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Stress on philosophy

The Introduction to the article focuses upon constraints, and lists physical, mental, social, and metaphysical constraints. The consideration of actual ascertainable facts about constraints, such as they may be, is found in Free_will#In_science, suggesting that this article is not intended to be just a philosophical discussion. However, the second and third paragraphs of the introduction narrow the focus to only philosophical schools of thought, and the section Free_will#In_Western_philosophy with its 12 sub-subsections constitutes most of the article.

The narrow focus upon philosophical aspects in most of the Introduction is a case of an undue emphasis in this section. This narrow view detracts a great deal from the appeal of this article to the general reader, who is unlikely to be moved by semantic considerations of definition and usage described under numerous headings like metaphysical libertarianism and so forth . The Introduction should be rewritten to introduce all aspects of the topic. In particular it should (i) provide a more balanced view that introduces the scientific questions about constraints and their observation and (ii) address the concerns of the general reader, which are likely to be more about the factual than the linguistic niceties. Brews ohare (talk) 15:06, 28 February 2014 (UTC)

its a philosophy article and you are banned from any editing whatsoever to do with physics so be careful ----Snowded 20:07, 28 February 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: So, in your opinion, as a strictly philosophy article, the first paragraph of the article which strays far outside philosophy, namely:

"Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism), physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions). The principle of free will has religious, legal, ethical, and scientific implications. For example, in the religious realm, free will implies that individual will and choices can coexist with an omnipotent divinity. In the law, it affects considerations of punishment and rehabilitation. In ethics, it may hold implications for whether individuals can be held morally accountable for their actions. In science, neuroscientific findings regarding free will may suggest different ways of predicting human behavior."

is not really introductory to the article, and its mention of social, psychological, and neurological issues are some kind of window dressing? And the section Free_will#In_science and more particularly its subsections on emergence, neuroscience and so forth are mistaken inclusions? Brews ohare (talk) 22:01, 28 February 2014 (UTC)

Brews, I have run out of all patience with you. One mention of physics however construed and this goes to Arb. enforcement. They normally double the time of the last ban for recidivists ----Snowded 07:32, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: It is interesting that you think of yourself as having a great capacity for patience that has now 'run out'. That is not the case. What you have is no patience for attention to content, and a great love of belligerence. Brews ohare (talk) 17:28, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

Ah Brews, ever the victim. The reality is you have made multiple content proposals on multiple articles which have nearly always been rejected by other editors. You contest any rejection interminably to the point where many editors have lost patience with you. But you don't see it so the warning stands ----Snowded 17:45, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

The bulk of the article by length is about philosophy, so it's fitting that the bulk of the lede be about philosophy, as the lede is a summary of the article.

An additional paragraph at the end of the lede summarizing the much smaller science section of the article could be appropriate, but I'm not really sure what it would need to say. Perhaps an introductory sentence of some sort, and a sentence for each of the science subsections: physics has things to say about determinism, genetics has things to say about nature vs nurture, etc etc.

As for what the general reader would be more interested in, that'd a rather hard question to settle and maintain a neutral point of view, but I will say this: the "linguistic niceties" you dismiss are a necessary question to settle before any sense can be made of the science. If you want to investigate whether people have free will, you first need to understand exactly what question you are asking and investigating answers to -- what do you mean by "free will"? What exactly is it that you are looking for to see if it's there or not -- is the thing you're looking for even a coherent idea, and if so, what would its observable implications be? That's what all the "linguistic niceties" in the philosophy section are talking about, and every scientific investigation purporting to discover something about free will presumes some answer or another to those philosophical questions. --Pfhorrest (talk) 04:22, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: There are a few things to clear up here. One is the role of 'philosophy' regarding 'free will'. The subject of 'free will' certainly comes up in philosophy, but it is not the only field where it arises. The introduction suggests it has "religious, legal, ethical, and scientific implications", which is about as vague as saying the term 'free will' shows up in English in various contexts. What exactly is the 'philosophical' role in these other arenas: I'd suggest that its role is twofold: (i) providing various definitions of the term 'free will' and related concepts like 'choice' and (ii) pointing out the various logical interconnections between these definitions and related concepts. I'd suggest further that when these various other disciplines use the philosophical material it is simply for the clarification of terms and logical interconnections. Of course, as Wittgenstein and Pinker and Chomsky have pointed out, we cannot think without language, but there is still the question of which language applies in any given context, and that is a matter for the disciplines to decide, not the philosophers.

In particular, when neuroscientists engage in free will commentary, they need not ask what philosophy can add to the laboratory study of brain circuitry, which is a matter for the laboratory and scientific methods. The application of neuroscience to mental disorders is not philosophy, although philosophy can discuss the purely logical connections between the terms used in the science when it discusses such matters.

So the leading sentence:

""Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism), physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions)."

is a bit misleading as it seems to bring up the question of what are the constraints upon our choices? while philosophy does not do this. Philosophy deals with the following: Let us suppose there are various kinds of constraints. Then what are the logical consequences for certain ideas of choice of these hypothetical constraints?

This emphasis upon constraints in the introduction is actually too narrow, as the philosophical subject of free will goes far beyond discussing categories of 'constraints' as might be identified by science, for example. The philosophical subject of 'free will' (and the WP article too) is very largely about debate over what one might mean by 'choice', and by 'freedom of choice', and also about various conceptions of the 'laws of nature' (for example, that they might be 'deterministic' or 'random', quite apart from what these laws actually are according to the scientists who use, invent, and verify them; and apart from whether scientists find these myopic descriptions useful) and whether these hypothetical conceptions of the 'laws of nature' are compatible with the various hypothetical meanings of 'free will' and 'choice'. These philosophical discussions are not about what we know about actual constraints, or what we know about actual laws of nature, or about what we actually know about choice. These philosophical exercises are about only hypothetical circumstances, and it is for the various disciplines that choose to use these maunderings to decide whether they have any practical use at all in guiding their thinking about their disciplines. Perhaps poetically speaking, the philosophical work is nothing more than a smorgasbord of (hopefully internally consistent) languages, like branches of mathematics, and each discipline can decide using their expertise just which particular form of 'mathematics' works for them.

Bottom line: the introduction does not serve the philosophical framework of 'free will', and tends to confuse matters of fact with matters of clarification of hypothetical constructs. Brews ohare (talk) 17:28, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

BTW, there are various views of philosophy discussed in metaphilosophy,12 and epistemology,3 and model-dependent realism,4 but if this article on free will fits with a different view than the one outlined above, the article should make that connection. Brews ohare (talk) 21:16, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

Brews, as we've been over many times before on this article, the first few sentences are the way they are only because we cannot without bias give a concise single sentence definition of what free will is to open the article with, because that matter is contentious. So for our opening definition we have to be very broad and vague, and then give a short list of different opinions on the specifics. That does not put any kind of weight at all, undue or otherwise, on the definitional issues; is merely avoids taking a stance on them, as any other kind of opening definition would.

The rest of the first paragraph is not about those definitional issues, but more general introductory kinds of statements as found on many other articles, giving an broad view of the significance of the topic to be discussed.

The next two paragraphs summarize the philosophy section which composes the bulk of the article, which is entire appropriate as the lede should summarize the article.

And as I just said yesterday, I agree an additional paragrsph summarizing the smaller science section would be warranted too.

What is absolutely not warranted is rewriting the lede in any way which biases the article toward one position or another on the controversial definitional issues, just so you can move on to more quickly talking about the kind of free will you think is most interesting and the research being done on it. --Pfhorrest (talk) 01:23, 2 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: Let's look at a couple of your sentences here:

"Brews, as we've been over many times before on this article, the first few sentences are the way they are only because we cannot without bias give a concise single sentence definition of what free will is to open the article with, because that matter is contentious."

Now I'd agree that there has been millennia of debate over free will that cannot be summarized in a paragraph. However, the problem is that the focus on 'constraints' is presented in such a way that this paragraph doesn't frame the philosophical issues correctly, never mind avoiding bias. I have explained the framework problems in more detail above, and will try to repeat that in different words if you wish.

"The rest of the first paragraph is not about those definitional issues, but more general introductory kinds of statements as found on many other articles, giving an broad view of the significance of the topic to be discussed."

Again, I agree that the first paragraph seems not to be about definitional issues, but seemingly and wrongly is about various facts about constraints, when what the philosophy of free will is about is various abstract issues that do not depend upon any 'facts' at all, but are about definitions and logic. The philosophical issues could be expanded to include very much deeper matters like the problem of consciousness and the mind-body problem and just where does this intuition of 'free will' come from. That expansion of subject would be a very much more interesting article than the present one, which makes no such attempt.

"I agree an additional paragraph summarizing the smaller science section would be warranted too."

Actually I'd agree with that only if the 'science' aspect were restricted to the usage of the term 'free will' in the sciences, and refrained from attempts to evaluate what science has to say about the facts of 'free will', for example, as to the bearing of dopamine production or the Libet experiments, because crossing that line into claims about the 'facts' of constraints would mean this article would become a more general article on 'free will', not a philosophical article in the way it is presently conceived. That enlargement of subject would require a very different organization. For one thing, the introduction would have to point out that these two approaches to the topic are largely disjoint and based upon different ideas of how things are to be established. Brews ohare (talk) 04:55, 2 March 2014 (UTC)

I'm finding it hard to discern a point in all of that, but I feel like you are getting caught up on some kind of significance you are reading into the word "constraints" that is not intended.

To open the article, we need to say what free will is.

What free will is, is a controversial matter.

What's not controversial about it is:

• It's some kind of ability
• It's an ability to choose in some way
• It's an ability to choose in some way which is free from something that might otherwise limit that ability to choose

Exactly what it is that one must be free from in order to have free will is the controversial point in defining it.

The intent of the word "constraint" is merely to name a thing-which-might-otherwise-limit-that-ability-to-choose, so that we don't write something stupid-sounding like "Free will is the ability to make choices free from some kind of thing or another. Things that some people have said it's important to be free from include...".--Pfhorrest (talk) 08:34, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I guess this outline is supposed to boil things down to basics, but it has a bunch of built-in viewpoints. It really isn't up to WP editors to say things like 'free will is an ability' . It is our job to say what sources say about it. Many sources can be reported as saying 'free will' is a widely held intuition. Some entertain the description of this intuition, search for its origin, ask whether it is part of the way our brain works, or is a cultural matter, or a superstition. Some spend all their effort trying to reduce this intuition to some form of words and then argue over the wording. Some invent a simplistic version of science and then search for the limitations their view of science places upon human actions.

WP editors don't have to settle these matters. But they shouldn't be sucked into accepting one way of framing things, which is what has happened so far. There is lots of literature that adopts the 'deterministic/random' view of nature's laws and spends its time trying to reconcile intuition with this pseudo-science. Fine,it can be summarized. There are those that think brain scans will tell us whether we can make decisions. We can report that. There are those that predict the expansion of science to contain intuition within its domain. That can be reported too. There are those that think we are genetically programmed to have such an intuition, and those who think it is a matter for cultural psychology. And on, and on. Can't this article be opened up? Do we have to accept the idea that Fischer Harris, Dennet, are onto something with their endless nitpicking over minutiae of usage and some reductionist program to subject 'free will' to unexamined simplifications of nature's laws? Brews ohare (talk) 13:11, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

On a different matter, this is a general article on all things to do with free will. This is not just "free will as discussed in philosophy", with material on free will as discussed in other field to go elsewhere. It all goes here. But free will is predominantly discussed as a philosophical matter, those philosophical matters are still open questions, and every scientific investigation about anything to do with free will has to take some position on the philosophical matters for granted in order to proceed, but this article can't do that and still remain neutral on its philosophical content. So the lede, defining the subject, has to touch on some of the philosophy at least briefly, enough to be clear that the exact definition is controversial and to give some ideas as to what those controversial positions are. That is not an opening to go into more general philosophical matters right there in the lede; we just have to touch on a few of them very briefly to maintain neutrality, and then move on. And that's what we do in the first paragraph: two sentences to give the uncontroversial part of the definition and then the different controversial options, then we move on to more general comments. Then later we come back to summarize the philosophy section in other paragraphs. A paragraph summarizing the science section would fit perfectly right right in there.

I honestly can't tell if you are complaining that there's too much philosophy in the lede, or too little. It sounds like you want this article to either set aside the stupid philosophy stuff and get straight to the important science, or make this the philosophy getto (filled with tangentially related philosophical matters) and go build a "real" free will article on scientific investigations (biased toward one philosophical position or another) elsewhere. --Pfhorrest (talk) 08:34, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: You are proposing that this article concerns all aspects of 'free will', not just philosophical aspects, and go on to observe that mostly the concept is ignored outside philosophy. But even within the framework of philosophy itself, the focus of this WP article is overly narrow. If 'free will' is a fundamental intuition, it can be commented upon from many more angles than whether it is compatible with or incompatible with some (debatable) view of nature's laws. And even with a more accurate view of 'nature's laws', it may be noted that 'nature's laws' are an invention of the human mind that correlate a very limited set of observations filtered through an idealistic notion of 'objectivity'. Brews ohare (talk) 13:41, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

Basically I view the first paragraph of the introduction as a stalking horse introducing constraint as the main issue under the disguise of being an 'unbiased view' that allows all kinds of constraints, but then the subject is steered in paragraphs two and three toward limiting constraints to the 'constraint of dominant concern' being the popular notion that science denies the reality of 'free will' beyond some psychological disorder that can be explained away by sophistry. Brews ohare (talk) 16:24, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

Another problem with the 'constraint' approach, beyond its narrow focus on the 'constraint of dominant concern', is that a 'constraint' is a seemingly objective entity that can be dealt with from that perspective. In contrast, the view of 'free will' as an intuition places the subject in a context where 'objectivity' is harder to achieve, as it is with other obscure phenomena like art, religion, music, and so forth. Brews ohare (talk) 14:33, 5 March 2014 (UTC)

I'm having trouble finding much coherent point in all this and I'm too overworked right now to put effort into looking for one, but I want to address this one specific thing about calling free will an "intuition". People no doubt have an intuition that free will exists and they have it. But the definitional question asks what is the thing that people have an intuition about? And the general answer from all parties is that it's some kind of unconstrained ability to choose, of some sort or another... the details of which then get controversial. People have an intuition that their ability to choose is, in some important way, not bound, limited, restricted, or constrained. Then they argue about which way exactly is the important one, and whether their ability to choose really is constrained in that way or not. Saying that what free will is is "an intuition" says nothing about it at all; you might as well say it's "a belief" or "an opinion". An intuition, belief, or opinion, that what? What is it that is intuited? --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:53, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

Saying 'free will' is an intuition is an assertion that it is not simply summarized and immersed in a fog of verbiage. It ups the ante on 'the definitional question' which must capture what is going on and not settle for easy but inadequate encapsulation. As you well know, some philosophers have taken the view that the onus upon discussion of 'free will' is to come up with an adequate understanding of it, and not to engage in the fruitless exchange over how a simplistic view of science seemingly rules it out as near dementia . If we are ready to admit to the real variety of views, maybe it's time to look at the subject in all it's complexity and apportion unbiased attention to all its aspects, as you say is the intention of this article, but is so far unrealized.Brews ohare (talk) 16:07, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

We might begin by outlining the shortcomings of a reductionist approach based upon an erroneous conception of science and it's domain of applicability, now the focus of this article. Brews ohare (talk) 16:13, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

Or we could begin by outlining the alternatives to this unsatisfactory approach. There are three approaches:

(i) 'Free will' is a phenomena addressable by science. With this view, we may ask what scientific approaches are considered candidates for explanation. There are several. One is the view that brain scans and neuroscience will elaborate the mechanisms behind free will. Another is that the understanding of complex systems and multi-pathed feedback systems will push science into a new category of explanations, perhaps emergence, and 'free will' will be discovered in the operation of such systems. And there is, of course the simplistic view of the present WP article that each and every occurrence is either determined by past occurrences or a throw of the dice, and 'free will' must be understood from this perspective.

