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{{Short description|Military action to prevent an enemy from acquiring attack capabilities in the medium term}} | |||
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{{War}} | |||
A '''preventive war''' is an armed conflict "initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk."<ref>''Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms'' p.413 (2001, as amended 2002).</ref> The party which is being attacked has a latent threat capability or it has shown that it intends to attack in the future, based on its past actions and posturing. A preventive war aims to forestall a shift in the balance of power<ref name="S.M._Walt">Taming American Power, Stephen M. Walt, pp 224</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Levy |first=Jack S. |date=2011 |title=Preventive War: Concept and Propositions |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2011.546716 |journal=International Interactions |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=87–96 |doi=10.1080/03050629.2011.546716 |s2cid=154345645 |issn=0305-0629}}</ref> by strategically attacking before the balance of power has had a chance to shift in the favor of the targeted party. Preventive war is distinct from ], which is the first strike when an attack is imminent.<ref name=" S.M._Walt" /> Preventive uses of force "seek to stop another state . . . from developing a military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it thereafter, whereas reemptive uses of force come against a backdrop of tactical intelligence or warning indicating imminent military action by an adversary."<ref>William Safire, "Rope-a-Dope: A Lexicon of Intervention," ''N.Y. Times,'' Oct. 13, 2002, p.30, 31.</ref> | |||
==Criticism== | |||
'''Preventive war''' is ] launched in anticipation of a future loss of security or strategic advantage. Preventive war is sharply distinct from ], or anticipatory self-defense. Preventive war is only claimed to ''prevent'' a hypothetical attack which might occur in the future; for example, a war launched to prevent an adversary acquiring more powerful weapons. In ], preventive war has no recognized status as distinct from a ]. Many, if not most wars have been characterised as "preventive" in nature, often by both sides of the conflict. | |||
The majority view is that a preventive war undertaken without the approval of the ] is illegal under the modern framework of ].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-preventive-war/523833/|title=How America Shed the Taboo Against Preventive War|last=Beinart|first=Peter|date=2017-04-21|website=The Atlantic|language=en-US|access-date=2019-03-13}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|last1=Warren|first1=Aiden|title=Self-Defense in International Law: Preemptive/Preventive Requisites|date=2014|work=Governing the Use-of-Force in International Relations: The Post 9/11 US Challenge on International Law|pages=23–45|editor-last=Warren|editor-first=Aiden|series=New Security Challenges Series|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK|language=en|doi=10.1057/9781137411440_3|isbn=9781137411440|last2=Bode|first2=Ingvild|editor2-last=Bode|editor2-first=Ingvild}}</ref><ref>{{citation |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UQajT7Bqf-MC&q=un+charter&pg=PT97 |publisher = Oxford UP |editor1 = Henry Shue |editor2 = David Rodin |title=Preemption: military action and moral justification |chapter=The False Promise of Preventive War |author=Suzanne Uniacke |year=2007 |page=88|isbn = 9780199233137 }}</ref> The consensus is that preventive war "goes beyond what is acceptable in international law"<ref>{{cite book|title=International Law (6th edn)|last=Shaw|first=Malcolm|author-link=Malcolm Shaw (academic)|year=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge|isbn=978-0-521-72814-0|page=1140}}</ref> and lacks legal basis.<ref>{{cite book|title=Principles of Public International Law|last=Brownlie|first=Ian|author-link=Ian Brownlie|year=2008|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0-19-921176-0|page=734}}</ref> The UN ] stopped short of rejecting the concept outright but suggested that there is no right to preventive war. If there are good grounds for initiating preventive war, the matter should be put to the ], which can authorize such action,<ref>https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C9B1B6D819968E83C1256F5E00597208/$file/Report+of+the+High-level+Panel+on+Threats+Challenges+and+Change.pdf {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210123052413/https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C9B1B6D819968E83C1256F5E00597208/$file/Report+of+the+High-level+Panel+on+Threats+Challenges+and+Change.pdf |date=2021-01-23 }} p.54</ref> given that one of the Council's main functions under Chapter VII of the ] ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression") is to enforce the obligation of member states under Article 4, Paragraph 2 to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .<ref>{{cite web | url=https://un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text | title=United Nations Charter (Full text) }}</ref> The Charter's drafters assumed that the Council might need to employ preventive force to forestall aggression such as initiated by Nazi Germany in the 1930s.<ref>"One of the fundamental purposes of the Charter is to provide forces which will be immediately available to the Security Council to take action to prevent a breach of the peace."Senate Executive Report No. 8, "to Accompany Executive F," 79th Cong. (1945).</ref> | |||
== |
==Examples== | ||
The ] in ] routinely invaded neutral countries on grounds of prevention and began the ] in 1939 by claiming the Poles had attacked a border outpost first. In 1940, ] and argued that Britain might have used them as launching points for an attack or prevented supply of ] to Germany. In the summer of 1941, ], inaugurating the bloody and brutal land war by claiming that a ] conspiracy threatened the Reich. In late 1941, the ] was carried out to secure a supply corridor of petrol to the Soviet Union. Iranian Shah ] appealed to US President ] for help but was rebuffed on the grounds that "movements of conquest by Germany will continue and will extend beyond Europe to Asia, Africa, and even to the Americas, unless they are stopped by military force."<ref>''Sunrise at Abadan'', Stewart Richard pp 94–108</ref> | |||
