Misplaced Pages

Latest revision as of 19:37, 7 January 2025

Hizbul Mujahideen
حزب المجاھدین
[REDACTED] Official logo
Founders	Muhammad Ahsan Dar Hilal Ahmed Mir Masood Sarfraz
Patron and Supreme Commander	Syed Salahuddin
Operational Commander	Farooq Ahmed Nali (a.k.a. Abu Ubaida) (chief operational commander in the Kashmir Valley, India)
Foundation	September 1989 (notional)
Dates of operation	1989–present
Split to	Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind The Resistance Front
Group(s)	Dukhtaran-e-Millat
Motives	Separation of Kashmir from India and its merger with Pakistan
Headquarters	Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir
Ideology	Islamism Jihadism
Status	Active
Part of	United Jihad Council
Allies	al-Qaeda Lashkar-e-Taiba Al-Badr
Battles and wars	Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir
Designated as a terrorist group by	India  European Union  Canada  United States

Hizbul Mujahideen, also spelled Hizb-ul-Mujahidin (Arabic: حزب المجاھدین, transl. 'Party of Holy Fighters'), is a Pakistan-affiliated Islamist militant organisation that has been engaged in the Kashmir insurgency since 1989. It aims to separate Kashmir from India and merge it with Pakistan, and is thus one of the most important players in the region as it evolved the narrative of the Kashmir conflict by steering the struggle away from nationalism and towards jihadism.

Founded in September 1989 as an umbrella group of Islamist militants, Hizbul Mujahideen quickly came under the control of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir; it is considered to be the military wing of the organisation. It was supported, since its inception, by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and was established through an effort initiated under erstwhile Pakistani president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. It is headquartered in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani-administered Azad Kashmir, and also has liaison offices in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, Pakistan's political and military capital cities, respectively.

The organisation has claimed responsibility for multiple armed attacks in Kashmir. It has been designated as a terrorist group by the European Union, India, Canada, and the United States. It remains a lawfully-operating organisation in Pakistan.

Foundation

Origins

The efforts for the creation of the Hizbul Mujahideen go back to 1980, when Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq called the chief of Jamaat-e-Islami in Azad Kashmir, Maulana Abdul Bari, and asked for assistance in raising an insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. Zia said that he would be able to divert funds and resources from the Afghan mujahideen for a conflict in Kashmir. Bari travelled to the Kashmir Valley and met with the leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir. Protracted negotiations continued for three years when finally, the founding amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir, Maulana Saaduddin Tarabali, was invited for a meeting with Zia ul-Haq in May 1983. Saaduddin wanted complete operational control of the insurgency, with Pakistan's role limited to military training and financial support. Pakistan agreed albeit reluctantly, and a deal was struck. Maulana Saaduddin sent his own son as part of the first group of volunteers for military training.

However, the progress with Jamaat-e-Islami was sluggish. The ISI got frustrated with it and started looking for other options. It made contact with Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1984 and struck a deal with it in 1986. According to scholars, JKLF was only a short-term expedient for ISI, a means to spur Jamaat-e-Islami into action. Some 10,000 militants were trained by July 1988, operating in fifty units, when an insurgency was launched. Operating under the JKLF banner were also a number of Islamist jihadi groups that owed loyalty to Jamaat-e-Islami: a group called "Zia Tigers" operating since 1987, "Al-Hamza" since 1988, "Hizbul Ansar" led by Muzaffar Shah, a largest and best organized group called "Ansarul Islam", and a subsidiary of it called "Al-Badr". According to Arif Jamal, "this vast network of jihadi groups worked within the JKLF for many months; they were among the most active members of the insurgency."

In August 1989, the Jamaat-e-Islami of Azad Kashmir sent a commander called Masood Sarfraz to bring the various Islamist groups together and create a serious organisation parallel to the JKLF. "Hizbul Mujahideen" ("Party of holy warriors") was his chosen name for the new umbrella group. While his efforts were under way, Ansarul Islam, which was under pressure from the Indian security forces, had also changed its name to "Hizbul Mujahideen". The two organisations operated in parallel for a few weeks, but merged in October 1989. Muhammad Ahsan Dar was chosen as the leader of the united group in this meeting, but Hilal Ahmed Mir (alias Nasirul Islam) of the former Ansarul Islam is said to have been elected as its amir later.

Jamaat takeover

The launch of insurgency by JKLF in July 1988 alerted the members of the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir to the fact that "a new game has started". Informal relationships with the militant groups were strengthened, with various Jamaat members taking direct roles. The senior leadership of the Jamaat did not get involved, except for Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who worked with Muhammad Ahsan Dar in his personal capacity.

The ISI and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Azad Kashmir were intent on bringing Hizbul Mujahideen under the control of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir. A meeting was arranged in Kathmandu on 14 January 1990, with participants from the Jamaat organisations from Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and the Kashmir Valley. The Kashmiri Jamaat was resistant to direct involvement in the insurgency, saying that it would destroy the organisation and open it to Indian assault. But Syed Ali Shah Geelani dramatically appeared when the negotiations stalled and pushed the Jamaat into supporting the insurgency. Having decided to participate in the militancy, states Arif Jamal, the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir moved to "decisive action, activating a decade of planning".

The constitution of Hizbul Mujahideen was finalised on 10 June 1990, under ISI direction. It allowed Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir to nominate one of its members as the leader of the group, which, according to Arif Jamal, "virtually turned the organization into a subsidiary of Jamat-i-Islami". The Jamaat nominee was to be called the patron, who would nominate an amir, who would in turn nominate a chief commander. Jamaat appointed Mohammad Yusuf Shah, its district chief of Srinagar, as the patron of Hizb. He took the nom de guerre of "Syed Salahuddin", and quickly consolidated total control over the organisation.

In a power play, Ahsan Dar announced at a press conference in July 1990 that Hizbul Mujahideen had formed an alliance with Jamaat. This only served to strengthen Yusuf Shah's position and a weakening of his own. Hilal Ahmed Mir, who was Deobandi by persuasion, reacted against the announcement and ended up getting marginalised as well. He quit the group and set up a new one, which came to be called Jamiatul Mujahideen. Masood Sarfraz came again in September 1990 to consolidate the grouping. Tehreek-i-Jihad-i-Islami, another umbrella group formed in 1989, also merged with Hizbul Mujahideen and its leader Abdul Majeed Dar was appointed as the secretary general. After the completion of consolidation, Yusuf Shah alias Salahuddin left for Azad Kashmir, where he managed the group's relationship with the ISI as well as the Jamaat of Azad Kashmir.