(ii) 'Free will' is a phenomena outside the domain of science. This view has deep roots in philosophy, in Kant, Wittgenstein, Chomsky and Pinker. Basically it is a chapter of the mind-body problem. It places free will among those phenomena that science cannot reach because the role of objectivity in science, its focus on results that are publicly verifiable and reproducible, precludes examination of the subjective.

(iii) Both the above alternatives adopt the view that 'free will' is extant and is to be explored as such. That is a view irrelevant to a third view that focuses upon constructing a variety of internally consistent axiomatic systems, all of which employ the words 'free will' with one or another definitions, and each of which logically connects its chosen definition with other definitions about 'freedom', 'choice', 'ability to do otherwise', and so forth. The ultimate question of how to establish whether any of these axiomatic systems connects to reality is put aside as an empirical matter that isn't part of the semantic construction project. Brews ohare (talk) 17:11, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

Proposed change to introduction

The existing introduction says:

"Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints..."

One might argue that the identification of 'free will' as an 'ability' is only one of many definitions, and many argue that it is, in fact, not an ability but an illusion. The basis of the subject, however, is the experience of free will that drives us to try to formulate this experience in words, and this underlying experience is what all attempts at definition try to capture.

It is proposed to change this to read as follows:

"Free will refers to the common intuition that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological and other conflicting influences. Free will is widely discussed in terms of constraints, that is, various factors that may limit the ability of agents to make choices. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints..."

----

Sources

"One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free flowing." Corliss Lamont as quoted by Gregg D Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books. pp. p. 8. ISBN 0739171364. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)

"The freedom in question is a property, real or imagined, that nearly all adult human beings...believe themselves to possess. To say that one doesn't understand what it is, is to claim to lack the most basic understanding of the society one lives in, and such a claim is not believable." from Galen Strawson (2010). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 0199247501. Quoted by The Information Philosopher and accessible on-line in Amazon's 'look inside' feature.

"All normal humans experience a kind of basic, on-the-ground certainty that we, our conscious selves, cause our own voluntary acts." from Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, Shaun Gallagher (2009). "Introduction". In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, Shaun Gallagher, eds (ed.). Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?. MIT Press. p. 1. ISBN 0262512572. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

• Comment: The reason for this change is, as expressed by the cited source, that free will is the "unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being", and there would be very little written about 'free will' at all were it not for this widely shared feeling. As Dennett summarizes one position:1

"Free will is here to stay, and the challenge for science is to figure out exactly how it works and not to peddle silly arguments that deny the undeniable."

and this:

"Arguments for free will are based on the subjective experience of freedom" Britannica

and this:

"Theories of free will are more plausible when they capture our intuitions and experiences than when they explain them away. Thus, philosophers generally want their theories of free will to aptly describe the experiences we have when we make choices and feel free and responsible for our actions." 1

Other sources along these lines can be quoted.

The idea is that the primal feeling or intuition is the spring driving our interest, and definitions and arguments are attempts to come to terms with it. Hence, the everyday feeling should be placed up front, to be followed by various attempts at definition and argumentation. Identification with an 'ability' is prejudicial. Brews ohare (talk) 22:31, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

• Comment: If you want to change the lede you should be using a more general source, one that summarises the field. That is if it needs changing which I am unsure of. I think you are (as ever) arguing a position based on the sources you have found rather than focusing onthe use of secondary material ----Snowded 08:30, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: This argument of yours is just a way to duck cited sources by suggesting that there is some 'better' source that would say something else. I've already provided half a dozen supporting sources that are very reputable, including the Encyclopedia Britannica. In any event, the proposed change in the introduction does not interfere with the presentation presently in place; it just provides a sourced and broader initial position. Perhaps you could break with all precedent and actually suggest what you find objectionable about the proposed content? Brews ohare (talk) 16:37, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

• Comment: I don't have time to read this in full right now but I want to quickly address one part.

You write "many argue that it is, in fact, not an ability but an illusion"

Just as with "intuition" above, those who hold that free will is an illusion are saying that the ability to choose freely is an illusion.

For yet another analogy: sun dogs. What are sun dogs? They're these bright spots of light that appear to the sides of the sun. Sun dogs are entirely illusory, they're an optical artifact: there are no actual objects where those bright spots of light appear to be, lensing effects just make it look like there are. But what is the illusion of? Bright spots of light to the sides of the sun.

If free will is entirely illusory, then it is an illusion of something, and that something is what defines free will. For something like sun dogs we can outright say in the lede that the phenomenon in question is illusory: sun dogs are illusory spots of light, etc... because their illusory nature is uncontroversial. With free will that's not so, for either illusoriness or intuitiveness or anything else. Saying "free will is " does not say anything about whether that concretely-defined thing exists, or is merely an illusion, or something we wrongly intuit to exist, or anything -- it merely identifies what the object of such intuitions or illusions are, out of all the many possible intuitions or illusions one might have. --Pfhorrest (talk) 10:31, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

On an unrelated note to your suggested lede: use-mention distinction. Learn it. Free will does not refer to anything. "Free will" refers to something, namely free will, whatever that is. Free will just is something. The article is about the topic, not the term. --Pfhorrest (talk) 10:31, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: Your retreat into arcania amounts to saying that the present assertion that "Free will is the ability of agents..." really should be read as saying "Free will is a supposed ability of agents...", which would still be an objectionable formulation because it makes the everyday experience of free will seem conjectural when it is we might say, self-evident to everybody. The prevalence of this experience is attested to by the half-dozen sources cited above. In any event, the topic here is not some supposed formulation, but the experience and the consequent attempts to account for it in some framework or another - three possible frameworks have been presented to you above. Brews ohare (talk) 16:42, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

As an FYI: the three approaches to the experience of free will listed in the earlier thread are:

(i) 'Free will' is a phenomenon addressable by science.

(ii) 'Free will' is a phenomenon outside the domain of science.

(iii) 'Free will' is a term to be defined and logically connected with other definitions about 'freedom', 'choice', 'ability to do otherwise', and so forth. Construction of a logical apparatus is the focus although, of course, it is hoped there is relevance to the experience provoking this exercise.

Comment upon these approaches can go in the previous thread, and aren't relevant to this proposal. The point in bringing up these approaches is to emphasize that they all are sparked by the experience of free will and intend to deal with that experience one way or another. Hence, the proposed beginning identifies the phenomenon: "Free will refers to the common intuition that..." Brews ohare (talk) 17:34, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

Bottom line: 'Free will' is a phenomenon, and a phenomenon is separate from various attempts to explain it. We all have direct personal access to this phenomenon every moment of every day, and the experience has nothing to do with various clumsy or clever attempts to define it in words, although the urge towards its understanding provokes attempts to put it into words. Brews ohare (talk) 17:43, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

You are writing an essay on your view of the subject and that is not appropriate. You have not (and never do so I wonder if it is worth making the point again) addressed the issue of the need to use secondary sources rather than your interpretations and selection of primary ones. Neither is it appropriate to insult both editors engaged with you here. You need to walk the line a bit more carefully Brews ----Snowded 18:26, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

→ Snowded: (1.) there is no 'essay' here; everything is sourced; (2.) your masochistic desire to be abused by some imaginary insult is your personal problem. Brews ohare (talk) 20:58, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

(i) the fact something is sourced does not mean it is not an essay, the issue is how you are selecting sources and providing commentary (ii) Comments like "retreat into arcane" to an editor who is trying to engage you is one example. The fact you don't see either of these, or choose not to accept them is a large part of the problem here.----Snowded 04:40, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: Instead of your continued focus on imaginary personal affronts, when are you going to address content beyond derogatory accusations backed up by absolutely nothing? Brews ohare (talk) 17:47, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

It doesn't take much imagination to see the failure to follow WP:Civil in many of your comments Brews, but it may be you don't see it. Just as you don't see that content issues are being addressed, but not in a way you are happy with. It seems to be an experience you are having with lots of editors Not to worry, I suppose we have to wait and see which article you will move to next after failing to get your way here. Its been a pattern for months and I really think you should make a donation to[REDACTED] to cover the costs of all the extra storage you use talking about your views on a subject. ----Snowded 18:06, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

→ Snowded: Indeed, content is not being addressed by you as I would like. 'Content' refers to specific statements that represent what reliable sources say. Consequently, criticism of content consists of challenging the statement as unrepresentative of the source, or in providing another reputable source with a different viewpoint. Of course, you are completely aware of these points, but choose not to engage in any such useful development of content. Brews ohare (talk) 19:59, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

Would "apparent" in place of "supposed" make you happy? (Or "seeming", or something else suggesting that phenomenality you're so intent on including). I'm usually fine with such softening words when stating a definition of something the existence of which is doubted, but they often get removed by other editors as "weasel words". If nobody else objects to it though I'm happy to see something like "apparent" or "seeming" or some other such adjective put right after "free will is the..." in the current lede. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:18, 7 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: There is a distinction between the 'phenomenon' of free will and its description as an 'apparent ability'. It is that free will is an experienced phenomenon, that we try to put in words, and is independent of any attempt at verbal description, however apt, such as it's description as an 'ability', real or imagined. An "intuition" is not an "ability", nor necessarily indicative of an ability.

Do you really object to the proposed introduction on some grounds of misstatement of the subject, or what? Don't you agree with the sources cited that 'free will' is a widely held intuitive experience, and not simply an item of technical vocabulary? Somewhat similarly, music is experienced and is more than its description by notes on a staff.

Many discussions of free will begin with a verbal formulation and then assess it. That approach is entirely compatible with identifying the phenomenon of free will as an intuition and then proceeding to try to verbalize it and study the logical consequences of that verbalization. "Arguments for free will are based on the subjective experience of freedom" Britannica. As a phenomenon, 'free will' transcends any encapsulation in words, just like an eclipse of the moon is a phenomenon that can be addressed by devouring dragons or by planetary motions, but still is an eclipse, however it is described. A difference from an eclipse, however, is that the experience of free will, despite its prevalence, is not established objectively by third-party observations, but by introspection and by reports by others of their own subjective mental life. Whether we all are deluded, or whether the matter lies outside the reach of science, the experience is there, and these wide-ranging questions about this experience are part of an exploration that the framing of the subject should include. Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 9 March 2014 (UTC)

"Do really object to the proposed introduction on some grounds of misstatement of the subject"? In short, yes. Let's take your first sentence, which is only thing that differs significantly from the current lede, and look at it word by word. I've already voiced many of these objections:

"Free will refers to the common intuition that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological and other conflicting influences."

Free will...

Good so far.

...refers to...

No. The words "free will" refer to something. Whatever that something is, free will (note the absence of quotation marks) is that thing. "Free will" refers to whatever free will is; free will is whatever "free will" refers to. Since the article (like most Misplaced Pages articles) is about the topic, not the term, we want the free-will-is kind of sentence here, not the "free will"-refers-to kind of sentence here. So strike this phrase and substitute "is". Free will is...

...the common intuition that one has...

No. There is a common intuition that one has something, that something being free will; but free will is not identical to that intuition, it is the object of that intuition. Free will is the thing that we commonly have an intuition of having. What is that thing exactly? That's what this first sentence is supposed to say. We can say separately that there is a common intuition that we have that thing; first we have to say what the thing we're going to talk about is supposed to be. So strike that clause completely. Free will is...

...complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological and other conflicting influences.

The rest of this part is OK, but adds nothing substantial beyond what's already there in the current version, and has some one slight problem.

Similarities first: Who are we talking about having that control? People, actors, the ones who perform the actions being chosen among... "agent" is the standard philosophical terminology for one who acts, as such. And we're talking about such agents being able to control, right? So this control would be a kind of ability... of agents.. to choose among alternative actions, that is, to make choices. And that ability, that power of control over choices, must persist even in the face of other conflicting influences, or factors if you will. And to have control even in the face of conflicting influences is to be... wait for it... unconstrained by those other influences. So you're talking about an ability of agents to control how they choose among alternative actions even in the face of conflicting influences, and we're already talking about an ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. What exactly are you saying that's different from what we're already saying, again?

The slight problem now: Why list only psychological influences as possibly conflicting ones, and leave all the others unspecified? That gives undue weight to one view of free will (one that I agree with mind you, so I'm striving for neutrality against my own interests here). To fix that, we could say that free will is "complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of conflicting influences. Influences of historical concern have included psychological, social, physical, and metaphysical influences." Add in parenthetical examples of each kind of influence for clarity, and you've once again got something that's not substantially different from what we have already, just slightly rephrased and reordered. So what's wrong with what we have already?