{{POV check}} | |||
=== World War II === | |||
Both Axis and Allies in the Second World War invaded neutral countries on grounds of prevention. In 1940, Germany occupied Denmark and Norway, arguing that Britain might have used them as launching points for an attack, or prevented supply of strategic materials to Germany. In 1941, the British and Soviets invaded Iran to secure a supply corridor into Russia. The Iranian Shah appealed to ] for help, but was rebuffed on the grounds that "movements of conquest by Germany will continue and will extend beyond Europe to Asia, Africa, and even to the Americas, unless they are stopped by military force". | |||
===Pearl Harbor=== | |||
The ] ] (]) was motivated by the knowledge that American military power was rapidly increasing, while American policy towards Japan was becoming more adversarial. America was moving battleships and strategic bombers into the Asian theatre, an action which was construed as a long-term potential threat but was not a real or anticipated attack. | |||
{{Main|Attack on Pearl Harbor|Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor}} | |||
Perhaps the most famous example of preventive war is the ] by the ] on December 7, 1941.<ref name="bakerinstitute.org">J. Barnes, R. Stoll, "PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE WAR: A PRELIMINARY TAXONOMY", p.15, THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY, {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101123064942/http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/Preemptive%20and%20Preventive%20War-1.pdf |date=2010-11-23 }}</ref> Many in the US and Japan believed war to be inevitable. Coupled to the crippling US economic embargo that was rapidly degrading the Japanese military capability, that led the Japanese leadership to believe it was better to have the war as soon as possible.<ref name="bakerinstitute.org"/> | |||
The sneak attack was partly motivated by a desire to destroy the ] to allow Japan to advance with reduced opposition from the US when it secured Japanese oil supplies by fighting against the ] and the ] for control over the rich East Indian (], ]) oil-fields.<ref>Keith Crane, ''Imported oil and US national security'', p. 26, Rand Environment, Energy, and Economic Development (Program), International Security and Defense Policy Center</ref> In 1940, American policies and tension toward ] and ] in the Far East increased. For example, in May 1940, the base of the US Pacific Fleet that was stationed on the ] was forwarded to an "advanced" position at Pearl Harbor in ], ]. | |||
=== 1967 Arab-Israeli War === | |||
A dispute over territorial waters led Egypt to mobilize its military forces against Israel. Israel could not maintain a comparable level of mobilization due to its smaller population, and so decided to strike first. This has been described as a ''preemptive'' war, but in the absence of an imminently anticipated armed attack, more closely fits the definition of a ''preventive'' war.. | |||
The move was opposed by some ] officials, including their commander, Admiral ], who was relieved by Roosevelt.{{citation needed|date=July 2010}} Even so, the ] was not significantly reinforced. Another ineffective plan to reinforce the Pacific was a rather late relocation of fighter planes to bases located on the ] like ], ], and the ]. For a long time, Japanese leaders, especially leaders of the ], had known that the large US military strength and production capacity posed a long-term threat to ], especially if hostilities broke out in the Pacific.{{citation needed|date=April 2008}} War games on both sides had long reflected those expectations. | |||
=== 2003 Iraq War === | |||
===Iraq War (2003–2011)=== | |||
The 2003 Invasion of Iraq was justified in part as a preventive war, on the grounds that an Iraqi weapons buildup might threaten America and Britain in the future and/or possible alliances with international Islamic terrorist groups that share a common hatred of Western countries. | |||
{{Main|Criticism of the Iraq War|Rationale for the Iraq War}} | |||
The ] was framed primarily as a ] by the ],<ref>David E. Sanger, "Bush's Doctrine for War," ''N.Y. Times,'' March 18, 2003 at A1</ref> although President Bush also argued it was supported by Security Council Resolutions: "Under Resolutions 678 and 687—both still in effect—the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction."<ref>"Bush's Speech on Iraq: 'Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave,'" ''N.Y. Times,'' March 18, 2003 at A 10.</ref> At the time, the US public and its allies were led to believe that ] might have restarted its nuclear weapons program or been "cheating" on its obligations to dispose of its large stockpile of ] dating from the ]. Supporters of the war have argued it to be justified, as Iraq both harbored ] groups sharing a common hatred of the United States and was suspected to be developing ] (WMD). Iraq's history of noncompliance of international security matters and its history of both developing and using such weapons were factors in the public perception of ]. | |||
