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Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (IPA: ) (born July 28, 1954) is the 53rd and current President of Venezuela. As the leader of the "Bolivarian Revolution," Chávez promotes his vision of militarism, democratic socialism, Latin American integration, and what he terms anti-imperialism. Furthermore, he is an outspoken critic of neoliberal globalization and United States foreign policy.

A career military officer, Chávez founded the leftist Fifth Republic Movement after being the architect of a failed 1992 coup d'état against Carlos Andrés Pérez. Chávez was elected President in 1998 on promises of aiding Venezuela's poor majority, and was reelected in 2000. Since then, he has survived a 2002 coup and a failed 2004 recall referendum.

Domestically, Chávez has launched the Bolivarian Missions, a series of social programs with the stated aim of mitigating poverty and social inequity, which analysts say have yielded only modest results. Abroad, Chávez has acted against the Washington Consensus by supporting alternative models of economic development, and has advocated cooperation among Latin American nations.

Chávez's far-reaching reforms have evoked exceptional controversy in Venezuela and abroad, receiving both criticism and adulation. Venezuelans are split between those who say he has empowered the poor, and those who say he is autocratic and has mismanaged the economy. Some foreign governments view Chávez as a threat to global oil prices and regional stability, while others welcome his bilateral trade and reciprocal aid agreements.

Whether viewed as a socialist liberator or an authoritarian demagogue, Chávez remains one of the most complex, controversial, and interesting figures in contemporary politics.

Early life (1954–1992)

Chávez was born on July 28, 1954 in the town of Sabaneta, Barinas. The second son of two schoolteachers, Hugo de los Reyes Chávez and Elena Frías de Chávez, he is of mixed Amerindian, African, and Spanish descent. Chávez was raised in a thatched palm leaf house near Sabaneta. At an early age, Chávez was sent to Sabaneta with his older brother to live with his paternal grandmother, Rosa Inés Chávez. There, Chávez pursued hobbies such as painting, singing, and baseball, while also attending elementary school at the Julián Pino School. He was later forced to relocate to the town of Barinas to attend high school at the Daniel Florencio O'Leary School.

At age seventeen, Chávez enrolled at the Venezuelan Academy of Military Sciences. After graduating in 1975 as a sub-lieutenant with a degree in Military Arts and Science, Chávez entered military service for several months. He was then allowed to pursue graduate studies in political science at Caracas' Simón Bolívar University, but left without a degree.

Over the course of his college years, Chávez and fellow students developed a fervently left-nationalist doctrine that they termed "Bolivarianism," inspired by the Pan-Americanist philosophies of 19th-century Venezuelan revolutionary Simón Bolívar, the influence of Peruvian dictator Juan Velasco, and the teachings of various socialist and communist leaders. Chávez engaged in sporting events and cultural activities during these years as well. Notably, Chávez played both baseball and softball with the Criollitos de Venezuela, progressing with them to the Venezuelan National Baseball Championships in 1969. Chávez also authored numerous poems, stories and theatrical pieces.

Upon completing his studies, Chávez initially entered active-duty military service as a member of a counter insurgency battalion stationed in Barinas. Chávez's military career lasted 17 years, during which time he held a variety of post, command, and staff positions, eventually rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Chávez also held a series of teaching and staffing positions at the Military Academy of Venezuela, where he was first acknowledged by his peers for his fiery lecturing style and unusually radical critique of Venezuelan government and society. At this time, Chávez established the Bolivarian Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 (MBR-200). Afterwards, he rose to fill a number of sensitive high-level positions in Caracas and was decorated several times.

Coup attempt of 1992

After an extended period of popular dissatisfaction and economic decline under the administration of President Carlos Andrés Pérez, Chávez made extensive preparations for a military coup d'état. Initially planned for December, Chávez delayed the MBR-200 coup until the early twilight hours of February 4, 1992. On that date, five army units under Chávez's command barreled into urban Caracas with the mission of assaulting and overwhelming key military and communications installations throughout the city, including the Miraflores presidential palace, the defense ministry, La Carlota military airport, and the Historical Museum. Chávez's ultimate goal was to intercept and take custody of Pérez, who was returning to Miraflores from an overseas trip.

Chávez held the loyalty of less than 10% of Venezuela's military forces; still, numerous betrayals, defections, errors, and other unforeseen circumstances soon left Chávez and a small group of rebels cut off in the Historical Museum, without any means of conveying orders to their network of spies and collaborators spread throughout Venezuela. Further, Chávez's allies were unable to broadcast their prerecorded tapes on the national airwaves in which Chávez planned to issue a general call for a mass civilian uprising against Pérez. As the coup unfolded, the coup plotters were unable to capture Pérez: fourteen soldiers were killed, and 50 soldiers and some 80 civilians injured in the ensuing violence. Nevertheless, rebel forces in other parts of Venezuela made advances and were ultimately able to take control of such large cities as Valencia, Maracaibo, and Maracay with the help of spontaneous civilian aid. Chávez's forces, however, had failed to take Caracas.

Chávez, alarmed, soon gave himself up to the government. He was then allowed to appear on national television to call for all remaining rebel detachments in Venezuela to cease hostilities. When he did so, Chávez famously quipped on national television that he had only failed "por ahora"—"for the moment." Chávez was catapulted into the national spotlight, with many poor Venezuelans seeing him as a figure who had stood up against government corruption and kleptocracy. Chávez was sent to Yare prison; meanwhile, Pérez, the coup's intended target, was impeached a year later. While in prison, Chávez developed a carnosity of the eye, which spread to his iris. The clarity of his eyesight was slowly corrupted; despite treatments and operations, Chávez's eyesight was permanently weakened.

Political rise (1992–1999)

Template:ChavezElections1998 After a two-year imprisonment, Chávez was pardoned by President Rafael Caldera in 1994. Upon his release, Chávez reconstituted the MBR-200 as the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR—Movimiento Quinta República, with the V representing the Roman numeral five). Later, in 1998, Chávez began to campaign for the presidency. In working to gain the trust of voters, Chávez drafted an agenda that drew heavily on his ideology of Bolivarianism. Chávez and his followers described their aim as "laying the foundations of a new republic" to replace the existing one, which they cast as "party-dominated"; the current constitution, they argued, was no more than the 'juridico-political embodiment of puntofijismo,' the country's traditional two-party patronage system. Controversially, foreign banks—including Spain's Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) and Banco Santander (BSCH), each the owner of one of Venezuela's largest banks—illicitly funneled millions of dollars into Chávez's campaign.

Chávez utilized his charisma and flamboyant public speaking style—noted for its abundance of colloquialisms and ribald manner—on the campaign trail to win the trust and favor of a primarily poor and working class following. By May 1998, Chávez's support had risen to 30% in polls, and by August he was registering 39%. Chávez went on to win the Carter Center-endorsed 1998 presidential election on December 6, 1998 with 56% of the vote.

Presidency (1999–present)

1999: Economic crisis and new constitution

Chávez took the presidential oath of office on February 2, 1999 with a mandate to reverse Venezuela's economic decline and strengthen the role of the state in the economy. Chávez's first few months in office were dedicated primarily to dismantling what his supporters deemed puntofijismo via new legislation and constitutional reform, while his secondary focus was on immediately allocating more government funds to new social programs.