By the time of its establishment, the organisation asserted a strength of over 10,000 armed cadres, the majority of whom were trained in Pakistan, with some having received training in Afghanistan during the Afghan Civil War. Heavily critical of all other actors who accepted or advocated for Kashmir's complete independence as the third option (as an alternative to merging with either India or Pakistan) in the Kashmir conflict, the group solely advocated for an outright integration of Kashmir with Pakistan. Paul Staniland, an American political scientist at the University of Chicago, notes that the organisation primarily mobilised through the Jamaat-e-Islami network, and initially represented a minority politico-religious ideology of theirs.

Early days

The organisation's first major strike is deemed to be the assassination of Maulvi Farooq Shah, the then Mirwaiz of Kashmir and chairman of the All Jammu and Kashmir Awami Action Committee, a coalition of disparate political parties in Jammu and Kashmir, on 21 May 1990. 21 people were killed in the clashes that ensued. The group gradually sought for a greater control of the socio-economic sphere of Kashmir and in June 1990 asked farmers to abstain from exporting their produce through "Hindu middlemen" in order to severe the link between the "local rich class" and their counterparts in the Indian state.

On 27 October 1990, the organisation adopted a resolution supporting the merger of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan.

The group grew and units were set up at the Jammu province by February 1991. Field intelligence units were also set up across different places. Cadre was extensively mobilised in the name of Islam The establishment of the Supreme Advisory Council followed by a student wing took place in spring 1991. The latter though became a separate organisation in its entirety, in June 1991, under the leadership of Nasir-ul-Islam, after it organised the kidnapping of a high-profile bureaucrat. After a 1991 merger with Tehreek-e-Jihad-e-Islami (TJI), which was backed by Jamaat, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen gained significant military might and its strength reached about 10,000 fighters.

By the end of March 1991, Hizbul Mujahideen demanded that the local government provides the list of all permanent residence certificates and that all non-residents leave the state within one month.

Insurgency decade

Friction with JKLF and alliance with Jamaat

The first three years of the insurgency (1990–92) were dominated by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Despite being supported by Pakistan, they under the renewed ideology of their new leaders shifted to a secular pro-independence stance and attracted huge support in the valley in their strategy to organise a mass-resistance, that would compel India to withdraw from Kashmir.

But, a lack of a social fabric among the new mass-recruits, (who often did not share a common ideology) coupled with an urban-centric focus led to the gradual weakening of JKLF. Indian counter-insurgency operations removed much of its leadership, wiping out its central control. Pakistan was also heavily incentivised by the popularisation of Jihadi sentiments in the Kashmiri youth; and utilised the situation to gain control over Kashmir. By 1991, ISI had begun to cease providing of funds to JKLF, (which stood its ground for independence of the territory) and were instead advocating splinter factions to break off and form their own militant groups after receiving due training in their territory. Subsequently, Hizbul Mujahideen came to be favoured by the ISI as a potentially valuable resource and finally, after JKLF rejected certain demands of nuancing their pro-independence stance; all of their erstwhile camps in Azad Kashmir were handed over to Hizbul Mujahideen. Jamaat also scoped the opportunity and choose to infiltrate Hizbul Mujahideen from within, by installing loyal members at key central positions. Numerous jihadi factions too departed from JKLF and were subsumed within Hizbul Mujahideen.

Soon enough, arrests by Indian forces necessitated a re-organisation of the central command and in the reshuffle, Ahsan Dhar, a moderate leader with an independent mind was asked to step down and Syed Salahuddin, a radical Jamaat loyalist, was appointed instead. Dar was soon expelled by Salahuddin loyalists in late 1991 and formed a splinter group-- "Muslim Mujahideen", which quickly fell apart after his arrest in 1993. An overall restructuring to enable a collective, hierarchical and institutionalised leadership along the lines of Jamaat soon followed which lend a much-needed organisational strength that lacked JKLF. Hizbul Mujahideen also managed to increase their penetration into the rural belt courtesy the utilisation of Jamaat's socio-religious authority and homogeneity. An implementation of Sunni culture in the ground-roots helped their cause further.

In the meanwhile, Hizb-ul Mujahideen rigidly opposed JKLF, all throughout and had rejected JKLF's nationalist agenda in favour of an Islamist one. There were increasing clashes with one another and the differences reached their peak by 1991, as it publicly opposed JKLF's agreement to a solution of the dispute without the aid of UN resolutions. Military clashes between JKLF and Hizbul Mujahideen became increasingly commonplace after the first such incident in April 1991 wherein a JKLF area commander was killed. It began to systematically target members of JKLF, killing them and intimidating others to defect. JKLF leaders had alleged Hizbul Mujahideen militants to be informers for the Indian forces and Amanullah Khan even complained of his cadres in Pakistan being coerced to join the ranks of Hizbul Mujahideen. Fuelled by resources from Pakistan State actors and Pakistan Jamaat; Hizbul Mujahideen also targeted other militant groups, killing hundreds while neutralising and disarming more than 7,000.

Hizbul Mujahideen also murdered several of the pro-independence intelligentsia with JKLF leanings. Some of these killings included Hriday Nath Wanchoo, a Kashmiri Pandit human rights advocate. Hizbul Mujahideen militant Ashiq Hussain Faktoo was convicted for his killing. Other prominent killings included Dr. Abdul Ahad Guru who was a cardiologist and JKLF ideologue, Mirwaiz Qazi Nisar and Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq, Mohammed Maqbool Malik, Prof. Abdul Ahad Wani, Muhammad Sultan Bhat, Abdul Ghani Lone, and Abdul Majeed Dar.

Hizbul Mujahideen was instrumental in preventing the return of Kashmiri Pandits after their ethnic cleansing from the valley, Salahuddin spoke of them being Hindu agents whilst threatening to auction their properties. Many of operations of the outfit during 1994-95 were designed to polarise the masses along religious lines.

Zenith

By 1994, many JKLF members had denounced militancy and some even joined state politics, which led to further splintering amongst JKLF and a complete yield of its military dominance to Hizbul Mujahideen which grew up to be the major force in Kashmir despite facing a much widespread and effective counter insurgency response from the Indian forces. This survival has been attributed to its widespread penetration across rural networks. By 1996, the arm-bearing factions of JKLF were entirely crushed and with other local insurgent factions having either disbanded or becoming defunct or having switched loyalties to the Indian cause; Hizbul Mujahideen was the sole militant group operating in the valley.