It doesn't say anything about intuition, I bet you'll say. But I'd be fine with adding a sentence, even making it the third sentence (immediately following the definition, just before the "free will has important implications" sentence), just stating that there is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will, with maybe a counter-clause stating that the truth of that intuition, or even a precise statement of what it is that we intuit, are much-debated issues. I think such a sentence might work better as a replacement for the first sentence of the second paragraph however, as that then segues into a summary of those debates. --Pfhorrest (talk) 04:31, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I'll take another look at this tomorrow. My first reaction is perplexity. You agreed earlier with the sources that say we all share a common intuition, but rather than name that intuition 'free will' you want to reserve that name for some form of words, and then deny that the subject of this article is the intuition, but insist it is instead the form of words you identify as 'free will'. To me, this position is like refusing to admit the primacy of a phenomenon we all have witnessed called the eclipse of the moon, and insisting the thing we witness is not the eclipse, but that the eclipse is the travel of the Moon into the Earth's shadow. What we witness is only our perception of 'the travel of the Moon into the Earth's shadow'? Thanks for the reply; I'll think some more about this. Brews ohare (talk) 06:15, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

I think you may be mixing up my several independent objections.

One objection is just about the use-mention distinction and your use of the phrasing "refers to". Please read that article I just wikilinked as it explains the problem in detail. A short version of it can be put thus: "cats" is a word, and as such, it can refer to something. That word, "cats", has four letters, but it doesn't have any legs; words don't have legs. The thing that word refers to, on the other hand, namely cats, the animals, have four legs, but they have no letters; animals generally don't have letters. And aside from animals like us who can produce speech that can refer to things, animals generally do not refer to anything. So cats don't refer to anything. But "cats" refers to something, namely cats, whatever those are. Note that this says nothing yet about what makes something a cat, or equivalently, what the definition of the word "cat" is. It just means that an article about cats should say "Cats are..." rather than "Cats refer to", unless the article is about the word "cats", rather than the animals that word refers to. So this article, being as it should be about free will (whatever that is) and not just the words "free will", should say "Free will is..." rather than "Free will refers to...".

The other, completely unrelated, objection, is to do with distinguishing an attitude and the object of that attitude. I'll try to phrase this in terms of your eclipse example. A lunar eclipse is a darkening of the moon. It is not the observation of the darkening of the moon. The eclipse is the thing which is observed, not the observing of it. Let's switch to solar eclipses so I can make my next point: so a solar eclipse is a darkening of the sun, not the observation of the darkening of the sun. However (this is that next point), solar eclipses are highly observer-dependent: a person on one part of the Earth may not observer a solar eclipse at the same time that another observer does. But still, the eclipse is the thing observed, not the observing of it. So we would not say "A solar eclipse is the observation of the sun darkening". We might say "A solar eclipse is the apparent darkening of the sun", to acknowledge that that darkening may be a highly subjective (observer-dependent) phenomenon. But the act of observing the eclipse is not the eclipse itself. Likewise, with free will, free will is the thing we intuit that we have, it is not the intuition of that thing. We commonly have an intuition that we have free will. What is free will then? What do we have an intuition of having? If free will is just the intuition that we have free will, then free will is the intuition that we have the intuition that we have the intuition that we have the intuition that we have the intuition that we have the intuition that we have the.... you get the idea. Free will is.... something. We have an intuition that we have that something. But free will is not that intuition of having that something. It is the something that we intuit that we have. You could say the same kind of thing about all kinds of things people might intuit that they have... souls, magic powers, whatever. When I was a little kid, I had an intuition that magic was real and that I had some kind of power to use it. That intuition was not magic itself; it was an intuition (a false one as it turns out) about magic, which as it turns out does not exist at all. Many people similarly intuit that they have souls; but that intuition is not itself a soul, it is an intuition about souls. And likewise our common intuition that we have free will is not itself free will, it is about free will. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:40, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Hi Pfhorrest: You present an interesting view of language: "a lunar eclipse is a darkening of the Moon, not the observation of the darkening of the Moon". This viewpoint sounds persuasive when the description is shifted from "a lunar eclipse is the traversing of the Earth's shadow by the Moon" to more everyday language like "darkening of the Moon". The first formulation obviously congers up a model of orbiting spheres that is seemingly unintuitive. But we use words like 'darkening' in many contexts, so it seems to place the eclipse in an everyday setting among things like turning out the lights, and so 'darkening' seems somehow more perceptual and less theoretical, putting it closer to the 'observation' of the darkening of the moon, and making the noting of an 'observation' less significant. I don't find the replacement of the word 'observation' by the identification of a particular type of observation, a 'darkening', to be persuasive here. Of course, the eclipse of the Moon has been described in many ways, from Moon-eating dragons, to poetry, to astronomy. We agree, it seems, that the eclipse (use) transcends all such descriptions. Although I don't think the contrast of a 'darkening' with the 'observation of a darkening' gets us anywhere, I do think that the intuition of 'free will' or the experience of 'free will' is the subject of this article (the use of 'free will'), and 'free will' (the use, or phenomenon) is not one of many debatable and non-unique formulations in words (various philosophical attempts to encapsulate the phenomenon in words). I am unsure whether you consider the 'experience' of free will to be an 'observation' of free will, making the 'intuition' of free will prior to the experience of it? Or perhaps you view the 'intuition' of free will as an 'observation' of free will, and 'free will' to be something extant and prior to the intuition or the experience of it? If so, doesn't this introduce the Use–mention distinction in a different fashion, where we now have to identify the 'use' of 'free will' as something even more difficult to identify than the intuition of free will?

"Likewise, with free will, free will is the thing we intuit that we have, it is not the intuition of that thing."

Why is that necessary? Why not take the view that, like many whims, we have many intuitions (that the person in front of us is our true love, that there is only one God, that 'science governs all that happens', that 'no machine can embody what is essentially human',...) and one intuition on that list is the intuition that "we are free to make our own choices", or "that we cause our own conscious acts"? What we have to do in order to discuss the intuition we might label as the 'intuition of free will' is to identify from among our many intuitions which is the one we are talking about.

If we have an intuition of free will, how do we identify this intuition? Doesn't any identification, such as those of the sources, for example, "the unmistakeable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free flowing", plunk us down in linguistic controversy, an infinite regress? That entry into regress is based upon the mistake that identifying this intuition requires its complete and definitive description. Of course, the rarer the experience, the more description is needed to bring it to mind, and if there are many similar experiences a more complete a description is needed in order to separate what is being talked about from other things that seem similar on the surface. But in the case of 'free will', no-one will misunderstand what is referred to here. As the source says, it is 'unmistakable'. That is not to say that this description is complete or definitive. It is just a tag that identifies the subject, and the intuition itself may be far more complicated and unclear than this tag. That ambiguity is actually why reference to the intuition is preferable to any attempted encapsulation in words: once one has identified the intuition, which is directly experienced, one can begin to assess what is said about it and decide whether what is said is a more or a less complete characterization. There is no infinite regress necessary, just a comparison of the verbal characterization with one's identified intuition. On that basis we can propose a 'compatibilist' or an 'incompatibilist' position vis à vis 'determinism' and inquire how that fits our intuition, or we can decide that correlations of brain scans with lifting our finger capture our intuition, or whether one's persistent attempts to form one's own character capture our intuition, or whether all these are only facets we recognize as aspects of our intuition. And we can ask whether the intuition is well-founded, in whole or in part, and how that might be established. The entire subject is broadened and recognizes what the Encyclopedia Britannica points out, "Arguments for free will are based on the subjective experience of freedom". Brews ohare (talk) 14:13, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Perhaps a revised version of the proposed change presented below is more acceptable? Brews ohare (talk) 17:03, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

One intuition on that list is the intuition that "we are free to make our own choices", or "that we cause our own conscious acts"

"We are free to make our own choices" and "we cause our own conscious acts" are sentences roughly equivalent to "we have free will". At least, they're sentences of the same order: they're talking about some ability or capacity of us, rather than some attitude we have towards having that ability or capacity. You might say "one intuition on that list it the intuition that we have free will". That would be a perfectly fine way of speaking. But you are plainly misusing basic English if you want to say that an intuition of having something is identical to that thing, or any kind of intensional attitude toward a thing is identical to that thing. A belief in something is not the thing believed, a desire for something is not the thing desired, an emotion about something is not the thing emoted over, an intuition about something is not the thing intuited, an opinion about something is not the thing opined about, and so on.

I'm not raising any objection whatsoever (at this point at least) about whether or not there is a common intuition that we have free will, or whether or not there is anything to be known about free will besides that we have some intuition about it, or anything substantial like that. This is a linguistic objection; and that is not to say that all there is to be said about free will is language games either, it's saying that you are abusing language in your attempts to talk about the subject. I'm objecting to your abuse of language in trying to state what free will is by saying that it is the intuition that we have it. What is the thing that we have an intuition about? Whatever your answer, however precisely or vaguely or however we want to describe it, it's linguistically fine to say that that thing is free will, but not to say that the intuition that we have that thing is, itself, identical to free will. It would be linguistically fine to say, adapting your two phrases above, that "Free will is the freedom to make our own choices", or "Free will is the causation of our own conscious acts". Those sentences do not commit the error I am harping on here. (They have different problems though). But "Free will is the intuition that we are free to make our own choices" is just, prima facie, linguistically screwy -- you're saying essentially "free will is the intuition that we have ", when what we need is a sentence saying "free will is ", where those bracketed words at the end are standing for some kind of definite description of free will, the specifics of which are a matter for a different argument.

Let's look at magic again for another example. It would be wrong, in the same was as you're wrong here, to say "magic is the belief that one has power to alter the physical world by thought alone". No. Magic is not a belief in . Magic is . Where that bracketed "" there is again standing in for a definite description of magic. You could say "magic is the power to alter the physical world by thought alone". That would be linguistically fine. We could then argue about whether "the power to alter the physical world by thought alone" is an uncontroversially accurate definite description of magic. That would be a separate issue. But that issue aside, believing you have magic is not the same thing as having magic. It may be that there is no magic, that there is only belief in it, and there is nothing more to be said about it than that people believe in it, and the kinds of things they believe -- but that doesn't make the belief identical to the thing believed-in. Likewise free will. It may be that there is no free will, there is only this intuition that we have it, and there is nothing more to be said about free will than that we intuit that we have it, and the kinds of things we intuit about it -- but that doesn't make free will identical to the intuition that we have it.

I'm getting seriously frustrated here, over multiple article and years of discussion, with your apparently utter inability to think in abstract terms and understand when you are confusing things like this, or even understand the thing that it's being said you are confusing. It's simple language confusion, over and over again -- you don't grasp what words mean, different orders of abstraction, different modalities of language or logic, intensional attitudes and their objects, etc. I'm getting sick of it. --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:40, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: Perhaps the choice of the word 'intuition' is a problem. You say 'a desire is not the thing desired'. No problem. Likewise, 'an intuition is not the thing intuited' I am not violating this paradigm. I want to say that free will is a subjective phenomena, like a sense of individuality, a thing in itself. You prefer to call it an 'attitude'.

Let me think out loud for a moment. Of course, the intuition that 'there is a God' is not evidence there is a God. The intuition that one has a capacity is not that capacity. The intuition that one is free to choose is not the freedom to choose. But if I wish to define a particular intuition as the "intuition of 'free will' ", there is no linguistic problem in saying I have the particular intuition that I call the "intuition of 'free will' ", meaning I am under the impression, or have the intuition that 'I have the capacity to choose'. (More precisely, I direct attention to this intuition using this label, although the intuition is in fact more complex than the label indicates.) The problem you point out arises only if I suggest this intuition is the actual capability of choice, which is not being asserted. Am I still making a mistake here? I think you misunderstand me. Brews ohare (talk) 15:13, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Most of what you write here just now makes sense enough. The objection is that the wording of your proposed lede sounds like it's saying something that doesn't make such sense. It makes it sound like you are identifying free will with the intuition that we have the capacity to choose, rather than identifying free will with the capacity to choose itself. There certainly is an "intuition of free will", but that is like a "belief in God"; God (whether or not he exists) is not the belief in God, and free will (whether or not it exists) is not the intuition of free will; the latter item of each of those pairs is an intentional attitude (a mental state about something) about the former item in that pair. So however we may want to mention that free will is commonly intuited, we cannot do so in a way that identifies free will as the intuition that we have it; we have to instead state what it is, and then that we intuit that we have it. --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:26, 13 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest:You are right that I want to connect to the intuition that we might identify with the label "capacity to choose", although I use the designation "the intuition that we have the capacity to choose" only as a label, and do not wish to say that this intuition is completely described by this label, in the same way that one might identify a wagon with the phrase "the wagon that is red" without suggesting that the color 'red' is a complete description of the wagon, which obviously has many interesting features beyond its color. In contrast, if I say 'free will is the capacity to choose" I have limited myself to this definition. To gain adequate flexibility to discuss the topic of 'free will' I am now faced with some preamble like the following in order to make clear that no one simple definition, no matter how clever, is adequate to contain the subject:

"The term 'free will' has many different meanings and nuances that ultimately can be traced back to the complexity of the intuition we associate with 'free will', To treat these various aspects, we will proceed to consider a list of definitions of 'free will' that to some extent overlap, and will contrast and compare these various approaches. A number of these definitions can be set up in the same words, but they differ because the meanings attached to words like 'free' 'freedom' 'choose' 'choice' and so forth can be interpreted in many ways. Some approaches take the view that 'free will' is a concept outside the reach of objective observation, and to be examined in some important dimensions only by introspection or the reports by others of their introspections. Other definitions are oriented more toward the sciences, and try to set up definitions of 'free will' that have some possibility of experimental substantiation. These fall into two categories - those that may be verifiable by scientific methods (like brain scans) that are already available techniques. Others are formulations that conceivably could be tested by techniques that may be developed in the future, for example, supposing our understanding of complex systems today can be extrapolated to more advanced understanding of complex feedback systems beyond our grasp today. A completely different set of definitions can be found in various religions, which attempt in various ways to reconcile the concept of free will with religious ideas about the capacities of various deities." And so on and so forth.