In support of an attack on Iraq, US President ] stated in an address to the ] on September 12, 2002 that the Iraqi "regime is a grave and gathering danger."<ref></ref> However, despite extensive searches during the several years of occupation, the suspected weapons of mass destruction or weapons program infrastructure alleged by the Bush administration were not found to be functional or even known to most Iraqi leaders.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7634313|title=CIA's final report: No WMD found in Iraq|website=] |date=25 April 2005 |access-date=2009-05-24}}</ref> Coalition forces instead found dispersed and sometimes-buried and partially dismantled stockpiles of abandoned and functionally expired chemical weapons. Some of the caches had been dangerously stored and were leaking, and many were then disposed of hastily and in secret, leading to secondary exposure from improper handling. Allegations of mismanagement and information suppression followed.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Ford |first1=Dana |title=Report: United States kept secret its chemical weapons finds in Iraq |url=https://www.cnn.com/2014/10/15/us/iraq-chemical-weapons/index.html |access-date=18 September 2019 |agency=Turner Broadcasting System, Inc |publisher=CNN |date=October 15, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Chivers |first1=CJ |title=The Secret Casualties of Iraq's Abandoned Chemical Weapons |url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/14/world/middleeast/us-casualties-of-iraq-chemical-weapons.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=279797D532B892B5066743757602314B&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL |access-date=18 September 2019 |work=New York Times |date=14 October 2014}}</ref> | |||
== Views of Preventive war == | |||
Legal scholars generally agree that preventive war is not legally distinct from aggression, "the supreme crime" in international law. Commentators as diverse as ] and ] have argued that accepting one preventive war would open the floodgates to all preventive wars, reducing the world to "the law of the jungle". Others, especially Western ], have argued that preventive war is a useful and necessary tool in an age of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and that international law favours order and national sovereignty over more important factors such as preventing genocide or liberating oppressed peoples. | |||
===Eisenhower on Preventive War=== | |||
====Up to ]==== | |||
"When people speak to you about a preventive war, you tell them to go and fight it. After my experience, I have come to hate war. ... War settles nothing."<ref></ref> | |||
====]==== | |||
'''Q.''' Ray L. Scherer, National Broadcasting Company: Mr. President, there seem to be increasing suggestions that we should embark on a preventive war with the Communist world, some of these suggestions by people in high places. I wonder, sir, if you would care to address yourself to that proposition. | |||
== Case for preventive nuclear war == | |||
THE PRESIDENT. "All of us have heard this term 'preventive war' since the earliest days of Hitler. I recall that is about the first time I heard it. In this day and time, if we believe for one second that nuclear fission and fusion, that type of weapon, would be used in such a war--what is a preventive war? | |||
{{See also|First strike (nuclear strategy)}} | |||
Since 1945, World War III between the US and the USSR was perceived by many as inevitable and imminent. Many high officials in the US military sector and some renowned luminaries in non-military fields advocated preventive war. According to their rationale, total war is inevitable, and it was senseless to permit the Russians to develop a nuclear parity with the United States. Hence the sooner the preventive war come the better, because the ] is almost surely decisive and less devastating.<ref>Brodie, Bernard (1959). ''Strategy in the Missile Age'', (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p 229.</ref><ref>Kaku, Michio & Axelrod, Daniel (1987). ''To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans'', (Boston: South End Press), p 314.</ref> | |||
]<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 12-13.</ref> | |||
and ]<ref>Burnham, James (1947). ''Struggle for the World'', (New York: The John Day Company), p 248, https://ia800504.us.archive.org/25/items/struggleforworld00burn/struggleforworld00burn.pdf</ref> adhered to the version that the war is not inevitable but is already going on, although the American people still do not realize it. | |||
The US military sector widely and wholeheartedly shared the idea of preventive war.<ref>Baldwin, Hanson W. (October 1, 1950). “Hans Baldwin on preventive war,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', 6/10, October 1: p 318, https://books.google.com/books?id=_Q0AAAAAMBAJ </ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 10-11.</ref> Most prominent proponents included Defense Secretary ], ] Chairman Admiral ], Navy Secretary ], Admiral ], Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington, Air Force Chiefs ] and ], Air Force Generals ] and ], General ] (the wartime commander of the ]) and CIA Director ].<ref>Baldwin, Hanson W. (October 1, 1950). “Hans Baldwin on preventive war,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', 6/10, October 1: p 318, https://books.google.com/books?id=_Q0AAAAAMBAJ </ref><ref>LeMay, Curtis & Kantor, MacKinlay (1965). ''Mission with LeMay: My Story'', (New York: Doubleday & Company), p 481-482, 485.</ref><ref>Twining, Nathan (1966). ''Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at US Military Policy and Strategy'', (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p 19.</ref><ref>Ball, Desmond (1982/83). “US strategic forces: How would they be used?” ''International Security'', vol 7 (3): p 42.</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 5, 19-20, 41.</ref><ref>Dingman, Roger (1988/89). “Atomic diplomacy during the Korean War,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 69.</ref><ref>Gentile, Gian P. (Spring 2000). “Planning for preventive war, 1945 – 1950,” ''Joint Forces Quarterly'', vol 24: p 70. </ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 131-132, 136, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref><ref>Meilinger, Phillip S. (2012). ''Bomber: The Formation and Early History of Strategic Air Command'', (Alabama: Air University Press), p 290.</ref> ]-100 and several studies by ] and JCS during the Korean War advocated preventive war too.<ref>Rosenberg, David Alan (1983). “The origins of Overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960,” ''International Security'', vol 7 (4): p 33-34.</ref> | |||