However, as a recession triggered by historically low oil prices and soaring international interest rates rocked Venezuela, the shrunken federal treasury provided very little of the resources Chávez required for his promised massive anti-poverty measures. Consequently, in April 1999 Chávez set his eyes upon the one Venezuelan institution that was costly for the government but did little for the systematic social development that Chávez desired: the military. Chávez ordered all branches of the military to devise programs to combat poverty and to further civic and social development in Venezuela's vast slum and rural areas. This civilian-military program was launched as "Plan Bolivar 2000," and was heavily patterned after a similar program enacted by Cuban President Fidel Castro during the early 1990s, while the Cuban people were still suffering through the "Special Period." Projects within Plan Bolivar 2000's scope included road building, housing construction, and mass vaccination. The plan faltered at the end of 2001 with accusations and revelations of corruption by military officers, including both military officers who later rebelled against the president in April 2002 and officers linked to the president.

Chávez sharply diverged from previous administrations' economic policies, terminating their practice of extensively privatizing Venezuela's state-owned holdings, such as the national social security system, holdings in the aluminum industry, and the oil sector. However, although Chávez wished to promote the redistribution of wealth, increased regulation, and social spending, he did not wish to discourage foreign direct investment (FDI). In keeping with his predecessors, Chávez attempted to shore up FDI influxes to prevent an economic crisis of chronic capital flight and inflation.

Chávez also worked to reduce Venezuelan oil extraction in the hopes of garnering elevated oil prices and, at least theoretically, elevated total oil revenues, thereby boosting Venezuela's severely deflated foreign exchange reserves. He extensively lobbied other OPEC countries to cut their production rates as well. As a result of these actions, Chávez became known as a "price hawk" in his dealings with the oil industry and OPEC. Chávez also attempted a comprehensive renegotiation of 60-year-old royalty payment agreements with oil giants Philips Petroleum and ExxonMobil. These agreements had allowed the corporations to pay in taxes as little as 1% of the tens of billions of dollars in revenues they were earning from the Venezuelan oil they were extracting. Afterwards, Chávez stated his intention to complete the nationalization of Venezuela's oil resources. Although unsuccessful in his attempts to renegotiate with the oil corporations, Chávez focused on his stated goal of improving both the fairness and efficiency of Venezuela's formerly lax tax collection and auditing system, especially for major corporations and landholders. Template:ChavezElections1999

Nevertheless, by mid-1999, Chávez was incensed by his administration's setbacks in enacting his much-promised anti-poverty initiatives. The National Assembly's opposition members impeded the legislation of his political allies. Chávez moved to bypass such opposition by approving the scheduling of two fresh national elections for July 1999—just months after Chávez's presidential election. The first was a nationwide referendum to determine whether a national constitutional assembly should be created. The assembly was tasked with framing a new Venezuelan constitution that hewed more closely to Chávez's own political ideology. A second election was held that elected delegates to this constitutional assembly. The constitutional referendum passed with a CNE-audited 72% "yes" vote; in the second election, members of Chávez's MVR and select allied parties formed the Polo Patriotico ("Patriotic Pole"). Chávez's Polo Patriotico went on to win 95% (120 out of the total 131) of the seats in the voter-approved Venezuelan Constitutional Assembly.

However, in August 1999, the Constitutional Assembly established a special "judicial emergency committee" with the power to remove judges without consulting with other branches of government—over 190 judges were eventually suspended on charges of corruption. In the same month, the Constitutional Assembly declared a "legislative emergency," resulting in a seven-member committee that was tasked with conducting the legislative functions ordinarily carried out by the National Assembly. Legislative opposition to Chávez's policies was immediately disabled. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Assembly prohibited the National Assembly from holding meetings of any sort.

The Constitutional Assembly itself drafted the new 1999 Venezuelan Constitution. With 350 articles, the document was, as drafted, one of the world's lengthiest constitutions. It first changed the country's official name from "Republic of Venezuela" to "Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela." It also increased the presidential term of office from five to six years, allowed for two consecutive presidential terms rather than one, introduced a presidential two-term limit, and introduced provisions for national presidential recall referenda—that is, Venezuelan voters gained the right to remove the president from office before the expiration of his presidential term. Such referenda can only be activated by a petition to do so with the required number of signatures. The presidency was also dramatically strengthened, with the power to dissolve the National Assembly upon decree. The new constitution converted the formerly bicameral National Assembly into a unicameral legislature, and stripped it of many of its former powers. Provisions were also made for a new position, the Public Defender, an office with the authority to check the activities of the presidency, the National Assembly, and the constitution. Chávez characterized the Public Defender as the guardian of the "moral branch" of the new Venezuelan government, tasked with defending public and moral interests. Lastly, the Venezuelan judiciary was reformed. Judges, under the new constitution, were now to be installed after passing public examinations and were not, as in the old manner, to be appointed by the National Assembly.

This new constitution was presented to the national electorate in December 1999 and approved. Over a span of a mere 60 days, the Constitutional Assembly thus framed a document that enshrined as constitutional law most of the structural changes Chávez desired. Chávez stated that such changes were necessary in order to successfully and comprehensively enact his planned social justice programs. He planned to enact sweeping changes in Venezuelan governmental and political structure, and, based on his 1998 campaign pledges, to dramatically open up Venezuelan political discourse to independent and third parties. In the process, Chávez sought to fatally paralyze his AD (Acción Democrática) and COPEI opposition. All of Chávez's aims were, in one move, dramatically furthered.

On December 15 1999, after weeks of heavy rain, statewide mudslides claimed the lives of an estimated 30,000 people. Critics claim Chávez was distracted by the referendum and that the government ignored a civil defense report, calling for emergency measures, issued the day the floods struck. The government rejected these claims. Chávez personally led the relief effort afterwards. Subsequent mudslides in 2000 left 3 dead.

2000–2001: Reelection

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Elections for the new unicameral National Assembly were held on July 30, 2000. During this same election, Chávez himself stood for reelection. Chávez's coalition garnered a commanding two-thirds majority of seats in the National Assembly while Chávez was reelected with 60% of the votes. The Carter Center monitored the 2000 presidential election; their report on that election stated that, due to lack of transparency, CNE partiality, and political pressure from the Chávez government that resulted in unconstitutionally early elections, it was unable to validate the official CNE results. However, they concluded that the presidential election legitimately expressed the will of the people.

Later, on December 3, 2000, local elections and a referendum were held. The referendum, backed by Chávez, proposed a law that would force Venezuela's labor unions to hold state-monitored elections. The referendum was widely condemned by international labor organizations—including the International Labour Organization—as undue government interference in internal union matters; these organizations threatened to apply sanctions on Venezuela.

After the May and July 2000 elections, Chávez backed the passage of the "Enabling Act" by the National Assembly. This act allowed Chávez to rule by decree for one year. In November 2001, shortly before the Enabling Act was set to expire, Chávez enacted a set of 49 decrees. These included the Hydrocarbons Law and the Land Law, which are detailed below. Fedecámaras, a national business federation,and the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela, a federation of labor unions, opposed the approval of the new laws and called for a general business strike on December 10, 2001 in the hope that the President would reconsider his legislative action and, instead, open a debate about those laws. The strike failed to significantly impact Chávez's decision or policies.

By the end of the first three years of his presidency, Chávez's main policy concerns had successfully challenged Venezuelan landowners, and introduced reforms purportedly aimed at improving the social welfare of the population by lowering infant mortality rates, and implementing a cursory government-funded free healthcare system and education up to university level. By December of 2001, following Chávez's imposition of capital controls, inflation fell from 40% to 12% while economic growth was steady at 4 percent. Chávez's administration also reported an increase in primary school enrollment by one million students.

