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{{Short description|Phrase in Soviet historiography}}
] ]

'''Stalin's ten victories''', '''Stalin's ten blows''', or '''ten victories of the Red Army''' is a Soviet term for ten successful strategic offensives conducted by the Red Army in ]. These offensives destroyed a large portion of ], and lead to the surrender of a number of Germany's more minor allies. The term is primarily used by Soviet historians and is less well known in Western histories. In ], '''Stalin's ten blows'''{{efn|Also "Stalin's ten victories" or the "ten victories of the Red Army".}} ({{langx|ru|Десять сталинских ударов|Desyat' stalinskikh udarov}}) were the ten successful strategic offensives in Europe conducted by the ] in 1944 during ]. The Soviet offensives drove the ] from Soviet territory and precipitated ]'s collapse.


==History of the expression== ==History of the expression==
The term was heard for the first time in November 1944 from ] in his speech "27th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution" ({{lang-ru|«27-я годовщина Великой Октябрьской социалистической революции»}}) during the 1944 meeting of the Moscow's Soviet deputies. The term was coined more as a reflection of the "cult of personality" that prevailed in Soviet Union at the time. It did not reflect specific strategic planning of the ], but evolved after 1944, and at times had been called the "'''Year of twelve victories'''," counting the ] and ] to further enhance Stalin's role in the Soviet part in the victory over the Axis. In the list of ten presented below, these are not included; they are considered part of the ]. This categorization is most commonly used.<ref name="Willmott368">Willmott 1989, p. 368</ref> The term was heard for the first time in November 1944 from ] in his speech "27th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution" ({{langx|ru|«27-я годовщина Великой Октябрьской социалистической революции»|links=no|translit="27-ya godovshchina Velikoy Oktyab'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii"}}) during the 1944 meeting of the Moscow's Soviet deputies.<ref></ref> The term was coined as a reflection of the ] that prevailed in Soviet Union at the time. It did not reflect specific strategic planning of the '']'', and at times had been called the "Year of twelve victories," based on the order issued by Stalin on the following day, authorizing the firing of artillery salutes with 24 guns in 12 cities of the Soviet Union:<ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080503095828/http://militera.lib.ru/docs/ww2/leaders/orders/stalin_1944-11-07.html |date=2008-05-03 }} И. Сталин о Великой Отечественной войне Советского Союза. М.: Госполитиздат, 1946</ref> Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Petrozavodsk, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, Kishinev, Tbilisi, Sevastopol, and Lvov.<ref name=Willmott368>], p. 368</ref> Having in his youth enrolled in the ] ], Stalin would have been familiar with the Bible and specifically with the famous ], ten massive "blows" which God was said to have inflicted on the evil Pharaoh and leading to Pharaoh's surrender.
The term was discontinued in use after ]'s 1956 ] denouncing Stalin and ending his cult of personality following his death.{{citation needed|date=December 2012}}

After the ] of the ] at ], the Soviet ] and the ] later in 1943, it became apparent that the tide of war was turning against Germany. Soviet forces were, all along the front, approaching the pre-war border. Partly because of ], which funnelled all new men and materials to the ], to meet the expected ], issued on 3 November, 1943, Axis forces along the Eastern Front were severely inadequately equipped in comparison to their Soviet opponents, reinforcements were rare, and reserves were stretched thin.<ref>Ziemke 1968, p. 216</ref> Although in this directive Hitler implied that he might be willing to allow withdraws, trading space for time, this proved to be false.<ref>Ziemke 1968, p. 217</ref> This, combined with Hitler's insistence on holding onto captured territory at all costs, made Soviet victories in 1944 nearly inevitable.<ref name="Digest330">Wright 1989, p. 330</ref>


==Background==
The term was discontinued in use after Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin following his death.
After the ] of the ] at ], the Soviet ], and the ] later in 1943, it became apparent that the tide of war was turning against Germany. Soviet forces were, all along the front, approaching the pre-war border. Partly because of ], which funneled all new men and materials to the ], to meet the expected ], issued on 3 November 1943, Axis forces along the Eastern Front were severely inadequately equipped in comparison to their Soviet opponents, reinforcements were rare, and reserves were stretched thin.<ref name=Ziemke216>], p. 216</ref> Although in this directive Hitler implied that he might be willing to allow withdrawals, trading space for time, this proved to be false.<ref name=Ziemke217>], p. 217</ref> This, combined with Hitler's insistence on holding onto captured territory at all costs, made Soviet victories in 1944 nearly inevitable.<ref name=Pimlott330>], p. 330</ref>


{| class="wikitable" border="1" {| class="wikitable" border="1"
Line 18: Line 18:
|- |-
| '''Personnel''' | '''Personnel'''
| 6.5 million<ref name="Digest330"/> | 6,500,000<ref name=Pimlott330/>
| 4.3 million<ref name="Digest330"/> | 4,300,000<ref name=Pimlott330/>
|- |-
|'''Tanks''' |'''Tanks'''
| 5600<ref name="Digest330"/> | 5,600<ref name=Pimlott330/>
| 2300<ref name="Digest330"/> | 2,300<ref name=Pimlott330/>
|- |-
|'''Field Guns''' |'''Field Guns'''
|90000<ref name="Digest330"/> |90,000<ref name=Pimlott330/>
|54000<ref name="Digest330"/> |54,000<ref name=Pimlott330/>
|- |-
|'''Aircraft''' |'''Aircraft'''
|8800<ref name="Digest330"/> |8,800<ref name=Pimlott330/>
|3000<ref name="Digest330"/> |3,000<ref name=Pimlott330/>
|} |}