Pfhorrest, no doubt you would write this preamble in a different fashion (as would I upon reading it over), but perhaps you can see that using a single, narrow definition at the outset as is now done is a straightjacket that does not fit the subject. The subject is not free will in some narrow sense, but free will with all the complexity contained in the intuition of free will. (I've tried to provide some of this flavor in the clumsy paragraph above.) It is this intuition that drives the subject, not any particular verbalization of it that chops off a part of the intuition so one can deal more simply with only that chosen part of the phenomenon. Brews ohare (talk) 04:34, 13 March 2014 (UTC)

To use your example of a red wagon, let's say we were editing an article about something called a "rotwag". The first sentence of that article, defining the subject to be discussed, might be something like "A rotwag is a red wagon." There are a lot of other things that could probably be said about such a thing: who has built them, what are they made out of, why are they important, what has happened with them and where have they been over the course of their existence, and so on. But the defining characteristic of a rotwag, all of that stuff aside, is its being a red wagon -- there might be all different kinds of red wagons and lots of things to say about them, but "a red wagon" is sufficient to identify the kind of thing that "rotwag" names. Saying "A rotwag is a red wagon" in no way claims that there is nothing more to say about such wagons other than that they are red. It's just enough to say about them to tell the reader that red wagons are the things named "rotwags" that we're going to be telling them more about in the article they're about to read.

Let's say that images of rotwags are extremely common. They appear on all kinds of things everywhere. In fact people have perhaps more exposure to images of rotwags than they do to actual rotwags themselves, or at least, they could tell you more about the images of rotwags than they could about rotwags themselves. Maybe the only reason anyone is interested in rotwags is because there are, for some reason, images of them all over the damn place. We'd want our article on rotwags to say somewhere prominently that images of rotwags are extremely common, sure enough. But we would not open the article by saying "A rotwag is a common image of a red wagon." No. A rotwag is a red wagon. Images of rotwags are common. And there's a lot of other interesting things to say about rotwags. But we start Misplaced Pages article with definitions, and "a red wagon" is a good definition of a rotwag: it tells you just enough to identify a rotwag, without being so specific as to rule out by definition things which should count as rotwags, or so vague as to leave readers with no idea what the article is going to be about, and without confusing rotwags with something else about them, like the common images of them that are everywhere, or the word "rotwag" used to name them, etc.

Your long preamble there is good enough on a cursory read for an essay about free will, nothing really screams 'incorrect' about it to me, but it is not a writing style appropriate for the lede of a Misplaced Pages article, which must begin with a good definition, and which is generally (with some exceptions, but not here) about a topic rather than a term used to name that topic. For topics which have vague of controversial definitions, the best we can do within those confines is to give an extremely minimal definition that will not conflict with any of the specific controversial ones, and then list some of the controversial specifics.

You've used phrases like "capacity to choose, even in the face of conflicting influences". I've repeatedly stated that, stripped of all the other problems, a statement like "Free will is the capacity to choose, even in the face of conflicting influences" is an acceptable style of definition... but one that is scantly at all different from the one we already have. Free will is the ability to will freely -- that's completely uncontroversial because it's just an inane tautology. Like "free speech is the ability to speak freely." It's just an inane tautology though, so we need to fill in more informative but still synonymous and equally uncontroversial phrases for those words "will" and "freely". What is it to will, in the broadest general sense? To choose, to make choices, to make decisions... there are all kinds of things we could fill in here that would be adequate synonyms. And what is it to do something freely? To do it without being restricted, constrained, forced, coerced, influenced, and so on. You're picking different words than the ones we already have but they're still saying the same thing, once we strip away all the other problems: Free will is some kind of {ability, capacity, power, etc} to {will, choose, decide, etc} without being {restricted, constrained, forced, coerced, influenced, etc}. On that level there is no controversy anywhere. Where the definitional controversy comes in is in what it is important to be free from. So we list some general categories of things that notable sources have said are the important thing that your willing needs to be free from in order for you to have free will.

None of that pretends to have said everything there is to say about free will, or even to have given an exhaustive gloss of every possible definition of free will. It just gives a minimalist uncontroversial definition just to meet the requirement that the article begin with a good definition, and then it lists some prominent examples of controversial details which often get added to that minimalist uncontroversial definition.

You're not going to get around the requirement that the article start with a good definition. That is policy. We can't start with a big rambling preamble about the topic just to avoid your discomfort with saying "Free will is ". That's not how Misplaced Pages articles are written. We can argue about the nuances of the exact words that we put in for that , how much detail we can put in before it becomes controversial to someone, and so forth. But so far all your proposals, when stripped of other problems that are mostly just misuse of language, boil down to what we already have, just using different synonyms, slightly different grammar, etc. You have yet to propose anything which actually points at a problem in the current lede and suggests a fix; you've only proposed adding new problems, without even being able to see that they are problems until I write multiple doctoral theses explaining why they are problems, and often not even then. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:39, 13 March 2014 (UTC)

Hi Pforrest: Your 'multiple doctoral theses' might have been shorter if you stopped to read what I said instead of assuming I am incapable of using English, and in several instances simply repeating what I have said, but in your own words. That aside, we seem to agree on two main points:

(i) There is a widely held intuition concerning free will (as attested by a dozen sources);

(ii) No definition of free will adequately captures the subject (or the intuition), including, in particular, the present definition: "'free will' is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors".

We appear to disagree about an early notice to readers about the role of this intuition, and about the limitations of this definition (leading to many alternative definitions, not all compatible with one another). Personally I think a better handling of these two issues is achievable in principle without deviating much from the present formulation. However, you appear to be unwilling to recognize any need for improvement, or perhaps feel that an attempt at improvement is inadvisable, and that being so, there is nothing that can be done about it. Brews ohare (talk) 16:01, 13 March 2014 (UTC)

Hoping against hope, I have made a third attempt that seems to offer a possible resolution of these matters. Brews ohare (talk) 17:02, 13 March 2014 (UTC)

I repeat things similar to what you have said with important modifications, in an attempt to better illustrate the places where I agree and the places where I object. You seem to read these as either agreeing or disagreeing with you entirely, and rarely seem to get the nuance of the partial agreement, partial disagreement, which is the real point I'm trying to discuss: that something could be OK, but only if certain problems were fixed.

For example, I do not agree on point (ii) there. In fact the major point of my previous response was that your own proposed lede, stripped of other problems, is roughly synonymous to the present definition, and consequently that the present definition should be equally unproblematic to you, serving the same purpose as your own terminology does, in merely identifying the thing to be discussed, not giving an exhaustive description of everything there is to say about it. I agreed that it is difficult to give a substantial definition of free will without bias, but I object that it is not impossible to give a minimal definition that says just enough to identify the topic, but little enough to avoid bias.

I also have not objected (and have repeatedly explicitly said that I don't object) to giving prominent mention of your point (i), which I do agree with. I disagree with the specific way you try to do so. Something of the form "Free will is . There is a widely held intuition concerning it." is not intensely objectionable for a lede. I'm only objecting that "Free will is the intuition that " is problematic.

I am not arguing that the article is perfect as it is. I am merely looking at each of your proposed changes as written and asking "is there anything wrong with this?" and commenting where I see problems. A proposed change with any problems fixed would be fine. But so far, your proposed changes, minus the problems I see with them, end up proposing almost no change at all, and so do not seem like constructive changes. I'm even trying to suggest ways that the gist of what you seem to want to add can be added without those problems. (Like a sentence mentioning the common intuition that we have free will somewhere in the first or second paragraphs -- once it's divorced from the problem of defining free will as "an intuition" as your proposal literally suggests). But you seem not to hear those and insist on fighting about the problematic way to make that point instead, reading me as objecting to the substance when it's largely the form that's a problem.

I will look at your new proposal below in a bit. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:50, 14 March 2014 (UTC)

The scientific approach to 'free will'?

A description of how a scientist might approach the phenomenon of the intuition of free will is found in Pockett. It consists of questions like: "Why do people feel free in their choices although they may not be?" "Under what conditions do healthy minds develop intuitions of free will?"

On the other hand, general questions like "Do the laws of nature contradict the possibility of mental acts to control events?" are not answerable by science and can only be conjectured upon. A more specific question like "Do the laws of neuroscience (or psychology or sociology or ...; name your field) as presently understood contradict the possibility that mental acts might control events?" would have to be answered in the negative because the chosen theory does not encompass the relevant experimental domain and is not applicable without extrapolation beyond the realm where it is verified.

The present WP article, with its emphasis upon various philosophical positions regarding the import of the archaic notion of determinism (simply a gussied-up version of fatalism) and its bias toward reductionism is framed outside both the possibility of an extra-scientific approach (for example, Pinker or Kant), and even the scientific approach itself.

The weighting of the article toward the battle with determinism is indicative of a great deal of philosophical debate, but that preoccupation is very one-sided and should be better balanced to represent a wider and more pertinent perspective. Brews ohare (talk) 19:16, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

Wrong type of source. The Machines like us hypothesis is one take (and a controversial one), you need a general summary of scientific approaches not one that pops up on a google search. There is no one clear way of understanding scientific approaches to free will, look at the controversy over Freeman's work as one example and then we have the whole autonomic v novelty receptive debate In practice science and philosophy are hopefully entwined on this subject at the moment and creating a dichotomy is not helpful. ----Snowded 22:43, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: Not the point, which is rather that no scientific theory as we know it today can make the claim that minds can or cannot control even one of our decisions. That claim requires extrapolation beyond what is so far established. So the arguments about the implications of determinism that dominate this article are not about any realistic claim, and should not be the preponderance of the article. In its place should be a discussion of the intuition of free will, its possible origins (genetic? sociological? psychological?), its connection with morality and the law, and so on.

The focus in this article on determinism and incompatibilism or compatibilism is only a facet of the topic and not a practically interesting one except to those who for some reason or another think that determinism (or its variant that allows chance as well) is not only a viable view of the actual laws of nature as we know them, but that it applies to everything, not just scientific subjects, a gross exaggeration that cannot be justified.See, e.g., JT Roberts Brews ohare (talk) 00:37, 9 March 2014 (UTC)

we need secondary sources Brews not your summaries of what you have found on google searches. You make the classic Cartesian error above for example. You really do not understand this subject and you are not well enough read to summarise if. Work from secondary sources not partial pricey ones and you might, just might get somewhere. Otherwise your ar just waiting everyone's time. ----Snowded 20:03, 9 March 2014 (UTC)

So entertaining talking with you Snowded. I am prepared to learn more about this subject, but I'm unprepared to take your say-so about my misunderstandings. Perhaps you could elucidate, or point at some relevant source? As you know, even were you to establish credentials in this area, which isn't going to happen, WP is designed to avoid attaching any credibility based solely upon say-so, regardless of reputations always in the real world. So let us hear more. Brews ohare (talk) 21:10, 9 March 2014 (UTC)

sorry Brews, other editors may be prepared to give you a 101 course in philosophy through the talk pages. I am not. My point was that interaction over primary sources is not what Misplaced Pages is about. You either learn that or you will continue to have little or no impact on content. As to my opinion, your concept of physics is clearly an engineering one and your knowledge of philosophy is so biased towards a limited range of.sources that your contributions are nearly always deeply problematic . But that is my opinion, you will doubtless ignore it, and ignore the advice of many another editor. You are a time waster ----Snowded 19:32, 10 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: For one conversant with the subject, as you claim to be, it is but a moment of your time to draw some few words from your memory to identify the problem as you see it and provide a source for my further education. And perhaps improve WP content? Brews ohare (talk) 20:02, 10 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest perplexes you, I obviously irritate you and[REDACTED] overall has got oh so many things wrong; per you multiple essays on your talk page. Maybe there is a lesson there. As to a source for your further education I suggest using the time your retirement has provided to go to a local community college and do a 101 Philosophy course, it would get you started. ----Snowded 06:44, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded, for an amateur philosopher your imprecise use of English is surprising. It's pretty obvious that it is not Pfhorrest that perplexes me; quite the contrary; but his argument. This example (and many others where you have had to backtrack), and your reluctance to say anything of consequence in this instance, suggests that your claimed insight into this matter is not something you wish to put to the test. Brews ohare (talk) 14:45, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Just remind me Brews. How many of your edits on Philosophy articles have been accepted? ----Snowded 22:20, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: So this discussion of 'free will' has boiled down to which of the two of us is 'bigger'? Very pertinent. But you lose. Brews ohare (talk) 22:54, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

You may wish to see it that way Brews, but the point (which you are ignoring) is that you cannot write essays based on primary sources. That has resulted in a zero acceptance rate for your substantial edits over many articles. Now you can learn from that or you can ignore it. Your call ----Snowded 23:07, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

→ Snowded: You raise as the main issue this point: "you cannot write essays based on primary sources". This remark is another dodge to avoid saying what you think is wrong with proposed content, or proposing alternatives to it. Instead of providing a better summary of sources, or additional sources with other ideas, you wish to divert attention to an abstract policy issue divorced from specific content, and therefore requiring no understanding from you of the subject at hand. Brews ohare (talk) 04:02, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

No Brews, it is a refusal to engage in an under graduate discussion of the subject. Here we use secondary sources. You are the one who advocates change, you have to provide material to support the need. At the moment, as I said before, if you want these sort of discussions enrol in your local community college don't waste people's time----Snowded 07:08, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: You cannot point to any Talk-page discussion of the content of this article made by yourself, nevermind an elementary one. Brews ohare (talk) 15:08, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Correct Brews, because I am not prepared to talk about primary sources ----Snowded 17:01, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

And we are back to the diversion from content to policy issues. It is obvious that primary sources can be presented if their views are accurately reported, and if there is controversy the primary sources with differing views also should be presented. What is disallowed is for a WP editor to referee such differences of opinion - they only can be reported, not adjudicated. Your unwillingness to engage in this kind of presentation of views is not because of policy, but because you don't feel like it. Brews ohare (talk) 17:06, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

No Brews, you don't get Misplaced Pages, what you choose or present from primary sources has to be a result of a secondary source. Until you get that (or are prepared to listen) you will get no where ----Snowded 17:35, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

This point is clearly made on WP:Primary: a secondary source is needed only to establish the importance of a topic, particularly for justification of an article. As for subsidiary topics within an article, there is no such requirement. And, as you also know, there rarely are truly 'secondary' sources for philosophy articles. The Internet Encyclopedia and the Stanford Encyclopedia and the Oxford Companion all have articles written by a single author and are no more scrutinized than other published works.

