the attacks in a videotape released through Al Jazeera, saying he was inspired by Israeli attacks on high-rises in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon: "As I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind and that we should destroy towers in America in order that they taste some of what we tasted and so that they be deterred from killing our women and children."

By the end of 2004, the US government proclaimed that two-thirds of the most senior al-Qaeda figures from 2001 had been captured and interrogated by the CIA: Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in 2002; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in 2003; and Saif al Islam el Masry in 2004. Mohammed Atef and several others were killed. The West was criticized for not being able to handle al-Qaeda despite a decade of the war.

Activities

Main countries of activity of al-Qaeda

Africa

Main article: Al-Qaeda involvement in Africa
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly GSPC) area of operations

Al-Qaeda involvement in Africa has included a number of bombing attacks in North Africa, while supporting parties in civil wars in Eritrea and Somalia. From 1991 to 1996, bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders were based in Sudan.

Islamist rebels in the Sahara calling themselves al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have stepped up their violence in recent years. French officials say the rebels have no real links to the al-Qaeda leadership, but this has been disputed. It seems likely that bin Laden approved the group's name in late 2006, and the rebels "took on the al Qaeda franchise label", almost a year before the violence began to escalate.

In Mali, the Ansar Dine faction was also reported as an ally of al-Qaeda in 2013. The Ansar al Dine faction aligned themselves with the AQIM.

In 2011, al-Qaeda's North African wing condemned Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and declared support for the Anti-Gaddafi rebels.

Following the Libyan Civil War, the removal of Gaddafi and the ensuing period of post-civil war violence in Libya, various Islamist militant groups affiliated with al-Qaeda were able to expand their operations in the region. The 2012 Benghazi attack, which resulted in the death of US Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, is suspected of having been carried out by various Jihadist networks, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia and several other al-Qaeda affiliated groups. The capture of Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, a senior al-Qaeda operative wanted by the United States for his involvement in the 1998 United States embassy bombings, on October 5, 2013, by US Navy Seals, FBI and CIA agents illustrates the importance the US and other Western allies have placed on North Africa.

Europe

Main article: Al-Qaeda activities in Europe

Prior to the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda was present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its members were mostly veterans of the El Mudžahid detachment of the Bosnian Muslim Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Three al-Qaeda operatives carried out the Mostar car bombing in 1997. The operatives were closely linked to and financed by the Saudi High Commission for Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina founded by then-prince King Salman of Saudi Arabia.

Before the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, westerners who had been recruits at al-Qaeda training camps were sought after by al-Qaeda's military wing. Language skills and knowledge of Western culture were generally found among recruits from Europe, such was the case with Mohamed Atta, an Egyptian national studying in Germany at the time of his training, and other members of the Hamburg Cell. Osama bin Laden and Mohammed Atef would later designate Atta as the ringleader of the 9/11 hijackers. Following the attacks, Western intelligence agencies determined that al-Qaeda cells operating in Europe had aided the hijackers with financing and communications with the central leadership based in Afghanistan.

In 2003, Islamists carried out a series of bombings in Istanbul killing fifty-seven people and injuring seven hundred. Seventy-four people were charged by the Turkish authorities. Some had previously met bin Laden, and though they specifically declined to pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda they asked for its blessing and help.

In 2009, three Londoners, Tanvir Hussain, Assad Sarwar and Ahmed Abdullah Ali, were convicted of conspiring to detonate bombs disguised as soft drinks on seven airplanes bound for Canada and the US. The MI5 investigation regarding the plot involved more than a year of surveillance work conducted by over two hundred officers. British and US officials said the plot – unlike many similar homegrown European Islamic militant plots – was directly linked to al-Qaeda and guided by senior al-Qaeda members in Pakistan.

In 2012, Russian Intelligence indicated that al-Qaeda had given a call for "forest jihad" and has been starting massive forest fires as part of a strategy of "thousand cuts".