2002: Coup and worker strike

On April 9, 2002, CTV leader Carlos Ortega called for a two-day general strike. Approximately 500,000 people took to the streets on April 11, 2002 and marched towards the headquarters of Venezuela's state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), in defense of its recently-fired management. The organizers decided to redirect the march to Miraflores, the presidential palace, where a pro-Chávez demonstration was taking place. Chávez took over the Venezuelan airwaves several times in the early afternoon in what is termed a cadena, or a commandeering of the media airwaves to broadcast public announcements, asking protesters to return to their homes, playing lengthy pre-recorded discourses, and attempting to block coverage of the ensuing violence. Gunfire and violence erupted between two groups of demonstrators, Caracas's Metropolitan Police (under the control of the oppositionist mayor), and the Venezuelan national guard (under Chávez's command), and snipers were reported from the areas where both opposition and Chávez supporters were concentrated.

Then, unexpectedly, Lucas Rincón Romero, commander-in-chief of the Venezuelan armed forces, announced in a broadcast to a nationwide audience that Chávez had tendered his resignation from the presidency. While Chávez was brought to a military base and held there, military leaders appointed the president of the Fedecámaras, Pedro Carmona, as Venezuela's interim president. Carmona's first decree reversed all of the major social and economic policies that comprised Chávez's "Bolivarian Revolution," including loosening Chávez's credit controls and ending his oil price quotas by raising production back to pre-Chávez levels. Carmona also dissolved both the National Assembly and the Venezuelan judiciary, while reverting the nation's name back to República de Venezuela.

Carmona's decrees were followed by pro-Chávez uprisings and looting across Caracas. Responding to these disturbances, Venezuelan soldiers loyal to Chávez called for massive popular support for a counter-coup. These soldiers later stormed and retook the presidential palace, and retrieved Chávez from captivity. The shortest-lived government in Venezuelan history was thus toppled, and Chávez resumed his presidency on the night of Saturday, April 13, 2002. Following this episode, Rincón was reappointed by Chávez as Commander of the Army, and later as Interior Minister in 2003. The opposition would later argue that, since Lucas Rincón remained close to the President, there was no coup but a power vacuum once Chávez resigned, despite the succession order being broken.

After Chávez resumed his presidency in April 2002, he ordered several investigations to be carried out, and their official results supported Chávez's assertions that the 2002 coup was sponsored by the United States. On April 16, 2002, Chávez claimed that a plane with U.S. registration numbers had visited and been berthed at Venezuela's Orchila Island airbase, where Chávez had been held captive. On May 14, 2002, Chávez alleged that he had definitive proof of U.S. military involvement in April's coup. He claimed that during the coup Venezuelan radar images had indicated the presence of U.S. military naval vessels and aircraft in Venezuelan waters and airspace. The Guardian published a claim by Wayne Madsen – a writer (at the time) for left-wing publications and a former Navy analyst and critic of the George W. Bush administration – alleging U.S. Navy involvement. U.S. Senator Christopher Dodd, D-CT, requested an investigation of concerns that Washington appeared to condone the removal of Mr Chavez, which subsequently found that "U.S. officials acted appropriately and did nothing to encourage an April coup against Venezuela's president", nor did they provide any naval logistical support.

Chávez also claimed, during the coup's immediate aftermath, that the U.S. was still seeking his overthrow. On October 6, 2002, he stated that he had foiled a new coup plot, and on October 20, 2002, he stated that he had barely escaped an assassination attempt while returning from a trip to Europe. During that period, the US Ambassador to Venezuela warned the Chávez administration of two potential assassination plots.

Following his return to office, Chávez quickly took steps to secure support for his government. First, Chávez fired sixty generals and completely replaced the upper echelons of Venezuela's armed forces, substituting them with more complacent pro-Chávez personnel. Chávez also sought to strengthen support among rank and file soldiers. He boosted support programs, employment, and benefits for veterans, while promulgating new civilian-military development initiatives.

However, only a few months would pass after the April 2002 coup before the Chávez presidency would enter another crisis. Chávez, outraged by the coup and seeking more funds for his social programs, moved in late 2002 to implement total control over the PDVSA and its revenues. As a result, for two months following December 2, 2002, Chávez faced a strike from resistant PDVSA workers that sought to force Chávez out of office by completely removing his access to the all-important government oil revenue. The strike, led by a coalition of labor unions, industrial magnates, and oil workers, sought to halt the activities of the PDVSA. As a result, Venezuela ceased exporting its former daily average of 2,800,000 barrels (450,000 m³) of oil and oil derivatives. Hydrocarbon shortages soon erupted throughout Venezuela, with long lines forming at petrol-filling stations. Gasoline imports were soon required. Alarmed, Chávez responded by firing PDVSA's anti-Chávez upper-echelon management and dismissing 18,000 skilled PDVSA employees. Chávez justified this by alleging their complicity in gross mismanagement and corruption in their handling of oil revenues, while opposition supporters of the fired workers stated that his actions were politically-motivated. Later, allegations arose from anti-Chávez activists that Chávez had authorized the creation of blacklists to prevent the employment of strike participants. A disputed Venezuelan court ruling declared the dismissal of these workers illegal and ordered the immediate return of the entire group to their former posts. Nevertheless, Chávez and his allies have repeatedly stated that the ruling will not be enforced.

In spite of a presidential term limit of 12 years, Chávez often suggests that he will remain in power for 25 years, A claim he denies as a misinterpretation of his intent. However he recently proposed a constitutionally binding referendum to allow for a third term. In November 2002, speaking on his show Aló Presidente about the possibility of a constitutional Presidential recall referendum, Chávez stated, "Not even if we suppose that they hold that referendum and get 90% of the votes, I will not leave. Forget it. I will not leave." When the referendum was approved, he softened his position stating, "If the opposition wins, then I am out of here."

2003–2004: Recall vote

In 2003 and 2004 Chávez launched a number of social and economic campaigns as he struggled to maintain popular support. In July 2003 he launched "Mission Robinson," billed as a campaign aimed at providing free reading, writing and arithmetic lessons to the more than 1.5 million Venezuelan adults who were illiterate prior to his 1999 election. On October 12, 2003, Chávez initiated "Mission Guaicaipuro," a program billed as protecting the livelihood, religion, land, culture, and rights of Venezuela's indigenous peoples. In late 2003, the Venezuelan president launched "Mission Sucre," with the stated intent of providing free higher education to the two million adult Venezuelans who had not completed their elementary-level education. In November 2003, Chávez announced "Mission Ribas," with the promise of providing remedial education and diplomas for Venezuela's five million high school dropouts. On the first anniversary of Mission Robinson's establishment, Chávez stated in Caracas's Teresa Carreño theater to an audience of 50,000 formerly illiterate Venezuelans, "in a year, we have graduated 1,250,000 Venezuelans." Nevertheless, there were also significant setbacks. Notably, the inflation rate rocketed to 31% in 2002 and remained at the high level of 27% in 2003, causing a great deal of hardship for the poor.