Analysts and academics though believe that Hizbul Mujahideen lacked popular support in the valley and that their aversion to pro-independence ideas and Sufi practices alienated many Kashmiris.

Retreat

But roughly beginning the same time, Hizbul Mujahideen actually started to lose their popular influence in the valley. People from the fellow militant groups often aligned with the counter insurgency operations to avenge the Hizbul Mujahideen or protect themselves from the organisation, killing many Hizbul commanders in the process. They also imparted ground intelligence to the Indian forces; thus systematically degrading Hizbul Mujahideen's own networks. A simultaneous targeting of Jamaat's militants led to their revoking theirs open support for organisation, which destroyed the social fabric of Hizbul Mujahideen to a large extent. By the end of the 1990s; Hizbul Mujahideen was forced to go for a retreat. The Al-Badr faction split in 1998 due to a dislike of excessive interference by Jamaat.

Ceasefire of 2000 and withdrawal

In the following years, the group started to fragment as ISI pushed foreign extremists into Hizbul Mujahideen. Rivalries developed often leading to violence, and one such incident culminated in the killing of 21 people in a Pakistan administered Kashmir village in 1998. Several Hizbul Mujahideen members were increasingly displeased with ISI's manners of treating the Kashmiris and with more militants joining mainstream politics, they were pushed to the sidelines.

Starting April 2000, there were alleged parleys between Abdul Majid Dar, the Kashmir commander and other top leaders of Hizbul Mujahideen with Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Intelligence Bureau (IB) officials in Delhi and other venues; that led to the build-up of a ceasefire offer. Offensive counter-insurgency operations against the group were also reduced. On 24 July 2000, Dar, along with four other Hizb commander (some Hizb commanders didn't agree with Dar) made an unconditional ceasefire declaration for a span of 3 months, from the outskirts of Srinagar and asserted it to be backed by the consent of the local populace, who were surveyed. Majeed Dar had also apparently visited Pakistan before the announcement for consultations with the Hizbul Mujahideen Central Command. The ceasefire was welcomed and approved in India, near unanimously and was immediately ratified by the Pakistan-based commander Syed Salahuddin who until then was against any diplomatic resolution. The Pakistani government soon enough ordered its forward posts on the LOC, to abide by a no-shoot first policy.

A unit-commander from Pakistan-administered Kashmir in the Pir-Panjal area disagreed with the ceasefire and was expelled along with his faction; leading to a violent clash with the Pakistan Jamaat.

On the next day, United Jihad Council (UJC), a coalition of 16 radical Islamist organisations (that comprised Hizbul Mujahideen and was incidentally chaired by Salahuddin himself), severely criticised the ceasefire declaration. Hizbul Mujahideen was soon revoked of its council membership and Salahuddin lost his chair. Jamaat leaders too vociferously criticised the ceasefire declaration and alleged it to be an act of sabotage. LeT launched multiple attacks killing and injuring numerous civilians as a form of protest against the ceasefire declaration with an aim to derail it.

Two rounds of talks were smoothly held and a cricket match was played out between Indian armed forces and Hizbul Mujahideen. The Indian government did not agree to indulge with Pakistan and whilst Pakistani government initially maintained a neutral posture of abiding by the wishes of the Kashmiri populace, it later changed its stance and demanded a representation. Salahuddin then called off the talks on 8 August under flimsy pretexts; interpreting an address of Vajpayee to the Parliament as calling for a strict abidance of the Indian delegation to the Indian constitution. He also re-warned of more escalation and threatened to spill their activities over the rest of India; incidentally Hizbul Mujahideen's earlier stance was to wage war against the Indian occupation but not against India. The US State Department as well as the British Foreign Office blamed Hizbul Mujahideen for the failure of the process.

The ceasefire move, its immediate endorsement and subsequent withdrawal highlighted deep divisions between the more hawkish operatives in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and those based in India. Dar was soon removed from his role of military commander and in May 2002, he was formally expelled from the Hizb along with a number of supporters and commanders whilst being.denounced as an agent of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Dar and several other ex-leaders were assassinated by Hizbul Mujahideen between 2001 and 2003. By 2003, most key leaders of Hizbul Mujahideen were in Azad Kashmir and they were quite inactive in Kashmir; a fragmented Hizbul Mujahideen survived a total collapse but had metamorphosed into a vanguard group.

Yet, in 2004 it was still "regarded as one of the most influential groups involved in the conflict over Kashmir." As of 2009, it was supposedly "the brand name of the Kashmir militancy because of being the largest and the most important in terms of its effectiveness in perpetrating violence across Kashmir."

Decline

Since mid-2010s, the organization has suffered multiple losses, and by 2023 it has become skeletal of its former self.

The downfall of the organization started with the killing of one of its most powerful commanders - Burhan Wani.

On 8 July 2016, he along with two other militants were killed by Indian security forces. Widespread protests erupted in the Kashmir valley after Wani's death, causing unrest in the valley for nearly half a year. More than 96 people died while over 15,000 civilians and more than 4,000 security personnel were injured. The violence which erupted after his death was described as the worst unrest in the region since the 2010 Kashmir unrest, with Kashmir being placed under 53 consecutive days of curfews imposed by authorities.

After his encounter in 2016, the group suffered severe losses with more than 200 of its fighters killed within the span of next 6 years.

Wani was succeeded by Sabzar Bhat, a close aide of his and member of group within the organization named Wani's boys Indian security forces considered Bhat effective at using social media to recruit youth towards militancy.

Sabzar was a close aide of Burhan and member of a group within the hizbul Mujahideen, dubbed Wani's boys. It was a 11-member group, which had become famous when there photograph become viral in June 2015 as they posed boldly without masks in front of the camera and posted pictures online, in contrast to earlier times when they remained hidden and did not reveal much. The photo had become hugely popular among youth.

Bhat was killed in May 2017. His death sparked clashes and a police-imposed curfew, during which a youth was killed in clashes with the Central Reserve Police Force. Internet and phone service across Kashmir was suspended in an attempt to calm the region. A previously unknown militant group, Mujahideen Taliban-e-Kashmir, claimed it had provided information on Bhat to security forces. The claim remains unverified, though some analysts suggested it reflected a growing schism between various militant groups in Kashmir, with members of Hizbul Mujahideen concerned that Zakir Musa may have betrayed Bhat.