==The offensives== ==The offensives==
#] (14 January - 1 March, 1944). This, the second chronologically of the offensives, fully relieved the ], which had started on August 30, 1941. Although the Germans resisted fiercely at first, having had years to prepare defensive rings including pillboxes and minefields around ], once the initial defenses were broken Soviet forces easily reached ]. It was conducted by the ] and the ]. <ref>Willmott 1989, p. 369 - 371</ref><ref>Werth 1964, p. 764</ref> #] (14 January 1 March 1944). This, the second chronologically of the offensives, fully relieved the ], which had started on September 8, 1941. Although the Germans resisted fiercely at first, having had years to prepare defensive rings including pillboxes and minefields around Leningrad, once the initial defenses were broken Soviet forces easily reached the border of ]. In Stalin's speech he called it the ''Lifting of the Leningrad Blockade''. It was conducted by the ] and the ].<ref name=Willmott369-371>], p. 369-371</ref><ref name=Werth764>], p. 764</ref>
#] (24 January 1944 - 17 February 1944) by the ] and ]s as part of the ] (24 December, 1943 - 17 April, 1944). This offensive was launched on Christmas Eve, 1943, the first chronologically of the 1944 offensives. It involved the clearing of Axis forces from ]. It also resulted in the isolation of the German-controlled ]. It involved the 1st, 2nd, ], and ]s, and the ] and ]s.<ref>Willmott 1989, p. 372 - 374</ref><ref name="Werth765">Werth 1964, p. 775</ref> #] (24 December 1943 17 April 1944). This offensive was launched on Christmas Eve, 1943, the first chronologically of the 1944 offensives, but the second mentioned in Stalin's speech. It involved the clearing of Axis forces from Ukraine. It also resulted in the isolation of the German-controlled ]. It was called the ''Liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine'' in Stalin's speech, and involved the ], ], ], and ]s, and the ] and ]s.<ref name=Willmott372-374>], p. 372-374</ref><ref name=Werth765>], p. 765</ref>
#] (26 March 1944 - 14 April 1944) which begun the third blow, and the ] (8 April - 12 May, 1944) which completed it. The third offensive cleared the ] of German and ]n forces, and recaptured ]. After ] refused to allow Axis forces to evacuate, believing that retention of the Crimea was vital to maintaining ] neutrality. Once the ] attacked over the ], it quickly drove the German and Romanian forces back to Sevastopol, which surrendered on 8 May. Although Hitler had finally given permission for evacuation, the majority of soldiers surrendered and went into captivity. Due to heavy casualties suffered by the Romanian forces, this battle was a major factor in their surrender. It was conducted by the 4th Ukrainian Front. <ref>Wright 1989 , p. 334</ref> #] (26 March 1944 14 April 1944) which began the third blow, and the ] (8 April - 12 May 1944) which completed it. Even though militarily the Odessa Offensive was included in the Dnieper&ndash;Carpathian Offensive, Stalin grouped it with the Crimean Offensive in his speech. This offensive cleared the ] of German and ]n forces, and recaptured ]. ] had refused to allow Axis forces to evacuate, believing that retention of the Crimea was vital to maintaining ] neutrality. The ] attacked over the ], and quickly drove the German and Romanian forces back to Sevastopol, which surrendered on 9 May. Although Hitler had finally given permission for evacuation, the majority of soldiers were unable to escape in time and surrendered and went into captivity. Due to heavy casualties suffered by the Romanian forces, this battle was a major factor in the Romanian surrender later in 1944. Stalin called it the ''Liberation of Odessa'' and ''Liberation of the Crimea'' in his speech. It was conducted by the 4th Ukrainian Front.<ref name=Pimlott334>], p. 334</ref>