In May 9, 2004, a group of 126 Colombians were captured during a raid of a farm near Caracas. Chávez soon accused them of being a foreign-funded paramilitary force who intended to violently overthrow his rule. These events merely served to further the extreme and violent polarization of Venezuelan society between pro- and anti-Chávez camps. Chávez's allegations of a putative 2004 coup attempt continue to stir controversy and doubts to this day. In October 2005, 27 of the accused Colombians were found guilty, while the rest were released and deported. Template:ChavezElections2004

In early and mid-2003, Súmate, a grassroots volunteer civilian voter rights organization, began the process of collecting the millions of signatures needed to activate the presidential recall provision provided for in Chávez's 1999 Constitution. In August 2003, around 3.2 million signatures were presented, but these were rejected by the pro-Chávez majority in the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE; "National Electoral Council") on the grounds that many had been collected before the mid-point of Chávez's presidential term. Reports then began to emerge among opposition and international news outlets that Chávez had begun to act punitively against those who had signed the petition, while pro-Chávez individuals stated that they had been coerced by employers into offering their signatures at their workplaces. In November 2003, the opposition collected an entirely new set of signatures, with 3.6 million names produced over a span of four days. Riots erupted nationwide as allegations of fraud were made by Chávez against the signature collectors.

The provision in the Constitution allowing for a presidential recall requires the signatures of 20% of the electorate in order to effect a recall. Further, the cedulas (national identity card numbers) and identities of petition signers are not secret, and in fact were made public by Luis Tascón, a member of the Venezuelan National Assembly representing Chávez' party (Fifth Republic Movement - MVR) and the Communist Party of Venezuela of Táchira state. The government was accused of increasing the voter rolls by giving citizenship to illegal immigrants and refugees; and the oposition claimed that it was a citizenship for votes program. Voter registration increased by about 2 million people ahead of the referendum, which in effect raised the threshhold of the 20% of the electorate needed to effect a recall.

Credible reports again emerged that Chávez and his allies were penalizing signers of the publicly posted petition. Charges were made of summary dismissals from government ministries, PDVSA, the state-owned water corporation, the Caracas Metro, and public hospitals controlled by Chávez's political allies. Finally, after opposition leaders submitted to the CNE a valid petition with 2,436,830 signatures that requested a presidential recall referendum, a recall referendum was announced on June 8, 2004 by the CNE. Chávez and his political allies responded to this by mobilizing supporters to encourage rejection of the recall with a "no" vote.

The recall vote itself was held on August 15, 2004. A record number of voters turned out to defeat the recall attempt with a 59% "no" vote. European Union observers did not oversee the elections, saying too many restrictions were put on their participation by the Chávez administration. Chávez would not allow open audits at the polling places to reconcile electronic voting and paper ballot tallies, an independent audit sample, a statistically reliable audit sample, a closed-door audit with CNE members present, inspection of the electronic voting machines immediately after the vote, or unlimited access to the electronic vote center. The election was overseen by the Carter Center and certified by them as fair and open. Critics called the results fraudulent, citing documents which indicated that the true results were the complete opposite of the reported ones, and raising questions about the government ownership of voting machines. "Massive fraud" was alleged and Carter's conclusions were questioned, although five other opposition polls showed a Chávez victory.

A jubilant Chávez pledged to redouble his efforts against both poverty and "imperialism," while promising to foster dialogue with his opponents. Chávez's government subsequently charged the founders of Súmate with treason and conspiracy for receiving foreign funds, earmarked for voter education, from the United States Department of State through the National Endowment for Democracy, triggering commentary from human rights organizations and the U.S. government. The trial has been postponed several times. A program called "Mission Identity", to fast track voter registration of immigrants to Venezuela — including Chávez supporters benefiting from his subsidies — has been put in place prior to the upcoming 2006 presidential elections.

2004–present: Focus on foreign relations

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In the aftermath of his referendum victory, Chávez's primary objectives of fundamental social and economic transformation and redistribution accelerated dramatically. Chávez himself placed the development and implementation of the "Bolivarian Missions" once again at the forefront of his political agenda. Sharp increases in global oil prices gave Chávez access to billions of dollars in extra foreign exchange reserves. Economic growth picked up markedly, reaching double-digit growth in 2004 and a 9.3% growth rate for 2005.

Many new policy initiatives were advanced by Chávez after 2004. In late March 2005, the Chávez government passed a series of media regulations that criminalized broadcasted libel and slander directed against public officials; prison sentences of up to 40 months for serious instances of character defamation launched against Chávez and other officials were enacted. When asked if he would ever actually move to use the 40-month sentence if a media figure insulted him, Chávez remarked that "I don't care if they call me names.... As Don Quixote said, 'If the dogs are barking, it is because we are working.'" Chávez also worked to expand his land redistribution and social welfare programs by authorizing and funding a multitude of new "Bolivarian Missions," including "Mission Vuelta al Campo"; the second and third phases of "Mission Barrio Adentro," both first initiated in June 2005 with the stated aim of constructing, funding, and refurbishing secondary (integrated diagnostic center) and tertiary (hospital) public health care facilities nationwide; and "Mission Miranda, which established a national citizen's militia. Meanwhile, Venezuela's doctors went on strike, protesting the siphoning of public funds from their existing institutions to these new Bolivarian ones, run by Cuban doctors.

Chávez focused considerably on Venezuela's foreign relations in 2004 and 2005 via new bilateral and multilateral agreements, including humanitarian aid and construction projects. Chávez has engaged, with varying degrees of success, numerous other foreign leaders, including Argentina's Néstor Kirchner, China's Hu Jintao, Cuba's Fidel Castro and Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. On March 4, 2005, Chávez publicly declared that the U.S.-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was "dead." Chávez stated that the neoliberal model of development had utterly failed in improving the lives of Latin Americans, and that an alternative, anti-capitalist model would be conceived in order to increase trade and relations between Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil. Chávez also stated his desire that a leftist, Latin American analogue of NATO be established.

Over the course of 2004 and 2005, the Venezuelan military under Chávez also began in earnest to reduce weaponry sourcing and military ties with the United States. Chávez's Venezuela is thus increasingly purchasing arms from alternative sources, such as Brazil, Russia, China and Spain. Friction over these sales escalated, and in response Chávez ended cooperation between the militaries of the two countries. He also asked all active-duty U.S. soldiers to leave Venezuela. Additionally, in 2005 Chávez announced the creation of a large "military reserve"—the Mission Miranda program, which encompasses a militia of 1.5 million citizens—as a defensive measure against foreign intervention or outright invasion. Additionally, in October 2005, Chávez banished the Christian missionary organization "New Tribes Mission" from the country, accusing it of "imperialist infiltration" and harboring connections with the CIA. At the same time, he granted inalienable titles to over 6,800 square kilometers of land traditionally inhabited by Amazonian indigenous peoples to their respective resident natives, though this land could not be bought or sold as Western-style title deeds can. Chávez cited these changes as evidence that his revolution was also a revolution for the defense of indigenous rights, such as those promoted by Chávez's Mission Guaicaipuro.

During this period, Chávez placed much greater emphasis on alternative economic development and international trade models, much of it in the form of extremely ambitious hemisphere-wide international aid agreements. For example, on August 20, 2005, during the first graduation of international scholarship students from Cuba's Latin American School of Medicine, Chávez announced that he would jointly establish with Cuba a second such medical school that would provide tuition-free medical training—an ex gratia project valued at between $20 and 30 billion—to more than 100,000 physicians who would pledge to work in the poorest communities of the Global South. He announced that the project would run for the next decade, and that the new school would include at least 30,000 new places for poor students from both Latin America and the Caribbean.