All of which has no place here in a Talk page (supposedly) devoted to the drafting of a presentation of the subject of Free will. Brews ohare (talk) 18:27, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Content is determined by policy and your attempts to use policy discussion groups to support your view on primary sources failed, as did your RFAs Brews. Otherwise I find it highly ironic that you are concerned about misuse of talk pages, and simply unbelievable that you think there are few secondary sources for philosophy articles. ----Snowded 19:27, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: I think content is determined by accurate reporting of published sources, not policy. Of course, policy is supposed to assist this undertaking, while in your hands it is mainly useful for other purposes, for which it is not intended. Brews ohare (talk) 05:34, 13 March 2014 (UTC)

A reformulation of the proposed change to the Introduction:

The following is a revised version of the change in the introduction suggested in the above thread:

"Free will is the common intuition (whether valid or not) that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological and other conflicting influences. Although sufficient to identify this intuition, this description is only indicative, and there is much more to say about free will and how to put this intuition into words and how to assess it. In particular, as part of the assessment of this intuition, free will is widely discussed in terms of constraints, that is, various factors that may limit the ability of agents to make choices. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints..."

----

Sources

"One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free flowing." Corliss Lamont as quoted by Gregg D Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books. pp. p. 8. ISBN 0739171364. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)

"The freedom in question is a property, real or imagined, that nearly all adult human beings...believe themselves to possess. To say that one doesn't understand what it is, is to claim to lack the most basic understanding of the society one lives in, and such a claim is not believable." from Galen Strawson (2010). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 0199247501. Quoted by The Information Philosopher and accessible on-line in Amazon's 'look inside' feature.

"All normal humans experience a kind of basic, on-the-ground certainty that we, our conscious selves, cause our own voluntary acts." from Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, Shaun Gallagher (2009). "Introduction". In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, Shaun Gallagher, eds (ed.). Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?. MIT Press. p. 1. ISBN 0262512572. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

"The experience of being able to act differently in similar situations is certainly a main source of our intuition that we possess free will." Henrik Walter (2001). Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy. MIT Press. p. 48. ISBN 0262232146.

"Free will does exist, but it is a perception, not a power or driving force. People experience free will. They have the sense that they are free." An often-quoted remark by Mark Hallett, researcher with the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stoke. Quoted, for example, by Richard McKenzie Neal (2008). The path to addiction and other troubles we were born to know. AuthorHouse. p. 45. ISBN 1438916752.

• Comment: In response to an observation by Pfhorrest, 'free will' is identified as a particular intuition, a phenomenon of the mind that is widely recognized, and not simply a 'reference to' this intuition. The intuition is first identified, and then immediately qualified by the subsequent discussion of constraints. Brews ohare (talk) 16:58, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

The fact that many articles reference the common intuition does not mean that free will is defined by it. The citations you give are mainly commentaries not definitions. ----Snowded 23:08, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

That the 'intuition of having a capacity' is acknowledged by many reputable sources holding a wide variety of views about that intuition indicates that the intuited capacity is a subject of discussion. In fact, some say that were it not for this intuition, there would be very little interest in this topic of 'free will', even among philosophers. There is no assertion that the intuition of free will is 'defined' by simply identifying the intuition among the many intuitions humankind entertains. In fact, to some degree, an 'intuition' defies definition, inviting a variety of interpretations corresponding to a variety of contexts. A good part of the philosophical and of the scientific discussion is about just which aspects of the intuition are adequately captured by various attempts at putting the intuition into words. Brews ohare (talk) 01:09, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Brews, as above, there is no objection to mentioning the fact that there is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will, or that that is a motivating factor in the discussion of the topic, or anything substantial like that. It is a linguistic problem. You are confusing an attitude with the object of that attitude.

To illustrate this, let's take one of those sources you quote, and stick your proposed definition of free will in place of the words "free will" in that sentence.

Let's take your quote from Henrik Walter, which speaks of "our intuition that we possess free will".

Now let's take your definition of free will, "the common intuition that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions", and stick that in there.

Do you think Walter is speaking of "our intuition that we possess the common intuition that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions"?

Or is he speaking of "our intuition that we possess complete control to choose among alternative actions"?

Do you see how the first possibility there is a completely screwy way to speak? Talking about the intuition of having an intuition? Obviously he means something more like the second. So when we say "free will is...", we need to finish that sentence with something like what we replaced the words "free will" with in the second paraphrase there. "Complete control to choose among alternative actions" is a possible definition of free will that does not commit the error I'm harping on right now. (It may have other problems). It would also be fine to say somewhere prominent that there is a common intuition that we have such control. But trying to define free will as the intuition that we have such control, rather than as such control itself, just plainly abuses language, all substantial matters aside. Do you see that? --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:55, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Pforrest: Let me first explain how to avoid this screwy way to speak, and then get to the real issue of presenting the topic of 'free will' here.

(i) Suppose that we regard the unit of discourse to be some combination like "the intuition that we have control over our actions". The italicized words simply identify which intuition we are talking about, separating it from things like "the intuition that there is a God" . So Walter's statement ""The experience of being able to act differently in similar situations is certainly a main source of "our intuition that we possess free will." cannot be rewritten to repeat the word 'intuition'. That would be like speaking of "I don't mean the wagon that is red, but the red wagon that is red". You take the view that the 'intuition of free will' is circular; so one has the "the intuition of the ]]. You can view Walter's statement that way if you like, but I take his "intuition that we possess free will" as a short-hand label selecting among intuitions the 'intuition that one is capable of choice' (or something similar). That is,'free will' in the phrase the 'intuition that we have free will' is only a tag to select among intuitions, and there is no implication that the word 'red' in the phrase 'the wagon that is red' describes everything about the wagon, defining 'wagon'. It just designates it. I've reworded the proposal to make this point more obvious. You might take another look at it.Brews ohare (talk) 15:38, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

(ii) Here is what I think is the problem with this article, whether or not 'intuition' helps to solve it. There are many pieces to the 'free will' discussion: (a) the standard arguments about compatibilism, incompatibilsm and so forth (b) the dualist point of view of Pinker and Kant (c) the Libet experiments and neuroscience in general (e) the emergence viewpoint based on hoped-for qualitatively new developments in the understanding of feedback systems (f) the hypothesis of free will as a powerless conscious concomitant of unconscious processes that actually decide things (an epiphenomenon, or 'ghost in the machine') (g) the religious viewpoints.

The idea of an intuition of free will fits with any of these viewpoints and does not weight the discussion in any direction. The present article mixes up the empirical with the logical, the pursuit of facts with refinements in usage, and above all (IMO) ignores the fact that reductionism is a belief, not a verifiable position, so the whole emphasis of the discussion upon consideration of determinism is just one (silly) point of view that does not even employ a viable idea of what constitutes a 'law of nature'.

What can be done? Brews ohare (talk) 05:11, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

I don't want to get off onto a discussion of this much larger reorganization you are proposing until we can settle the much smaller issue already under discussion of the problems with your proposed introduction, which were, to repeat succinctly:

• The use-mention distinction error in using the word "refers", now fixed.
• The confusion of intentional attitudes and their objects in defining "free will" as an intuition, where we are just starting to make progress in another section above -- let's consolidate discussion of that up there instead of continuing it here.
• The undue weight of singling out psychological influences alone to mention amongst all possible conflicting influences.
• The fact that's what left of your proposal after fixing those things is virtually identical to what we already have, so what's the point?

On that last point, let me take a virtual editor's pen to your latest proposal to illustrate:

Free will is the common intuition (whether valid or not) that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological and other conflicting influences. Although sufficient to identify this intuition, this description is only indicative, and there is much more to say about free will and how to put this intuition into words and how to assess it. In particular, as part of the assessment of this intuition, free will is widely discussed in terms of constraints, that is, various factors that may limit the ability of agents to make choices. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints ..."

So now we have:

• Free will is complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of conflicting influences. Conflicting influences of historical concern have included conflicting psychological influences, conflicting social influences, conflicting physical influences, and conflicting metaphysical influences.

Compared to what we had already:

• Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints, physical constraints, social constraints, and mental constraints.

I've taken the liberty of eliding the examples given of each kind of constraint for the sake of comparison. (Note also, FWIW, that "mental constraints" used to say "psychological constrains" until an earlier bout with you led to a lot of shuffling of the lede).

Where exactly is the improvement in your version?

--Pfhorrest (talk) 03:06, 13 March 2014 (UTC)

Another attempt at a revised introduction

The following is a third version of the change in the introduction suggested in the above thread:

"Free will is a term used to capture the common intuition (whether valid or not) that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological and other conflicting influences. Although this description serves to distinguish this intuition from others, there are many attempts at a precise definition of free will. Whatever formulation is adopted, its reality is widely discussed in terms of constraints, that is, various factors that may limit the ability of agents to make choices. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints..."

----

Sources

"One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free flowing." Corliss Lamont as quoted by Gregg D Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books. pp. p. 8. ISBN 0739171364. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)

"The freedom in question is a property, real or imagined, that nearly all adult human beings...believe themselves to possess. To say that one doesn't understand what it is, is to claim to lack the most basic understanding of the society one lives in, and such a claim is not believable." from Galen Strawson (2010). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 0199247501. Quoted by The Information Philosopher and accessible on-line in Amazon's 'look inside' feature.

"All normal humans experience a kind of basic, on-the-ground certainty that we, our conscious selves, cause our own voluntary acts." from Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, Shaun Gallagher (2009). "Introduction". In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, Shaun Gallagher, eds (ed.). Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?. MIT Press. p. 1. ISBN 0262512572. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

"The experience of being able to act differently in similar situations is certainly a main source of our intuition that we possess free will." Henrik Walter (2001). Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy. MIT Press. p. 48. ISBN 0262232146.

"Free will does exist, but it is a perception, not a power or driving force. People experience free will. They have the sense that they are free." An often-quoted remark by Mark Hallett, researcher with the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke. Quoted, for example, by Richard McKenzie Neal (2008). The path to addiction and other troubles we were born to know. AuthorHouse. p. 45. ISBN 1438916752.

A recent attempt by a neurophilosopher to put 'free will' into words he finds compatible with machine intelligence is: "Our belief in free will expresses the idea that, under the right circumstances, we have the ability to guide our decisions by our higher-level thoughts, beliefs, values, and past experiences, and to exert control over our undesired lower-level impulses." Stanislas Dehaene (2014). Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts. Viking Adult. p. 264. ISBN 0670025437.

• Comment: This revision avoids some objections by Pfhorrest to the earlier versions and tries to alert the reader both to the intuition of 'free will' underlying the interest in it, and to the difficulties in arriving at a precise verbalization of this intuition. At the same time it leads naturally into the consideration of constraints, which is the thrust of the rest of the introduction. Brews ohare (talk) 17:00, 13 March 2014 (UTC)

Ok, let's go over this word by word again:

Free will is a term used to capture...

WIkipedia articles are about topics, not terms. This article is about free will, not the term "free will". So strike "a term used to capture", and we have "Free will is..."

...the common intuition (whether valid or not) that one has...

As we've been going over at length above, while there may be a common intuition that we have , free will is not identical to that intuition. To keep this inline here, we'd need to rephrase to something like "...the commonly-intuited...", but that sounds very awkward and I think this needs to be moved to another sentence entirely. "Free will is . There is a common intuition that we have free will." Or something like that. But meanwhile, what goes in that ""? "Free will is..."

...complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological and other conflicting influences.

Most of this is ok-ish, but as mentioned above already, singling out psychological influences as the only source of conflict worth mentioning by name (with everything else as just "other") biases the lede of the article toward undue weight to one of many controversial positions. We could list some other prominent influences inline here with it: social, physical, and metaphysical, like we have now. We did that at one point, in fact. But then people wanted clarification on what those meant, so each of them got a little parenthetical list of examples. And then the first sentence was huge, so that last part got split into a second sentence immediately following the first.

If we preempted that process here, and followed up with the moved intuition sentence above, we'd have something like "Free will is complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of conflicting influences. Conflicting influences which people have notably been concerned about have included psychological influences (such as ), social influences (such as ), physical influences (such as ), and metaphysical influences (such as ). There is a common intuition that we have free will." That would not be awful (I'd quibble with a thesaurus some), but except for the added sentence about intuition at the end, it says pretty much exactly what we already have. So what's wrong with what we already have, that adding that extra sentence won't fix?

Although this description serves to distinguish this intuition from others, there are many attempts at a precise definition of free will.

You're still talking about the intuition, rather than the thing intuited, which is the topic of this article, but aside from that, this sentence seems completely unnecessary. If something like it were to be salvaged, it could fit in as a second half of the sentence stating that there is a common intuition about free will, contrasting the commonality of that intuition with the difficulty in agreeing on the exact details of it. This would segue well into the existing second paragraph, and so could plausibly replace the existing first sentence of that paragraph.

Whatever formulation is adopted, its reality is widely discussed in terms of constraints, that is, various factors that may limit the ability of agents to make choices. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints..."

This is completely redundant with the fixed "conflicting influences" above now, so one or the other should go; and since something like this is already in the article, I see no reason why it should go only to be replaced with something else that means the same thing and needs some work to sound better.

Bottom line: There might be something in this that could make a good replacement for the current first sentence of the second paragraph; something saying something to the effect of "There is a commonly held intuition that we have free will, but whether or not we really do, and what free will even means at all, are widely debated topics." But the attempt to rewrite the definitional first sentence of the article to make that point only brings a bunch of problems and otherwise says exactly what's already there. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:28, 14 March 2014 (UTC)

Well, Pfhorrest, you take a very negative view of this attempt. The idea that somehow this proposed introduction is a violation of some imagined WP custom of beginning an article with a definition is a crock. What is the definition of Brittany Spears? A bit facetious, but if there is no satisfactory definition as is the case here, and if the reason is simply that 'free will' is one of those terms that cannot be pinned down, like Wittgenstein's analysis of 'games', then there is no need to use an awkward approach.

It's my opinion that rather than look at the issues raised and examining the views of the six cited sources, you have mounted a defense of the status quo and combined it with a generally hostile tone that doesn't encourage a fresh look at the intro. If you were to look at the definition of reference 6, for example, it bears very little resemblance to the version you prefer. And there isn't much doubt that the underlying critique of all these approaches is based upon how well they compare with our intuition of free will, with many sources devoted entirely to reinterpreting commonly used words to make a definition square with our intuition.