#] (9 June – 9 August 1944). Directed against Finnish forces north of Leningrad, its strategic objective was to drive Finland out of the war by destroying Finnish forces on the Karelian Isthmus and advancing to the ],<ref name="Gebhardt2">], p. 2</ref><ref name="Stavka-97">], pp. 97–98</ref><ref name="MoDRF">{{in lang|ru}} Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110930074753/http://victory.mil.ru/war/1944/war/01_06.html |date=2011-09-30 }} ''По замыслу Ставки войска Ленинградского и Карельского фронтов при содействии Краснознаменного Балтийского флота, Ладожской и Онежской военных флотилий мощными ударами должны были разгромить противостоящего противника, овладеть Выборгом, Петрозаводском и выйти на рубеж Тикшеозеро, Сортавала, Котка. Операцию начинали войска Ленинградского фронта, затем в наступление переходил Карельский фронт.''</ref> whereby Soviet forces would prepare for an advance deep into Finland.<ref name="Platonov">]</ref> It was carried out by the Leningrad Front and the ].<ref name=Werth765/><ref name=Pimlott343>], p. 343</ref> Soviet forces succeeded in expelling Finnish forces from territory they had gained in 1941, but the Soviet advance was halted at the ]. Further north, Finnish victories in the Battles of ] and ] halted additional Soviet attempts to break through Finnish lines. The Soviet destruction of Finnish forces and advancement to the Kymi River had failed.<ref name=Mannerheim-500>], p. 500</ref><ref name=Ziemke-388>], p. 388</ref> An unsigned draft document called "The Terms for Finnish Unconditional Surrender" was found in October 1993 in the Russian Foreign Ministry archive, implying that unconditional surrender was indeed the Soviet goal.<ref name=tiihonen77>{{cite book|title=Ratkaisu Kannaksella 1944|trans-title=Decision at the Isthmus 1944|publisher=Fenix|location=]|author=Tapio Tiihonen|pages=77–79|year=2000|quote=The Voroshilov committee prepared the conditions for Finnish capitulation for nine and a half months. The secretary of the committee, S. Bazarov handed these to the "secret police man" of the Foreign Ministry, V. Dekanozov on 26 June The "sekretno projekt" for the surrender of Finland, handed by Barazov to Dekanozov, is dated to 28 June. The signature of the agreement would have meant a complete economic, political, and social subduction of Finland to the Soviet Union The agreement was to be signed by attorneys from both the Soviet and Finnish governments and armed forces. Already the preamble of the agreement made it clear to Finland, what it was about: "The Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Defence Forces acknowledge the complete defeat of the Finnish Armed Forces in the war against the U.S.S.R. and announce the unconditional surrender of Finland, requesting the cessation of acts of war."}}</ref><ref name=unconditional>], p. 168, Dr. Turtola discovered a Soviet draft for "The Unconditional Surrender of Finland" from the Russian Foreign Ministry archive in Moscow, dated June 1944. Here are the relevant passages from the document: "The Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Defence Forces acknowledge the complete defeat of the Finnish Armed Forces in the war against the U.S.S.R. and announce the unconditional surrender of Finland, requesting the cessation of acts of war."; "5. As this document takes effect, the Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Finnish Defence Forces commit themselves without delay in calling to Finland all Finnish troops on other fronts and in disarming them."; "7. The Supreme Command of the Finnish Defence Forces will carry out the disarming of all Finnish land, air, and naval forces according to the orders, schedule, and sequence given by the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces, under its supervision. 8. Since the moment of signing this document until when the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces has taken under its control all communications connections in Finland, all radio broadcasts in Finnish territory are forbidden, and Finnish telegraph, telephone, and radio connections to other countries will be cut off. 9. The Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Finnish Defence Forces will secure the transportation of military troops of the U.S.S.R. in Finnish territory by rail and by other means of transportation and the needed supplies to the troops. 10. To fulfill the terms of surrender and to secure the interests of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces – by its own military forces and at its own discretion – will occupy partially or fully the territory of Finland, her harbours, the archipelago of Åland, and the islands of the Gulf of Finland.
#] (9 June - 9 August, 1944). This offensive against ] recaptured the ] and ]. After having reached the 1940 border, the Soviet forces stopped voluntarily. It was successful in territorial gains, but due to Finnish fortifications, and German reinforcements was not as great a success as hoped by the ]. However, it was an cause of the eventual Finnish surrender on 19 September. It was carried out by the Leningrad Front and the ]. <ref>Wright 1989, p. 343</ref><ref name="Werth765"/>