Arab world

Main articles: Al-Qaeda involvement in Asia, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and USS Cole bombing
USS Cole after the October 2000 attack

Following Yemeni unification in 1990, Wahhabi networks began moving missionaries into the country. Although it is unlikely bin Laden or Saudi al-Qaeda were directly involved, the personal connections they made would be established over the next decade and used in the USS Cole bombing. Concerns grew over al-Qaeda's group in Yemen.

In Iraq, al-Qaeda forces loosely associated with the leadership were embedded in the Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group commanded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Specializing in suicide operations, they have been a "key driver" of the Sunni insurgency. Although they played a small part in the overall insurgency, between 30% and 42% of all suicide bombings which took place in the early years were claimed by Zarqawi's group. Reports have indicated that oversights such as the failure to control access to the Qa'qaa munitions factory in Yusufiyah have allowed large quantities of munitions to fall into the hands of al-Qaida. In November 2010, the militant group Islamic State of Iraq, which is linked to al-Qaeda in Iraq, threatened to "exterminate all Iraqi Christians".

Al-Qaeda did not begin training Palestinians until the late 1990s. Large groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have rejected an alliance with al-Qaeda, fearing that al-Qaeda will co-opt their cells. This may have changed recently. The Israeli security and intelligence services believe al-Qaeda has managed to infiltrate operatives from the Occupied Territories into Israel, and is waiting for an opportunity to attack.

As of 2015, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are openly supporting the Army of Conquest, an umbrella rebel group fighting in the Syrian Civil War against the Syrian government that reportedly includes an al-Qaeda linked al-Nusra Front and another Salafi coalition known as Ahrar al-Sham.

Kashmir

Main article: Kashmir conflict

Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri consider India to be a part of an alleged Crusader-Zionist-Hindu conspiracy against the Islamic world. According to a 2005 report by the Congressional Research Service, bin Laden was involved in training militants for Jihad in Kashmir while living in Sudan in the early 1990s. By 2001, Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had become a part of the al-Qaeda coalition. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), al-Qaeda was thought to have established bases in Pakistan administered Kashmir (in Azad Kashmir, and to some extent in Gilgit–Baltistan) during the 1999 Kargil War and continued to operate there with tacit approval of Pakistan's Intelligence services.

Many of the militants active in Kashmir were trained in the same madrasahs as Taliban and al-Qaeda. Fazlur Rehman Khalil of Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was a signatory of al-Qaeda's 1998 declaration of Jihad against America and its allies. In a 'Letter to American People' (2002), bin Laden wrote that one of the reasons he was fighting America was because of its support to India on the Kashmir issue. In November 2001, Kathmandu airport went on high alert after threats that bin Laden planned to hijack a plane and crash it into a target in New Delhi. In 2002, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on a trip to Delhi, suggested that al-Qaeda was active in Kashmir though he did not have any evidence. Rumsfeld proposed hi-tech ground sensors along the Line of Control to prevent militants from infiltrating into Indian-administered Kashmir. An investigation in 2002 found evidence that al-Qaeda and its affiliates were prospering in Pakistan-administered Kashmir with tacit approval of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. In 2002, a special team of Special Air Service and Delta Force was sent into Indian-administered Kashmir to hunt for bin Laden after receiving reports that he was being sheltered by Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, which had been responsible for kidnapping western tourists in Kashmir in 1995. Britain's highest-ranking al-Qaeda operative Rangzieb Ahmed had previously fought in Kashmir with the group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and spent time in Indian prison after being captured in Kashmir.

US officials believe al-Qaeda was helping organize attacks in Kashmir in order to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan. Their strategy was to force Pakistan to move its troops to the border with India, thereby relieving pressure on al-Qaeda elements hiding in northwestern Pakistan. In 2006 al-Qaeda claimed they had established a wing in Kashmir. However Indian Army General H. S. Panag argued that the army had ruled out the presence of al-Qaeda in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Panag also said al-Qaeda had strong ties with Kashmiri militant groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed based in Pakistan. It has been noted that Waziristan has become a battlefield for Kashmiri militants fighting NATO in support of al-Qaeda and Taliban. Dhiren Barot, who wrote the Army of Madinah in Kashmir and was an al-Qaeda operative convicted for involvement in the 2004 financial buildings plot, had received training in weapons and explosives at a militant training camp in Kashmir.