Within the next 3 years, this entire group was wiped in multiple operations by Indian security forces.

Next major commander of the organization to be killed was Riyaz Naikoo, who was chief operations commander. He was killed on 6 May 2020. He was organization's longest serving field commander.

On 10 May 2020, Gazi Haider (aka Saifullah and Saif-ul-Islam Mir) was appointed the new chief operations commander. He was formerly the district commander of Hizbul Mujahideen in Pulwama.

Soon after, on 19 May 2020, Ashraf Sehrai's son, Junaid Sehrai, a commander in the organization, was killed by Indian security forces.

On 1 November 2020, Ghazi Haider was killed in an operation, in Srinagar by Indian security forces, thus wiping out all the major and important commanders of hizbul Mujahideen. After his death, the organization has been mount any attack and has fell into redundancy.

On 20 February 2023, one of the founder of Hizbul Mujahideen and 2nd-in-command of the organization, after Syed Salahuddin, Bashir Ahmad Peer was shotdead outside a shop in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, by two bike-borne assailants. He had also been designated as a terrorist by India in October, 2022.

See also

• Syed Ali Shah Geelani
• Kashmir conflict
• Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir
• Lashkar-e-Taiba
• U.S. Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Explanatory notes

1. TRF And ULF active in Jammu and Kashmir Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen leaders form the core of the TRF in Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and ULF is Group of Al Badr but also working with TRF against India
2. Throughout this article, "Kashmir" refers to the Kashmir Valley.
3. It is generally supposed that the Jamaat-e-Islami in Azad Kashmir is a wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan. However Arif Jamal states that it is an independent organisation founded in 1974. (Jamal, Shadow War 2009, p. 108)
4. Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's secret service.
5. "Arif Jamal, a former contributing writer to the New York Times, is a visiting fellow at the Centre on International Cooperation at New York University. A leading Pakistani journalist, he has worked for the Muslim, the News, and the Pakistan Times, as well as for international media including Radio France International and the CBC." (Jamal, Shadow War 2009, back cover)
6. Arif Jamal describes Masood Sarfraz as a "clandestine militant" initially associated with Hizbul Ansar. According to Imtiaz Gul, he was called the "Lion of Peer Panjal", who "managed the wing in Azad Kashmir before creating in 2000 after he fell out with the of Azad Kashmir".
7. The name was derived from that of the Hizb-e Islami party of Afghanistan, which operated under the leadership of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and with which Sarfraz had been previously involved.
8. The precise sequence of the appointment of the two leaders and their relative positions is unclear, but the frictions between them came into open in June 1990.

Citations

1. "Who is Syed Salahuddin, and why is he designated as a 'global terrorist'?". The Hindu. 27 June 2017. Archived from the original on 9 June 2020. Retrieved 27 May 2020.
2. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 281, note 40: "Interestingly, Jamat-i-Islami considers September 1989, the day the Hizbul Mujahideen was founded, as the beginning of the insurgency."
3. Zee Media Bureau (15 May 2017). "With Call For 'Islamic Rule', Zakir Musa May Have Signalled Ideological Split in Kashmir Terrorism". The Wire (Indian web publication). Archived from the original on 17 September 2017. Retrieved 14 April 2023.
4. Gupta, Shishir (8 May 2020). "Pak launches terror's new face in Kashmir, Imran Khan follows up on Twitter". Hindustan Times. Archived from the original on 5 November 2021. Retrieved 11 May 2020.
5. "'Pakistan trying to securalise Kashmir militancy': Lashkar regroups in Valley as The Resistance Front". The Indian Express. 5 May 2020. Archived from the original on 6 April 2023. Retrieved 11 May 2020.
6. Gupta, Shishir (8 May 2020). "New J&K terror outfit run by LeT brass: Intel". Hindustan Times. Archived from the original on 14 December 2023. Retrieved 11 May 2020.
7. Pubby, Manu; Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy (29 April 2020). "The Resistance Front: New name of terror groups in Kashmir". The Economic Times. Archived from the original on 5 April 2023. Retrieved 11 May 2020.
8. "Security Forces Have Eliminated Over 100 Militants in Jammu and Kashmir This Year, Say Officials". CNN News18. 8 June 2020. Archived from the original on 8 June 2020. Retrieved 8 June 2020.
9. "DeM cadres lead women congregations across Kashmir". Greater Kashmir. 3 August 2016. Archived from the original on 24 December 2018. Retrieved 9 August 2016.
10. Gul, Khalid (5 August 2016). "Pro-freedom rallies in Pampore, Bijbehara". Greater Kashmir. Archived from the original on 8 August 2016. Retrieved 9 August 2016.
11. Jaffrelot, Christophe (2002). Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation. Zed Books. p. 180. ISBN 9781842771174.
12. ^ *Staniland, Organizing Insurgency (2012), "The Hizb, by contrast, represented a less popular Islamist ideology and did not embrace a mass mobilization strategy."
    • Garner, Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution (2013), p. 423: "When many of the other jihadi groups began to leave the umbrella of JKLF, they consolidated under Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. With political leadership wrapping itself in the mantle of Islam, and Islamist groups gaining power and influence, the Kashmiri conflict became yet another ripe opportunity for foreign jihadists."
    • Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants (2013), pp. 264–265: "HM has long-standing ties with the Pakistani Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami."
13. • Staniland, Insurgent Fratricide (2012), p. 27: "As the JKLF slipped from armed prominence in 1992 and 1993, the arena of combat shifted to pro-Pakistan, Islamist organizations. The most powerful of these was the Hizbul Mujahideen, which combined Pakistani aid with the support of the Jamaat-e-Islami political party."
    • Gunaratna & Yee Kam, Handbook of Terrorism (2016), p. 271: "The Hizbul Mujahideen is an Islamist separatist group that is bent on liberating the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The group wants Kashmir to be independent and integrated with Pakistan."
    • Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants (2013), p. 265: "HM has historically called for the unification of Kashmir under Pakistani control, but it takes a somewhat subtler line in its public communications."
14. Pakistan Archived 19 March 2023 at the Wayback Machine. Mapping Militants. Stanford University.
15. Kiessling, The ISI of Pakistan (2016), p. 193.
16. *Staniland, Insurgent Fratricide (2012), p. 27: "As the JKLF slipped from armed prominence in 1992 and 1993, the arena of combat shifted to pro-Pakistan, Islamist organizations. The most powerful of these was the Hizbul Mujahideen, which combined Pakistani aid with the support of the Jamaat-e-Islami political party."
    • Gunaratna & Yee Kam, Handbook of Terrorism (2016), p. 271: "The Hizbul Mujahideen is an Islamist separatist group that is bent on liberating the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The group wants Kashmir to be independent and integrated back with Pakistan."
    • Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants (2013), p. 265: "HM has historically called for the unification of Kashmir under Pakistani control, but it takes a somewhat subtler line in its public communications."
17. "Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Hizbul Mujahideen". United States Department of State. 2019. Archived from the original on 13 April 2022. Retrieved 27 March 2022.
18. *Garner, Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution (2013), p. 423: "The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), active since the mid-1980s, and its parent political party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, were the two most important players in the evolution from nationalism to jihad."
    • Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants (2013), pp. 264–265: "Some analysts believe that JI founded HM on behalf of the ISI while others contend that JI did so on its own initiative but with the assistance of the ISI."
    • Staniland, Insurgent Fratricide (2012), p. 27: "The most powerful of these was the Hizbul Mujahideen, which combined Pakistani aid with the support of the Jamaat-e-Islami political party."
    • Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), pp. 76–77: "While its rise to dominance occurred after 1990, its mobilization during 1989–1991 through the networks of the Jamaat-e-Islami laid the basis for an integrated organization that persisted..."
    • Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 281, note 40: "Interestingly, Jamat-i-Islami considers September 1989, the day the Hizbul Mujahideen was founded, as the beginning of the insurgency."
19. ^ Behera, Navnita Chadha (2007). Demystifying Kashmir. Pearson Education India. p. 154. ISBN 9788131708460. Archived from the original on 17 January 2023. Retrieved 16 August 2019.
20. ^ Kiessling, The ISI of Pakistan (2016), p. 180
21. ^ Sirrs, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (2016), p. 177
22. Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants (2013), p. 265; Gunaratna & Yee Kam, Handbook of Terrorism (2016), p. 271
23. Sareen, The Jihad Factory (2005), p 141: "Dar's followers have been trying to seize HM offices in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi and Islamabad."
24. ^ Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 80.
25. A sample:
    • "Hizbul Mujahideen takes responsibility for attack on CRPF camp". NDTV.com. Archived from the original on 10 June 2020. Retrieved 10 June 2020.
    • US Department of State. "Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Hizbul Mujahideen". Refworld. Archived from the original on 12 February 2020. Retrieved 10 June 2020.
    • US Department of State. "Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 - India". Refworld. Archived from the original on 12 June 2020. Retrieved 12 June 2020.
26. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion (1999).
27. "Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430 of 21 December 2015". Official Journal of the European Union. 22 December 2015. Archived from the original on 10 January 2019. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
28. "Banned Organisations". Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. 29 January 2013. Archived from the original on 29 January 2013.
29. "Canada labels the Proud Boys, other neo-Nazi groups as terrorists". CBC. Archived from the original on 21 December 2022. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
30. "US adds 4 Indian outfits to terror list". Rediff News. 30 April 2004. Archived from the original on 25 December 2018. Retrieved 13 May 2015.