#] (22 June - 29 August, 1944).<ref>The wartime codename of the operation, Operation Bagration, was not used in the speech</ref> Started exactly three years after the ], and named after ], a Russian general during the ], this drove the last remaining German forces from Soviet lands, recapturing all of ]. It resulted in the almost complete destruction of the German ], and was undoubtedly one of Germany's worst defeats of the war. It is sometimes known as "The destruction of Army Group Center." Soviet forces advanced past the ]-]-] line, and nearly reached ] before stopping. Almost 30 German ]s were encircled near ], and the prewar border of ] was reached. The ] is considered part of this operation. It was conducted by the ], and the 1st, 2nd, and ]s.<ref>Wright 1989, p. 336</ref><ref name="Werth765"/>
The Government of the U.S.S.R. will make use of all the rights of an occupying power in the occupied territories of Finland. The Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces will publish its own orders and directives. The Finnish Government and the Finnish people will by all means try to contribute to the execution of these orders and directives. To serve this aim, the Finnish Government will without delay give an order to all the authorities of the central and local government, to the judicial system, public organisations, and all civil servants to remain in their previous positions, to obey orders unconditionally, and to carry out their duties conscientiously, until the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces gives its directives."</ref> While the Red Army had failed to achieve all of its objectives, the offensive nonetheless led to Finland agreeing to Soviet peace terms. On 19 September 1944, the ] was signed, ending the ]. Stalin dubbed the operation the ''Liberation of Karelia-Finland Soviet Republic''.
#] (13 July - 29 August, 1944). This offensive to the south of and concurrent to Operation Bagration advanced through Poland and past the ]. Although it made little progress at first, eventually it became successful, capturing ], ], and ]. It was carried out by the 1st Ukrainian Front. <ref name="Digest338">Wright 1989, p. 338</ref>
#] (22 June 19 August 1944) Started exactly three years after the ], and named after ], a Georgian prince fighting for the ] during the ], this drove the last remaining German forces from Soviet territory, recapturing Belarus. It inflicted extremely heavy casualties upon the German ], to the point of being called "The Destruction of Army Group Center," and was undoubtedly one of Germany's worst defeats of the war. Soviet forces advanced past the ]-]-] line, and nearly reached ] before stopping. Almost 30 German ]s were encircled near ], and the prewar border of ] was reached. Stalin called the operation the ''Belorussian Operation, and liberation of Lithuania and significant parts of allied Poland, and advance to the borders of Germany''. It was conducted by the ], and the 1st, 2nd, and ]s.<ref name=Werth765/><ref name=Pimlott336>], p. 336</ref>
#] (19 August - 14 October, 1944). These began with the Iasi-Kishinev Offensive from 20 August to 29 August, and included the abortive ]. These offensives, in the ], was targeted at German and Romanian formations in ]. About 15 or 16 German divisions were encircled with several Romanian divisions.These operations, which continued into October, directly caused the capitulation of Romania and ]. It decimated the formations of Army Group South Ukraine, and continued the advance deep into Romania. It was carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts. <ref>Wright 1989, p. 341</ref><ref name="Werth765"/>
#] (13 July 29 August 1944). This offensive to the south of and concurrent to Operation Bagration advanced through Poland and past the ]. Although it made little progress at first, eventually it became successful, capturing ], ], and ]. Called the ''Liberation of western Ukraine and crossing of the ]'', it was carried out by the 1st Ukrainian Front,<ref name=Pimlott338>], p. 338</ref> and, in conjunction with Operation Bagration, destroyed the German ].<ref name=McCarthy232>], p. 232</ref>
#] (14 September - 20 November, 1944). Recapturing the ], including most of ] and ], this offensive isolated the ], where 30 divisions of ] were cut off from Army Group Center till the ]. The ], ], and ]s, along with the Leningrad Front carried out this attack.<ref name="Digest338"/>
#] (19 August 14 October 1944). This offensive includes the Second Jassy&ndash;Kishinev Offensive, from 20 to 29 August, and its follow-ups, which continued well into October. This offensive and its follow-ups were mainly conducted in the ], and were targeted at German and Romanian formations in ]. About 15 or 16 German divisions were encircled with several Romanian divisions during the course of the Soviet advance. These operations directly caused the capitulation of Romania and ]{{Citation needed|date=July 2009}}. It decimated the formations of Army Group South Ukraine, and Soviet forces advanced deep into Romania. In Stalin's speech, he referred to it as the ''Forcing out of the war of Romania and Bulgaria, advancing to the borders of Hungary, and the possibility of offering assistance to allied Yugoslavia.'' It was carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts.<ref name=Werth765/><ref name=Pimlott341>], p. 341</ref>
#] (8 September 1944 - 28 September 1944)and ] (20 October, 1944 - 13 February 1945), and the ] (14 September 1944 - 24 November 1944). These, the final of the successful 1944 offensives, resulted in the capture of ], on 13 February 1945. Budapest was surrounded by Soviet forces on 26 December, 1944, and, after brutal street fighting, fell. It was conducted by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts. <ref>Willmott, p. 391</ref> The three offensives were regarded, and planned as a single continuous strategic advance that was also imbued with great political significance due to the participation of the Yugoslav communist forces in its final phase.
#] (14 September 20 November 1944). Recapturing the ], including most of ] and Estonia, this offensive isolated the ], where 30 divisions of ] were cut off from Army Group Center until the ]. Stalin's speech called the offensive the ''Liberation of Estonia and Latvia, surrounding of Germans in Courland, and forced exit of Finland from the war.'' The Leningrad Front and the ], ], and ]s carried out this attack.<ref name=Pimlott338/>
#] (7 October - 29 October, 1944). This, the first and only large-scale Arctic military operation<ref name="Willmott387">Willmott 1989, p. 387</ref> started after German forces did not evacuate from Finnish territory by 15 September, as dictated in the terms of the ]. It involved Soviet forces chasing retreating Germans into ], and was very successful for the Soviet Union. It led to the occupation of the ] mines in ], which had been producing metal vital for the German war effort. It was conducted primarily by the Karelian Front, with assistance from Soviet naval forces. <ref name="Willmott387"/>
#] (8 September 1944 28 September 1944), ] (29 October 1944 13 February 1945), and the ] (14 September 1944 24 November 1944). These, the final of the 1944 offensives, resulted in the capture of ] on 13 February 1945. Budapest was surrounded by Soviet forces on 26 December 1944, and was captured after weeks of brutal street fighting. The three offensives were regarded and planned as a single continuous strategic advance that was also imbued with great political significance due to the participation of the Yugoslav communist forces in its final phase. Stalin called it the ''crossing of the Carpathian mountains, liberation of Belgrade and offering of direct help to Czechoslovakia, destruction of the Budapest group of Axis forces, and Liberation of Belgrade.'' It was conducted by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts.<ref name=Willmott391>], p. 391</ref>
#] (7–29 October 1944). This, the first and only large-scale Arctic military operation<ref name=Willmott387>], p. 387</ref> started after German forces did not evacuate from Finnish territory by 15 September, as dictated in the terms of the ]. It involved Soviet forces chasing retreating Germans into ], and enabled the occupation of the ] mines in ], which had been producing metal vital for the German war effort. Stalin called it the ''Removal of the threat from German forces to the Soviet northern shipping port of Murmansk and entry into Norway.'' It was conducted primarily by the Karelian Front, with assistance from Soviet naval forces.<ref name=Willmott387/>