Maulana Masood Azhar, the founder of Kashmiri group Jaish-e-Mohammed, is believed to have met bin Laden several times and received funding from him. In 2002, Jaish-e-Mohammed organized the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl in an operation run in conjunction with al-Qaeda and funded by bin Laden. According to American counter-terrorism expert Bruce Riedel, al-Qaeda and Taliban were closely involved in the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814 to Kandahar which led to the release of Maulana Masood Azhar and Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh from an Indian prison. This hijacking, Riedel said, was rightly described by then Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh as a 'dress rehearsal' for September 11 attacks. Bin Laden personally welcomed Azhar and threw a lavish party in his honor after his release. Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, who had been in prison for his role in the 1994 kidnappings of Western tourists in India, went on to murder Daniel Pearl and was sentenced to death in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda operative Rashid Rauf, who was one of the accused in 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot, was related to Maulana Masood Azhar by marriage.

Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Kashmiri militant group which is thought to be behind 2008 Mumbai attacks, is also known to have strong ties to senior al-Qaeda leaders living in Pakistan. In late 2002, top al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah was arrested while being sheltered by Lashkar-e-Taiba in a safe house in Faisalabad. The FBI believes al-Qaeda and Lashkar have been 'intertwined' for a long time while the CIA has said that al-Qaeda funds Lashkar-e-Taiba. Jean-Louis Bruguière told Reuters in 2009 that "Lashkar-e-Taiba is no longer a Pakistani movement with only a Kashmir political or military agenda. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a member of al-Qaeda."

In a video released in 2008, American-born senior al-Qaeda operative Adam Yahiye Gadahn said that "victory in Kashmir has been delayed for years; it is the liberation of the jihad there from this interference which, Allah willing, will be the first step towards victory over the Hindu occupiers of that Islam land."

In September 2009, a US drone strike reportedly killed Ilyas Kashmiri who was the chief of Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, a Kashmiri militant group associated with al-Qaeda. Kashmiri was described by Bruce Riedel as a 'prominent' al-Qaeda member while others have described him as head of military operations for al-Qaeda. Kashmiri was also charged by the US in a plot against Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper which was at the center of Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy. US officials also believe that Kashmiri was involved in the Camp Chapman attack against the CIA. In January 2010, Indian authorities notified Britain of an al-Qaeda plot to hijack an Indian airlines or Air India plane and crash it into a British city. This information was uncovered from interrogation of Amjad Khwaja, an operative of Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, who had been arrested in India.

In January 2010, US Defense secretary Robert Gates, while on a visit to Pakistan, said that al-Qaeda was seeking to destabilize the region and planning to provoke a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Internet

Al-Qaeda and its successors have migrated online to escape detection in an atmosphere of increased international vigilance. The group's use of the Internet has grown more sophisticated, with online activities that include financing, recruitment, networking, mobilization, publicity, and information dissemination, gathering and sharing.

Abu Ayyub al-Masri's al-Qaeda movement in Iraq regularly releases short videos glorifying the activity of jihadist suicide bombers. In addition, both before and after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq), the umbrella organization to which al-Qaeda in Iraq belongs, the Mujahideen Shura Council, has a regular presence on the Web.

The range of multimedia content includes guerrilla training clips, stills of victims about to be murdered, testimonials of suicide bombers, and videos that show participation in jihad through stylized portraits of mosques and musical scores. A website associated with al-Qaeda posted a video of captured American entrepreneur Nick Berg being decapitated in Iraq. Other decapitation videos and pictures, including those of Paul Johnson, Kim Sun-il (posted on websites), and Daniel Pearl obtained by investigators, have taken place.

In December 2004 an audio message claiming to be from bin Laden was posted directly to a website, rather than sending a copy to al Jazeera as he had done in the past. Al-Qaeda turned to the Internet for release of its videos in order to be certain they would be available unedited, rather than risk the possibility of al Jazeera editing out anything critical of the Saudi royal family.

Alneda.com and Jehad.net were perhaps the most significant al-Qaeda websites. Alneda was initially taken down by American Jon Messner, but the operators resisted by shifting the site to various servers and strategically shifting content.