I would say a preventive war, if the words mean anything, is to wage some sort of quick police action in order that you might avoid a terrific cataclysm of destruction later. | |||
In Congress, preventive warriors counted Deputy Secretary of Defense ],<ref>Later, Nitze distanced himself from a “small group” of believers in preventive war. Nitze, Paul H. (1976). “Assuring strategic stability in an era of Détente,” ''Foreign Affairs'', vol 54 (2): p 212.</ref> expert on the Soviet Union ] of the State Department, Senators ], ], ], ] (Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee), ] and Congressman ]. The diplomatic circle included distinguished diplomats like ], ] (US Ambassador to Moscow), and ] (from the same embassy).<ref>'']'' (1949), vol I: p 284. </ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 8-9, 20, 47.</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 4-5.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 127, 131-132, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref><ref>Albertson, Trevor D., (2015). “Ready for the worst: Preemption, prevention and American nuclear policy,” ''Air Power History'', vol 62 (1): p 32.</ref> | |||
A preventive war, to my mind, is an impossibility today. How could you have one if one of its features would be several cities lying in ruins, several cities where many, many thousands of people would be dead and injured and mangled, the transportation systems destroyed, sanitation implements and systems all gone? That isn't preventive war; that is war. | |||
] of the Manhattan Project and later a consultant for the ] expressed: "With the Russians it is not a question of whether but of when… If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today?"<ref>Blair, Clay (February 25, 1957). “Passing of a great mind: John von Neumann, a brilliant, jovial Mathematician, was a prodigious servant of science and his country,” ''Life'': p 96, https://books.google.com/books?id=rEEEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA89</ref><ref>Chen, Janet & Lu, Su-I & Vekhter, Dan (1999). "Von Neumann and the development of game theory," (Stanford University), https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/1998-99/game-theory/neumann.html</ref> Other renowned scientists and thinkers, such as ], ],<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 7-8.</ref> James Burnham,<ref>Burnham, James (1947). ''Struggle for the World'', (New York: The John Day Company), p 248, https://ia800504.us.archive.org/25/items/struggleforworld00burn/struggleforworld00burn.pdf</ref> and ].<ref>Perkins, Ray (Winter 1994/95). "Bertrand Russell and preventive war," ''Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives'', vol 14: p 135-153.</ref> | |||
I don't believe there is such a thing; and, frankly, I wouldn't even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked about such a thing." | |||
joined the preventive effort. The preventive war in the late 1940s was argued by “some very dedicated Americans.”<ref>Twining, Nathan (1966). ''Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at US Military Policy and Strategy'', (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p 49.</ref><ref>Meilinger, Phillip S. (2012). ''Bomber: The Formation and Early History of Strategic Air Command'', (Alabama: Air University Press), p 314.</ref> “Realists” repeatedly proposed the preventive war.<ref>Oppenheimer, Ernest (December 1, 1947). “The challenge of our time,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', vol 3 (12): p 370, https://books.google.com/books?id=pA0AAAAAMBAJ</ref> "The argument—prevent before it is too late—was quite common in the early atomic age and by no way limited to “the lunatic fringe.”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 7-8.</ref> A famous atomic scientist expressed a concern: In 1946, public discussion of international problems, in the United States at least, "has moved dangerously towards a consideration of so-called preventive war. One sees this tendency perhaps most markedly in the trend of news in Americans newspapers."<ref>Urey, Harold C. (November 1, 1946a). “Atomic energy and world peace,” ''Bulletin of Atomic Scientists'', vol 2 (9-10): p 2, https://books.google.com/books?id=WgwAAAAAMBAJ</ref> | |||
Bernard Brodie noted that at least prior to 1950, preventive war was a “live issue … among a very small but earnest minority of American citizens.”<ref>Brodie, Bernard (1959). ''Strategy in the Missile Age'', (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p 227-228.</ref> The dating of Brodie is too short, as the preventive war doctrine has had increasing support since the Korean War started.<ref>''FRUS'' (1950), vol III: p 197-204. </ref> The late summer 1950 saw “a flurry of articles” in the public press dealing with preventive war. One of them in ] (September 18, 1950) called for a buildup, followed by a “showdown” with the Russians by 1953.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 21.</ref> “1950 may have marked the high tide of ‘preventive war’ agitation…”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 24. </ref> According to ] of July 1950, right after the outbreak of the War, 14% of the polled opined for the immediate declaration of war on the USSR, the percentage which only slightly declined by the end of the War.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 5.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 149-150, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> “So preventive war thinking was surprisingly widespread in the early nuclear age, the period from mid-1945 through late 1954.”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” Security Studies, vol 16 (1): p 5.</ref> | |||
'''Q.''' Chalmers M. Roberts, Washington Post and Times Herald: Mr. President, in answering that question about preventive war, you confined yourself to military reasons against it. Did you wish to leave the impression that that was the only basis of your opposition to the idea? | |||