    See also

    • "Appendix A: Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents, 2002", Patterns of Global Terrorism, US Department of State, 30 April 2003, archived from the original on 21 August 2019, retrieved 23 May 2019
    • "Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups", Patterns of Global Terrorism, US Department of State, 30 April 2003, archived from the original on 21 August 2019, retrieved 23 May 2019
    • "Appendix C – Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups", Patterns of Global Terrorism, 29 April 2004, archived from the original on 21 August 2019, retrieved 23 May 2019
    • Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups (PDF), US Department of State, archived (PDF) from the original on 21 August 2019, retrieved 23 May 2019
31. Kiessling, The ISI of Pakistan (2016), p. 183.
32. Sirrs, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (2016), p. 157; Riedel, Deadly Embrace (2012), p. 26; Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 109
33. Riedel, Deadly Embrace (2012), p. 26: "Zia promised that he would use the war against the Soviet invaders to help build a support base for a Kashmiri insurgency. In other words, the Afghan war would also train cadres for another jihad, this time against India. Zia also promised that some of the American assistance earmarked for the Afghan jihad would be diverted to the Kashmiri project and that the ISI would help with both."
34. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 109: "According to Bari, the general stated his intentions plainly: he had decided to contribute to the American-sponsored war in Afghanistan in order to prepare the ground for a larger conflict in Kashmir, and he wanted to involve the Jamat-i-Islami of AJK. To the general, the war in Afghanistan would be a smokescreen behind which Pakistan could carefully prepare a more significant battle in Kashmir."
35. Sirrs, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (2016), p. 157: "This prompted Zia to host their leaders in May 1983 and push the negotiations forward. During these talks, the JI for Indian Kashmir (JIK) wanted to impose certain conditions on the proposed partnership, including minimizing ISI's role to that of training, weapons and money. The Kashmiris did not want ISI to exercise any operational control over any planned operations."
36. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), pp.113–115: (p. 113) "The strategy was jihad—a holy war waged against Indian oppression, a campaign for "freedom". Members of Jamat were to return to IJK and begin the recruitment of young Kashmiris—who would, the plan went, be sent at first opportunity for military training." (p. 114) "In exchange for his support, Din wanted to drastically limit the role of the Pakistani army in the conflict. In his mind, the army should provide only military training and financial support. Everything else must be left to Jamat." (p. 115) "Zia and ISI were willing to agree to a limited role, but they wanted a firm commitment that Jamat-i-Islami would send its units for training."
37. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 115.
38. Riedel, Deadly Embrace (2012), pp. 26, 39
39. Sirrs, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (2016), pp. 157–158: (p. 157) "Some in Islamabad hoped that an ISI–JKLF cooperative relationship would force the JIK to seek a similar arrangement."
40. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 129.
41. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), pp. 138–139.
42. Imtiaz Gul, Friday Times, 18–24 July 2003, quoted in Sareen, The Jihad Factory (2005), pp. 140–141.
43. ^ Jamal, Shadow War (2009), pp. 140–141.
44. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 137.
45. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), pp. 137–138: "Key Jamat-i-Islami members including Habib Ullah in Kupwara, Wali Mohammad Shah in Baramula, Riaz Rasool in Budgam, Mir Asad Ullah in Pulwama, and Abdur Rashid Islah in Doda started working with smaller jihadi cells."
46. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), pp. 141–142: "Among top leaders of the organization in 1989, only Syed Ali Shah Geelani was willing to publicly support armed jihad."
47. Biberman, Gambling with Violence (2019), p. 82: "Dar tried to pursue a partnership with Jamaat, but he was told that Jamaat could not support the militancy because its constitution barred it from carrying out underground activities. Geelani was with Dar, but not as Jamaat."
48. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), pp. 141–142.
49. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 142.
50. Anand K. Sathay, Fai goes back a long way with Jamaat in Kashmir Archived 28 October 2023 at the Wayback Machine, Asian Age, 24 July 2011.
51. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 143: "Geelani appeared suddenly, made an impassioned speech and, according to accounts of the meeting, succeeded in pushing the group toward openly supporting the jihad."
52. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 143.
53. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 143.
54. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 144: "Salahuddin acted ruthlessly in taking the reins of Hizbul Mujahideen. Though he initially kept Ahsan Dar on as chief commander, he soon decided to consolidate Jamat-i-Islami control over the new organization and demote him."
55. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 77: "The Jamaat took over the Hizbul Mujahideen from within by placing loyal personnel in key positions, rapidly expanding the already Jamaat-heavy social composition of its organizers."
56. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), pp. 144–145.
57. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), pp. 145–146.
58. Jamal, Shadow War (2009), p. 146.
59. ^ Menon, Jaideep E.; Komerath, Narayanan M. (9 January 2009). "The Hizbul-Mujahideen Ceasefire Who Aborted It? BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR: Volume 3(2); September – October 2000". Archived from the original on 9 January 2009. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
60. ^ "The birth of the Hizbul Mujahideen". Rediff. Archived from the original on 3 September 2020. Retrieved 20 March 2019.
61. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 67–68, 77.
62. "Strategic Kashmir is divided by conflicting loyalties". Christian Science Monitor. 10 June 1983. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017.
63. Mahapatra, Dhananjay (22 July 2010). "SC upholds life sentence for killer of Mirwaiz's father". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 11 November 2019.
64. Masoodi, Amin (18 January 2009). "Mohammad Ahsan Dar's Arrest: End of the Road for Hizbul?". Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies. Archived from the original on 19 March 2015.
65. ^ Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 85.