The US government charged a British information technology specialist, Babar Ahmad, with terrorist offences related to his operating a network of English-language al-Qaeda websites, such as Azzam.com. He was convicted and sentenced to 12+1⁄2 years in prison.

Online communications

In 2007, al-Qaeda released Mujahedeen Secrets, encryption software used for online and cellular communications. A later version, Mujahideen Secrets 2, was released in 2008.

Aviation network

Al-Qaeda is believed to be operating a clandestine aviation network including "several Boeing 727 aircraft", turboprops and executive jets, according to a 2010 Reuters story. Based on a US Department of Homeland Security report, the story said al-Qaeda is possibly using aircraft to transport drugs and weapons from South America to various unstable countries in West Africa. A Boeing 727 can carry up to ten tons of cargo. The drugs eventually are smuggled to Europe for distribution and sale, and the weapons are used in conflicts in Africa and possibly elsewhere. Gunmen with links to al-Qaeda have been increasingly kidnapping Europeans for ransom. The profits from the drug and weapon sales, and kidnappings can, in turn, fund more militant activities.

Involvement in military conflicts

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The following is a list of military conflicts in which al-Qaeda and its direct affiliates have taken part militarily.

Start of conflict End of conflict Conflict Continent Location Branches involved
1991 ongoing Somali Civil War Africa Somalia Al-Shabaab
1992 1996 Civil war in Afghanistan (1992–1996) Asia Islamic State of Afghanistan Al-Qaeda Central
1992 ongoing Al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen Asia Yemen Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
1996 2001 Civil war in Afghanistan (1996–2001) Asia Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Al-Qaeda Central
2001 2021 War in Afghanistan (2001–2021) Asia Afghanistan Al-Qaeda Central
2002 ongoing Insurgency in the Maghreb (2002–present) Africa Algeria
Chad
Mali
Mauritania
Morocco
Niger
Tunisia 		Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
2003 2011 Iraq War Asia Iraq Al-Qaeda in Iraq

Islamic State of Iraq

2004 ongoing War in North-West Pakistan Asia Pakistan Al-Qaeda Central
2009 2017 Insurgency in the North Caucasus Asia Russia Caucasus Emirate
2011 ongoing Syrian Civil War Asia Syria al-Nusra Front
2015 ongoing Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen Asia Yemen Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

Broader influence

Anders Behring Breivik, the perpetrator of the 2011 Norway attacks, was inspired by al-Qaeda, calling it "the most successful revolutionary movement in the world." While admitting different aims, he sought to "create a European version of Al-Qaida."

The appropriate response to offshoots is a subject of debate. A journalist reported in 2012 that a senior US military planner had asked: "Should we resort to drones and Special Operations raids every time some group raises the black banner of al Qaeda? How long can we continue to chase offshoots of offshoots around the world?"

Criticism

According to CNN journalists Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, a number of "religious scholars, former fighters and militants" who previously supported Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) had turned against the al-Qaeda-supported Iraqi insurgency in 2008; due to ISI's indiscriminate attacks against civilians while targeting US-led coalition forces. American military analyst Bruce Riedel wrote in 2008 that "a wave of revulsion" arose against ISI, which enabled US-allied Sons of Iraq faction to turn various tribal leaders in the Anbar region against the Iraqi insurgency. In response, Bin Laden and Zawahiri issued public statements urging Muslims to rally behind ISI leadership and support the armed struggle against American forces.

In November 2007, former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) member Noman Benotman responded with a public, open letter of criticism to Ayman al-Zawahiri, after persuading the imprisoned senior leaders of his former group to enter into peace negotiations with the Libyan regime. While Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the affiliation of the group with al-Qaeda in November 2007, the Libyan government released 90 members of the group from prison several months after "they were said to have renounced violence."

In 2007, on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks, the Saudi sheikh Salman al-Ouda delivered a personal rebuke to bin Laden. Al-Ouda addressed al-Qaeda's leader on television asking him:

My brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed ... in the name of al-Qaeda? Will you be happy to meet God Almighty carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands or millions on your back?

