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War of the Pacific
Map showing changes of territory due to the war
Date 1879-1883 Location Peru and Bolivia in Pacific coast of South America Result Chilean victory Territorial changes Litoral Department (Antofagasta) ceded by Bolivia to Chile in 1904. Tarapaca Department ceded by Peru to Chile in 1884. Puna de Atacama ceded by Bolivia/Chile to Argentina in 1889/1899 Tarata occupied by Chile in 1885, return to Peru in 1925. Arica province occupied by Chile in 1884, ceded by Peru in 1929. Tacna (Sama River) occupied by Chile in 1884, return to Peru in 1929.
Belligerents
Republic of Peru Republic of Bolivia	Republic of Chile
Commanders and leaders
President of Peru Mariano Ignacio Prado (1876-1879) Nicolás de Piérola (1879-1881) Francisco García C. (12.Mar.1881-28.Sep.1881) Lizardo Montero Flores (South Peru 1881-1882) Miguel Iglesias (North Peru 1882-1885) President of Bolivia Hilarion Daza (1876-1879) Narciso Campero (1879-1884)	President of Chile Anibal Pinto (1876-1881) Domingo Santa Maria (1881-1886)
Strength
1879 Bolivian Army: 2,300 soldiers Bolivian Navy: None Peruvian Army: 4,700 soldiers Remington and Minie rifles. Blakely cannon Peruvian Navy: 2 ironclad, 1 corvette, 1 gunboat 1881 Peruvian Army: 28,000 soldiers Peruvian Navy: None	1879 Chilean Army: 4,000 soldiers Comblain rifle. Krupp cannon Chilean Navy: 2 battleships, 4 corvettes, 2 gunboats 1881 Chilean Army: 45,000 soldiers Chilean Navy: 2 battleships, 3 ironclads, 4 corvettes, 2 gunboats
Casualties and losses
18,213 Killed in Action 7,896 Wounded 10,467 Killed/Wounded (9,103 POWs)	2,825 Killed in Action 7,347 Wounded

The War of the Pacific, occurring from 1879-1884, was a conflict between Chile and the joint forces of Bolivia and Peru. Also known as the "Saltpeter War," the war arose from disputes over the control of territory that contained substantial mineral-rich deposits. After an illegal Bolivian tax increase and later confiscation of Chilean property, Chile responded with the occupation of Bolivian territory. The war officially began on 1879, after the Bolivian declaration of war and the activation of the casus foederis of the treaty between Peru and Bolivia. The conclusion of the conflict ultimately led to the Chilean acquisition of the Peruvian territories of Tarapaca and Arica, as well as the disputed Bolivian department of Litoral, leaving Bolivia as a landlocked country.

Background

In 1879 Peru covered 1,5 to 1,6 million square kilometers and had approximately 2,5 to 2,7 millions. His ally, Bolivia, didn't had a census but by guess had 2,3 millions inhabitants in 1,3 million km2. Chile was the small country with only 2,25 millions inhabitants in 0,36 million km2

The dry climate of the Peruvian and Bolivian coasts had permitted the accumulation and preservation of vast amounts of high-quality nitrate deposits such as guano and saltpeter over many thousands of years. In the 1840s, the discovery of the use of guano as a fertilizer and saltpeter as a key ingredient in explosives made the Atacama desert strategically and economically valuable. Bolivia, Chile, and Peru suddenly found themselves sitting on the largest reserves of a resource that the world needed.

But at the beginning of the 1870s the Long Depression hit the three countries and pressed the governments to obtain more revenues from the nitrate: Peru nationalized the trade of nitrate, Bolivia increased the tax on nitrate in spite of the agreement in the Boundary treaty of 1874 and Chile was inflexible regarding the Bolivian tax increase

Boundary disputes in South America

After the wars of the independence, the new republics accepted the Uti possidetis doctrine in order to define the frontiers but the different maps versions were controversial because cartographers often had a vague idea of the unknown and unhabitated territories. In fact, in the 1870s there were boundary conflicts between Chile and Argentina, Chile and Bolivia, Argentina and Bolivia, Argentina and Brasil, Brasil and Peru, Brasil and Bolivia and between Brasil and Chile.

Boundary treaty of 1866 between Bolivia and Chile

A conflicting situation between Bolivia and Chile developed because no permanent borders had been established between the nations. Claiming their borders according to the uti possidetis principle, Bolivia and Chile disagree on whether the territory of Charcas, originally part of the Viceroyalty of Peru and, later, part of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata, had access to the sea. Eventually, the two countries negotiated the Boundary Treaty of 1866 that established the 24°S parallel as their national boundaries and entitled Chile and Bolivia equal rights to share the tax revenue on mineral exports from the territory between the 23°S and 25°S parallels, which comprised a large part of the Atacama desert.

The 1866 treaty led to disagreement over the definition of "metall", over the administration of civil law in the zones, and over the question whether the boundary line ran from parallel 24°S, the shortest route to the Andes, or straight east to them.

Treaty of alliance between Bolivia and Peru of 1873

On February 6, 1873, Peru and Bolivia signed a Treaty of alliance which guaranteed the independence, sovereignty and the integrity of their territories, and obliged them to defend each other against all foreign aggression. An additional clause kept the treaty secret among the allies. Argentina had begun talks with Peru and Bolivia to join the alliance, and the Chamber of Deputies, in a secret session, approved the law, but the Argentine Senate postponed the matter to 1874. Chile was not directly mentioned in the text of the treaty and was not informed about its existence. Historians disagree about the nature of the treaty. Some historians call it a defensive pact but other historians see it as a offensive pact. The Chilean government regarded it as a menace and mentioned it as one of the reasons of the declaration of war.

Boundary treaty of 1874 between Bolivia and Chile

In 1874, Chile and Bolivia superseded the boundary treaty signed in 1866 with the same boundary, parallel 24°S, granting Bolivia the authority to collect full tax revenue between the 23°S and 24°S parallels, fixing the tax rates on Chilean companies for 25 years.

Rivalry between Chile and Peru

Historically, Peru had been the jewel of the Spanish Empire, while Chile was the subordinate, poor cousin.

During the War of the Confederation, (1836 - 1839) Chile participated in a Peruvian civil war and dissolved a Peru-Bolivia confederation that theatened the regional balance of power. On a deeper level, both countries were in a heated competition for the control of the commercial routes on the Pacific; and for the Chileans specially, whose relations with independent Peru had already been strained by economic problems centering on the rivalry between their ports of Callao and Valparaíso.

During and after the Chincha Islands War (1864-1866, against the spanish Fleet), the Peruvian Navy with two ironclads outgunned the Chilean Navy that possesed only wooden ships.

In 1872, Peru began to get involved in the Chile-Bolivia dispute when it attempted to use its naval power in order to help Bolivia obtain a definite boundary.

But on December 26, 1874, the recently built Chilean ironclad Cochrane arrived in Valparaiso; it remained in Chile until the completion of the Blanco Encalada, throwing the balance of power in the south Pacific ocean towards Chile. Following this turn of events, Peru postponed the Argentine signing of the alliance treaty.

Economic interests

After the discovery of the profitable use of guano and saltpeter, the population of the Atacama became quickly populated by Chilean investors backed by Europeans. Due to the natural barrier that the Andes mountains created between the Bolivian altiplano and the Pacific coast, Bolivians were not able to colonize the area with as great a quantity. Chilean and foreign enterprises in the region eventually extended all the way to the Peruvian saltpeter mines.

The US-American historian William F. Sater gives 4 possible and non-contradictory reasons for the begin of the war:

1. The holder of the Chilean nitrate companies "bulldozed" the Chilean president Aníbal Pinto into declaring war in order to protect the owner of the Compañia de Salitres y Ferrocarril and later to seize Bolivia's and Peru's salitreras.
2. The true causes of the conflict are not economic but geopolitical: a struggle for control of the southwestern portion of the Pacific ocean.
3. Peru desired to monopolize and appropriate the nitrate works to strengthen its nitrate monopoly and in order to achieve it, the Bolivian and Chilean salitreras had to be controlled by Peru.
4. The declarations of war between Chile and Peru were a product of popular domestic forces, that is, the president had to enter into war or to abandon and cede.