66. ^ Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 74.
67. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), pp. 74–75.
68. Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (2003), p. 128.
69. ^ Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (2003), p. 126.
70. ^ Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 77.
71. ^ Garner, Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution (2013)
72. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), pp. 67–68.
73. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), pp. 78–79, 85.
74. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), pp. 67–68, 78–79.
75. ^ Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (2003).
76. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 80, 83.
77. Schofield, Victoria (2010). Kashmir in conflict India, Pakistan and the unending war. I.B. Tauris. p. 157. ISBN 9780857713988. OCLC 929274072.
78. Dixon, Jeffrey S.; Sarkees, Meredith Reid (2015). A Guide to Intra-state Wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014. CQ Press. pp. 571–572. ISBN 9781506317984.
79. ^ Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (2003), pp. 3–4, 128–132.
80. Peerzada Ashiq (6 February 2016). "J&K separatist leader completes 23 years in jail". The Hindu. Archived from the original on 5 February 2016. Retrieved 10 October 2017.
81. Santhanam, Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir (2003), p. 128.
82. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 81.
83. Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 83.
84. Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (2003), pp. 133, 136.
85. ^ Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), pp. 85–86.
86. ^ Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 88.
87. "Hizb expels three top commanders". 5 May 2002. Archived from the original on 20 July 2015. Retrieved 17 July 2015.
88. ^ Bhatnagar, Gaurav (2009). "The Islamicization of Politics: Motivations for Violence in Kashmir". 20 (1): 1–20. doi:10.7916/D8WQ01S2. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
89. Swami, Praveen (25 May 2002). "The Hizbul meltdown". Frontline. Archived from the original on 11 January 2016. Retrieved 6 May 2015.
90. "Dar & Co are RAW agents: Hizbul hawks". Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 17 July 2015.
91. ^ Staniland, Networks of Rebellion (2014), p. 89.
92. "Abdul Majid Dar shot dead". Archived from the original on 20 July 2015. Retrieved 17 July 2015.
93. Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad (2007), p. 202.
94. ^ "Burhan Wani's Viral Group Photo Had 11 Militants. The Last of Them Was Killed Today". News18. 3 May 2023. Archived from the original on 25 February 2023. Retrieved 25 February 2023.
95. "Decline of Hizbul Mujahideen: Slain cadres, busted modules, arrested members take toll on once feared group in Kashmir". 8 February 2023. Archived from the original on 25 February 2023. Retrieved 25 February 2023.
96. "Who was Burhan Wani and why is Kashmir mourning him?". Huffington Post. Archived from the original on 14 July 2016. Retrieved 15 July 2016.
97. "Doctors stage protest in J-K against civilian deaths in Kashmir unrest". The Indian Express. Archived from the original on 21 March 2019. Retrieved 17 August 2016. Kashmir Valley is on the boil since July 9, a day after Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani was killed in an encounter with security forces in Anantnag district of south Kashmir. The widespread protests claimed the lives of 55 people and left over 6000 injured, with hundreds hit by pellets in their eyes as a result of which, doctors say, a number of youths have lost their eye sight.
98. "2016 Unrest: Not even one probe into killings completed". Greater Kashmir. 6 December 2016. Archived from the original on 21 March 2019. Retrieved 27 January 2017.
99. "Day 85 Toll 92: Hit by pellets on Sep 15, Budgam youth succumbs at SKIMS". Greater Kashmir. 1 October 2016. Archived from the original on 21 March 2019. Retrieved 27 January 2017.
100. "Indian troops kill three suspected separatists in Kashmir". The Nation. Agence France-Presse. 24 January 2017. Archived from the original on 4 August 2017. Retrieved 27 January 2017.
101. Yasir, Sameer (2 January 2017). "Kashmir unrest: What was the real death toll in the state in 2016?". Firstpost. Archived from the original on 2 February 2017. Retrieved 27 January 2017.
102. "Kashmir Is Paralyzed by an 'Adored' Band of Militants". The New York Times. 14 November 2016. Archived from the original on 7 August 2019. Retrieved 4 January 2017.
103. Akmali, Mukeet (23 January 2017). "After 15000 injuries, Govt to train forces in pellet guns". Greater Kashmir. Archived from the original on 26 January 2017. Retrieved 27 January 2017.
104. "Pakistan fomenting trouble, but Modi will solve Kashmir issue: Mehbooba Mufti". The Times of India. 29 August 2016. Archived from the original on 24 March 2019. Retrieved 30 August 2016.
105. "India's Modi lashes out at Pakistan, Pakistan hits back". Reuters. 15 August 2016. Archived from the original on 21 March 2019. Retrieved 17 August 2016. Modi met national party leaders on Friday to seek ways to end the worst unrest in Kashmir since 2010.
106. "Five civilians killed, 31 injured in fresh firing in Kashmir; toll reaches 65". Hindustan Times. 17 August 2016. Archived from the original on 21 March 2019. Retrieved 17 August 2016. The worst violence since 2010 — when the Valley was rocked by similar protests leaving scores dead and injured — has sparked a verbal spat between India and Pakistan, both blaming each other for the flare-up.
107. "Curfew lifted from Valley, one killed in clash in Sopore". Press Trust of India. 31 August 2016. Archived from the original on 21 March 2019. Retrieved 31 August 2016.
108. Peerzada Ashiq (31 August 2016). "One killed, 100 injured in Valley". The Hindu. Archived from the original on 31 August 2016. Retrieved 31 August 2016.
109. "Curfew lifted from entire Kashmir valley, says Div Com". Greater Kashmir. 31 August 2016. Archived from the original on 21 March 2019. Retrieved 31 August 2016.
110. "Decline of Hizbul Mujahideen: Slain cadres, busted modules, arrested members take toll on once feared group in Kashmir". Firstpost. 8 February 2023. Archived from the original on 25 February 2023. Retrieved 25 February 2023.
111. Parvaiz, Athr (30 May 2017). "Since July 2016, Kashmir's schools and colleges stayed shut on 60% of working days". Hindustan Times. Archived from the original on 2 June 2017. Retrieved 3 June 2017. The killing of Wani's successor, Sabzar Bhat, on May 27, 2017, threatens to further stoke the fire raging since the April 9, 2017 by-elections for a parliamentary seat. On May 27, 2017, separatists announced three days of strike and protests to mourn Bhat's death while the police imposed curfew to prevent people from gathering. Yet, clashes took place between protesters and personnel of the state police and the Central Reserve Police Force resulting in the killing of a youth and injuries to 70 others.