The preventive warriors remained minority in America’s postwar political arena, and Washington’s elder statesmen soundly rejected their arguments.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 11.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 121, 127-128, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> However, during several of the East-West confrontations that marked the first decade of the Cold War, well-placed officials in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations urged their Presidents to launch preventive strikes on the Soviet Union.<ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 121, 127-128, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> Entry in Truman’s secret personal journal on January 27, 1952 tells: | |||
THE PRESIDENT. "Well, let me make it this way: if you remember, I believe it was Conan Doyle's White Company, there was a monk that left the church; he said there were seven reasons, and the first one was he was thrown out; they decided there was no use to recite the other six. | |||
{{Blockquote| | |||
It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an ultimatum with a ten-days expiration limit informing Moscow that we intend to blockade the China coast … and that we intend to destroy every military base in Manchuria … by means now at our control and if there is any further interference we shall eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish our peaceful purposes. This means all-out war. It means Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Beijing… and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be eliminated. This is the final chance for the Soviet Government to decide whether it desires to survive or not.<ref>Kaku, Michio & Axelrod, Daniel (1987). ''To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans'', (Boston: South End Press), p 73. </ref>}} | |||
In 1953, Eisenhower wrote in a summary memorandum to his Secretary of State, ]: In present circumstances, "we would be forced to consider whether or not out duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment we could designate.”<ref>Eisenhower, Dwight, (September 8, 1953). " Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State," ''Office of the Historian'', https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d89</ref> In May 1954, the JCS’s Advance Study Group proposed to Eisenhower to consider “deliberately precipitating war with the USSR in the near future,” before Soviet thermonuclear capability became a real menace.<ref>Rosenberg, David Alan (1983). “The origins of Overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960,” ''International Security'', vol 7 (4): p 33-34. </ref> The same year, Eisenhower asked in a meeting of National Security Council: “Should the United States now get ready to fight the Soviet Union?” and pointed out that “he had brought up this question more than once at prior Council meetings and he had never done so facetiously.”<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 39.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 137-138, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> By the fall 1954, Eisenhower made his mind up and approved a ''Basic National Security Policy'' paper which stated unequivocally that “the United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war, or acts intended to provoke war.”<ref>Rosenberg, David Alan (1983). “The origins of Overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960,” ''International Security'', vol 7 (4): p 33-34.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 127-128, 137, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 6.</ref> | |||
Winston Churchill was more resolved on the preventive war. He argued repeatedly in the late 1940s that matters needed to be brought to a head with the Soviets before it was too late, while the United States still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly.<ref>Kissinger, Henry A. (1961). ''The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy'', (New York: Harper & Row Publishers), p 178-179.</ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc (1988/89). “A ‘wasting asset’: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance,” ''International Security'', vol 13 (3): p 9-10. </ref><ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 5.</ref><ref>Mueller, Karl P. & Castillo, Jasen J. & Morgan, Forrest E. & Pegahi, Negeen & Rosen, Brian (2006). “Striking first: Preemptive and preventive attack in US national security policy,” ''Project Air Force'', (RAND Corporation), p 121, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG403.pdf</ref> Charles de Gaulle in 1954 regretted that now it was too late.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc. (2007). “Preventive war and US foreign policy,” ''Security Studies'', vol 16 (1): p 5.</ref> The same regret of opportunity missed expressed later Curtis LeMay<ref>LeMay, Curtis & Kantor, MacKinlay (1965). ''Mission with LeMay: My Story'', (New York: Doubleday & Company), p 485.</ref> | |||
It seems to me that when, by definition, a term is just ridiculous in itself, there is no use in going any further. | |||
and ].<ref>Kissinger, Henry A. (1979). ''The White House Years'', (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown and Company), p 62.</ref> | |||
==See also== | |||
There are all sorts of reasons, moral and political and everything else, against this theory, but it is so completely unthinkable in today's conditions that I thought it is no use to go any further."<ref></ref> | |||
* '']'' | |||
====]==== | |||
"I am really amazed now to be told by Soviet leaders, who have never even been near this country, that there are in the United States those who, in your words, "utter the dangerous call for preventive war"; and conduct "unrestrained ] for war." If any such persons exist in the United States, I do not know of them; nor do I know of any "imperialist ruling circles" that are supposedly eager to plunge the world into war in order to make financial gains."<ref></ref> | |||
=== The Bush doctrine, Iraq and Afghanistan === | |||