Chávez has also taken ample opportunity on the international stage to juxtapose such projects with the manifest results and workings of neoliberal globalization. Most notably, during his speech at the 2005 UN World Summit, he denounced development models that are organized around neoliberal guidelines such as liberalization of capital flows, removal of trade barriers, and privatization as the reason for the developing world's impoverishment. Chávez also went on to warn of an imminent global energy famine brought about by hydrocarbon depletion (based on Hubbert peak theory), stating that "we are facing an unprecedented energy crisis.... Oil is starting to become exhausted." Additionally, on November 7, 2005, Chávez referenced the stalling of the FTAA, stating at the Fourth Summit of the Americas, held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, that "the great loser today was George W. Bush. The man went away wounded. You could see defeat on his face." Chávez took the same opportunity to state that "the taste of victory" was apparent with regards to the promotion of his own trade alternative, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA—Alternativa Bolivariana para América), which Venezuela and Cuba inaugurated on December 14, 2004.

In 2005, Chávez demanded the extradition of Luis Posada Carriles, accused of conspiring to bomb Cubana Flight 455. A Texas judge blocked the extradition on the grounds that he could be tortured in Venezuela; the Venezuelan embassy blamed the Department of Homeland Security for refusing to contest such accusations during the trial. Chávez also requested the extradition of former Venezuelan officers and members of Militares democraticos, Lt. German Rodolfo Varela and Lt. Jose Antonio Colina, who are wanted for bombing the Spanish and Colombian embassies after Chavez made a speech criticizing both governments.

Impact of Presidency

Domestic policy

Template:Bolivarian Missions Infobox 1 Chávez's domestic policy relies heavily on the "Bolivarian Missions," a series of political campaigns aimed at radically altering the economic and cultural landscape of Venezuela.

The "Bolivarian Missions" have entailed the launching of massive government anti-poverty initiatives, the construction of thousands of free medical clinics for the poor, the institution of educational campaigns that have reportedly made more than one million adult Venezuelans literate, and the enactment of food and housing subsidies. There have been marked improvements in the infant mortality rate between 1998 and 2005.

The Missions have overseen widespread experimentation in what Chávez supporters term citizen- and worker-managed governance, as well as the granting of thousands of free land titles, reportedly to formerly landless poor and indigenous communities. Several allegedly unused estates and factories have been expropriated to provide this land.

On March 2006 the Communal Council Law was approved, whereby communities that decide to organize themselves into a council can be given official state recognition and access to federal funds and loans for community projects. This skips the local and state governments that are perceived as corrupt.

Some criticism has come from Chávez's supporters. Chávez's own political party, Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), has been criticized as being riddled with the same cronyism, political patronage, and corruption that Chávez alleged were characteristic of the old "Fourth Republic" political parties. Venezuela's trade unionists and indigenous communities have participated in peaceful demonstrations intended to impel the government to speed up labor and land reforms. These communities, while largely expressing their sympathy and support for Chávez, criticize what they see as Chávez's slow progress in protecting their interests against managers and mining concerns, respectively.

Chávez was first elected on an anti-corruption platform and promises of redistributing wealth to the poor, but analysts say that "despite record oil proits that are funding social spending, his initiatives have yielded only very modest gains", and critics say that his policies are most vulnerable in the areas of corruption, jobs and crime.

During Chávez's presidency, from 1999 to 2004, per-capita GDP dropped 1–2 %, but with the help of rising oil prices, the end of the oil strike, and strong consumption growth, recent economic activity under Chávez has been robust, particularly in the non-petroleum sectors, which showed growth rates greater than 10% during 2004 and 2005. Most of that growth was directed to the poorest sectors of society, with real income growth of 55% reported between 2003 and 2005, although some economists argue that the subsidized growth in this sector could stop if oil prices decline. Overall, since the start of his presidency, government statistics indicate a 6.4% drop in official unemployment and a 6% drop in the rate of poverty. Despite high oil revenues, official unemployment figures have only dropped to around 10%. With the help of an expanded public payroll, unemployment has been reduced from the 2003 high under Chávez of 20%, but some economists argue that the jobs may not be permanent, and critics question the government's reported poverty figures, based on contradictory statistics and definitions, which have not fallen enough considering the country's vast oil revenues in the last two years. The World Bank reports a 10% drop in poverty in the last 10 years, from 40% to 30%. Critics report that both poverty and unemployment figures under Chávez have not seen significant improvement and that official corruption under his government continues to be rampant, and point to the 1-2% drop in Venezuela's per-capita GDP early in Chávez's term, before the 2004 surge in oil prices. The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom ranked Venezuela 152 out of 157 countries, among the 12 economies of the world labelled "repressed".

The government and independent observers refute the charges of economic decline by pointing out that the renewed economic growth of the last two years has brought rapid reductions in poverty, especially when one considers the vast expansion of non-cash income represented by subsidized food distribution and other social programs.

At the same time, critics opine that the administration's unwillingness to utilize private sector resources has resulted in a crumbling public infrastructure and a deficit in housing. Critics cite the many public hospitals that lack basic medicine and hygenic supplies. They also question the the motives behind the Bolivarian Missions' regular cash and in-kind payments to the millions of poor Venezuelans enrolling in their social programs. With many enrollees participating in more than one Mission simultaneously, receiving a steady and unearned income, critics worry that work ethic will be corrupted and enrollees will be predisposed to support and vote for Chávez. Supporters would respond that the opposition was not similarly worried about economic policy influencing political allegiances in the years when the current Venezuelan opposition promoted policies that re-distributed income upward.

In its annual survey, Berlin-based Transparency International ranked Venezuela as one of only a dozen countries where perceived corruption had "greatly increased", resulting in a ranking of 130 out of the 150 countries surveyed, to become the nation perceived as the third most corrupt in Latin America, above Paraguay and Haiti. Critics claim that rampant corruption reaches the highest levels of Venezuelan airport and security officials, that billions of dollars have been siphoned away from social programs by corrupt officials, and that leaders of the military have limited oversight, creating an environment in which impunity and corruption develop. Members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces are alleged to be involved in supplying arms to Colombia's FARC, and U.S. anti-drug officials allege that corruption within the Chávez administration is converting Venezuela into a trafficing route for Colombian drugs. Critics also allege widespread corruption in the police force. Critics say that Chávez's large purchases of military hardware are for reasons other than the defence of his country in the event of the "imminent US invasion" which he has repeatedly claimed will take place, and has used as a reason to justify these large transactions. Reasons cited by critics include covert or otherwise intervention in other South American countries in order to further political objectives in the region. They say Chávez's new civil reserve defense force is intended to intimidate domestic opponents and repress internal dissent. Chávez government officials respond that the reserve is similar to civilian reserves and forces in many nations, including the United States.

Since he took office, The Economist reports that the murder rate has almost tripled, and that Venezuela's capital – Caracas – has become South America's most violent, with police implicated in some of the crimes. The United Nations reported in 2005 that Venezuela had the highest number of deaths by gunfire per capita in the world, garnering for Venezuela claim to the title of the world's most violent crime capital.