Crisis

The ten cents tax

A major crisis took place in 1878 when the National Congress of Bolivia and a National Constituent Assembly found an 1873 contract authorizing the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company to extract saltpeter duty-free for 15 years to be incomplete due to a lack of ratification from the Bolivian Congress as required by the constitution of 1871. The Bolivian Congress proposed to approve the contract only if the company would pay a 10 cents tax per quintal of mineral extracted, but the company complained the increased payments were illegal and demanded an intervention from the Chilean government which, in response, claimed the border treaty of 1874 did not allow for such a tax hike. When the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company refused to pay the tax, the Bolivian government under President Hilarion Daza threatened to confiscate its property and, in December 1878, Chile sent a warship to the area.

Occupation of Antofagasta and Peruvian Mediation

After the company refused to pay the tax, Bolivia announced the seizure and auction of the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company on February 14, 1879. Chile announced that such an action would render the border treaty null.

On the day of the auction, 500 Chilean soldiers went ashore from the Chilean ships and occupied the Bolivian port city of Antofagasta, whose population was 93%-95% Chilean, without a fight. According to Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre, not only did the Chilean troops occupy the city without any major resistance, but they also received widespread public support and encouragement. A few days later the Chilean troops occupied all Bolivian towns and nitrate mines in the Atacama desert up to the border with Peru: Calama, Caracoles, Cobija and Tocopilla. Bolivian soldiers and civilian residents made a futile attempt to oppose the Chilean troops at the Battle of Topáter, on March 23, 1879, whilst the Chileans were on their way to occupy Calama. This became the first battle of the war. Further land battles would not take place until the war at sea was resolved.

Peru attempted to mediate the conflict by sending Jose Antonio Lavalle, a senior diplomat, to negotiate with the Chilean government in order to request for Chile to return Antofagasta to Bolivian authorities. Nonetheless, previous Peruvian demands favoring Bolivia and the Lavalle's denial of knowing about the existence of a secret treaty caused the Chilean government to stall negotiations under suspicion that Peru's mediation was not Bona fide, and that it was only trying to gain time while it hurried its war preparations. On March 14, Alejandro Fierro, Chilean Foreign Minister, sent a telegram to the Chilean representative in Lima, Joaquin Godoy, requesting immediate neutrality from the Peruvian government. On March 17, Godoy formally presented the Chilean proposal in a meeting with Peruvian president Mariano Ignacio Prado who, the following day, told Godoy that there existed a treaty allying Peru with Bolivia.

On March 1. 1879 Bolivian dictator Hilarión Daza declared war on Chile Bolivia then requested Peru to activate the secret treaty of 1873, officially titled defensive, as they felt that the Chilean invasion of Antofagasta constituted a casus foederis of the alliance. Two weeks later the Bolivian declaration of war came to Santiago de Chile.

On March 24, Peru responded to Chile and Bolivia by proposing consideration in the Peruvian Congress of April 24 of both the Chilean proposal for neutrality and the Bolivian request of alliance. On March 31, after receiving the secret treaty from Lima, Lavalle proceeded to read the whole treaty to Fierro and told him that it was not offensive to Chile. Acknowledging awareness of the Bolivia-Peru alliance, Chile responded by breaking diplomatic ties and formally declaring war on both Bolivia and Peru on April 5, 1879. On April 6, Peru declared casus foederis of the defensive alliance treaty, stating that it had officially come into effect.

The Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre wrote about the Bolivian intentions with the declaration of war:

The Chilean version saw that Bolivia aimed to impede the purchase of weapons to Chile. In reality, Daza intended to eliminate Lavalle's mission. Once again the Peruvian legation in La Paz failed because in accordance with the treaty such act should have been done in agreement between both . As long as no state of war between Chile and Bolivia existed , Chile couldn't require neutrality from Peru. Since Bolivia declared the war on Chile, the Chilean request of Peruvian neutrality was inevitable. The Bolivian declaration of war on Chile was (as stated by Chilean historian Bulnes) a traverse fault through the wheel of Lavalle's handkart.

The War

Naval campaign

Given the few roads and railroad lines, the nearly waterless and largely unpopulated Atacama desert was a rough terrain to conquer and maintain occupied for long. From the beginning of the war it became clear that, in order to achieve control of the local nitrate industry in a difficult desert terrain, control of the sea would prove to be the deciding factor of the war.

By 1879 Bolivia didn't possess ships, but on 26. March 1879 Daza formally offered letters of marque to combat for Bolivia. Bolivia hadn't signed the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law but the USA, England and France refused the legality of Bolivia's act. Since Bolivia hadn't ports anymore because of the Chilean occupation and Peru discouraged the measure, the naval conflict was left to be resolved between the Chile and Perú.

The power of the Chilean navy was based on the twin central-battery ironclad frigates, Cochrane and Blanco Encalada, of 3,560 tons, equipped with 6 guns of 250 pounds of muzzle-loading, 2 of 70, 2 of 40 pounds, a shield of 9 inches, and had a maximum capacity speed of 11 miles. The rest of the fleet was formed by the corvettes Chacabuco, O'Higgins, and Esmeralda, the gunboat Magallanes, and the schooner Covadonga.

The Peruvian navy based its power on the broadside ironclad frigate Independencia and the monitor Huáscar. The Independencia of 3,500 tons, had a shield of 4 ½ inches, 2 guns of 150 pounds, 12 of 70, 4 of 32, 4 of 9 pounds, and had a maximum capacity speed of 11 miles. The monitor Huáscar of 1,745 tons, had a shield of 4 ½ inches, 2 muzzle-loading guns of 300 pounds, and had a maximum capacity speed of 11 miles. The rest of the fleet was completed by the corvette Unión, the gunboat Pilcomayo, and the coastal monitors Atahualpa and Manco Cápac. Although both the Chilean and Peruvian ironclads seemed evenly matched, the Chilean ironclads had twice the armor and held a greater range and hitting power.

In one of the first naval tactical moves of the war, the Peruvian port of Iquique was blocked by of the Chilean Navy. In the Battle of Iquique, which took place on May 21 of 1879, the Peruvian monitor Huáscar, sank the Chilean corvette Esmeralda. At around the same time, the Peruvian frigate Independencia, chases the Chilean schooner Covadonga through shallow coastal zones which eventually caused the heavier Independencia to crash at Punta Gruesa. The tactical results of the naval battles of Iquique and Punta Gruesa were the lift of the blockade of the port of Iquique, the Chilean wooden ship Esmeralda and the Peruvian ironclad Independencia sunk.

The outgunned Huáscar managed to avoid engagement with the superior battleships of the Chilean navy for six months. Among the actions of these "Excursions of the Huáscar" are the Battle of Antofagasta (May 26, 1879) and the Second Battle Antofagasta (August 28, 1879). The most successful of the excursions was the capture of the steamship Rímac on July 23, 1879. Not only is the ship captured, but the cavalry regiment Carabineros de Yungay which was on board is also captured, making this the largest loss the Chilean army had thus far had in the war. This causes a crisis in the Chilean government which causes the resignation of admiral Juan Williams Rebolledo commander of the Chilean fleet. who was replaced by commodore Galvarino Riveros Cárdenas, who devises a plan to catch the Huáscar.

The decisive battle of the sea campaign took place in Punta Angamos, on October 8, 1879. In this battle, the monitor Huáscar was finally captured by the Chilean Navy, despite the attempts of its crew to sink the ship. Finally the Peruvian Navy was completely defeated during the blockade of Callao, where the Peruvian fleet was set on fire and the coastal defenses of Callao were destroyed or taken to Chile.

Campaign of Tarapaca

Once the naval superiority was achieved, the troops of the Chilean army began the occcupation of the Peruvian province of Tarapacá.

On 2 November 1879 at 7:15 began the naval bombardment and disembarkment at the small port of Pisagua and the Junin Cove, –some 500 km North of Antofagasta. At Pisagua, several landing waves Chilean troops attacked beach defenses held by Allies, and took the town. By the end of the day, the Chilean army were ashore and moving inland.

From Pisagua the Chileans marched south towards the city of Iquique with 6,000 troops and defeated on 19 November 1879 the 7,400 troops allies gathered in Agua Santa in Battle of San Francisco/Dolores. Bolivians forces retreated to Oruro and Peruvians to Tiliviche. Four days later, the Chilean army captured Iquique without resistance.

A detachment of 3,600 Chilean soldiers, cavalry and artillery, was sent to face the Peruvian forces in the small town of Tarapaca. Peruvian forces started a march towards Arica in order to find Bolivian troops led by Hilarion Daza comming from Arica southwards, but in Camarones Daza decided to return towards Arica.

Chileans and Allies met on 27. November 1879 in the Battle of Tarapaca, where the Chilean forces were defeated but the Peruvian forces, unable to mantain the territory, retreated further north to Arica by 18 December 1879.