In any event, you are happy with things the way they are, and that is that. Brews ohare (talk) 06:49, 14 March 2014 (UTC)

Imagined custom? It's policy. "Encyclopedia articles should begin with a good definition", from WP:NOTDIC. (Which by the way also links to WP:REFERS, the policy behind my first point above).

I didn't mention your sources because I don't have any objection to them. They are not the problem. But they don't counter the other problems. And now that you point it out, your source 6 doesn't appear to support the assertion it's attached to, it's just an example of the thing that assertion is talking about. But let's look at it anyway since you seem to think I don't care about whether the current lede conforms to sources:

Our belief in free will expresses the idea that...

A roundabout way of saying "free will is..". The content of our belief in free will amounts to the following proposition; that is, to believe in free will is to believe the following proposition; that is, the following proposition is an elaboration of what "free will exists" means, and by extension, a definition of what "free will" means.

...under the right circumstances...

In other words, absent the wrong circumstances; in absence of something impeding or restricting or limiting the following proposition.

...we have the ability to guide our decisions by our higher-level thoughts, beliefs, values, and past experiences, and to exert control over our undesired lower-level impulses.

In other words, we can choose, make choices, or decisions, and so on. This definition from the source goes into more detail on what exactly that entails, but that's not the point; what is described here falls (along with other possible elaborations) under the umbrella of "making choices", so the existing lede doesn't go against this, it just leaves out some details (which may be controversial).

So the definition proposed is tantamount to "Free will is the ability to, absent impeding circumstances, make choices", with some flowery wording and some elaboration on what it means (in this person's view) to make choices. How does that conflict with what we have at present again, that free will is the ability to make choices unconstrained by certain factors? My point is not that the current wording is the best it could possibly be -- just that you haven't shown a source that it conflicts with, so it remains an adequate minimal good definition that captures the basics of what all the more elaborate definitions have in common. All your sources say the same kind of thing (some with added, possibly conflicting details, which we omit), and your own proposed wording, once linguistic problems are fixed, also says the same kind of thing. So what is the problem?

I also want to point out that I did identify the genuinely new and unproblematic part in your proposal, and suggested an unproblematic way to include it, but I guess you want to ignore that and insist that any critique of your proposal is blanket rejection of the whole thing. To be extra clear, here is your proposal with the problems edited out again, as minimally as possible, all in one place, to show you how much I am not objecting to:

Free will is a term used to capture the commonly-intuitioned (whether valid or not) that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological, social, physical, metaphysical and other conflicting influences. There are have been many attempts at a precise definition of free will. Whatever formulation is adopted, its reality is widely discussed in terms of constraints, that is, various factors that may limit the ability of agents to make choices. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints...

Or to go ahead and apply those edits for further clarity, these are your own words, with only minor formal problems with them fixed:

Free will is the commonly-intuited complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological, social, physical, metaphysical and other conflicting influences. There have been many attempts at a precise definition of free will.

My only objections with that are stylistic. It reads awkwardly and could be better worded and rearranged but the substance of it is fine.

However the only new bit of substance is the "commonly-intuited" bit. I have suggested an alternative way to include that without having to rewrite all of the rest of it in this awkward way that's going to take a bunch of rewrites just to end up saying the same thing anyway. Do you want to go back and read that suggestion again (I've repeated it multiple times) or are you going to continue making this your-way-or-the-highway? --Pfhorrest (talk) 08:40, 14 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I'm glad to continue. I am not in a 'my-way-or-the-highway' frame of mind. I do like some indication that I am being understood.

So I'd suggest that the 'intuition' of free will be given more attention, and invite your suggestions about how that can be done. I'd suggest further that although constraints are significant, they should be identified as significant only as part of a program to assess the reality and the boundaries of 'free will' rather than as part of the definition of what is to be verified or circumscribed. The strong focus upon constraints is like defining a thing by what it isn't, rather than by what it is.

The intuition of free will is dismissed by Dehaene (reference 6). He says the intuition of free will is a present-day superstition that will 'evaporate' along with Chalmers' hard problems of consciousness as we re-educate our intuition in the light of greater understanding. He views his definition of 'free will' based upon a machine left alone to execute its supervisory software covers the territory, but he still has to refer to this intuition and spend pages defending against it.

My view is that there just isn't a single definition, and that is why a roundabout approach is used in this WP article. My alternative is to say any definition is an attempt to capture our intuition about 'free will', and that intuition is elusive, leading to this ambiguity and multiplicity of formulations. I think all the sources above, cited and supplementary, bring up the intuition because they understand the only interest in this topic is a result of this intuition. They want to embark upon some codification of this intuition, which they see as a starting point for a more careful formulation. Each author starts from this intuition and tries to phrase it in what they hope is a clearer manner than others have done. Do you disagree?

I'd like to hear some concrete suggestions for a change in the introduction in place of complicated circumlocutions about why the introduction is a really good presentation already. Brews ohare (talk) 18:08, 14 March 2014 (UTC)

I'm in a rush to leave for the weekend so I have to be brief.

I've made a concrete suggestion. Replace the first sentence of the second paragraph with something saying that we commonly intuit that we have free will but whether that is true or what that even means are long-debated subjects. (As that paragraph begins the summary of those debates). That seems to be the only new substance your proposal, and it is fine.

The rest of my comments are not defending the perfection of the current introduction, but rather critiquing the new problems your proposal would introduce, and then asking of what's left: what is substantially different about this, besides the piece about intuition which I've suggested a better way to include?

To repeat: your proposed definition speaks of "conflicting influences", and that is all that the talk of "constraints" means. Would changing the phrasing to "conflicting influences" solve the problem you think exists with the present lede? How? Likewise your proposed definition speaks of "control to choose among alternative actions", but how is that of any substantial difference to "ability to make choices"?

You are happy to use a phrase like "control to choose among alternative actions even in the face of conflicting influences" to "merely identify the intuition", but you seem not to realize that that is all the definition in any Misplaced Pages article does: it identifies the thing to be talked about, which in this article is the object of the intuition you so much want to talk about: free will.

What is different about your proposed lede (minus its problems that just avoid talking about the topic directly at all) that solves the problems you think exist in the current lede?

How is your (fixed, and reordered):

Free will is complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological, social, physical, metaphysical and other conflicting influences. It is commonly intuited that we have it, but there have been many attempts at a precise definition of it.

Any better than the gist of the current first two sentences plus the proposed new par2 sen1:

Free will is the ability to make choices unconstrained by certain factors, such as mental, social, physical, and metaphysical factors. It is commonly intuited that we have it, but there have been many attempts at a precise definition of it.

What does the first one fix about the second? --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:25, 14 March 2014 (UTC)

What is appropriate to this article?

Hi Pfhorrest: You suggest that identification of the subject of this article is all that the definition in any WP article does: it identifies the thing to be talked about. But apparently this article is about 'free will' and cannot be about the 'intuition of free will', so we are forced, as I understand you, by WP policy to avoid the second formulation within this article because, I guess, the title of the article is not intuition of free will.

Such a discussion of beliefs is not, as you have noted, about the 'content of our belief in the concept of free will' but about the 'beliefs that are concerned with the concept of free will'. That opens the door to what types of belief about free will various sources report, the verification and testing of these various types of belief, their connections with the subject-object problem and the mind-body problem, and so on, which is not divorced from their content, but is not restricted to their content. So, within this subject, one can analyze beliefs as dualist, reductionist, epiphenomenalist, cultural, or whatever.

It might be of interest in this connection to note that Stanislas Dehaene (Ref 6 above) regards the "intuition of free will" as in the same realm as Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness, namely it is a superstition: "Chalmer's hard problem will evaporate...The hypothetical concept of qualia...will be viewed as a peculiar idea of the prescientific era, much like vitalism." 1 I'd presume that when this happens, the entire topic of 'free will' will become a curiosity, not just the belief.

In your opinion, would this perspective add to the article? Brews ohare (talk) 05:13, 15 March 2014 (UTC)

I am in no way objecting to material about what people think (or believe, or intuit, or any other intentional attitude) about free will being included. That's what most of the content of the article has to be about, since it is not a cut-and-dry scientific matter that we can report facts about in the article's own voice: the only way we talk talk about the subject is to report what other people think about it, attributing their opinions to them.

Also note that we already have a section about the psychology of belief in free will, where all kinds of things could be said about how common the intuition that we have free will is, how strongly it is held, under what circumstances people will abandon it, and so on, if that's the kind of thing that you want to talk about.

My only objection on the subject of 'intuition' was phrasing the introductory definition in such a way that it (as literally worded) identified free will with an intuition about it. We can talk all we want about intuitions people have about it, in the appropriate place in the article.

Dahaene's opinion you describe there is of the type that is perfectly appropriate to this article. I don't know enough about him at the moment to say what weight it deserves or where it belongs exactly, but it's the kind of material that is suitable for inclusion somewhere here, sure.

Things like subject-object and mind-body issues are also appropriate to the extent that they are tightly relevant to discussion about free will; in particular, that they are relevant to some particular view on free will. Different conceptions of free will (and the proponents of those conceptions) may or may not find those issues important. In the course of discussing a particular conception of free will which finds those kinds of issues important, it is appropriate to bring them up, but only to give a short summary of what those issues are, and say that they are important to that particular conception of free will. It is not appropriate to write at length about those issues in and of themselves (they have their own articles for that), or to write about them in a way that's divorced from their relevance to the particular view of free will which finds them important (such as in the lede, or in an overview section of all philosophy, or something like that, rather than say, for example, the paragraph under Metaphysical Libertarianism we have now, discussing the importance of interactionist dualism to libertarians who wish to maintain that physical determinism is true, and require a nonphysical mind to provide the nondeterminism necessary for free will as they conceive of it to exist).

--Pfhorrest (talk) 07:32, 18 March 2014 (UTC)

Thanks for the remark about intuition in the Intro. Your exposition above seems to be quite open-minded, although it is sowed with land mines like 'undue weight', avoiding 'writing at length', and 'relevance to some particular view on free will' (possibly meaning 'Don't go outside the Procrustean bed already in place). Brews ohare (talk) 18:34, 18 March 2014 (UTC)

Those "land mines" are there intentionally, to forewarn against some of the problematic aspects of your previous contributions. There is plenty of room to add to this article, certainly, but it needs to be done within certain confines to avoid causing more problems than it solves, and as you've crossed those lines before I think it's worth mentioning them again in advance. It's like "Please, come inside, but wipe your feet first, and don't put them up on the table, and don't jump on the couch, and.... and don't stick beans up your nose. But other than that come in and make yourself at home." I want to be welcoming but I don't want to end up fighting over the same things again. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:30, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

Secondary sources and belief in free will

Pursuant to the above thread, a digression on secondary source followed, as below:

Find a secondary sources that talks about the different types of belief and you might have a case for material. Your using primary sources to make that determination is not acceptable. Personally I remain awestruck that Pfhorrest is still prepared to engage with you, despite you ignoring everything which s/he has explained to you. ----Snowded 06:21, 15 March 2014 (UTC)

The suggestion that secondary sources are necessary is wrong, and your surprise that Pfhorrest has a real interest in WP content is no surprise to those that share that interest. Brews ohare (talk) 05:35, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

No Brews it is right and you had that explained to you on the discussion forum concerned, There are limited circumstances in which primary can be used and that most definitely does not include simply collecting some quotes that appeal to you. My comment on Pfhorrest related to his willingness to continue to give you a tutorial service with no fee not to his interest in content ----Snowded 07:36, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: A good deal of philosophical writing consists of discussion of quotes from reputable sources. Of course, the Stanford Encyclopedia and the Internet Encyclopedia and the Oxford Companions allow their contributors to advance their own views regarding these quotations, because their authors are considered to have some expertise. However, WP editors cannot do this as it constitutes WP:OR so as a WP editor it is necessary to restrict oneself to stating what the sources say.

There are different views about a presentation using quotations together with commentary that does not add OR. Your view is that (i) nothing of this kind is allowed unless the quotations are a rehash of a secondary source, and (ii) quotations are in general to be discouraged and paraphrase is better (although exposed to questionable choices of rewording).

I suspect this personal aesthetic of yours originates in a profound unease that a selection of primary sources could result in undue weight of particular views, an anxiety you are unwilling to allay by digesting sources or participating in discussion. Instead you assert the occurrence of imagined policy violations and misbehavior, thereby avoiding exhaustion of your limited attention. Brews ohare (talk) 15:06, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

Simple policy Brews, suggested deep psychological motivations are a result of your own imagination and I suspect reveal more about you than me ----Snowded 15:27, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

More avoidance of content, eh Snowded? The issue, lest you forget, is the discussion of the belief in free will per se, rather than about whether the various beliefs are logically formulated for a variety of specialized verbal contexts. Brews ohare (talk) 15:57, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

Then find a source which summarises different beliefs then we can look at it. I'm avoiding original research and synthesis not content ----Snowded 16:38, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

From your earlier remarks, I assume you would not find satisfactory a variety of sources addressing various beliefs individually, even if a complete spectrum of such viewpoints were represented? As an example of one such view, there is this assertion that machines have free will. The author says intuition is a function of our understanding and will change along with this understanding to dismiss any belief in a free will beyond that available to machines. Conflicting sources also would be cited, perhaps this discussion dismissing determinism. This author believes there is a realm accessible to intuition and not available to machines. Have I identified your reaction correctly as being entirely opposed to such a presentation, no matter how completely it covers the spectrum of opinion and no matter how authoritative the individual presentations? Brews ohare (talk) 19:39, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

I am not opposed to covering the subject if there is some source which gives us a summary (or maybe one or two). However a synthesis of a limited number of sources, particularly partial ones won't do it ----Snowded 19:56, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

Most sources summarize several views from what they feel is an objective standpoint. It might take a few sources to cover all views - for example, many philosophers are not concerned with views far removed from active discussion. However, it is probable that each philosopher has their own approach to this exposition. I think it will be felt that a proponent of a view presents their own view better than a contestant, eh? That applies to articles in the Stanford or the Internet Encyclopedias just as much as it does to textbooks or monographs.