==Notes== ==Notes==
{{reflist|2}} {{notelist}}

{{Reflist|2}}


==References== ==References==
*{{cite journal|journal=Leavenworth Papers|issue=17|title=The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944|last1=Gebhardt|first1=James|year=1990|publisher=Combat Studies Institute|location=Fort Leavenworth|issn=0195-3451|url=http://carl.army.mil/download/csipubs/gebhardt/geb_chapt1.pdf|access-date=10 May 2010|ref=Gebhardt}}
* {{cite book | author= Wright, Michael. |title= The World at Arms: The Reader's Digest Illustrated History of World War II |publisher= The Reader's Digest Association Limited |location= London|year= 1989|isbn=0895773333}}
* {{cite book |title=War on the Eastern Front: The German Soldier in Russia, 1941-1945 |last=Lucas |first=James |year=1991 |publisher=Greenhill Books |isbn=978-1-85367-311-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=feCzQspt9dAC&q=%22Stalin%27s+ten+blows%22|ref=Lucas}}
* {{cite book | author= Werth, Alexander. |title= Russia At War: 1941 - 1945 |publisher= E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc |location= New York|year= 1964}}
*{{cite book | author= Willmott, H.P. |title= The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War |publisher= The Free Press |location= New York|year= 1989|isbn= 0-02-934715-7}} * {{cite book|last=Mannerheim|first=G.|title=The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim|year=1953|publisher=Cassell|location=London|ref=Mannerheim}}
* {{cite book |title=Panzerkrieg: The Rise and Fall of Hitler's Tank Divisions |last=McCarthy |first=Peter
*{{cite book | author = Ziemke, Earl|title= Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East| publisher= The U.S. Army Center of Military History|location= Washington, DC|year=1968|isbn=1410204146}}
|author2=Mike Syron |year=2003 |publisher=Carroll & Graf Publishers |isbn=978-0-7867-1264-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LwqhCwNAjSYC&pg=RA1-PA233|ref=McCarthy}}
*{{cite book |author= Pimlott, John|title= The World at Arms: The Reader's Digest Illustrated History of World War II|year= 1989|publisher= The Reader's Digest Association Limited|location= London|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=DX5rHgAACAAJ&q=reader%27s+digest+illustrated+history+of+World+War+II|chapter= Year of ten victories |isbn=0-89577-333-3|ref=Pimlott|display-authors=etal}}
* {{cite book|last=Platonov|first=S. P.|title=Bitva za Leningrad|publisher=Voenizdat Ministerstva Оborony|location=Moscow|year=1964|language=ru|ref=Platonov}}
* {{cite book|title=Mannerheim-kirja|trans-title=Mannerheim Book|language=fi|location=Helsinki|publisher=Ajatus|last1=Turtola|first1=Martti|year=2001|isbn=951-0-18860-3|ref=unconditional}}
*{{cite book |title= Russia at War, 1941 - 1945|last= Werth|first= Alexander|author-link= Alexander Werth|year= 1964|publisher= E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc|location= New York|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=QQgbAAAAIAAJ&q=russia+at+war |chapter= 1944: Russia enters Eastern Europe|isbn= 9788013045928|ref=Werth}}
*{{cite book |title= The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War|last= Willmott|first= H.P.|year= 1989|publisher= The Free Press|location= New York|isbn= 0-02-934715-7 |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=l_xpAQAACAAJ&q=The+Great+Crusade|ref=Willmott}}
*{{cite book |title= Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East|last= Ziemke|first= Earl F.|year= 1968|publisher= The U.S. Army Center of Military History|location= Washington, DC|isbn= 1-4102-0414-6 |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=JBQOAAAACAAJ&q=Stalingrad+to+Berlin|ref=Ziemke}}
* {{cite book|last=Ziemke|first=Earl|title=Stalingrad to Berlin. The German Defeat in the East|year=2002|publisher=Government Printing Office|location=Washington, DC|isbn=978-0-16-001962-3|ref=Ziemke2002|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/StalingradToBerlinTheGermanDefeatInTheEast}}