Former ] under ], ], has drawn up Articles of ] of ] ] and ] ] that includes the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq as "Violations and subversions of the ] and ]" consistent with discussion of the "rationale for preventive war" above.<ref> | |||
</ref> ] Professor ] argues the preventive war in Iraq is a ] as defined by Justice ], chief prosecutor for the ] at the ].<ref></ref><ref></ref> | |||
Preventive war has been described as an important element of the ], although the ] government uses the term ] in a way which is partly consistent with international usage. It was argued that ]i missiles already threatened the United States, although only ] and ] weapons were yet ready for use. Based on this justification the ] should have been a possible example of a preemptive war. The Iraqi missiles, while unable to target the United States directly, were in violation of the cease fire agreement following the 1991 Gulf War (see below). Their development was one of many alleged cease fire violations cited in support of resumption of hostilities and therefore do not necessarily fall under either preventive or preemptive war definitions. However, the purported threat of Saddam Hussein possibly handing off chemical or biological weapons to terrorist groups that might use them against the United States or merely evincing "nothing more than the intent and ability to develop WMD" would be an example of a reason used for a preventive war.<ref>Ibid.</ref> | |||
However, President ] has claimed, on occasion, that the invasion of Iraq was justified on the grounds that ] may have someday been able to develop ]. Based on this justification, the invasion would constitute a preventive war, since there was no impending attack by Iraq. The Bush administration, however, argues that the ] ] was never officially finished, and that the invasion was a continuation of that conflict. Of course, many modern wars are never formally declared or finished, and critics of administration policy view this as an attempt to find a legal loophole. However, a cease fire agreement was made after the 1991 Gulf War and certain stipulations were set in place as a condition of that cease fire. If the ] had found continued violation of those stipulations it would have provided a legal basis for resumption of hostilities. Finding none, they did not, however, as Colin Powell told the World Economic Forum, "When we feel strongly about something we will lead, even if no one is following us."<ref>Ibid.</ref> | |||
Additionally, some critics of the Bush administration argue that the ] was another example of preventive war. This is due to the fact that the government of ] did not actually attack the U.S. Rather, ] is widely believed to be responsible, and the President's policy is to attack any country which is believed to be "harboring terrorists."<ref></ref> | |||
Proponents of the invasion argued that the ] constituted a sufficient reason for an attack on Afghanistan. In support of this, they assert that Afghanistan's ] government was assisting Al-Qaeda and this is equivalent to an act of aggression against the U.S. The intricacies of this argument hinge on one's definition of an attack or act of aggression. The Bush doctrine of preventive war still presents unresolved questions: for example, if applied universally it could mean that the United States government (via support of various groups) actively attacks other states on a regular basis, an instance of which is former Cubans in south Florida running operations against Cuba, with US support. | |||
Alternatively, some argue that the U.S. did not actually initiate a war at all, but simply supported one side (the ]) in a ]. Critics, however, have responded that Afghanistan was not actually engaged in a civil war. Those, including the UN, who officially recognised the Taliban government as the legitimate government of Afghanistan are examples. | |||
The United States position towards Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 attack by Al Qaeda terrorists was that the government of Afghanistan was harboring the leader of an organization that executed attacks on them. They also asserted that the Taliban, as the current government of Afghanistan, did not prevent and continued to provide the terrorist organization with the freedom to run multiple camps to train more terrorists who would then be sent to attack the United States. Considering ]'s declaration of war against the United States, the Bush administration considered this support a hostile act in support of Al-Qaeda. From this point of view the war in Afghanistan was neither preventive nor preemptive. | |||
==References== | |||
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== See also == | |||
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==References== | |||
== External links == | |||
{{Reflist}} | |||
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Latest revision as of 01:55, 6 January 2025
Military action to prevent an enemy from acquiring attack capabilities in the medium termThis article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. (Learn how and when to remove these messages)
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A preventive war is an armed conflict "initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk." The party which is being attacked has a latent threat capability or it has shown that it intends to attack in the future, based on its past actions and posturing. A preventive war aims to forestall a shift in the balance of power by strategically attacking before the balance of power has had a chance to shift in the favor of the targeted party. Preventive war is distinct from preemptive strike, which is the first strike when an attack is imminent. Preventive uses of force "seek to stop another state . . . from developing a military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it thereafter, whereas reemptive uses of force come against a backdrop of tactical intelligence or warning indicating imminent military action by an adversary."