So what you are faced with in rejecting some of these sources yourself is a personal decision, not an objective one. It is better to let the sources speak for themselves, as they have been through the filter of some book or journal publication process that is better than your own evaluation. By presenting the reader with sources across the spectrum, the reader is able to evaluate and compare by themselves, and form their own judgment. Unlike a scholarly work, WP is not engaged in weighing in to adjudicate differences, not to 'add to the literature' on the subject, but to present readers with a reasonable cross-section of the subject with a choice of sources that readers can check out for themselves, without relying upon a WP editor's judgment. Brews ohare (talk) 20:46, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

Yes, well your belief that[REDACTED] should have strings of quotes from original sources is not in accordance with policy. So we cannot rely on our judgement about which sources to present we need to find a refereed secondary sources that does that. Now beliefs and emotional responses to the issue of free will seem (from my reading) to be incidental remarks rather than something essential to an understanding of the subject. The lack of secondary sources could be seen as supporting that. ----Snowded 21:06, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded, I think what you are trying to deal with is the following: an expert is widely read in their field and has a deep understanding of their subject. Naturally they can summarize a field based upon knowledge of its history, the seminal articles and books, and most important authors. In contrast, a WP editor is very likely not an expert, quite possibly has a shallower understanding of the subject, and is possibly swayed by some superficialities an expert would discount. So here is the problem you, Snowded, have posed for yourself - how can you keep WP articles to expert standards when they aren't written by experts?

You suggest using secondary sources, but this idea is inadequate. A 'secondary source' is conventionally an encyclopedia or general reference, kind of a dictionary with longer entries and a bibliography. There seems to be a myth that these sources are more definitive than a monograph. There are a few problems with such sources. Among the difficulties are (i) such sources are usually 5-10 years behind the times; (ii) such sources deal mainly with broad subjects for the general (possibly well-educated) reader and don't go into the detail found in specialist literature. Another difficulty is that heavy reliance of WP upon secondary sources would severely limit what WP could do, and what it could do would not be equal to the secondary sources it imitated. On the other hand, special topic collections like the various handbooks of particular philosophical fields and the on-line philosophy encyclopedias comprised of collections of very short monographs are not secondary sources - they are (at their best) review articles of the technical literature and (at their worst) are position papers - they have to be like this because their subjects are narrow and mainly experts talk about them. So there is little distinction beyond length between an article in the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for example, and a book by Dennett or whoever.

As you are aware, apart form whatever we can do to establish what is an authoritative source, WP relies upon a process, not the process of journals and book publishers based upon expert opinions, but the process of having non-experts assemble the arguments of published sources and presenting them, subject to two key points (i) that each source is accurately presented, and (ii) all points of view are presented with the caveat of avoiding undue weight. This is a process, because the non-experts require time to discover pertinent sources that should be included and include them, and over time they will discover infelicities of presentation and correct them. This process is mediated by Talk page discussion intended to decide which sources add to the presentation, and what form of words most felicitously represents each published position.

I think you, Snowded, recognize the problems. So you want to solve the problem of quality using your own judgment, and as that is not WP policy, you are forced into artificial arguments to impose your judgment. Snowded, you are trying to cut the Gordian knot here by intruding your own judgment instead of using your knowledge of philosophy to help the process along to reach its natural conclusion. Brews ohare (talk) 22:01, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

See previous comments ----Snowded 23:07, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

Some just won't accept an umbrella when out in the rain. Brews ohare (talk) 03:28, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

Well if you have finalised realised that umbrella's have been on offer to you from several editors over many articles we are making progress ----Snowded 07:22, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

Compatibilism

The introduction says:

Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists, because they hold determinism to be compatible with free will.

Now, this statement appears to be self-contradictory as it says compatibilists do not refer to determinism, but at the same time do refer to it by saying determinism is compatible with free will.

Some who define free will without mention of determinism, do not think determinism has anything to do with it, but refer instead to the 'laws of nature' and define free will to accommodate these laws.

For example, Stanislas Dehaene thinks the intuition of 'free will' is a temporary frame of mind and as our "intuition becomes educated" it will "evaporate". He says:

"When we discuss "free will" we mean a much more interesting form of freedom." "Our belief in free will expresses the idea that, under the right circumstances, we have the ability to guide our decisions by our higher order thoughts, beliefs, values, and past experiences, and to exert control over our undesired lower level impulses. Most of the time our willful acts ....consist in a careful review of our options, followed by the deliberate selection of the one we favor....This conception of free will requires no appeal to quantum physics, and can be implemented in a standard computer. Our global neuronal workspace allows us to collect all the necessary information, both from our current senses and from our memories, synthesize it, evaluate its consequences, ponder them for as long as we want, and eventually use this internal reflection to guide our actions. ...Our brain states are clearly not uncaused and do not escape the laws of physics - nothing does. But our decisions are genuinely free whenever they are based upon conscious deliberation that proceeds autonomously, without any impediment, carefully weighing the pros and cons before committing to a course of action..."

I'm under the impression that Dehaene is only one of several philosophers who use the idea of a central clearing house where decisions are weighed, but in a manner consistent with the laws of nature. The criteria that are in place in the control center during the weighing process are programmed by a variety of external mechanisms that include genetics, upbringing, and culture, which are very large external influences also governed by the laws of nature including evolution and social mechanisms (vis à vis Ratner).

I believe this exposition (you can read it in more detail here is one example of a thinker who simultaneously (i) believes in free will and (ii) believes all events obey the laws of nature. He is (I guess) a compatibilist but it is hard to fit him into the framework of those that deny the ubiquity of natural law. Brews ohare (talk) 15:52, 18 March 2014 (UTC)

There is no contradiction because that sentence is talking about people with opinions like Dehaene's. Dehaene would be called a compatibilist because he doesn't say "in order to have free will, determinism must be false". He gives a conception of free will that is not defined by its relation to determinism, and as such, he does not find determinism a detriment to that conception of free will -- in other words, free will as he defines it is perfectly compatible with determinism, because free will as he defines it does not hinge on determinism either way. You don't have to say "I define free will as something compatible with determinism" to be a compatibilist; you just have to not say "I define free will as requiring the absence of determinism".

I'm unclear what you mean by "the framework of those that deny the ubiquity of natural law" but it makes me think you are still confused as to what these different positions name. Let me try to explain again.

Say you compiled a list of all the different answers anybody gives to the question "What is free will?" You'd have things like:

• "Free will is the ability to guide our decisions by our higher order thoughts"
• "Free will is the ability to act as we choose without fear of punishment"
• "Free will is the ability to move our bodies in accordance with our desires"
• "Free will is the ability to act in ways that defy prediction from prior events"

And so on. If you then asked everyone who agrees with one of those answers "Do we have free will or not?", and you'd get 'yes' or 'no' answers of course, two groups for each answer.

But as it turns out, an answer like that last one to the "What is free will?" question has been so popular over time that the people answering any of the other answers, combined, were of comparable notability to the people on either side of the "Do we have free will?" question within that last group alone. So people would ask questions like "Do you believe in free will, or do you believe in determinism?" and one notable group would answer "free will", another notable group would answer "determinism", and a third notable group would answer "that's a false dilemma, your definition of free will is wrong."

That last group, the "false dilemma" group, are the compatibilists. Everyone who doesn't play the free-will-or-determinism dilemma game is a compatibilist.

So compatibilism the category of positions is defined in reference to the position which defines free will in reference to determinism ("incompatibilism"), but compatibilist positions explicitly do not define free will in reference to determinism. That's what makes them compatibilist. The category "compatibilism" is defined as "those positions that don't define free will in reference to determinism". There are different orders of abstraction at play here: positions about free will on one order, and categories of such positions on a higher order. The common categorization is determinism-centric, because a determinism-centric position has historically been so damn popular, but not all the positions thus categorized are themselves determinism-centric: compatibilism is the category of all positions that are not.

Believe me, as a compatibilist myself (of a variety very similar to Dehaene in fact), I think this kind of terminology is itself biased, but it's the kind of terminology used in the literature so it's what we have to go with. It's like how in certain countries is makes sense for historical reason to speak of "whites" and "colored" (or "people or color" or "non-whites" or whatever the locally acceptable term is in the country in question), even though caucasians are just one of many races and an ahistorical categorization of race would list caucasians equally amidst many different races. In some places, caucasians have so dominated every other race there that the terminology reflects that history, as there is something common to all of the other races despite all their significant differences: they are not a part of the historically dominant group, namely white people. Likewise, the incompatibilist definition of free will is just one of many possible definitions which on an ahistorical listing would just be listed alongside the others, but it has been so dominant for so much of history that it makes sense to group all of the others together, despite their significant differences, as the group of all those not agreeing with that dominant definition. But although the category "nonwhite" is defined in terms of whiteness, the nonwhites people in that category are by definition not white; and so too although the category "compatibilism" is defined in terms of determinism, compatibilist positions in that category are by definition not concerned with determinism. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:13, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

Two points:

First, the statement:

Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists, because they hold determinism to be compatible with free will.

is self-contradictory on the face of it, saying two opposite things (compatibilism both does and doesn't refer to determinism), no matter how complicated a wiggle is used to make sense of it. It should be rewritten. Here's a possibility:

Those who define 'free will' and 'determinism' in ways that are not logically exclusive and contradictory of each other are called compatibilists, because they hold views of free will and determinism that are compatible.

Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

It's not a complicated wiggle, Brews, you're just failing to distinguish orders of abstraction again. Compatibilist definitions of free will do not refer to determinism. The definition of the category "compatibilism" does. They are two separate things that only sound contradictory because you can't seem to separate first- and second-order discourses from each other.

Here's a really simple illustration. What does x equal? Survey says:

• x=3
• x=5
• x=7
• x=9

Now let's make a category of all answers that don't say x=3, and call them x≠3ers.

The category of x≠3ers is defined in reference to 3. Obviously, it's right in the name.

None of the answers in the x≠3ers category define x in reference to 3 though. Look at them:

• x=5
• x=7
• x=9

I don't see any of them talking about 3. But they're all in a category defined in reference to 3... because they'd all say x≠3! Oh noes! Contradiction!

See how silly that is? --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:18, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

Second, you say that you hold a position like that of Dehaene, but that the introduction cannot be phrased to include (never mind espouse) such a position because a poll would show that view to be a small minority view. I'd summarize this approach by saying something like: this article is taken by some to be about a defensible position, but superstition prevails and so the article must be phrased to make the introduction incompatible with any other position. That is a far less defensible position than one that designates a group in an inoffensive manner. Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

If you think the present introduction excludes views like Dehaene's, then you don't understand what the present introduction says, which is what I've been trying to say all along. I agree pretty much completely with Dehaene and the present introduction does not sound biased against my position to me. The present introduction does not assert incompatibilism in any way. "Constraints" is not about determinism, and in fact that language was chosen before you came along explicitly to make the lede not define free will in terms of determinism, to be inclusive of compatibilist positions. "Unconstrained" just an elaboration of the word "free".

Would you agree with a lede that said "Free will is the ability to will freely?" It's kind of inane but it's uncontroversially true, isn't it?

How about if we substitute something for "to will", like "to make choices"? Or some other synonymous phrase, your pick. Is there something we could stick in there to make it sound less inane?

Now how about we do the same for "freely". Can you think of some short phrase that explains what "freely" in general means? Bearing in mind that different definitions of free will are concerned about the will being free from different things, so you need to say what "freely" means without specifying what it's free from; just that it's free from something or other.

Then how about we list a couple things different definitions think it's important to be free from? (For a modern compatibilist like Dehaene, for example, it would be freedom from anything bypassing or overriding our deliberative processes; freedom from overwhelming irrational thought processes like compulsions of phobias. For incompatibilists, it would be freedom from causation or predictability. And so on).

Can you fill in the blanks there in some way that sounds alright to you? Because if you can, you'll have come up with a sentence or two that are equivalent to what the current introduction says, just phrased differently. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:18, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

It appears to me that Dehaene is among those that achieve a compatibilist position by defining either 'free will' or 'determinism' in ways that are not logically distinct and contradictory of each other. So 'free will' becomes supervisory regulation by a governing software system and 'determinism' becomes 'laws of nature' (which could include evolution and genetic programming). Definitional inventions are a fun activity, I guess, so there is no reason that the intro can't say that this is one of the games associated with the free will debate. Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

That's how anyone achieves a compatibilist position. That's what compatibilism is. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:18, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

What is incontrovertible is that all humans have an instinctive belief in free will, that this instinct is so basic that we have no problem identifying that we have it, and that feeling is prior to and independent of any attempt to verbalize it, and the life in this topic is derived entirely from this instinct and trying to make some sense out of it. Dehaene accepts this situation, but says it is a temporary cultural phenomenon that will evaporate as our intuitions become educated by greater scientific understanding of the thought processes. In different words, Dehaene is an evangelist. Brews ohare (talk) 15:17, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: If every compatabilist achieves their stance "by defining either 'free will' or 'determinism' in ways that are not logically distinct and contradictory of each other", why not say so? You might notice that this makes the position different from say a verifiable, or experimental, or intuitive, or religious position. That is, compatibilism is about words and usage, and is not a way to look at a controversy over facts or beliefs. Brews ohare (talk) 06:06, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

If someone defines free will in a way that it is not contradictory with determinism (such as by not mentioning determinism at all), that makes them a compatibilist. The article at present says "Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists". How is that not clear already? --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:17, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Another point:You go to lengths to suggest that 'determinism' is used in several ways in the sentence

"Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists, because they hold determinism to be compatible with free will.

I'd say that is no way to write a clear statement for a general audience. Brews ohare (talk) 06:06, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

I'm not saying that "determinism is used in several different ways", like it means two different things; two different things are being said about two different orders of abstraction, both in reference to the same sense of "determinism". If you had read those "lengths" you would understand that. Look up at the numerical analogy again. Is "3" being used in different ways? Or is the same number "3" being spoken of with regards to two different kinds of things: the several answers to "what does x equal"? which do not mention the number 3, and the category "answers to that question which do not mention the number 3", which does mention the number 3, only to say that the things in that set do not.

I'll say it again: Compatibilists positions do not define free will in reference to determinism. But that sentence I just wrote does, in defining the category "compatibilists positions". --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:17, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Finally, in this edit you reintroduce the sentence:

"Though it is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will, it has been widely debated throughout history not only whether that is true, but even how to define the concept of free will."