==Recommended reading== ==Further reading==
* Beshanov, V., Stalin's ten blows, Minsk, Harvest, 2004 (Бешанов В. Десять сталинских ударов. — Мн.: Харвест, 2004.) * Beshanov, V., Stalin's ten blows, Minsk, Harvest, 2004 (Бешанов В. Десять сталинских ударов. — Мн.: Харвест, 2004.)
* Yemelyanov, Yu., Stalin's ten blows: triumph of the generalissimo, Moscow, Eksmo, 2006 (Емельянов Ю. Десять сталинских ударов. Триумф генералиссимуса — М.: Эксмо, 2006. ISBN 5-699-18353-1) * Yemelyanov, Yu., Stalin's ten blows: triumph of the generalissimo, Moscow, Eksmo, 2006 (Емельянов Ю. Десять сталинских ударов. Триумф генералиссимуса — М.: Эксмо, 2006. {{ISBN|5-699-18353-1}})



{{Joseph Stalin}}
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Latest revision as of 09:41, 28 December 2024

Phrase in Soviet historiography
Soviet gains, mid-1943 to end of 1944

In Soviet historiography, Stalin's ten blows (Russian: Десять сталинских ударов, romanizedDesyat' stalinskikh udarov) were the ten successful strategic offensives in Europe conducted by the Red Army in 1944 during World War II. The Soviet offensives drove the Axis forces from Soviet territory and precipitated Nazi Germany's collapse.

History of the expression

The term was heard for the first time in November 1944 from Joseph Stalin in his speech "27th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution" (Russian: «27-я годовщина Великой Октябрьской социалистической революции», romanized: "27-ya godovshchina Velikoy Oktyab'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii") during the 1944 meeting of the Moscow's Soviet deputies. The term was coined as a reflection of the Stalin's cult of personality that prevailed in Soviet Union at the time. It did not reflect specific strategic planning of the Stavka, and at times had been called the "Year of twelve victories," based on the order issued by Stalin on the following day, authorizing the firing of artillery salutes with 24 guns in 12 cities of the Soviet Union: Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Petrozavodsk, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, Kishinev, Tbilisi, Sevastopol, and Lvov. Having in his youth enrolled in the Russian Orthodox Theological Seminary in Tiflis, Stalin would have been familiar with the Bible and specifically with the famous Ten Plagues of Egypt, ten massive "blows" which God was said to have inflicted on the evil Pharaoh and leading to Pharaoh's surrender. The term was discontinued in use after Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 Secret Speech denouncing Stalin and ending his cult of personality following his death.

Background

After the collapse of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, the Soviet counter-offensives, and the Battle of Kursk later in 1943, it became apparent that the tide of war was turning against Germany. Soviet forces were, all along the front, approaching the pre-war border. Partly because of Führer Directive No. 51, which funneled all new men and materials to the Western Front, to meet the expected Allied Invasion, issued on 3 November 1943, Axis forces along the Eastern Front were severely inadequately equipped in comparison to their Soviet opponents, reinforcements were rare, and reserves were stretched thin. Although in this directive Hitler implied that he might be willing to allow withdrawals, trading space for time, this proved to be false. This, combined with Hitler's insistence on holding onto captured territory at all costs, made Soviet victories in 1944 nearly inevitable.

Comparison of German and Soviet forces, January 1944.
Soviet Axis
Personnel 6,500,000 4,300,000
Tanks 5,600 2,300
Field Guns 90,000 54,000
Aircraft 8,800 3,000