Criticism
The majority view is that a preventive war undertaken without the approval of the United Nations is illegal under the modern framework of international law. The consensus is that preventive war "goes beyond what is acceptable in international law" and lacks legal basis. The UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change stopped short of rejecting the concept outright but suggested that there is no right to preventive war. If there are good grounds for initiating preventive war, the matter should be put to the UN Security Council, which can authorize such action, given that one of the Council's main functions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression") is to enforce the obligation of member states under Article 4, Paragraph 2 to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . The Charter's drafters assumed that the Council might need to employ preventive force to forestall aggression such as initiated by Nazi Germany in the 1930s.
Examples
The Axis powers in World War II routinely invaded neutral countries on grounds of prevention and began the invasion of Poland in 1939 by claiming the Poles had attacked a border outpost first. In 1940, Germany invaded Denmark and Norway and argued that Britain might have used them as launching points for an attack or prevented supply of strategic materials to Germany. In the summer of 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, inaugurating the bloody and brutal land war by claiming that a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy threatened the Reich. In late 1941, the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran was carried out to secure a supply corridor of petrol to the Soviet Union. Iranian Shah Rezā Shāh appealed to US President Franklin Roosevelt for help but was rebuffed on the grounds that "movements of conquest by Germany will continue and will extend beyond Europe to Asia, Africa, and even to the Americas, unless they are stopped by military force."
Pearl Harbor
Main articles: Attack on Pearl Harbor and Events leading to the attack on Pearl HarborPerhaps the most famous example of preventive war is the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Empire of Japan on December 7, 1941. Many in the US and Japan believed war to be inevitable. Coupled to the crippling US economic embargo that was rapidly degrading the Japanese military capability, that led the Japanese leadership to believe it was better to have the war as soon as possible.
The sneak attack was partly motivated by a desire to destroy the US Pacific Fleet to allow Japan to advance with reduced opposition from the US when it secured Japanese oil supplies by fighting against the British Empire and the Dutch Empire for control over the rich East Indian (Dutch East Indies, Malay Peninsula) oil-fields. In 1940, American policies and tension toward Japanese military actions and Japanese expansionism in the Far East increased. For example, in May 1940, the base of the US Pacific Fleet that was stationed on the West Coast was forwarded to an "advanced" position at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii.
The move was opposed by some US Navy officials, including their commander, Admiral James Otto Richardson, who was relieved by Roosevelt. Even so, the Far East Fleet was not significantly reinforced. Another ineffective plan to reinforce the Pacific was a rather late relocation of fighter planes to bases located on the Pacific islands like Wake Island, Guam, and the Philippines. For a long time, Japanese leaders, especially leaders of the Imperial Japanese Navy, had known that the large US military strength and production capacity posed a long-term threat to Japan's imperialist desires, especially if hostilities broke out in the Pacific. War games on both sides had long reflected those expectations.
Iraq War (2003–2011)
Main articles: Criticism of the Iraq War and Rationale for the Iraq WarThe 2003 invasion of Iraq was framed primarily as a preemptive war by the George W. Bush administration, although President Bush also argued it was supported by Security Council Resolutions: "Under Resolutions 678 and 687—both still in effect—the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction." At the time, the US public and its allies were led to believe that Ba'athist Iraq might have restarted its nuclear weapons program or been "cheating" on its obligations to dispose of its large stockpile of chemical weapons dating from the Iran–Iraq War. Supporters of the war have argued it to be justified, as Iraq both harbored Islamic terrorist groups sharing a common hatred of the United States and was suspected to be developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iraq's history of noncompliance of international security matters and its history of both developing and using such weapons were factors in the public perception of Iraq's having weapons of mass destruction.
In support of an attack on Iraq, US President George W. Bush stated in an address to the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002 that the Iraqi "regime is a grave and gathering danger." However, despite extensive searches during the several years of occupation, the suspected weapons of mass destruction or weapons program infrastructure alleged by the Bush administration were not found to be functional or even known to most Iraqi leaders. Coalition forces instead found dispersed and sometimes-buried and partially dismantled stockpiles of abandoned and functionally expired chemical weapons. Some of the caches had been dangerously stored and were leaking, and many were then disposed of hastily and in secret, leading to secondary exposure from improper handling. Allegations of mismanagement and information suppression followed.