Now, in my mind, my emphasized it that is debated might be whether the intuition has a basis or whether some or another definition of free will (and that is pretty hard to pin down at this stage) is 'true'. Now, while I think many people would feel that at least certain of their intuitions have a basis, I don't think anybody thinks that a definition is 'true' (it's only a convention about what words will be taken to mean) although it might be consistent with some or another metaphysical system, or (as is highly improbable in this instance) it might be consistent with some observable evidence. This it needs fixing. Brews ohare (talk) 06:06, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Ugh. I'm sorry I'm losing my patience here, but can you read? "It" is a dummy pronoun used to rearrange a sentence that would otherwise say "whether that is true, and even how to define the concept of free will, has been widely debated throughout history". What has been widely debated through out history? Whether the intuition that we have free will is true; and also, how to define the concept of free will. That is what has been widely debated throughout history. It -- that is to say, whether the intuition that we have free will is true, and how to define the concept of free will -- has been widely debated throughout history. You know that set of questions that I keep repeating in this paragraph? It has been widely debated throughout history. Those questions have. The questions of whether the intuition that we have free will is true, and of how to define the concept of free will.

This is elementary school level grammar here, Brews.

Nothing in there is talking about a definition being true. It's talking about whether the proposition commonly intuited, "we have free will", is true. It is also talking about how to define the concept of free will employed in that proposition.

I'm starting to lose my good faith here. This is almost troll-level willful inability to understand here. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:17, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: You seem to think my confusion is feigned, or that I am simply the only person who finds these things less than clear. The first is incorrect, and the second might be (although I don't think so). However, rephrasing these things would be easier than explaining why they are already wonderful expressions of your thought. Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Here is a rephrasing of the definition of compatitibilism:

"Although some varieties of compatibilism define 'free will' and 'determinism' in ways that are not logically contradictory and so are compatible, others deny determinism in any form, making compatibility with determinism a non-issue that can be ignored in their definitions of 'free will'." Brews ohare (talk) 15:19, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

The second category of compatibilists is really a subset of the first with more radical definitions of determinism that are more or less obviously absurd. Brews ohare (talk) 15:24, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

The "deny determinism in any form" subcategory you mention belies a persistent apparent misunderstanding of what the different major positions on free will claim.

Forget for the moment what exactly "determinism" means. Let's just say there is some thesis, some claim, about how the world works. Doesn't matter how ridiculous it is, there is some claim that's made by someone and for some reason a lot of people are concerned about it.

• One major group all agree that having free will depends on that thesis being false.
  • Within that group, one subgroup claims that that thesis is true, and that consequently nobody can have free will.
  • Another subgroup among them claims that that thesis is false, and that consequently free will is possible.
• Another bunch of other people disagree in various ways about free will depending in any way on that thesis at all. They subsequently don't care whether that thesis is true or false. They don't have to "deny it in any form". Some of them may deny it anyway, but they would say that that was irrelevant to their stance on free will, because their stance on free will has nothing to do with whether that thesis is true or false.

That last group are the compatibilists. The first major group are incompatibilists, and the subgroups within them are hard determinists and metaphysical libertarians.

I think maybe the place you're getting confused is that you think some compatibilists get to "free will and determinism can coexist" by redefining that they mean by "determinism". They don't, and that would be a cheap cop-out because everyone involved in this discourse (besides you) generally understands what is meant by "determinism". Compatibilists differ from incompatibilists only in how they define free will. Incompatibilists define free will in reference to determinism, by saying "free will requires non-determinism". Compatibilists, all of them, just define free will in any other way, that doesn't make reference to determinism; and then, if someone asks them "but but but what if determinism?" they say "so what? not a problem". No compatibilist sets out to say "I define free will as compatible with determinism". They just say "I define free will as ", where "" has nothing to do with determinism, and so does not require free will as they define it to be incompatible with determinism. Because they don't require it to be incompatible, because they don't define it that way, then on their view they could be compatible. And that's a big deal to the big group who think they have to be incompatible, so they label all of those rebels who disagree "compatibilists".

Compatibilism, the category, is defined in contrast to incompatibilism, the category. The place where they contrast is this: incompatibilists define free will, the ability, in a way that requires non-determinism; and compatibilists don't define free will that way. They don't define it as being compatible with determinism; they just don't define it as not being compatible with determinism, because they don't mention determinism at all in their definitions. Beyond that one thing they all don't do, their definitions may differ in any way. The only thing they have in common, the only reason any of them would care to mention determinism at all, is to say "my kind of free will doesn't care about determinism". And the only reason they need to say that is because so many damn people think otherwise, that they need to say "nah I'm not with them". Compatibilists don't care about determinism enough to say anything about it aside from "I don't care about determinism". There's not some kind of... even-more-not-caring kind who doesn't just not care about determinism, they... don't care about... not caring about determinism? Whatever distinction you're trying to draw there isn't even coherent enough to paraphrase. --Pfhorrest (talk)

Pfhorrest: Your remark " Compatibilists don't care about determinism enough to say anything about it aside from ′I don't care about determinism′ " is far from true. Most compatibilists spend a lot of prose on the subject of 'determinism', and they don't all share a common understanding of what it is. Dehaene employs determinism as the 'laws of physics', presumably in their modern form, and not those laws as seen by Laplace; some use the 'laws of nature' presumably including evolution among other 'laws' (which might be reducible to 'laws of physics', but as yet defy that effort). The Stanford Encyclopedia points out the lack of a clear understanding of determinism:

"There is a long tradition of compatibilists arguing that freedom is fully compatible with physical determinism. Hume went so far as to argue that determinism is a necessary condition for freedom—or at least, he argued that some causality principle along the lines of “same cause, same effect” is required. There have been equally numerous and vigorous responses by those who are not convinced. Can a clear understanding of what determinism is, and how it tends to succeed or fail in real physical theories, shed any light on the controversy?"

Pfhorrest, I think you might admit to a bit of rhetorical excess here. You seem more interested in bringing me into the fold than in recognizing any need to revise the language to be more clear. Probably we pretty much agree about the discussions in the literature, but disagree about how to present them. Brews ohare (talk) 13:08, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

A primary point to be made clear is the role of the arguments over which definitions are compatible with which. That is an activity very different from an argument over beliefs or facts. The article right now is muddy about this distinction. The truth is, there is no conceivable evidentiary procedure that can address the 'best' choice of definitions, so the debate is really about (i) logical consistency and (ii) taste (or one's intuitions).

In the realm of consistency, one can choose the domain over which consistency is demanded, and most discussion concerns the assumption that consistency should include the 'laws of nature'. At the extreme, these laws are taken to be, not as they actually are or claim to be, but in an idealized extrapolation that is in itself unverifiable in principle. For example, that they are universally applicable (in some supposed form of the yet-to-be-discovered theory of everything) to every conceivable (nevermind observable) event, mental or otherwise.

In the realm of intuition, one could posit along with Dehaene that psychology will show that 'intuitions' are cultural artifacts, and that as people become more aware and better educated they will ultimately come round to Dehaene's view and 'free will' as ordinarily experienced ("our mind chooses its actions ′at will′ ", p. 263) will 'evaporate'. Or not. Even today, most of us already believe whatever is the realm where 'free will' has sway, it has its limitations. That view in some form is already in our statutes, for example, about 'crimes of passion'. Brews ohare (talk) 09:40, 22 March 2014 (UTC)

I see that I have digressed so far from the subject of defining 'compatibilism' that Pfhorrest doesn't know where to start with a reply. To go back to basics here, we need a better definition than:

Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists, because they hold determinism to be compatible with free will.

which is to be understood as saying in different words:

A definition of 'free will' adopted by compatibilism need not involve any mention of 'determinism'. Compatibilists adopt the view that, whichever definition of 'determinism' is adopted, it must be logically compatible with their chosen definition of 'free will', which is the more basic concept.

I am uncertain that in fact compatibilists first adopt a view of free will, and then adopt a compatible version of 'determinism', and think that some work it the other way around. For example, Dehaene is a compatibilist who defines 'determinism' first and then defines 'free will' so it fits with his determinism. In any event, a clearer definition is in order. Brews ohare (talk) 16:41, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

A more encompassing alternative might go like this:

Definitions of 'free will' and 'determinism' adopted by compatibilism must be logically compatible with each other. Different compatibilists differ as to which concept is the more basic.

Brews ohare (talk) 16:49, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

Paragraphing the new lede

I just want to weigh in on this before it becomes an edit war and then the small progress we've just made gets rolled back.

I don't think a paragraph break where Brews inserted one is necessary, as the bulk of the text prior to it serves as an introduction to the text after it and the paragraph after that.

However, as it serves as an introduction to both of those paragraphs, I also think it's fine to have that introductory text as a small paragraph of it's own preceding them both.

It would also be acceptable, but not necessary, to merge it into the end of the preceding paragraph, in case anyone thinks that might help.

I'm happy my little bold move has resulted in some productive back-and-forth between Brews and Snowded, I'm pretty happy with the compromise you've reached now, and I hope we can see more collaboration like this in the future. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:18, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

If the paragraph really matters to Brews I am happy to concede it, inserting mass quotes and arguments in references however is not and never has been acceptable. ----Snowded 07:24, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

It is hardly a 'mass quote' to indicate the reason for referring to Dehaene (reference 4) was his quotation from Lucretius that supports the claim that this discussion has been with us for a long time. Your reduction of this footnote to a link to Dehaene with no guidance to the reader makes the purpose of the footnote obscure. Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

"Conjectured" and "intuition"

Regarding today's edits, I want to weigh in that I am OK with some kind of qualifying word like "conjectured" being put where it was put, though I don't think that one is really the best word. "Supposed" or "purported" sounds much better to my ear. If Snowded or someone thinks that's weasley I'm not dead set on it, but I think something like it is OK.

I am also OK with something like the clarification of "whether that is true", though I'm not sure that "that" -> "that intuition" is quite accurate, as it's not so much the intuition that we're talking about being true, but the proposition "we have free will", which is the content of that intuition. On the whole we're saying, of the proposition that we have free will, that is is commonly intuited, but has been widely debated. "That intuition" is ok... ish... but if there's a better way to word it, that'd be preferable. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:33, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

I really don't see the need for any qualification. The title of the article is "Free Will" so we describe what that means, We then go on to say that it is a controversial issue. Even on pseudo-science articles we don't qualify the initial description of the subject. ----Snowded 06:28, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

I think the proposed change to the first sentence is both unnecessary and too weasely.—Machine Elf  15:51, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

1. The sentence:

"Though it is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will, it has been widely debated throughout history not only whether that intuition is true, but even how to define the concept of free will."

has a clear meaning, but Pfhorrest thinks it should mean something else entirely, namely:

"Though it is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will, how to define the concept of free will has been debated throughout history."

which also is clear, but says something quite different. I'd vote for this last version.

2. Although Pfhorrest is in agreement with a qualifier, Snowded is not. The first sentence says:

"Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors."

Snowded and MachineElf say there is no need to insert some qualifier as in:

"Free will is the xxx ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors."

where xxx could be 'supposed', 'putative', 'conjectured', 'often-assumed', 'purported', or some other adjective indicating that this 'ability' may or may not exist. In my opinion, clearly not that of Snowded or MachineElf, is that it is a belief in this "ability of agents" that is widespread, and the object of this belief, the ability itself, is conjectural, with many authors clearly expressing doubt that it is a real ability at all, and others that it is available only under restricting circumstances. The first sentence should not be interpretable as saying that this ability is something real and available.

So far, only Snowded's and MachineElf's personal preference is offered, without supporting reasoning, to explain why it is good form to have a beginning sentence that is easily misread as asserting the existence of a (most probably) mythical 'ability'. The rest of the article is properly introduced by adding an adjective that suggests discussion should take place. What is wrong with an adjective identifying the obvious uncertainty about this 'ability'?

Therefore, I agree with Pfhorrest on this one, and disagree with Snowded and MachineElf entirely: some xxx is necessary. Brews ohare (talk) 16:11, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

The article is about Free Will, so we defined it as such. We then go on to say that some people don't thing we have it/ Per my comment on pseudo-science articles above this is not a personal preference, it is the way[REDACTED] works. I am not at home to check my reference books but I doubt they qualify the term. ----Snowded 18:15, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

There is no policy about this: so an argument is necessary to support a choice. The subject is better served with the adjective, as already explained. Brews ohare (talk) 20:21, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

I'm pretty sure its in one of these style guides but lets see if you get any support before we waste anymore time on this ----Snowded 23:44, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest is in support, I am in support; we have a simple argument in support. You and MachineElf have a preference based upon your personal aesthetic, and no reason for opposition. Please get around to reasons. Brews ohare (talk) 00:38, 24 March 2014 (UTC)

You have weak support from Pfhorrest and two editors opposed. Reasons have been given you just don't like them. if other editors come in support of you then it may be worth the effort to repeat and elaborate arguments already provided. ----Snowded 05:43, 24 March 2014 (UTC)

"Repeat and elaborate 'arguments'?" All you have so far is your single argument based upon your undocumented report that in "pseudo-science articles we don't qualify the initial description of the subject". Now the topic of 'free will' might be seen as pseudo-science by some, but apparently not by philosophers. And if 'free will' is not pseudo-science, your example fails. And, of course, there is no WP policy suggesting an easily misinterpreted lead sentence is good practice. Your opposition to adding one or another of a half-dozen possible adjectives indicating every preferred shade of uncertainty is simply obstruction for the sake of being obstructive. Brews ohare (talk) 15:25, 24 March 2014 (UTC)

Brews (i) cool it, you are subject to WP:Civil like anyone else (ii) I said that even on pseudo-science articles we don't qualify and (iii) it is not misleading, you are simply over elaborating and over complicating (iv) STOP edit warring, you know you don't have agreement, wait until you do (v) note that (i) means that (iv) gets less and less likely ----Snowded 16:44, 24 March 2014 (UTC)

Sorry about that: "Even on pseudo-science articles we don't qualify the initial description of the subject". An even wider claim even harder to document and unsupported by policy. Brews ohare (talk) 18:23, 24 March 2014 (UTC)

Brews, you haven't succeeded in making this a pseudoscience article yet.—Machine Elf  18:36, 24 March 2014 (UTC)

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