The offensives

  1. Leningrad–Novgorod Offensive (14 January – 1 March 1944). This, the second chronologically of the offensives, fully relieved the siege of Leningrad, which had started on September 8, 1941. Although the Germans resisted fiercely at first, having had years to prepare defensive rings including pillboxes and minefields around Leningrad, once the initial defenses were broken Soviet forces easily reached the border of Estonia. In Stalin's speech he called it the Lifting of the Leningrad Blockade. It was conducted by the Leningrad Front and the Volkhov Front.
  2. Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive (24 December 1943 – 17 April 1944). This offensive was launched on Christmas Eve, 1943, the first chronologically of the 1944 offensives, but the second mentioned in Stalin's speech. It involved the clearing of Axis forces from Ukraine. It also resulted in the isolation of the German-controlled Crimea. It was called the Liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine in Stalin's speech, and involved the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, and the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts.
  3. Odessa Offensive (26 March 1944 – 14 April 1944) which began the third blow, and the Crimean Offensive (8 April - 12 May 1944) which completed it. Even though militarily the Odessa Offensive was included in the Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive, Stalin grouped it with the Crimean Offensive in his speech. This offensive cleared the Crimea of German and Romanian forces, and recaptured Sevastopol. Adolf Hitler had refused to allow Axis forces to evacuate, believing that retention of the Crimea was vital to maintaining Turkish neutrality. The Red Army attacked over the Perekop Isthmus, and quickly drove the German and Romanian forces back to Sevastopol, which surrendered on 9 May. Although Hitler had finally given permission for evacuation, the majority of soldiers were unable to escape in time and surrendered and went into captivity. Due to heavy casualties suffered by the Romanian forces, this battle was a major factor in the Romanian surrender later in 1944. Stalin called it the Liberation of Odessa and Liberation of the Crimea in his speech. It was conducted by the 4th Ukrainian Front.
  4. Vyborg–Petrozavodsk Offensive (9 June – 9 August 1944). Directed against Finnish forces north of Leningrad, its strategic objective was to drive Finland out of the war by destroying Finnish forces on the Karelian Isthmus and advancing to the Kymi River, whereby Soviet forces would prepare for an advance deep into Finland. It was carried out by the Leningrad Front and the Karelian Front. Soviet forces succeeded in expelling Finnish forces from territory they had gained in 1941, but the Soviet advance was halted at the Battle of Tali-Ihantala. Further north, Finnish victories in the Battles of Vuosalmi and Ilomantsi halted additional Soviet attempts to break through Finnish lines. The Soviet destruction of Finnish forces and advancement to the Kymi River had failed. An unsigned draft document called "The Terms for Finnish Unconditional Surrender" was found in October 1993 in the Russian Foreign Ministry archive, implying that unconditional surrender was indeed the Soviet goal. While the Red Army had failed to achieve all of its objectives, the offensive nonetheless led to Finland agreeing to Soviet peace terms. On 19 September 1944, the Moscow Armistice was signed, ending the Continuation War. Stalin dubbed the operation the Liberation of Karelia-Finland Soviet Republic.
  5. Operation Bagration (22 June – 19 August 1944) Started exactly three years after the invasion of the Soviet Union, and named after Pyotr Bagration, a Georgian prince fighting for the Russian Empire during the Napoleonic Wars, this drove the last remaining German forces from Soviet territory, recapturing Belarus. It inflicted extremely heavy casualties upon the German Army Group Center, to the point of being called "The Destruction of Army Group Center," and was undoubtedly one of Germany's worst defeats of the war. Soviet forces advanced past the Bobruisk-Mogilev-Vitebsk line, and nearly reached Warsaw before stopping. Almost 30 German divisions were encircled near Minsk, and the prewar border of East Prussia was reached. Stalin called the operation the Belorussian Operation, and liberation of Lithuania and significant parts of allied Poland, and advance to the borders of Germany. It was conducted by the 1st Baltic Front, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Belorussian Fronts.
  6. Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive (13 July – 29 August 1944). This offensive to the south of and concurrent to Operation Bagration advanced through Poland and past the Bug River. Although it made little progress at first, eventually it became successful, capturing Brody, Lvov, and Sandomierz. Called the Liberation of western Ukraine and crossing of the Vistula, it was carried out by the 1st Ukrainian Front, and, in conjunction with Operation Bagration, destroyed the German Army Group Centre.
  7. Second Jassy–Kishinev Offensive (19 August – 14 October 1944). This offensive includes the Second Jassy–Kishinev Offensive, from 20 to 29 August, and its follow-ups, which continued well into October. This offensive and its follow-ups were mainly conducted in the Balkans, and were targeted at German and Romanian formations in Army Group South Ukraine. About 15 or 16 German divisions were encircled with several Romanian divisions during the course of the Soviet advance. These operations directly caused the capitulation of Romania and Bulgaria. It decimated the formations of Army Group South Ukraine, and Soviet forces advanced deep into Romania. In Stalin's speech, he referred to it as the Forcing out of the war of Romania and Bulgaria, advancing to the borders of Hungary, and the possibility of offering assistance to allied Yugoslavia. It was carried out by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts.
  8. Baltic Offensive (14 September – 20 November 1944). Recapturing the Baltic states, including most of Latvia and Estonia, this offensive isolated the Courland Pocket, where 30 divisions of Army Group North were cut off from Army Group Center until the end of the war in Europe. Stalin's speech called the offensive the Liberation of Estonia and Latvia, surrounding of Germans in Courland, and forced exit of Finland from the war. The Leningrad Front and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Baltic Fronts carried out this attack.
  9. East Carpathian Offensive (8 September 1944 – 28 September 1944), Budapest Offensive (29 October 1944 – 13 February 1945), and the Belgrade Offensive (14 September 1944 – 24 November 1944). These, the final of the 1944 offensives, resulted in the capture of Budapest on 13 February 1945. Budapest was surrounded by Soviet forces on 26 December 1944, and was captured after weeks of brutal street fighting. The three offensives were regarded and planned as a single continuous strategic advance that was also imbued with great political significance due to the participation of the Yugoslav communist forces in its final phase. Stalin called it the crossing of the Carpathian mountains, liberation of Belgrade and offering of direct help to Czechoslovakia, destruction of the Budapest group of Axis forces, and Liberation of Belgrade. It was conducted by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts.
  10. Petsamo–Kirkenes Offensive (7–29 October 1944). This, the first and only large-scale Arctic military operation started after German forces did not evacuate from Finnish territory by 15 September, as dictated in the terms of the Moscow Armistice. It involved Soviet forces chasing retreating Germans into Norway, and enabled the occupation of the nickel mines in Pechenga, which had been producing metal vital for the German war effort. Stalin called it the Removal of the threat from German forces to the Soviet northern shipping port of Murmansk and entry into Norway. It was conducted primarily by the Karelian Front, with assistance from Soviet naval forces.