Critics claim that Chávez's policies are responsible for some of these declines. Amnesty International reports that Venezuela lacks an independent and impartial judiciary, and the U.S. State Department says there is unchecked concentration of power in the executive and the legal system. Critics accuse the Bolivarian Circles Chávez founded of furthering violence, while Chávez supporters say they are neighborhood associations, promoting and facilitating literacy classes and helping run local health clinics. According to a study by Brigham Young University scholars, the "Bolivarian circles" also help the government identify opponents, who are then denied services.

Labour policy

Chávez has had a combative relationship with the nation's largest trade union confederation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), which is historically aligned with the Acción Democrática (AD) party. During the December 2000 local elections, Chávez placed a referendum measure on the ballot that would mandate state-monitored elections within unions. The measure, which was condemned by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as undue interference in internal union matters, passed by a large margin on a very low electoral turnout. In the ensuing CTV elections, Carlos Ortega declared his victory and remained in office as CTV president, while chavista (pro-Chávez) candidates declared fraud.

The Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT—"National Union of Workers"), a new pro-Chávez union federation, formed in response, and has been growing in membership; it seeks to ultimately supplant the CTV. Several chavista unions have withdrawn from the CTV because of their strident anti-Chávez activism, and have instead affiliated with the UNT. In 2003, Chávez chose to send UNT, rather than CTV, representatives to an annual ILO meeting.

Further augmenting state involvement in Venezuela's economy, Chávez nationalized Venepal, a formerly closed paper and cardboard manufacturing firm, on January 19, 2005. Workers had occupied the factory floor and restarted production, but following a failed deal with management and amidst management threats to liquidate the firm's equipment, Chávez ordered the nationalization, extended a line of credit to the workers, and ordered that the Venezuelan educational missions purchase more paper products from the company.

Economic policy

Venezuela is a major producer of oil products, which remain the keystone of the Venezuelan economy. Chávez has gained a reputation as a price hawk in OPEC, pushing for stringent enforcement of production quotas and higher target oil prices. At a June 2006 meeting, Venezuela was the only OPEC country calling for lowered production to drive oil prices higher. Industry analysts say Venezuela wants lower quotas because, under Chávez's administration, the output of Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), Venezuela's state-owned oil company, has been reduced by 25% and Venezuela cannot meet its current quota. However, Forbes argues that some oil production numbers are politically motivated, intended to discredit the Venezuelan industry. Nonetheless, Chávez has attempted to broaden Venezuela's customer base, striking joint exploration deals with other developing countries, including Argentina, Brazil, China and India. Record oil prices have meant more funding for social programs, but have left the economy increasingly dependent on both the Chávez government and the oil sector; the private sector's role has correspondingly diminished.

Chávez has redirected the focus of PDVSA by bringing it more closely under the direction of the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum . He has also attempted to repatriate more oil funds to Venezuela by raising royalty percentages on joint extraction contracts that are payable to Venezuela. Chávez has also explored the liquidation of some or all of the assets belonging to PDVSA's U.S.-based subsidiary, Citgo. The Ministry of Energy and Petroleum has been successful in restructuring Citgo's profit structure, resulting in large increases in dividends and income taxes from PDVSA.

During Chávez's presidency from 1999 to 2004, per-capita GDP dropped 1–2 %, but with the help of rising oil prices, the end of the oil strike, and strong consumption growth, recent economic activity under Chávez has been robust, with GDP growth rates of 18% in 2004 and 10% in 2005. From 2004 to the first quarter of 2006, non-petroleum sectors of the economy have shown growth rates consistently greater than 10%. Most of that growth was directed to the poorest sectors of society, with real income growth of 55% reported between 2003 and 2005, although some economists argue that this subsidized growth could stop if oil prices decline. Overall, since the start of his presidency, government statistics indicate a 6.4% drop in official unemployment and a 6% drop in the rate of poverty. The World Bank reports a 10% drop in poverty in the last 10 years, from 40% to 30%. However, some social scientists and economists claim that the government's reported poverty figures have not fallen in proportion to the country's vast oil revenues in the last two years.

Venezuela's rate of unemployment dropped to 10% in February 2006 from the 2003 high of 20%, which occured during a two-month strike and business lockout that shut down the country's oil industry. However, some economists argue that recent job creation may not be permanent, for it relies on an expanded public payroll that will become unaffordable if oil prices fall.

Foreign policy

Chávez has refocused Venezuelan foreign policy on Latin American economic and social integration by enacting bilateral trade and reciprocal aid agreements, including his so-called "oil diplomacy". Chávez stated that Venezuela has "a strong oil card to play on the geopolitical stage . . ." He said, "It is a card that we are going to play with toughness against the toughest country in the world, the United States." Chávez has focused on a variety of multinational institutions to promote his vision of Latin American integration, including Petrocaribe, Petrosur, and TeleSUR. Bilateral trade relationships with other Latin American countries have also played a major role in his policy, with Chávez increasing arms purchases from Brazil, forming oil-for-expertise trade arrangements with Cuba, funding an ex gratia oil pipeline built to provide discounted natural gas to Colombia, and creating unique barter arrangements that exchange Venezuelan petroleum for cash-strapped Argentina's meat and dairy products. Additionally, Chávez worked closely with other Latin American leaders following the 1997 Summit of the Americas in many areas—especially energy integration—and championed the OAS decision to adopt the Anti-Corruption Convention. Chávez also participates in the United Nations Friends groups for Haiti, and is pursuing efforts to join and engage the Mercosur trade bloc to expand the hemisphere's trade integration prospects.

Abroad, Chávez regularly portrays his movement's objectives as being diametrically opposed to "neocolonialism" and "neoliberalism". Chávez has, for example, denounced U.S. foreign policy regarding areas such as Iraq, Haiti, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Chávez's warm and public friendship with Cuban President Fidel Castro has markedly compromised the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba diplomatically and economically. Long-standing ties between the U.S. and Venezuelan militaries were also severed by Chávez. Moreover, his stance as an OPEC price hawk has made him unpopular in the United States. In 2000, Chávez made a ten-day tour of OPEC countries in a bid to promote his policies, becoming the first head of state to meet Saddam Hussein since the Gulf War.

Chávez's foreign policy conduct and anti-Bush rhetoric has occasionally reached the level of personal attacks. Chávez once referred to U.S. President George W. Bush as a pendejo ("dumbass"). In a later speech, he made personal remarks regarding Condoleezza Rice, referring to her as a "complete illiterate" when it comes to comprehending Latin America.

After Hurricane Katrina battered the United States’ Gulf Coast in late 2005, the Chávez administration was the first foreign government to offer aid to the devastated regions. The Bush administration opted to refuse this aid. Later, in November 2005, officials in Massachusetts signed an agreement with Venezuela to provide discounted heating oil to low income families.

There have also been heated disputes between Chávez and other Latin American leaders, including one with Mexican President Vicente Fox over what Chávez alleged was Fox's support of U.S. trade interests. The dispute resulted in a strained diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Another diplomatic row with Colombia, referred to as the Rodrigo Granda affair, occurred in 2004, after the kidnap of Rodrigo Granda, a high ranking member of the political wing of the FARC. In 2001, a dissension with Peru occurred over suspicions that Chávez's administration was protecting and hiding Vladimiro Montesinos, a former Peruvian intelligence director under the Alberto Fujimori administration, wanted for corruption. Between January and March of 2006, Chávez commented on the candidates of the 2006 Peruvian Presidential election, openly backing Ollanta Humala while referring to Alan García as a "thief" and a "crook". The Peruvian government therefore admonished Chávez for interfering in Peru's affairs. The defeat of Humala (the Chávez-backed candidate) in Peru and the reelection of a U.S. ally, Álvaro Uribe, in Colombia can be seen as a rebuke to Chávez.