About the importance of the campaign Bruce W. Farcau wrote:

The province of Tarapaca was lost along with a population of 200,000, nearly one tenth of the Peruvian total, and an annual gross income of ₤ 28 million in nitrate production, virtually all of the country's export earnings.

giving Santiago not only a economic bonanza but also a diplomatic asset

Downfall of President Prado in Peru and Daza in Bolivia

The Peruvian government was confronted with widespread rioting in Lima because of the disastrous handling of the war to date.

On 18 December 1879 the Peruvian President Mariano Ignacio Prado suddenly took a ship from Callao to Panama with allegedly six million pesos in gold to oversee the purchase of new arms and warships for the nation. In a statement in the newspaper El Comercio he turned over the command of the country to Vice President La Puerta. After a putsch and more than 300 dead Nicolás de Piérola overthrew La Puerta and took power in Peru on 23 December 1879.

Back to Arica from the aborted expedition to Iquique, on 27 December 1879 Daza received a telegram from La Paz informing him the army had overthrown him. He departed to Europe with $500,000. In Bolivia General Narciso Campero became president.

Bolivia's president Campero remained in office until the end of the war, but Pierola was recognized as president only by the occupation of Lima.

Election of Domingo Santa Maria in Chile

During the Bolivian tax crisis, 1879, Chile voted a new congress on schedule and in 1881 Domingo Santa Maria was elected as president of the republic, who assumed the office on 18. September 1881. A new congress was elected in 1882.

Lynch's Expedition

To show Peru the futility of further resistance against Chilean forces, on 4 September 1880 the Chilean government dispatched an expedition of 2,200 men to northern Peru under the command of Captain Patricio Lynch in order to collect taxes. Lynch's Expedition arrived on 10 September to Chimbote levied taxes of $100,000 in Chimbote, $10,000 in Piata, $20,000 in Chiclayo, and $4,000 in Lambayeque in local currencies; those who did not comply had their property impounded or destroyed. On September 11, 1880, the Peruvian government made a decree that made the payment of these taxes an act of treason, but most land owners still paid the Chileans under the belief that denizens of occupied areas had to comply with the occupying army.

Lackawanna Conference

Prior to the United States becoming formally involved into the matter, the united proposal of France, England, and Italy was to provide Chile with Tarapaca while they retreated their troops to the Camarones River; Chile found this solution to be acceptable.

On October 22, 1880, delegates of Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Unites States of America in Chile held a 5-day conference aboard the USS Lackawanna in Arica.. The Lackawanna Conference, also called the Arica conference, attempted to develop a peace settlement for the war. Chile demanded the Peruvian Tarapaca province and the Bolivian Atacama, an indemnity of $20,000,000 gold Pesos, restoration of property taken from Chilean citizens, the return to Chile of the transport vessel Rimac, the abrogation of the secret alliance treaty between Peru and Bolivia, the formal commitment on the part of Peru not to mount artillery batteries in Arica's harbor once returned by Chile and to limit that port to commercial use only. and the retention by Chile of the territories of Moquegua, Tacna, and Arica until all previous conditions were satisfied. Although willing to accept the negotiated settlement, Peru and Bolivia insisted that Chile withdraw its forces from all occupied lands as a precondition for discussing peace. Having captured this territory at great expense, Chile refused to accept these terms and the negotiations failed.

Campaign of Tacna and Arica

After the failure of the peace talks the Chilean forces began to prepare the occupation of South Peru. On 28 November 1880 declared the formal blockade of Arica. Later also the port Callao was put under blockade.

A Chilean force of 600 men carried out an amphibious raid at Ilo as a reconnaissance in force, to the north of Tacna, on December 31 1879, and withdrew the same day.

On 24 February 1881 approximately 11,000 men in nineteen ships protected by the warships Blanco Encalada, Toro and the Magallanes as two torpedo boats sailed from Pisagua and arrived off Punta Coles, near Pacocha, Ilo on 26 February 1880. The landing took several days and occurred without resistance and the Peruvian commander, Lizardo Montero, refused to try to drive the Chileans from the beachhead, as the Chileans expected.

On 22 March 1880 3,642 Chilean troops defeated 1,300 Peruvian troops in the Battle of Los Ángeles cutting any direct Peruvian supply from Lima to Arica or Tacna (Supply was posible only through the long way over Bolivia).

After the Battle of Los Ángeles there were three allied positions in South Peru; at Arequipa was General Leyva's 2th Army (some survivors of Los Angeles included), at Arica was Bolognesi's 7th and 8th Division and at Tacna was the 1th Army, all under the command of the Bolivian president Campero. But they were unable to concentrate troops or at least to move from their places.

After crossing Template:Mi to km of desert, on 26 May 1880 the Chilean army (14,147 men) destroyed the allied army of 5,150 Bolivians and 8,500 Peruvians in the Battle of the Halt of the Alliance.

The need of a port near to the location of the army, in order to supply and reinforce the troops and the evacuation of the wounded, made the Chilean command to put its attention on the remaining Peruvian stronghold of Arica. On June 7, 1880 after the Battle of Arica fell the last Peruvian bastion in the Tacna Department.

After the campaign of Tacna and Arica the Peruvian and Bolivian regular armies ceased to exist. Bolivia effectively dropped out of the war.

Campaign of Lima

After the campaign of Tacna and Arica, the southern departments of Peru was in Chilean hands, and the allies armies were smashed, so for Chile there was no reason to continue the war. But the defeated allies not only didn't realize their situation but also even more controversially in Bolivia, despite the empty Bolivian treasury, on 16 June 1880 the national assembly voted in favour of a continuation of the war and on 11 June 1880 was signed in Peru a document declaring the creation of the United States of Peru-Bolivia.

This forced both the Chilean government and its high command to plan a new campaign with the objective to obtain an unconditional capitulation at the Peruvian capital city.

The Chilean forces faced an enormous challenge in order to confront the entire male population of Lima defending prepared positions and supported by a formidable collection of coastal guns of Lima within a few miles of the capital's arsenal and supply depots. Pierola ordered the construction of two parallel lines of defenses at Chorrillos and Miraflores a few kilometers south of Lima. The line of Chorrillos had Template:Mi to km long, lying from Marcavilca hill to La Chira, passing through the acclivities of San Juan and Santa Teresa. The Peruvian forces were approximately 26,000 men strong between Arequipa and Lima

A small Chilean force went ashore near Pisco, approximately Template:Mi to km South of Lima, and the gross of the army disembarked in Chilca only Template:Km to mi from Lima.

On January 13, 1881 the 20,000 Chilean troops charged 14,000 Peruvian defenders in Chorrillos. During the Battle of Chorrillos, the Chileans inflicted a harsh defeat to the Peruvian army and eliminated the first defensive line guarding Lima. Two days later, on January 15, 1881, after the triumph in the Battle of Miraflores the Chilean army entered Lima.

After the battle there were fires and sackings in the towns of Chorrillos and Barranco, but over the wrongdoers there are onesided information. Chilean authors incriminate demoralized Peruvian soldiers but Peruvian authors accuse drunken Chilean soldiers of the damages and crimes. Both versions must not be contradictory.

Occupation of Peru

Chileans troops entered Lima on 22 January 1881.. The Peruvian dictator Nicolás de Piérola retreated from the capital in order to try to continue governing from the rear area and he still refused to accept Chile's demand for territory and indemnity.

In absence of a Peruvian president who was willing to accept their peace terms, on February 22, 1881, the Chileans allowed a convention of Peruvian "notables" outside of Lima that elected Francisco García Calderón as president. Garcia Calderón was allowed to raise and arm two infantry battalions (400 men each) and two small cavalry squadrons in order to give more legitimacy to the provisional government. Uruguay, Costa Rica, and the United States were the only countries that recognized the presidency of Francisco García Calderón in Peru.

The commander of the Chilean occupation, Vice-admiral Patricio Lynch, set down his military headquarters in the Government Palace of Peru in Lima. After the confrontations in San Juan and Miraflores, the then Peruvian Colonel Andrés Avelino Cáceres decided to escape to the central Andes to organize and reinitiate the Peruvian resistance to the Chilean occupation army in the mountain range, which would come to be known as the Campaign of the Breña or Sierra, facing abundant acts of rebellion in Lima and, later, a clearly organized Peruvian resistance.

Meanwhile, in Chile the new administration under the command of Domingo Santa Maria pushed for an end to the costly war.