Notes

  1. Also "Stalin's ten victories" or the "ten victories of the Red Army".
  1. 27-я ГОДОВЩИНА ВЕЛИКОЙ ОКТЯБРЬСКОЙ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКОЙ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ Доклад Председателя Государственного Комитета Обороны на торжественном заседании Московского Совета депутатов трудящихся с партийными и общественными организациями г. Москвы 6 ноября 1944 года
  2. Приказ Верховного Главнокомандующего 7 ноября 1944 года Archived 2008-05-03 at the Wayback Machine И. Сталин о Великой Отечественной войне Советского Союза. — М.: Госполитиздат, 1946
  3. Willmott, p. 368
  4. Ziemke, p. 216
  5. Ziemke, p. 217
  6. ^ Pimlott, p. 330
  7. Willmott, p. 369-371
  8. Werth, p. 764
  9. Willmott, p. 372-374
  10. ^ Werth, p. 765
  11. Pimlott, p. 334
  12. Gebhardt, p. 2
  13. Zolotarev (1999), pp. 97–98
  14. (in Russian) Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. Наступление советских войск на Карельском перешейке и в Южной Карелии Archived 2011-09-30 at the Wayback Machine По замыслу Ставки войска Ленинградского и Карельского фронтов при содействии Краснознаменного Балтийского флота, Ладожской и Онежской военных флотилий мощными ударами должны были разгромить противостоящего противника, овладеть Выборгом, Петрозаводском и выйти на рубеж Тикшеозеро, Сортавала, Котка. Операцию начинали войска Ленинградского фронта, затем в наступление переходил Карельский фронт.
  15. Platonov (1964)
  16. Pimlott, p. 343
  17. Mannerheim (1953), p. 500
  18. Ziemke (2002), p. 388
  19. Tapio Tiihonen (2000). Ratkaisu Kannaksella 1944 [Decision at the Isthmus 1944]. Espoo: Fenix. pp. 77–79. The Voroshilov committee prepared the conditions for Finnish capitulation for nine and a half months. The secretary of the committee, S. Bazarov handed these to the "secret police man" of the Foreign Ministry, V. Dekanozov on 26 June The "sekretno projekt" for the surrender of Finland, handed by Barazov to Dekanozov, is dated to 28 June. The signature of the agreement would have meant a complete economic, political, and social subduction of Finland to the Soviet Union The agreement was to be signed by attorneys from both the Soviet and Finnish governments and armed forces. Already the preamble of the agreement made it clear to Finland, what it was about: "The Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Defence Forces acknowledge the complete defeat of the Finnish Armed Forces in the war against the U.S.S.R. and announce the unconditional surrender of Finland, requesting the cessation of acts of war."
  20. Turtola (2001), p. 168, Dr. Turtola discovered a Soviet draft for "The Unconditional Surrender of Finland" from the Russian Foreign Ministry archive in Moscow, dated June 1944. Here are the relevant passages from the document: "The Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Defence Forces acknowledge the complete defeat of the Finnish Armed Forces in the war against the U.S.S.R. and announce the unconditional surrender of Finland, requesting the cessation of acts of war."; "5. As this document takes effect, the Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Finnish Defence Forces commit themselves without delay in calling to Finland all Finnish troops on other fronts and in disarming them."; "7. The Supreme Command of the Finnish Defence Forces will carry out the disarming of all Finnish land, air, and naval forces according to the orders, schedule, and sequence given by the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces, under its supervision. 8. Since the moment of signing this document until when the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces has taken under its control all communications connections in Finland, all radio broadcasts in Finnish territory are forbidden, and Finnish telegraph, telephone, and radio connections to other countries will be cut off. 9. The Finnish Government and the Supreme Command of the Finnish Defence Forces will secure the transportation of military troops of the U.S.S.R. in Finnish territory by rail and by other means of transportation and the needed supplies to the troops. 10. To fulfill the terms of surrender and to secure the interests of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces – by its own military forces and at its own discretion – will occupy partially or fully the territory of Finland, her harbours, the archipelago of Åland, and the islands of the Gulf of Finland. The Government of the U.S.S.R. will make use of all the rights of an occupying power in the occupied territories of Finland. The Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces will publish its own orders and directives. The Finnish Government and the Finnish people will by all means try to contribute to the execution of these orders and directives. To serve this aim, the Finnish Government will without delay give an order to all the authorities of the central and local government, to the judicial system, public organisations, and all civil servants to remain in their previous positions, to obey orders unconditionally, and to carry out their duties conscientiously, until the Supreme Command of the Soviet Military Forces gives its directives."
  21. Pimlott, p. 336
  22. ^ Pimlott, p. 338
  23. McCarthy, p. 232
  24. Pimlott, p. 341
  25. Willmott, p. 391
  26. ^ Willmott, p. 387

References

Further reading

  • Beshanov, V., Stalin's ten blows, Minsk, Harvest, 2004 (Бешанов В. Десять сталинских ударов. — Мн.: Харвест, 2004.)
  • Yemelyanov, Yu., Stalin's ten blows: triumph of the generalissimo, Moscow, Eksmo, 2006 (Емельянов Ю. Десять сталинских ударов. Триумф генералиссимуса — М.: Эксмо, 2006. ISBN 5-699-18353-1)
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