Chávez and the media

Even before the April 2002 coup, many owners, managers, and commentators working for the five major private mainstream television networks and largest mainstream newspapers had stated their opposition to Chávez's policies. These media outlets have accused the Chávez administration of intimidating their journalists using specially-dispatched gangs. Chávez in turn alleges that the owners of these networks have primary allegiance not to Venezuela but to the United States, and that they seek the advancement of what he terms neoliberalism via corporate propaganda.

Throughout his presidency, Chávez has hosted the live talk show known as Aló, Presidente! ("Hello, President!"). The show broadcasts in varying formats on Venezolana de Televisión (VTV—Venezuelan State Television) each Sunday at 11:00 AM. The show features Chávez addressing topics of the day, taking phone calls and live questions from both the studio and broadcast audience, and touring locations where government social welfare programs are active. Additionally, on July 25, 2005, Chávez inaugurated TeleSUR, a proposed pan-American homologue of Al Jazeera that seeks to challenge the present domination of Latin American television news by Univision and the United States-based CNN en Español. Chávez's media policies have contributed to elevated tensions between the United States and Venezuela.

After the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11 2001, and with preparations for war in the U.S., Latin America could not compete for international media coverage. Moises Naim, a former Venezuelan Minister of Trade and Industry and editor of Foreign Policy magazine, argued in early 2003 that the world could no longer afford to ignore Venezuela's deterioration. He stated that Washington had mattered little in the Venezuelan crisis, and that "Fidel Castro's Cuba ... (had) been far more influential in Caracas than George W. Bush's mighty US", with sustained and effective attention towards its goal of keeping Chávez in power.

Bolivarianism and Chavismo

Chávez's version of Bolivarianism, although drawing heavily from Simón Bolívar's ideals, was also influenced by the writings of Marxist historian Federico Brito Figueroa and Argentinian political scientist Norberto Ceresole. Chávez was also thoroughly steeped in the South American tradition of socialism and communism early in his life, such as that practiced by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and Salvador Allende. Other key influences on Chávez's political philosophy include Ezequiel Zamora and Simón Rodríguez. Although Chávez himself refers to his ideology as Bolivarianismo ("Bolivarianism"), Chávez's supporters and opponents in Venezuela refer to themselves as being either for or against "chavismo," indicating a public perception that Chávez's political philosophy does not originate from Bolívar so much as from his own views. Thus, Chávez supporters refer to themselves not as "Bolivarians" or "Bolivarianists," but rather as "chavistas."

Later in his life, Chávez would acknowledge the role that democratic socialism (a form of socialism that emphasizes grassroots democratic participation) plays in Bolivarianism. Because his Bolivarianism relies on popular support, Chávez has organized the so-called "Bolivarian Circles," which he cites as examples of grassroots and participatory democracy. The circles are charged with such tasks as neighborhood beautification, mass mobilization, lending support to small businesses, and providing basic social services, but critics are suspect of their independence and aims.

Criticism

Chávez is a deeply disputed personality, both in Venezuela and abroad. Critics state that Chávez is a dangerous militarist and authoritarian revolutionary who poses a fundamental threat to Venezuelan democracy.

With respect to domestic policies, critics report that both poverty and unemployment figures under Chávez have not seen significant improvement, and that corruption and crime are rampant. They also cite a failing infrastructure and public hospitals lacking even basic medicine and hygenic supplies. They question the motives behind the Bolivarian Missions' regular cash and in-kind payments to the millions of poor Venezuelans enrolling in their social programs. Criticism from Chávez supporters arise from reports that Chávez is not fulfilling his major campaign pledges with respect to labor and land reform.

Critics have also charged that the Chávez government has engaged in extensive electoral fraud, especially during the 2000 and 2004 elections and the recent constitutional referendum. Human rights organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented numerous human rights violations under Chávez.

Abroad, some sources in the Western mainstream news media have reported that Chávez is a confrontational ideologue The U.S government claims that his cooperation in the war of terrorism is negligible or purposely indiferent, but they admit no evidence of a direct link with terrorism has been found.

Several public figures have called for the assassination of Chávez, most notably televangelist Pat Robertson. Other such requests have been expressed by Venezuelan actor Orlando Urdaneta and former president of Venezuela Carlos Andrés Pérez. The US Ambassador to Venezuela between 2001 and 2004, Charles Shapiro, also reported to the Chávez administration two potential assassination plots.

Personal life

Hugo Chávez has been married twice. He first wedded Nancy Colmenares, a woman from a poor family originating in Chávez's own hometown of Sabaneta. Chávez and Colmenares remained married for eighteen years, during which time they had three children: Rosa Virginia, María Gabriela, and Hugo Rafael. They separated soon after Chávez's 1992 coup attempt. During his first marriage, Chávez also had an affair with young historian Herma Marksman; they had a relationship which lasted nine years. Chávez is separated from his second wife, journalist Marisabel Rodríguez de Chávez. Through that marriage, Chávez had another daughter, Rosa Inés. In Venezuela, Gabriela.

Chávez is of Roman Catholic extraction, although he has had a series of disputes with both the Venezuelan Catholic clergy and Protestant church hierarchies. He has traditionally kept his own faith a private matter, but over the course of his presidency, Chávez has become increasingly open to discussing his religious views, stating that both his faith and his interpretation of Jesus' personal life and ideology have had a profound impact on his leftist and progressivist views.

See also

v t e Hugo Chávez
45th President of Venezuela (1999–2013)
Early life and career	Early life Military career Coup attempt of 1992 Presidential election of 1998 Death and state funeral
Presidency	Cabinet of Hugo Chávez 1999 Constitution General election of 2000 Presidential election of 2006 United Socialist Party of Venezuela Constitutional referendum of 2007 Constitutional referendum of 2009 Presidential election of 2012
Political events	Coup attempt of 2002 Venezuelan general strike of 2002–2003 Recall referendum of 2004 2005 Venezuelan parliamentary election 2007 protests RCTV Referendum 2010 Venezuelan parliamentary election
Domestic policy	Boliburguesía Bolivarianism Bolivarian Circles Bolivarian missions Bolivarian Revolution Chavismo Colectivos Economic policy Plan Bolívar 2000 Socialism of the 21st century Venezuelan communal councils
Foreign policy	Bank of the South Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Petrocaribe
Image	Aló Presidente Bolivarian propaganda Chavismo: The Plague of the 21st Century El ocaso del socialismo mágico El pueblo soy yo Hugo Chávez's cult of personality Mi amigo Hugo ¿Por qué no te callas? Public image of Hugo Chávez ¿¡Revolución!? teleSUR The Silence and the Scorpion Venezuelanalysis Venezuela Information Office
← Rafael Caldera Nicolás Maduro → Category

v t e President of Venezuela (list)
Since 1830	Páez Narvarte Vargas Carreño Vargas Narvarte Carreño Soublette Páez Soublette J. T. Monagas J. G. Monagas J. T. Monagas Gual J. Castro Gual Tovar Gual Páez Falcón Bruzual Villegas J. R. Monagas Villegas Guzmán Linares Valera Guzmán Crespo Guzmán H. López Rojas Andueza Villegas Villegas Pulido Crespo Andrade C. Castro Gómez Gil Fortoul Márquez Gómez J. Pérez Gómez López Contreras Medina Betancourt Gallegos Delgado Chalbaud Suárez Flamerich Pérez Jiménez Larrazábal Sanabria Betancourt Leoni Caldera C. Pérez Herrera Lusinchi C. Pérez Lepage Velásquez Caldera Chávez Cabello Chávez Maduro Guaidó
Acting / interim / caretaker presidents shown in italics Recognized by the National Assembly as "interim president" during the Venezuelan presidential crisis until 2023