112. Yasir, Sameer (29 May 2017). "Hizbul Mujahideen commander Sabzar Bhat killed: How security forces pulled off encounter in Tral". Archived from the original on 3 June 2017. The security forces pointed out that 26-year-old Ahmad, a resident of Ruthsana village in Tral, was the brain behind utilising social media as a tool to attract young boys towards militancy. He was marked as an 'A-category' militant.
113. Nanjappa, Vicky (30 May 2017). "Sabzar Bhat, the terrorist who shot more selfies than bullets". OneIndia. Archived from the original on 30 May 2017. Retrieved 3 June 2017. Intelligence Bureau officials tell OneIndia that like Wani, this person too was a social media tiger. The youth of Kashmir unnecessarily get carried away by such people who make a pomp and show on the social media. This is just a strategy on their part to attract the youth into their fold, the official also added.
114. "Burhan Wani's Viral Group Photo Had 11 Militants. The Last of Them Was Killed Today". News18. 3 May 2019. Archived from the original on 25 February 2023.
115. Rashid, Toufiq (28 May 2017). "Burhan Wani's father attends funeral of Hizbul militant Sabzar Bhat". Hindustan Times. Archived from the original on 31 May 2017. Retrieved 5 June 2017. Hizbul Mujahideen militant Sabzar Ahmad Bhat was buried in his village in Pulwama on Sunday morning, a day after the 27-year-old was killed in a gun fight with security forces in south Kashmir.
116. Parvaiz, Athr (30 May 2017). "Since July 2016, Kashmir's schools and colleges stayed shut on 60% of working days". Hindustan Times. Archived from the original on 2 June 2017. Retrieved 3 June 2017. The killing of Wani's successor, Sabzar Bhat, on May 27, 2017, threatens to further stoke the fire raging since the April 9, 2017 by-elections for a parliamentary seat. On May 27, 2017, separatists announced three days of strike and protests to mourn Bhat's death while the police imposed curfew to prevent people from gathering. Yet, clashes took place between protesters and personnel of the state police and the Central Reserve Police Force resulting in the killing of a youth and injuries to 70 others.
117. Masoodi, Nazir (1 June 2017). "CCTV Footage Helps Police Hunt Down Terrorists In Kashmir's Sopore, 2 Killed". NDTV. Archived from the original on 3 June 2017. Retrieved 3 June 2017. Internet services were suspended across Kashmir after Sabzar Ahmad Bhat, who has succeeded Burhan Wani, was killed in south Kashmir's Tral on Saturday.
118. "Not Even 24 Hours After It Was Restored, Mobile Internet Services In Kashmir Valley Snapped Again". The Huffington Post. 27 May 2017. Archived from the original on 30 May 2017. Retrieved 3 June 2017. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir snapped the mobile internet( 2G, 3G and 4G) services in Kashmir fearing law and order problems, especially after the killing of top Hizbul Mujahedeen commander Sabzar Bhat in Tral encounter on Saturday. It has not even been 24 hours since the social media sites and applications including Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter were restored in Kashmir Valley.
119. Rashid, Toufiq (1 June 2017). "J-K: Unknown militant group claims to have killed Hizb commander Sabzar Bhat". Hindustan Times. Archived from the original on 6 June 2017. Retrieved 5 June 2017. The group – which identified itself as Mujahideen Taliban-e-Kashmir – said they provided information on Bhat to security forces because "he was coming in the way of Kashmir's Islamic struggle". A video that surfaced on the social media on Wednesday showed an armed masked man swearing allegiance to former HM commander Zakir Musa in his quest to "turn Kashmir into an Islamic state". Another clip posted on Thursday showed three masked men telling both militants and Kashmiri citizens to follow Musa unless they wanted to face the same fate as Bhat. "We provided information on the militants in Arampora, and we will continue to do so if anybody comes in our way," one of them said. "Sabzar got what he deserved, and we don't care who becomes the new chief."
120. "Local Militant Group Claims It Informed Police About Hizb Commander Sabzar Bhat's Whereabout". Outlook. 2 June 2017. Archived from the original on 6 June 2017. Retrieved 5 June 2017. Hizbul Mujahideen commander and slain militant Burhan Wani's successor Sabzar Bhat's killing in Tral encounter has only exposed the widening schism between the militant groups in the valley.
121. Kanwal, Rahul (30 May 2017). "Was Sabzar Bhatt betrayed by boss Zakir Musa? Intel inputs suggest rift among Kashmiri terrorists". Archived from the original on 3 June 2017. Radio and mobile chatter intercepted by India's intelligence agencies reflect a high level of distrust between former Hizbul commander Zakir Musa and the terror outfit he had led till recently. In the aftermath of the encounter killing of Burhan Wani's successor Sabzar Bhatt, Indian agencies have recorded multiple conversations where Hizbul Mujahideen cadre can be heard discussing whether Zakir Musa betrayed Sabzar Bhatt. Hizbul terrorists seem to suspect that a personal messenger close to Musa tipped off the Jammu and Kashmir police about the location of Sabzar's hideout. Sabzar was killed last week in an encounter very close to his hometown of Tral.
122. Riyaz Naikoo: Hizbul Mujahideen Kashmir militant killed by Indian forces Archived 6 May 2020 at the Wayback Machine, BBC News, 6 May 2020.
123. Snehesh Alex Philip, Kashmir’s most wanted terrorist Riyaz Naikoo killed in encounter in his Pulwama village Archived 7 May 2020 at the Wayback Machine, The Print, 6 May 2020.
124. IANS (10 May 2020). "Hizbul Mujahideen appoints new terror commander in Kashmir". Outlook India. Archived from the original on 19 October 2021. Retrieved 11 May 2020.
125. "Saifullah Mir Aka Ghazi Haider Is Hizbul Mujahideen's New Face In Kashmir". Indian Defence News. 11 May 2020. Archived from the original on 2 November 2020.
126. "Junaid Sehrai, son of Hurriyat chairman, killed in Srinagar encounter". The Indian Express. 19 May 2020. Archived from the original on 20 May 2020. Retrieved 19 May 2020.
127. Scroll Staff (19 May 2020). "Jammu and Kashmir: Separatist leader's son among two Hizbul militants killed in Srinagar encounter". Scroll.in. Archived from the original on 26 May 2020. Retrieved 19 May 2020.
128. Javaid, Azaan (19 May 2020). "Junaid Sehrai — Hizbul commander killed today only militant with Hurriyat ties in last decade". ThePrint. Archived from the original on 19 May 2020. Retrieved 20 May 2020.
129. Jameel, Yusuf (1 November 2020). "Hizbul Mujahideen 'operational chief' Saif-ul-Islam Mir killed in encounter". The Deccan Chronicle. Archived from the original on 2 November 2020.
130. "Wanted In India, Top Hizbul Commander Killed In Pakistan". NDTV. 21 February 2023.