Letelier's expedition

In February 1881, the Chilean forces started under the command of Lt. Col. Ambrosio Letelier the first Expedition, 700 men, to defeat the last guerrilla bands from Huanuco (30 April) to Junin, but after many loses the expedition achieved very little and came back to Lima in early July, where Letelier and his officers were court martialed because they illegally diverted money into their own pocket.

First campaign of La Sierra

To annihilate the guerrilla, Lynch started in January 1882 a new offensive with 5,000 men first in direction Tarma and then southeast: Huancayo, until Izcuchaca. The Chilean troops suffered enormous hardships: cold, snow, mountain sickness (more than 5,000m). On 9 July 1882 was fought the epic Battle of La Concepción. The Chileans had to pull back with a lost of 534 soldiers: 154 died in combat, 277 died to disease and 103 deserted.

Rise of Miguel Iglesias

During the administration of James A. Garfield (Mar. 4, 1881 – Sep. 19, 1881) in the USA, the anglophobic secretary of state James G. Blaine wanted to advance America's presence in Latin America and believed that England had prodded Chile into war on Peru in order to secure England's stake. Blaine made a proposal that called for Chile to accept monetary indemnity and renounce to Antofagasta and Tarapaca. These American attempts reinforced Garcia Calderon's refuse to discuss the matter of territorial cesion. When it became known that Blaine's man by Garcia Calderon, Stephen Hurlburt, would personally profit from the business trade-off, was clear that Hurlburt was complicating the peace process.

Because of president Calderon's refusal to relinquish Peruvian control over Tarapacá, he was placed under arrest. Before Garcia Calderon left Peru to Chile, he named Admiral Lizardo Montero as successor. At the same time Pierola stepped back and supported Avelino Caceres. Caceres refused and also supported Lizardo Montero, who moved to Arequipa. In this way Garcia Calderon's arrest achieved the union of the forces of Pierola and Caceres.

Frederick Theodore Frelinghuysen, succesor of Blaine as secretary of state after the unexpected death of President Garfield, publicy disavowed Blaine's policy while abandoning any notion of intervening militarily in the dispute and recognizing Chile's right to annex Tarapaca.

On 1 April 1882 Miguel Iglesias, former Defence minister of Pierola, became convinced that the war had to be brought to an end if Peru was not to be completely devastated. He issued a manifesto, "Grito de Montan", calling for peace and in December 1882 called a convention of representatives of the seven departments of northern Peru where he was elected "Regenerating President"

Second campaign of La Sierra

In order to protect and support Iglesias against Montero, on 6 April 1883, Patricio Lynch started a new offensive to drive the montoneros from central Peru and destroy Caceres' little army. Unlike in previous plans, The Chileans troops pursued Caceres to northwest through narrow mountain passes until 10 July 1883 as the definitive Battle of Huamachuco was fought. It was the last battle of the war.

End of Occupation

After the signing of the peace on 20 October 1883 with the government of Iglesias, Lizardo Montero tried to resist in Arequipa, but fortunately for Chile, the only arrival of the its men stampeded Montero's troops and Montero went for a Bolivian asylum.

On 29 October 1883 ended the Chilean occupation of Lima.

Peace

Peace treaty with Peru

On October 20, 1883 hostilities between Chile and Peru formally came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Ancón. Under the terms of the treaty Chile was to occupy the provinces of Tacna and Arica for 10 years, after which a plebiscite was to be held to determine nationality. The two countries failed for decades to agree on the terms of the plebiscite. Finally in 1929, through the mediation of the United States under President Herbert Hoover, an accord was reached by which Chile kept Arica. Peru reacquired Tacna and received some concessions in Arica.

Peace treaty with Bolivia

In 1884, Bolivia signed a truce that gave control to Chile of the entire Bolivian coast, the province of Antofagasta, and its valuable nitrate, copper, and other mineral deposits, and a further treaty in 1904 made this arrangement permanent. In return, Chile agreed to build a railroad connecting the capital city of La Paz, Bolivia with the port of Arica, and Chile guaranteed freedom of transit for Bolivian commerce through Chilean ports and territory.

International Law of War

The three nations involved in war adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention to protect the war wounded, prisoners, refugees, civilians, and other non-combatants.

At that time there was no other binding international law between both countries about this issue. The Chilean government under President Aníbal Pinto Garmendia published "El derecho de la guerra según los últimos progresos de la civilización" with the following laws:

• the International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 August 1874
• St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 or full Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight
• International Red Cross founded 1863
• Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order Nr 100

and instructed the officers of the army and the navy to comply with.

Nevertheless there are accusations of atrocities committed during the war.

As war booty, Chile confiscated the contents of the National Library of Peru in Lima and transported thousands of books (including many centuries-old original Spanish, Peruvian, and Colonial volumes) to Santiago de Chile, along with much capital stock. However, in November 2007 3,778 books were returned to the National Library of Peru.

Strategy and technology

It was clear from the beginning that strategic control of the sea would be the key to an inevitably difficult desert war: supply by sea, including water, food, ammunition, horses, fodder and reinforcements, was quicker and easier than marching supplies through the desert or across the Bolivian high plateau. While the Chilean Navy started an economic and military blockade of the Allies' ports, Peru took the initiative and utilized its smaller but effective navy as a raiding force. Chile was forced to delay the ground invasion for six months, and to shift its fleet from blockading to hunting the Peruvian ship Huascar until it was captured. After achieving naval supremacy, sea mobile forces proved to be an advantage for desert warfare on a long coastline. Peruvian and Bolivian defenders found themselves hundreds of kilometers away from home while Chilean invading forces were usually a few kilometers away from the sea.

Chilean ground strategy focused on mobility: landing ground forces in enemy territory in order to raid Allied ground assets; landing in strength to split and drive out defenders and leaving garrisons to guard territory as the war moved north. Peru and Bolivia fought a defensive war: maneuvering along long overland distances; relying where possible on land or coastal fortifications with gun batteries and minefields; coastal railways were available to central Peru, and telegraph lines provided a direct line to the government in Lima. When retreating, Allied forces made sure that little if any assets remained to be used by the enemy. According to "Chinese Migration into Latin America – Diaspora or Sojourns in Peru?" some Chinese coolies supported the Chilean army against their plantation owners in Peru. Massive raidings from demoralized Peruvian soldiers and invading Chilean forces destroyed several Peruvian towns and cities across the coastline.

The occupation of Peru between 1881 and 1884 was a different story altogether. The war theatre was the Peruvian Sierra, where Peruvian resistance had easy access to population, resource and supply centres further from the sea; it could carry out a war of attrition indefinitely. The Chilean army (now turned into an occupation force) was split into small garrisons across the theatre and could devote only part of its strength to hunting down rebels without a central authority. After a costly occupation and prolonged anti-insurgency campaign, Chile sought to achieve an exit through a political strategy. Rifts within Peruvian society and the Peruvian defeat in the Battle of Huamachuco resulted in the peace treaty that ended the occupation.

The war saw the use by both sides of new, or recently introduced, late 19th century military technology such as breech-loading rifles & cannons, remote-controlled land mines, armor-piercing shells, naval torpedoes, torpedo boats, and purpose-built landing craft. The second-generation of ironclads (i.e. designed after the Battle of Hampton Roads) were employed in battle for the first time. That was significant for a conflict where a major power was not involved, and it drew the attention of British, French, and U.S. observers of the war. During the war, Peru developed the Toro Submarino ("Submarine Bull"). Though completely operational, she never saw action, and she was scuttled at the end of the war to prevent her capture by Chilean forces.

The U.S.S. Wachusett with Alfred Thayer Mahan in command, was stationed at Callao, Peru, protecting American interests during the final stages of the War of the Pacific. He formulated his concept of sea power while reading a history book in an English gentleman’s club in Lima, Peru. This concept became the foundation for his celebrated The Influence of Sea Power upon History.

World perspectives

The war remained largely relatively unregarded outside South America because neither the USA nor any mayor European power had a stake in the dispute. After the beginning of the war, the government of Great Britain declared its neutrality and refused to allow Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to take delivery of military or naval material on English soil.

A different matter was the case of persons or companies having some kind of investment in the countries involved in war.

In the 1870s Peru's president Manuel Pardo established a government monopoly to control the sale of nitrate and in 1875 expropiated the salitreras. The Peruvian Government isssued interest bearing certificates for the former owners and promised to redeem in two years.

Other group was the "Credit Industriel" and the "Peruvian Company", representing European and American creditor of Peru. They offered to lend the money that Peru requiered to pay reparations to Chile (to avoid Chilean anexation of Tarapaca). In return Peru would have to grant mining concessions in Tarapaca.