Case for preventive nuclear war
See also: First strike (nuclear strategy)Since 1945, World War III between the US and the USSR was perceived by many as inevitable and imminent. Many high officials in the US military sector and some renowned luminaries in non-military fields advocated preventive war. According to their rationale, total war is inevitable, and it was senseless to permit the Russians to develop a nuclear parity with the United States. Hence the sooner the preventive war come the better, because the first strike is almost surely decisive and less devastating. Dean Acheson and James Burnham adhered to the version that the war is not inevitable but is already going on, although the American people still do not realize it.
The US military sector widely and wholeheartedly shared the idea of preventive war. Most prominent proponents included Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson, JCS Chairman Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Navy Secretary Francis P. Matthews, Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington, Air Force Chiefs Curtis LeMay and Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Generals George Kenney and Orvil A. Anderson, General Leslie Groves (the wartime commander of the Manhattan Project) and CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith. NSC-100 and several studies by SAC and JCS during the Korean War advocated preventive war too.
In Congress, preventive warriors counted Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, expert on the Soviet Union Charles E. Bohlen of the State Department, Senators John L. McClellan, Paul H. Douglas, Eugene D. Millikin, Brien McMahon (Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee), William Knowland and Congressman Henry M. Jackson. The diplomatic circle included distinguished diplomats like George Kennan, William C. Bullitt (US Ambassador to Moscow), and John Paton Davies (from the same embassy).
John von Neumann of the Manhattan Project and later a consultant for the RAND Corporation expressed: "With the Russians it is not a question of whether but of when… If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today?" Other renowned scientists and thinkers, such as Leo Szilard, William L. Laurence, James Burnham, and Bertrand Russell. joined the preventive effort. The preventive war in the late 1940s was argued by “some very dedicated Americans.” “Realists” repeatedly proposed the preventive war. "The argument—prevent before it is too late—was quite common in the early atomic age and by no way limited to “the lunatic fringe.” A famous atomic scientist expressed a concern: In 1946, public discussion of international problems, in the United States at least, "has moved dangerously towards a consideration of so-called preventive war. One sees this tendency perhaps most markedly in the trend of news in Americans newspapers."
Bernard Brodie noted that at least prior to 1950, preventive war was a “live issue … among a very small but earnest minority of American citizens.” The dating of Brodie is too short, as the preventive war doctrine has had increasing support since the Korean War started. The late summer 1950 saw “a flurry of articles” in the public press dealing with preventive war. One of them in Time magazine (September 18, 1950) called for a buildup, followed by a “showdown” with the Russians by 1953. “1950 may have marked the high tide of ‘preventive war’ agitation…” According to Gallup poll of July 1950, right after the outbreak of the War, 14% of the polled opined for the immediate declaration of war on the USSR, the percentage which only slightly declined by the end of the War. “So preventive war thinking was surprisingly widespread in the early nuclear age, the period from mid-1945 through late 1954.”
The preventive warriors remained minority in America’s postwar political arena, and Washington’s elder statesmen soundly rejected their arguments. However, during several of the East-West confrontations that marked the first decade of the Cold War, well-placed officials in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations urged their Presidents to launch preventive strikes on the Soviet Union. Entry in Truman’s secret personal journal on January 27, 1952 tells:
It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an ultimatum with a ten-days expiration limit informing Moscow that we intend to blockade the China coast … and that we intend to destroy every military base in Manchuria … by means now at our control and if there is any further interference we shall eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish our peaceful purposes. This means all-out war. It means Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Beijing… and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be eliminated. This is the final chance for the Soviet Government to decide whether it desires to survive or not.
In 1953, Eisenhower wrote in a summary memorandum to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles: In present circumstances, "we would be forced to consider whether or not out duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment we could designate.” In May 1954, the JCS’s Advance Study Group proposed to Eisenhower to consider “deliberately precipitating war with the USSR in the near future,” before Soviet thermonuclear capability became a real menace. The same year, Eisenhower asked in a meeting of National Security Council: “Should the United States now get ready to fight the Soviet Union?” and pointed out that “he had brought up this question more than once at prior Council meetings and he had never done so facetiously.” By the fall 1954, Eisenhower made his mind up and approved a Basic National Security Policy paper which stated unequivocally that “the United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war, or acts intended to provoke war.”
Winston Churchill was more resolved on the preventive war. He argued repeatedly in the late 1940s that matters needed to be brought to a head with the Soviets before it was too late, while the United States still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly. Charles de Gaulle in 1954 regretted that now it was too late. The same regret of opportunity missed expressed later Curtis LeMay and Henry Kissinger.
See also
- A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm
- Command responsibility
- Caroline affair
- Pre-emptive nuclear strike
- Imperialism
- Jus ad bellum
- Kellogg–Briand Pact
- Legality of the Iraq War
- Military science
- UN Charter
References
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External links
- The Caroline Case : Anticipatory Self-Defence in Contemporary International Law (Miskolc Journal of International Law v.1 (2004) No. 2 pp. 104-120)
- The American Strategy of Preemptive War and International Law