Notes

1. Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. "Cuadro de Presidentes Venezolanos". Retrieved Internet Archive, 25 Nov 2004. Template:Es icon
2. ^ Shifter, Michael. "In Search of Hugo Chávez". Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006. 85:3.
3. Munckton, Stuart (2005-03-13). "Chavez steps up calls for socialism". Retrieved 2006-06-04. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
4. Ellner, Steve. "The 'Radical' Thesis on Globalization and the Case of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez" Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 29, No. 6, Globalization and Globalism in Latin America and the Caribbean. (Nov., 2002), pp. 88-93. Stable URL
5. McCoy, Jennifer & Trinkunas, Harold (1999). Observation of the 1998 Venezuelan Elections: A Report of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, Carter Center, p. 49.
6. McCoy, Jennifer & Neuman, Laura (2001). Observed Political Change In Venezuela: The Bolivarian Constitution and 2000 Elections: Final Report, Carter Center, pp. 71-72.
7. ^ Carter Center (Sep 2004). Report on an Analysis of the Representativeness of the Second Audit Sample, and the Correlation between Petition Signers and the Yes Vote in the August 15, 2004 Presidential Recall Referendum in Venezuela, p. 7.
8. ^ Government of Venezuela, Gobierno En Línea (2005). "Presidente Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías", Gobierno En Línea. Accessed 15 June 2006. Template:Es icon
9. Gott, Richard. (The Guardian, 25 Aug 2005). "Two fingers to America". Retrieved 18 Oct 2005.
10. Schuyler, George W. (2001), "Health and Neoliberalism: Venezuela and Cuba", The Policy Studies Organization.
11. Guillermoprieto (2005).
12. Gott (2005), p.64.
13. Gott (2005), p.63.
14. Gott (2005), p.69.
15. Gott (2005), pp.66-67.
16. Gott (2005), p. 67. Chávez spoke thus: "Comrades: unfortunately, for the moment, the objectives that we had set for ourselves have not been achieved in the capital. That's to say that those of us here in Caracas have not been able to seize power. Where you are, you have performed well, but now is the time for a rethink; new possibilities will arise again, and the country will be able to move definitively towards a better future."
17. Gott (2005), p.67.
18. O'Keefe, Derrick. (Z Communications, 09 Mar 2005). "Building a Democratic, Humanist Socialism: The Political Challenge of the 21st Century". Retrieved 11 Nov 2005.
19. ^ Chávez, Hugo. . Latino Pastoral Action Center. Bronx, New York City. 17 Sep 2005. Downloadable Audio. Retrieved 05 Nov 2005.
20. Chavez's constitutional reform; A Hard Look at the Rationale & Proposals, Latin America Weekly Report, January 12, 1999, Venezuela; Politics; WR-99-02; Pg. 18
21. Marcano and Barrera (2005), p.50.
22. Toro (2004).
23. Guillermoprieto (2005).
24. McCoy and Trinkunas (Feb 1999).
25. Text of report by Patrick J. O'Donoghue: "President Hugo Chavez, Copyright 2004 British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Monitoring Latin America - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 19, 2004.
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32. McCoy and Neuman (2001), pp. 71-72.
33. McCoy and Neuman (2001), p. 10.
34. McCoy and Neuman (2001), p. 73.
35. CNN. (CNN, 19 Jan 2003). "Venezuelan president names two generals to key posts: Chavez vows more raids on industries that support strike." Accessed 19 June 2006.
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37. Campbell, Duncan. (The Guardian, 29 April 2006). American navy 'helped Venezuelan coup'. Retrieved 21 Jun 2006]
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41. U.S. Department of State and Office of Inspector General. A Review of U.S. Policy toward Venezuela, November 2001 - April 2002. Accessed 26 May 2006.
42. Márquez Humberto. (IPS March 9 2006) Statements Indicate Chávez May Indeed Be in Somebody's Crosshairs. Retrieved 21 Jun 2006]
43. ^ The Economist, (June 8, 2006), "Venezuela's foreign policy: Bruised but unbowed," The Economist, Accessed 20 June 2006.
44. Holland, Alex. (Venezuela Analysis 21 Feb 2006). Chavez Threatens Opposition with Referendum on Third Term in Office. Retrieved 21 Jun 2006. Chavez argued that this was necessary as the job of rebuilding Venezuela was so big that it could not be done in 5 years. At other times Chavez has said that this project will not be finished until 2021. Chavez has also said he will retire from politics in 2021. This has led many to conclude that Chavez wants to be President until 2021. Chavez has denied this, though.
45. Holland, Alex. (Venezuela Analysis 21 Feb 2006). Chavez Threatens Opposition with Referendum on Third Term in Office. Retrieved 21 Jun 2006. “I might sign a decree calling for a popular referendum - Do you agree that Chavez should run for a third term in 2013?”
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References

• Amnesty International. "Venezuela". Accessed 20 June 2006.
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• Human Rights Watch. Venezuela. Accessed 20 June 2006.
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External links

Interviews and speeches:

• Chávez, Hugo, untitled speech, transcript, first plenary session of the Special Summit of the Americas in Monterrey, Mexico. January 12, 2004.
• Chávez, Hugo, untitled speech, transcript, opening of XII G-15 Summit. March 1, 2004.
• Chávez, Hugo, untitled speech, audio, UN’s 2005 World Summit.
• Chávez, Hugo, untitled speech, transcript, United Nations. September 16, 2005.
• Chávez, Hugo, untitled speech, audio, Latino Pastoral Action Center, Bronx, New York City, September 17, 2005. (Original Spanish-language Template:Es icon)
• Democracy Now! Part I and Part II of a Chavez interview in New York City. September 16, 2005.
• Koppel, Ted. Interview of Chávez. ABC News/Nightline. September 16, 2005.
• Palast, Greg. Venezuela President Hugo Chávez: Interview. 2006.
• Palast, Greg. Venezuela President Hugo Chávez: Interview. May 2, 2002.

Other links:

• Pilger, John. "Chávez is a threat because he offers the alternative of a decent society." Guardian Unlimited, May 13, 2006.
• Aló Presidente Template:Es icon — Website of Chávez's weekly talk show.
• Portal ALBA: Alternativa Bolivariana para América Template:Es icon — Web portal detailing Chávez's trade agenda and proposals.
• Presidente Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías Template:Es icon — Biography of Chávez from Venezuelan government.
• Sumate Template:Es icon — Venezuelan civilian volunteer voter rights organization.
• 11 Abril Template:Es icon — Summary of news about Chávez and Venezuela, subsequent to the events of 11 April.

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Template:Link FA

• 1954 births
• Current national leaders
• History of Venezuela
• Hugo Chávez
• Living people
• Military writers
• Presidents of Venezuela
• Rebels
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• Roman Catholic politicians