Since the nitrate traders and the holders of debts were all aware that they would receive payment only if the war ended, they influenced for a quick settlement to the conflict. These groups, and of course others on the Chilean side, acted more other less to obtain a convenient solution for its interests.

Consequences of the war

The War of the Pacific left traumatic scars on all societies involved in the conflict.

Bolivia

For Bolivians, the loss of the territory which they refer to as the Litoral (the coast) remains a deeply emotional issue and a practical one, as was particularly evident during the internal natural gas riots of 2003. Popular belief attributes much of the country's problems to its landlocked condition; accordingly, recovering the seacoast is seen as the solution to most of these difficulties.In 1932, this was a contributing factor in the failed Chaco War with Paraguay, over territory controlling access to the Atlantic Ocean through the Paraguay River. In recent decades, all Bolivian Presidents have made it their policy to pressure Chile for sovereign access to the sea. Diplomatic relations with Chile have been severed since 17 March 1978, in spite of considerable commercial ties. Currently, the leading Bolivian newspaper "El Diario" still features at least a weekly editorial on the subject, and the Bolivian people annually celebrate a patriotic "Dia del Mar" (Day of the Sea) to remember the crippling loss.

Chile

Economically, Chile fared better, gaining a lucrative territory with major sources of income, including nitrates, saltpeter and copper. The national treasury grew by 900% between 1879 and 1902 due to taxes coming from the newly acquired Bolivian and Peruvian lands.. British involvement and control of the nitrate industry rose significantly after the war. High nitrate profits lasted for only a few decades and fell sharply once synthetic nitrates were developed during World War I.

Territorially, during the war Chile waived most of its claim over the Patagonia in the Boundary treaty of 1881 between Chile and Argentina, in order to ensure Argentina's neutrality during the conflict; After the war, the Puna de Atacama dispute grew until it was solved in 1899, since both Chile and Argentina claimed former Bolivian territories. On 28 August 1929, Chile returned the province of Tacna to Peru. In 1999, Chile and Peru at last agreed to complete the implementation of the last parts of the Treaty of Lima, providing Peru with a port in Arica.

Peru

According to Bruce W. Farcau in his book The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884; "in Peru, the wounds run less deep, than in neighboring Bolivia. The defeat was certainly humiliating, and Peru also lost a substantial chunk of potentially valuable real estate"

On the other hand, George J. Mills argues that after Peru's defeat, Peruvian resentment, born of the loss of her nitrate territories, is still smoldering , to this day. It has also been argued that the behavior of local politicians and their honest desire to maintain neighborly relations is questionable. According to a report from the University for Peace, an independent subsidiary of the United Nations; "The unaccounted variable in this equation is the consolidating predisposition of Peruvians to quickly direct themselves against Chile should problems arise". The same report also claims that "instead of fomenting a political culture that questions and checks its government, Peru is diverting for a fundamentalist nationalism incapable of seeing beyond the hatred."

The defeat engendered a deep revenge desire among the ruling classes, which also led to a skewed view of the role of the armed forces; this attitude dominated society throughout the 20th century.

Bibliography

See also

• Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904 between Chile and Bolivia
• Atacama border dispute
• Chincha Islands War
• Chilean-Peruvian Maritime Dispute of 2006--2007
• Chile-Peru relations
• Puna de Atacama Lawsuit
• War of the Confederation
• Guano Islands Act

References

1. 19,000 in San Juan, 4,000 in Lima, 1,000 in El Callao (Pierola letter to Julio Tenaud) 4,000 in Arequipa, Col. Jose de la Torre
2. ^ See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", tables 22 and 23 in pages 348-349. The figures consider neither Chilean POWs (from "Rimac" and "Esmeralda" survivors) nor deserteuers
3. See W.F.Sater, "Chile and the War of the Pacific", page 6:

   The increase of taxes on the Compañia de Salitres y Ferrocarril clearly violated the 1874 treaty.

   See also B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 41,:

   The very fact that the legislature in La Paz found it necessary to vote in what they claimed was a strictly municipal issue when the tax was first levied implied that the conflict with the 1874 treaty was clearly seen and that a conscious precedent was being set

4. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 8 for Peruvian, page 12 for Bolivian and page 13 for Chilean data
5. See William F. Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 38:

   ...Peruvian government, which, working through a consortium of banks, set prices as well as production quotas. Peru had created a nitarte monopoly that virtually dominated the world market.

6. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 40:

   For Bolivia and Chile therefore the revenues derived from the Atacama nitrate operations assumed ever greater importance and motivated each government to seek out means of increasing its sharesof those revenues by one means or another.

7. See William F. Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 16,:

   they accepted the doctrine of utis possidetis juris de 1810 ...

8. See "University of Iowa studies in the social sciences", Volumen 8, page 54
9. See full english version of the treaty in Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879, Imprenta Universitaria. Santiago de Chile.
10. See
    1. History of the Latin-American nations By William Spence Robertson:
    2. New York Times: "The defensive treaty of 1873 between Peru and Bolivia" (First column).
    3. A history of Peru By Clements Robert Markham: "The Chileans used this purely defensive treaty, by which arbitration is provided for before there can be a casus foederis, as a pretext for war."
    4. CHILE, PERU AND THE TREATY OF 1929: THE FINAL SETTLEMENT by Ronald Bruce St John: "Peru was honour bound under the terms of an 1873 treaty of defensive alliance to join the conflict on the side of Bolivia."
11. See
    1. Donald E. Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer, "The Growth and Culture of Latin America", New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, 963 pages. Page 706,: In 1873, fearing the consecuences of taking action against Chile, Peru and Bolivia signed a defensive-offensive alliance
    2. Alfred Barnaby Thomas, Profesor of History, University of Alabama,"Latin America, A History", The Macmillian Company, New York, 1956, 800 pages, page 450: This rivaliry , straining the relations of the two countries, led Pardo to sign and offensive and defensive alliance with Bolivia in 1873, the latter being also disturbed by Chiles aggresiveness
    3. Charles de Varigny, "La Guerra del Pacifico", page 18, here: …Chile vacilaría aún más si Bolivia, firmando un tratado de alianza ofensiva y defensiva con el Perú, podía poner sobre las armas los efectivos militares y las fuerzas navales de esta nación. Un tratado de esta naturaleza fué precisamente la condición que puso Boliyia para aceptar la aventura que el Perú le proponía. Se iniciaron negociaciones y quedó firmado el Tratado, que se convino en mantener secreto, con el fin de proporcionar al Perú la ocasión de ofrecer su mediación, no revelándolo sino en caso de que Chile rechazase esta mediación y declarase la guerra.
    4. Gonzalo Bulnes, "Chile and Peru, The causes of the War of 1879" page 57 and 58: The Treaty menaces Chile … Never was Chile in greater peril, nor has a more favourable moment been elected for reducing her to the mere leavings that interested none of the conspirators. The advantage to each of them was clear enough. Bolivia would expand three degrees on the coast; Argentina would take possession of all our eastern terrisories to whatever point she liked; Peru would make Bolivia pay her with the salitre region. The synthesis of the Secret Treaty was this: opportunity: the disarmed condition of Chile; the pretext to produce conflict: Bolivia: the profit of the business: Patagonia and the salitre.
    5. Diego Barros Arana, "Historia de la Guerra del Pacifico", parte 1, capitulo III, page 31: Sea de ello lo que se quiera, el hecho es que el 6 de febrero de 1873 se firmaba en Lima un tratado secreto de alianza ofensiva i defensiva, por el cual ambas partes contratantes se comprometian a marchar unidas contra cualquier enemigo esterior que amenazase su independencia, su soberanía, o su integridad territorial.
    6. Chilean Magazin "Que Pasa" here: A comienzos de 1870, Perú pasaba por un mal período económico, ya que el guano -fertilizante natural del cual procedían las principales ganancias fiscales- estaba agotado, mientras el salitre, producto que lo reemplazaba, estaba en manos de particulares. La única solución era eliminar a nuestro país como competidor en la extracción del salitre, para traspasar la propiedad de las salitreras al Estado y poseer el monopolio. Fue a raíz de esto que Perú y Bolivia firmaron un tratado secreto ofensivo y defensivo contra Chile, donde ambas naciones se apoyarían en caso de guerra.
    7. "The New York Times" - Current History (1922) here page 450 : Notwithstanding the fact that in 1873 Peru had induced Bolivia to sign a pact of alliance tacitly directed against Chile, the Peruvian government offered its mediation in the Bolivian-Chilean conflict, the origin of which was nothing more than Peru’s monopolistic nitrate policy, which had instigated Bolivia to disposes Chilean industries. The mediation of Peru was accompanied by three suspicious circumstances: (1) The denial on the part of the mediating minister of the existence of the secret treaty of which Chile had lately become aware; (2) Previous Peruvian demands compatible only with the pretensions of Bolivia; (3) Hurried war preparations of Peru, the Peruvian government meanwhile showing a desire to gain time. These circumstances, with the fact that Bolivia did not manifest the slightest desire to facilitate an amicable adjustment, indicated to Chile that Peru was not working ‘bona fide’, but only with the intentin of strengthening the alliance.
    8. "By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905" by Robert N. Burr, page 130: But after extended discussionswhich served to delay Argentinas adherence to the anti-Chilean treaty, Buenos Aires accepted the exclusion of Brasil. There was however still another matter to be settled before Argentina was willing to join the alliance- the question of the boundary dispute with the altiplano.
    9. "Latin America's Wars: The age of the caudillo, 1791-1899" by Robert L. Scheina, here, page 375: Bolivia nad Peru concluded a secret defensive treaty which provided that if either Bolivia or Peru were attacked by a foreign nation (obviously, it was directed against Chile), the other nation would go to the aid of the co-signer (:: Robert L. Scheina calls the treaty obviously, it was directed against Chile and use the adjective "defensive" as a part of the name of the treaty: "a secret defensive treaty".)
    10. Bruce W. Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", Praeger Publishers, 2000, 214 pages, page 37: Peru began talks regarding a formal alliance between the two nations directed against Chile
12. See "Manifest of the Chilean government to the representatives of friendly powers with reference to the declaration of war against Peru". Alejandro Fierro, Chilean Ministry of Foreign affairs, Santiago April 12, 1879 here, page 170:

    …The secret treaty of the of Febreaury 6, 1873 needs to no lengthy examination to ascertain its object; and the reserve in which it has been maintained confirms in the least suspicious mind the conviction that it was entered into solely to aid the schemes of the government of Bolivia, a perpetual conspirator of the treaty of 1866. In 1873, neither Peru nor Bolivia was threatened by the remotest danger of territorial dismemberment; and much less could it be foreseen that Chile cherished such idea, seeing that it had granted to Bolivia whatever that republic demanded in the convention of 1866- applauded by the Bolivian people as a splendid manifestation of Chilean generosity…

    If the treaty meant a general guarantee against any advance of a foreign power, why was the cooperation of Chile not sought, which has given more than one example of being the first to contribute, with its men and its wealth, towards the maintenance of the sovereignty of nations of a common origin?…

    The treaty of 1873 owed its origin –hidden as a shameful act – to the measures adopted by Peru at that epoch, to justify one of the most audacious and cruel spoliation witnessed by countries submitted to a regime of common respect toward the industry of all nations. Peru desired to monopolize and appropriate the nitrate works; and in order to sustain its daily diminishing credit…

13. See Hugo A. Maureira, "The War of the Pacific (1879-1884) and the Role of Racial Ideas in the Construction of Chilean Identity", here
14. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 97:

    …specially since the Peru's fleet, reinforced by some recently purchased ironclads, now dwarfed that of Chile.

15. See Private note of Riva-Agüero to Novoa, November 20 1872. Godoy papers. Cited in Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile Peru, the causes of the War 1879, page 58 and 59:

    It is desirable that once for all, and as soon as possible, the relations between the two Republics should be defined, because it is necessary to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory to both parties. If Chile dealing with this boundary question seizes the most favourable opportunity to take possession of that coast-line, it is necessary that their plans develop before Chile is in possession of the ironclads under construction, in order that in the definite settlement of this question, the influence, which we are in a position to exert by means of our maritime preponderance may have due weight.

16. See Jorge Basadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru", Tomo V, Editorial Peruamerica S.A., Lima-Peru, 1964, page 2282, "El comienzo de la inferioridad naval peruana y la falta de iniciativa para una guerra preventiva":

    La supremacía conquistada por Chile en el mar ese mismo año de 1874 contribuyó a que el Perú procurase evitar cualquier problema

17. See Jorge Basadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru", Tomo V, Editorial Peruamerica S.A., Lima-Peru, 1964, page 2286, "El Peru en 1874 y 1878 evita la alianza con Argentina":

    …en agosto, septiembre y octubre de 1875 … el Peru se apresuro a tomar una actitud dilatoria y hasta inhibitoria para la firma del tratado de alianza con aquella republica con el fin de conservar su libertad de accion. La existencia de los blindados chilenos explica acaso la diferencia entre esta actitud y otras anteriores. …

    En 1878 se nego a entregar los elementos navales pedidos por el gobierno argentino y colaboro en la busqueda de una solucion pacifica …

18. See page 37 and ff
19. Retrospectiva del enclaustramiento maritimo. Una vision critica sobre como se inicio el conflicto. Jorge Gumucio. La Paz, Bolivia, page 30:

    …no había sido debidamente autorizada por el Congreso Nacional como disponía la Constitución de 1871, pero ese incumplimiento podría remediarse gravando a la mencionada compañía con un impuesto de 10 centavos por quintal exportable.

20. Relaciones Chile-Bolivia-Peru: La Guerra del Pacifico. June 2004. Patricio Valdivieso. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, page 8:

    En este contexto, el Congreso estudió la transacción que se había firmado con la Compañía de Salitres, en febrero de 1978, y ratificó esta transacción a condición de que la Compañía pagara 10 centavos por quintal exportado de salitre.

21. Los empresarios, la politica y la Guerra del Pacifico. Luis Ortega. Santiago de Chile. 1984. (Page 18. File Antony Gibbs & Sons AGA. Valparaiso to Londres. Private N 25. March 6, 1878)
22. See B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 40:

    … citing a clear violation of the provisions of the 1874 treaty that promised no new taxes for twenty-five years for Chilean business.

23. ^ See Diego Barros Arana, "Historia de la Guerra del Pacifico", Vol. I, page 59.
24. See Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru, the Causes of the War of 1879 page 42
25. The Peruvian Historian stated See also Jorge Basadre, here (retrieved on 9 Juli 2009):

    El desembarco se efectuó sin resistencia, con manifestaciones de entusiasmo. La bandera chilena flameó en todos los edificios del puerto.

26. See Diego Barros Arana, "Historia de la Guerra del Pacifico, 1879-1880", pages 68-70:

    Los chilenos quedaron así dueños de todo el desierto de Atacama hasta la frontera del Perú.

27. Jorge Basadre, Historia de la Republica del Peru, vol. VI, p. 40.
28. ^ La Guerra del Pacífico. Francisco A. Machuca. Valparaíso "Mientras el señor Lavalle gozaba de relativa tregua, y estudiaba las causas de la poca prisa del Gobierno chileno para continuar las negociaciones, éste, en constante comunicación con nuestro Ministro Godoy, quedaba impuesto el 18 de Marzo, por comunicación del día anterior, 17, de la existencia del pacto secreto, y de una nota clara y terminante de nuestro Ministro al Gobierno de Lima...Por fin, el 31 de Marzo, el señor Lavalle se apersonó al señor Ministro de Relaciones y le dió conocimiento del tratado secreto, que acababa de recibir de Lima, en circunstancia que hacía días, el general Prado le había confesado su existencia a nuestro Ministro Godoy, en una conferencia tenida en Chorrillos."
29. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", in page 36:

    Unfortunately, Peru insisted that Chile withdraw from the recently seized Bolivian litoral as a precondition for starting discussion with La Paz,

    and in page 37:
    

    By late March, most of Santiago believed that Peru had thrown its suport to Bolivia and that it would declare warr on Chile as soon as it had readied its armed forces

30. Bulnes, Gonzalo. Chile and Peru : the causes of the war of 1879. p. 147. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
31. Bulnes Gonzalo, Guerra del Pacífico, Tomo 1: De Antofagasta a Tarapacá. Page 148
32. Because the capital of Bolivia, La Paz, lacked a telegraph connexion abroad the there are different data for declaration of war depending of the place (i.e. the used means of transportation carriage, ship, telegraph abroad) where the new was received. There are two documents about and William F. Sater in "Andean Tragedy", page 28 states:

    Two weeks after the Chilean occupation of Antofagasta, he declared that had imposed "a state of war" on Bolivia. Apparently this decree did not constitute a formal declaration of belligerence, which he announced on 18 March.