General bibliography

• Bhatnagar, Gaurav (2009), "The Islamicization of Politics: Motivations for Violence in Kashmir" (PDF), The Journal of Politics and Society, 20 (1): 13–14
• Biberman, Yelena (2019), Gambling with Violence: State Outsourcing of War in Pakistan and India, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780190929961
• Bose, Sumantra (2003). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-01173-1 – via archive.org.
• Fair, C. Christine (2013). "Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants". Journal of Strategic Studies. 37 (2): 259–290. doi:10.1080/01402390.2013.811647. ISSN 0140-2390. S2CID 154750998.
• Farman Ali, Rao (2017), History of Armed Struggles in Kashmir, Srinagar: JayKay Books, ISBN 9789383908646
• Garner, George (2013). "Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution of Nationalism to Jihad and Beyond". Terrorism and Political Violence. 25 (3): 419–434. doi:10.1080/09546553.2012.664202. ISSN 0954-6553. S2CID 143798822.
• Gunaratna, Rohan; Yee Kam, Stefanie Li, eds. (2016), Handbook of Terrorism In The Asia-Pacific, World Scientific/Imperial College Press, ISBN 9781783269976
• Jamal, Arif (2009), Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir, Melville House, ISBN 978-1-933633-59-6
• Joshi, Manoj (1999), The Lost Rebellion, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-14-027846-0
• Kiessling, Hein (2016), Faith, Unity, Discipline: The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, Hurst, ISBN 978-1-84904-863-7
• Riedel, Bruce (2012), Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad, Brookings Institution Press, ISBN 978-0-8157-2283-0
• K., Santhanam (2003). Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery. SAGE Publications. p. 128. ISBN 978-0-674-01173-1. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
• Sareen, Sushant (2005), The Jihad Factory: Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making, Har-Anand Publications, ISBN 9788124110751
• Sirrs, Owen L. (2016), Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations, Routledge, ISBN 978-1-317-19609-9
• Staniland, Paul (February 2012), "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56 (1): 16–40, doi:10.1177/0022002711429681, JSTOR 23207770, S2CID 145603781
• Staniland, Paul (2012), "Organizing Insurgency: Networks, resources, and rebellion in South Asia", International Security, 37 (1): 142–177, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00091, JSTOR 23280407, S2CID 57570350
• Staniland, Paul (2014), Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, Cornell University Press, ISBN 978-0-8014-7102-5
• Swami, Praveen (2007), India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The covert war in Kashmir, 1947-2004, Asian Security Studies, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-40459-4

External links

• Top Hizbul Commander Riyaz Naikoo killed In An Encounter Archived 8 May 2020 at the Wayback Machine
• The birth of the Hizbul Mujahideen rediff.com
• Profile: Hizbul Mujahideen GlobalSecurity.org
• Official Journal of the European Union: Terrorism list
• Congressional Report: The New Islamist International(from FAS site) Bill McCollum, United States House of Representatives, Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 1 February 1993
• BBC Reports:Militants arrested in Bombay
• ABC Live Reports: Hizbul Mujahideen claimed Blast Left 1 Killed And 22 injured In Jammu Kashmir
• ISI using c
• Cross-border trade to fund Hizbul Mujahideen: NIA

• 1989 establishments in India
• Jamaat-e-Islami
• Jihadist groups in Jammu and Kashmir
• Jihadist groups in Pakistan
• Kashmir separatist movement
• Organisations based in Azad Kashmir
• Organisations designated as terrorist by India
• Organisations designated as terrorist by the European Union
• Organizations based in Asia designated as terrorist
• Jihadist groups in India
• Organizations designated as terrorist by the United States
• Organizations designated as terrorist by Canada