According to Pew polls, support for al-Qaeda had dropped in the Muslim world in the years before 2008. In Saudi Arabia, only ten percent had a favorable view of al-Qaeda, according to a December 2007 poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington-based think tank.

In 2007, the imprisoned Dr. Fadl, who was an influential Afghan Arab and former associate of Ayman al-Zawahiri, withdrew his support from al-Qaeda and criticized the organization in his book Wathiqat Tarshid Al-'Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w'Al-'Alam (English: Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World). In response, Al-Zawahiri accused Dr. Fadl of promoting "an Islam without jihad" that aligns with Western interests and wrote a nearly two hundred pages long treatise, titled "The Exoneration" which appeared on the Internet in March 2008. In his treatise, Zawahiri justified military strikes against US targets as retaliatory attacks to defend Muslim community against American aggression.

In an online town hall forum conducted in December 2007, Zawahiri denied that al-Qaeda deliberately targeted innocents and accused the American coalition of killing innocent people. Although once associated with al-Qaeda, in September 2009 LIFG completed a new "code" for jihad, a 417-page religious document entitled "Corrective Studies". Given its credibility and the fact that several other prominent Jihadists in the Middle East have turned against al-Qaeda, the LIFG's reversal may be an important step toward staunching al-Qaeda's recruitment.

Other criticisms

Bilal Abdul Kareem, an American journalist based in Syria created a documentary about al-Shabab, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia. The documentary included interviews with former members of the group who stated their reasons for leaving al-Shabab. The members made accusations of segregation, lack of religious awareness and internal corruption and favoritism. In response to Kareem, the Global Islamic Media Front condemned Kareem, called him a liar, and denied the accusations from the former fighters.

In mid-2014 after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant declared that they had restored the Caliphate, an audio statement was released by the then-spokesman of the group Abu Muhammad al-Adnani claiming that "the legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the Caliphate's authority." The speech included a religious refutation of al-Qaeda for being too lenient regarding Shiites and their refusal to recognize the authority Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Adnani specifically noting: "It is not suitable for a state to give allegiance to an organization." He also recalled a past instance in which Osama bin Laden called on al-Qaeda members and supporters to give allegiance to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi when the group was still solely operating in Iraq, as the Islamic State of Iraq, and condemned Ayman al-Zawahiri for not making this same claim for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Zawahiri was encouraging factionalism and division between former allies of ISIL such as the al-Nusra Front.

See also

Publications

References

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  2. "Aden intelligence service building targeted". Gulf News. Agence France-Presse. August 22, 2015. Archived from the original on August 22, 2015. Retrieved August 22, 2015.
  3. ^ Gallagher & Willsky-Ciollo 2021, p. 14
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  5. ^ Moussalli, Ahmad S. (2012). "Sayyid Qutb: Founder of Radical Islamic Political Ideology". In Akbarzadeh, Shahram (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Political Islam (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge. pp. 24–26. ISBN 978-1-138-57782-4. LCCN 2011025970. Archived from the original on January 11, 2023. Retrieved October 25, 2021.
  6. O'Bagy, Elizabeth (2012). Middle East Security Report: Al-Qaeda Sunni Islamist Rebels – Jihad in Syria (PDF). Vol. 6. Washington, D.C. p. 27. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 27, 2014. Retrieved September 21, 2012.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
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  9. ^ Atwan, Abdel Bari (March 11, 2005). The Secret History of Al Qaeda. University of California Press. p. 221. ISBN 0-520-24974-7. Retrieved May 8, 2011 – via Internet Archive.
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  11. Aydınlı, Ersel (2018). "The Jihadists pre-9/11". Violent Non-State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists. Routledge Studies on Challenges, Crises, and Dissent in World Politics (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-315-56139-4. LCCN 2015050373.
  12. Wright 2006, p. 79
  14. Giustozzi, Antonio (2023). "2: The strategies of global jihadists in Pakistan after 2001". Jihadism in Pakistan. New York: I.B. Tauris. pp. 27–52. ISBN 978-0-7556-4735-4.
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