    See also :
    1. "Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica dispute, University of Iowa studies in the social sciences, Vol. 8", by William Jefferson Dennis, here, page 69: On March 14 Bolivia advised representatives of foreign powers that a state of war existed with Chile. ... Godoi advised President Pinto that this move was to prevent Chile from securing armaments abroad ...
    2. "Andean Tragedy", William F. Sater, page 39:Thus, Daza's declaration of war was a godsend ..., also page 42in March he suddenly declared war on Chile
    3. "Latin America's Wars: The age of the caudillo, 1791-1899" By Robert L. Scheina, page 376: On March 18 Bolivia declared war and confiscated all Chilean property in Bolivia and under the terms of a secret treaty ..."
    4. "Wars and Peace Treaties, 1816-1991", By Erik Goldstein, page 182: As result of this action Bolivia declared war on Chile (1.March)
    5. "The history of Chile" By John Lawrence Rector, page 100: Bolivia declared war and attemted to expel all Chileans from its territory
    6. onwar.com: Bolivia then declared war on Chile and called upon Peru for help.
    7. country-data.com: Bolivia, in alliance with Peru, declared war on Chile on March 1, ...'
    8. andrewclem.com: ... , but Bolivia declared war on Chile and made known its “secret” alliance with Peru in March, ...
    9. globalsecurity.com: Bolivia, in alliance with Peru, declared war on Chile on March 1,...
    10. Encarta: Bolivia declared war and was joined by Peru, a partner in a secret alliance.
    11. "The geopolitics of security in the Americas: hemispheric denial from Monroe ..." by Martin Sicker here: and Bolivia declared war on 14 February 1879 ...
    12. "A history of Chile‎" - Page 326, by Luis Galdames, Isaac Joslin Cox - History - 1941 - 565 pages: The government of Chile refused to accede to this. Meanwhile Peru mobilized its army rapidly, Bolivia declared war against Chile, and the press of those ...
    13. "Chile and the War of the Pacific"‎ - Page 9 by William F. Sater - History - 1986 - 343 pages Two weeks after Chile occupied the disputed territory, Daza declared war.
    14. "The Bolivia-Chile-Peru dispute in the Atacama Desert" by Ronald Bruce St. John, Clive H. Schofield here: "Once Bolivia declared war on March 14 1879 ...".
33. Peruvian Congress March, 24 1879
34. See Jorge Besadre, "Historia de la Republica, La guerra con Chile", or here (retrieved on 09.September 2009):

    La versión chilena fue que Bolivia quiso impedir que Chile se armara. En realidad, Daza buscó la forma de malograr la misión Lavalle. Una vez más la legación peruana en La Paz había fallado porque, según el tratado secreto, un acto de esta especie debía haberse hecho previo acuerdo de las partes. Al no estar declarada la guerra entre Chile y Bolivia, Chile no podía pedir al Perú que se mantuviera neutral. Porque la había declarado Bolivia, la exigencia chilena de neutralidad peruana era inevitable. La declaración boliviana de guerra era (dice el historiador chileno Bulnes) un palo atravesado en las ruedas del carro empujado por Lavalle.

35. See Bruce W. Farcau, "The ten Cents War", Praegers Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881, ISBN 0-275-96925-8, Chapter 5, page 65:

    As the earlier discussion of the geography of the Atacama region illustrates, control of the sea lanes along the coastwould be absolutely vital to the success of a land campaign there

36. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 102 and ff:

    … to anyone willing to sail under Bolivia's colors …

37. ^ http://books.google.com/books?id=hH_BiSV-hYkC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 288
38. ^ See Mariano Paz Soldan, "Narracion historica de la Guerra de Chile contra el Peru y Bolivia", Imprenta y Libreria de Mayo, calle Peru 115, 1884, page 114
39. http://books.google.com/books?id=BsxISMTwsSUC&pg=PA77&dq=Carabineros+de+Yungay+Hu%C3%A1scar&lr= Page 55-56
40. http://books.google.com/books?id=BsxISMTwsSUC&pg=PA77&dq=Carabineros+de+Yungay+Hu%C3%A1scar&lr= Page 56
41. http://books.google.com/books?id=0osTAQAAIAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 37-42
42. Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto (1972). Guerra del Pacífico, 1879. California: Instituto Geográfico Militar. p. 44. Retrieved July 22, 2009. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
43. http://books.google.com/books?id=7sd-AAAAMAAJ&q=Miguel+grau+seis+meses&dq=Miguel+grau+seis+meses Page 71
44. http://books.google.com/books?id=UKPUAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s Pages 89 and 129-131
45. http://books.google.com/books?id=43EKAQAAIAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s Pages 221-222
46. http://books.google.com/books?id=BsxISMTwsSUC&pg=PA77&dq=Carabineros+de+Yungay+Hu%C3%A1scar&lr= Page 77-78
47. http://books.google.com/books?id=43EKAQAAIAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 244-246
48. http://books.google.com/books?id=KYQTAQAAIAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 130
49. http://books.google.com/books?id=RmVjAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 49
50. http://books.google.com/books?id=SPNjAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 54
51. Luna Vegas, Emilio (1978). Cáceres, genio militar. Peru: Librería Editorial Minerva-Miraflores. p. 19. Retrieved July 22, 2009. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
52. Valdés Vergara, Francisco (1908). Historia de Shile para la enseñanza primaria. California: Sociedad "Imprenta y litografía Universo". p. 319. Retrieved July 22, 2009. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
53. Elías Murguía, Julio J. (1980). Marinos peruanos en Arica. Peru: Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Maritimos del Perú. p. 38. Retrieved July 22, 2009. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
54. Basadre, Jorge (1961). Historia de la República del Perú. Michigan: Ediciones "Historia". p. 2538. Retrieved July 22, 2009. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
55. Calero y Moreira, Jacinto (1794). Mercurio peruano. Peru: Biblioteca Nacional del Perú. pp. 44–46. Retrieved July 22, 2009. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
56. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 172 and ff.
57. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragey", page 204:

    only the lack of allied cavalry prevented Buendia's men from finishing off the few remaining survivors

58. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 205:

    The victorious troops had no choice, as Colonel Suarez ruefully admitted, but to abandon Tarapaca to the Chileans.

59. See B.W. Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 119
60. W.S.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 181:

    not only a economic bonanza but also a diplomatic asset that could barter in return for Peru ending the war.

61. See Bruce W. Farcau, "The ten Cents War", Praegers Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881, ISBN 0-275-96925-8, Chapter 7, page 120:

    He was met with widespread rioting in the capital in protest over the administration's abysmal handling of the war to date

62. ee Bruce W. Farcau, "The ten Cents War", Praegers Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881, ISBN 0-275-96925-8, Chapter 7, page 120:

    …Prado suddenly gathered up his belongings … and took a ship …

63. See Bruce W. Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", Praegers Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881, ISBN 0-275-96925-8, Chapter 7, page 121:

    Pierola … mounted an assault on the Palace but … leaving more than three hundred corpses …

64. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 208:

    Daza received a telegram from Camacho, informing him that the army no longer …

65. See W.F.Sater, "Chile and the war of the Pacific", page 180:

    Even in the midst of the Bolivian crisis, congressional elections occurred in shedule. In 1881, the nation selected a new president, Domingo Santa Maria, and the following year, elected a new congress

66. See B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 152:

    Lynch's force consisted f the 1° Line Regiment and the Regiments "Talca" and "Colchagua", a battery of mountain howitzers, and a small cavalry squadron for a total of twenty-two hundred man

67. Diego Barros Arana, Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879-1880), vol. 2, page 98: Creía entonces que todavía era posible demostrar prácticamente al enemigo la imposibilidad en que se hallaba para defender el territorio peruano no ya contra un ejército numeroso sino contra pequeñas divisiones. Este fué el objeto de una espedicion que las quejas, los insultos i las lamentaciones de los documentos oficiales del Perú, i de los escritos de su prensa, han hecho famosa.
68. See also Jorge Basadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru", Tomo V, Editorial Peruamerica S.A., Lima-Peru, 1964, page 2475,
69. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 260 and ff
70. Diego Barros Arana quotes Johann Caspar Bluntschli: Bluntschili (Derecho internacional codificado) dice espresamente lo que sigue: Árt. 544. Cuando el enemigo ha tomado posesión efectiva de una parte del territorio, el gobierno del otro estado deja de ejercer alli el poder. Los habitantes del territorio ocupado están eximidos de todos los deberes i obligaciones respecto del gobierno anterior, i están obligados a obedecer a los jefes del ejército de ocupación.
71. http://books.google.com/books?id=DGexys3TxhQC&pg=PA104&dq=Italia+Guerra+del+Pacifico Page 97
72. See American Mediation: Peace Talks on the Lackawanna
73. B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 130:

    In the early morning hours of the 31. December 1879 …

74. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 217 and ff.
75. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", table on page 222
76. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 222:

    Baquedano could not simply bypass the Peruvian troops, whose presence threatened Moquegua as well as the communications network extending southeast across the Locumba Valley to Tacna and northwest to Arequipa and northeast to Bolivia

77. B.W.Farcau in "The Ten Cents War", page 138 specifies 3,100 men in Arequipa, 2,000 men in Arica and 9,000 men in Tacna, but this figures contradict the total numbers given (below) by W.F.Sater in page 229
78. See B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 138:

    …it became evident that there was a total lack of the necessary transport for even the minimun amount of supplies and water

79. See also W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 227:

    The allied force, he concluded lacked sufficent transport to move into the field its artillery as well as its rations and, more significantly, its supplies of water

80. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 229
81. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 256
82. See B.W.Farcau, "The Tens Cents War", page 147
83. See B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 149-150:

    Despite this expectations …

84. See B.W.Farcau, "The Tens Cents War", page 157:

    … until all vestiges of organized military force in Peru had been destroyed and the capital occupied

85. See B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 259
86. See W.F.Sater, "Andan Tragedy", page 276 and ff.
87. B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 157 gives 26,000 men but W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 274, gives 25,000 to 32,000 men
88. ^ See B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 164:

    This gave Baquedano some twenty thousand men in the assault with a further three thousand in reserve against about fourteen thousand Peruvians in the line with twenty-five hundred in reserve

89. Villalobos, Sergio. . p. 185. {{cite book}}: Check |url= value (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
90. See Charles de Varigny, "La Guerra del Pacifico", Imprenta Cervantes, Moneda 1170, Santiago de Chile, 1922, page XVIII: rendía incondicionalmente. La soldadesca desmoralizada y no desarmada saqueaba la ciudad en la noche del 16, el incendio la alumbraba siniestramente y el espanto reinaba en toda ella.
91. See Jorge Besadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru, La guerra con Chile", Chapter 'Los horrores de Chorrillos':

    Después de la batalla, los vencedores se entregaron al saqueo y a la embriaguez en gran escala, y llegaron a pelear entre ellos.

92. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 296.
93. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 302:

    which he did not

94. See Bruce W. Farcau, "The ten Cents War", Praegers Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881, ISBN 0-275-96925-8, Chapter 11, page 173
95. http://books.google.com/books?id=ugOWI0kGA0UC&dq=Guerra+del+Pacifico+Uruguay&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 109
96. see W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 309 and ff
97. See William F. Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 312:

    Consequently, the court stripped Letelier of his rank, sentenced him to six years in jail, and demanded restitution

98. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 315 and ff
99. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 304-306:

    The anglophobic secretary of state …

100. ^ See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 329
101. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 306
102. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 329-330
103. See B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 181-182
104. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 317-338
105. See B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War" pages 183-187
106. See W.F.Sater, "Chile and the War Of The Pacific", page 220:

     Since Montero was not a party to the Treaty of Ancon …

107. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 90:

     Happily for the wounded the three warring nations adhered to the Geneva Convention.

108. Diego Barros Arana, Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879-1880), Volumen 1, page 115
109. See Jorge Basadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru, La guerra con Chile", Chapter 'La vida en Lima durante la ocupacion':

     la Biblioteca Nacional despojada de muchos de sus libros;

110. Dan Collyns. "Chile returns looted Peru books". BBC. Retrieved 2007-11-10.
111. http://www.history.appstate.edu/ConferencePapers/dorotheamartinpaper.pdf
112. See "The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan" by Richard W. Turk; Greenwood Press, 1987. 183 pgs. page 10
113. See Larrie D. Ferreiro 'Mahan and the "English Club” of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of The Influence of Sea Power upon History', The Journal of Military History - Volume 72, Number 3, July 2008, pp. 901-906
114. See B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page2:

     it has largela been ignored outside the region as neither the USA nor any major European power had a stake in the game

115. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 85:

     Great Britain, for example, refused to allow Chile to take delivery of military or naval supplies on English soil.

116. See W.F.Sater, "Chile and the War of the Pacific", 1986, University of Nebraska Press, ISBN 0-8032-4155-0, page 127:

     In 1875, hagridden by financial problems, …

117. See W.F.Sater, "Andean Tragedy", page 305:

     An the sudden appearance of two previously unknkown corporations - the Credit Industriel and the Peruvian Company - …

118. See also W.F.Sater, "Chile and The War Of The Pacific", page 210 and ff
119. See B.W.Farcau, "The Ten Cents War", page 149:

     Another factor working in favor of a quick settlement to the conflict was the influence of the neutral powers …

120. El dia del mar se recordara con mas que un tradicional desfile civico
121. Crow, The Epic of Latin America, p. 180
122. Foster, John B. & Clark, Brett. (2003). "Ecological Imperialism: The Curse of Capitalism" (accessed September 2 2005). The Socialist Register 2004, p190-192. Also available in print from Merlin Press.
123. Dominguez, Jorge et al. 2003 Boundary Disputes in Latin America. United States Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace.
124. Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884&printsec=frontcover&source=bn &hl=en&ei=luVlSqTVIJK6MPjCuZsB&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4 The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884(Page 2).
125. http://books.google.com/books?id=FcdlAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA201&dq=Chile+by+george+j+mills&ei=4hJlSprSJ5mwyATcz52xDw By George J. Mills, William Henry Koebel (page 39)
126. http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=301#_ftn3
127. See Mariano Felipe Paz Soldan, "Relacion Historica de la Guerra de Chile contra el Per y Bolivia" page 102,:

     pero dia llegará en que Chile pague muy caro esta deuda

128. See also speech of Profesor Belisario Llosa Rivera, cited by Jorge Basadre Grohmann "Historia de la Republica" or here:

     Pero, al mismo tiempo, expresó su certeza de que, en diez años de unión, orden, economía, y laboriosidad, el Perú sería un gran país, capaz de vengarse.

129. See Five Sad Reasons to Worry about Peru (retrieved 24. September 2009):

     The unaccounted variable in this equation is the consolidating predisposition of Peruvians to quickly direct themselves against Chile should problems arise.

130. See W.F.Sater, "Chile and the War of the Pacific", page 225:

     The combination of Argentine expansionism as well as Peruvian-Bolivian revanchism forced The Moneda to undertake a costly rearmament program:

131. See Hardi Schindler, "Konflikte in Südamerika", page 56, here:

     Die Befürchtungen vor einer chilenisch-bolivianischen Einigung auf seine Kosten und der latenten Revanchismus des peruanischen Militärs wegen der Gebietsverluste an Chile und Brasilien verstärken den Anspruch des Landes, an allen eventuellen Verhandlungen gemäß dem Vertrag von 1929 beteiligt zu werden

     (Translation:

     The fear an Chilean-Bolivian agreement at the expense of Peru and the latent revanchism of the Peruvian military because of the lost of territories to Chile and Brasil bolster up the demand of the country to be part of any negotiation according the treaty of 1929)

132. See Speech of former President of Argentina in Latin America at a Crossroads (retrieved 24 September 2009):

     Indeed, local problems are likely to exacerbate regional tensioins. 2005 saw the return of seemingly buried territorial disputes, such as defining the maritime limits between Chile and Peru, as well as the revanchist pressures that are mounting in Bolivia for recovering access to the sea that was lost in the 19th century …

External links

• The United States and the Bolivian Seacoast Online book by Bolivian historian and diplomat Jorge Gumucio Granier
• Clear brief account of causes and consequences of the War of the Pacific, 1879-1883.
• Template:Es icon La Guerra del Pacifico, Los Heroes Olvidados Chilean site
• History of Chemical Engineering: Nitrogen, for a brief description nitrates and its strategic importance
• Template:Es icon Sin mar... hace 127 anos ("Without Sea... for 127 years"); page about the war and its impact on Bolivian society.
• Article: Bolivia Reaches for a Slice of the Coast That Got Away - NY Times 9/24/06
• Sociedad de Estudios Historicos Coronel Arnaldo Panizo Peruvian site

• Misplaced Pages articles needing copy edit from September 2009
• History of South America
• Wars involving Argentina
• Wars involving Bolivia
• Wars involving Chile
• Wars involving Peru
• War of the Pacific
• 19th century in Bolivia
• 19th century in Chile