Misplaced Pages

Latest revision as of 22:38, 14 December 2024

Criminology and penology
Theory Anomie Biosocial criminology Broken windows Collective efficacy Crime analysis Criminalization Differential association Deviance Expressive function of law Labeling theory Psychopathy Rational choice Risk & actuarial criminology Social control Social learning Strain Subculture Symbolic interactionism Victimology
Major theorists Émile Durkheim Hans Eysenck Enrico Ferri Michel Foucault Alexandre Lacassagne Cesare Lombroso Archibald Reiss
Types of crime Against Humanity Person State Class Blue-collar White-collar Cold case Perfect Corporate Hate International Juvenile Organized Political Public-order State State-corporate Transnational Victimless War
Methods Comparative Profiling Critical theory Ethnography Uniform Crime Reports Crime mapping Crime statistics Positivist school Qualitative Quantitative BJS NIBRS
Penology Denunciation Deterrence Incapacitation Trial Prison abolition open reform Prisoner Prisoner abuse Prisoners' rights Rehabilitation Recidivism Justice in penology Participatory Restorative Transformative Retributive Utilitarian Solitary confinement
Schools Anarchist Chicago Classical Conflict Critical Environmental Feminist Integrative Italian Marxist Neo-classical Positivist Postmodernist Realism Left Right
Subfields American Anthropological Biosocial criminology Conflict Criminology Critical Culture Cyber Demography Development Environmental Experimental Organizational Political Public Radical criminology
Browse Index Journals Organizations People
v t e

Punishment, commonly, is the imposition of an undesirable or unpleasant outcome upon an individual or group, meted out by an authority—in contexts ranging from child discipline to criminal law—as a deterrent to a particular action or behavior that is deemed undesirable. It is, however, possible to distinguish between various different understandings of what punishment is.

The reasoning for punishment may be to condition a child to avoid self-endangerment, to impose social conformity (in particular, in the contexts of compulsory education or military discipline), to defend norms, to protect against future harms (in particular, those from violent crime), and to maintain the law—and respect for rule of law—under which the social group is governed. Punishment may be self-inflicted as with self-flagellation and mortification of the flesh in the religious setting, but is most often a form of social coercion.

The unpleasant imposition may include a fine, penalty, or confinement, or be the removal or denial of something pleasant or desirable. The individual may be a person, or even an animal. The authority may be either a group or a single person, and punishment may be carried out formally under a system of law or informally in other kinds of social settings such as within a family. Negative or unpleasant impositions that are not authorized or that are administered without a breach of rules are not considered to be punishment as defined here. The study and practice of the punishment of crimes, particularly as it applies to imprisonment, is called penology, or, often in modern texts, corrections; in this context, the punishment process is euphemistically called "correctional process". Research into punishment often includes similar research into prevention.

Justifications for punishment include retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. The last could include such measures as isolation, in order to prevent the wrongdoer's having contact with potential victims, or the removal of a hand in order to make theft more difficult.

If only some of the conditions included in the definition of punishment are present, descriptions other than "punishment" may be considered more accurate. Inflicting something negative, or unpleasant, on a person or animal, without authority or not on the basis of a breach of rules is typically considered only revenge or spite rather than punishment. In addition, the word "punishment" is used as a metaphor, as when a boxer experiences "punishment" during a fight. In other situations, breaking a rule may be rewarded, and so receiving such a reward naturally does not constitute punishment. Finally the condition of breaking (or breaching) the rules must be satisfied for consequences to be considered punishment.

Punishments differ in their degree of severity, and may include sanctions such as reprimands, deprivations of privileges or liberty, fines, incarcerations, ostracism, the infliction of pain, amputation and the death penalty. Corporal punishment refers to punishments in which physical pain is intended to be inflicted upon the transgressor. Punishments may be judged as fair or unfair in terms of their degree of reciprocity and proportionality to the offense. Punishment can be an integral part of socialization, and punishing unwanted behavior is often part of a system of pedagogy or behavioral modification which also includes rewards.

Definitions

There are a large number of different understandings of what punishment is.

In philosophy

Various philosophers have presented definitions of punishment. Conditions commonly considered necessary properly to describe an action as punishment are that

1. it is imposed by an authority (single or multiple),
2. it involves some loss to the supposed offender,
3. it is in response to an offense and
4. the human (or other animal) to whom the loss is imposed should be deemed at least somewhat responsible for the offense.

In psychology

Introduced by B.F. Skinner, punishment has a more restrictive and technical definition. Along with reinforcement it belongs under the operant conditioning category. Operant conditioning refers to learning with either punishment (often confused as negative reinforcement) or a reward that serves as a positive reinforcement of the lesson to be learned. In psychology, punishment is the reduction of a behavior via application of an unpleasant stimulus ("positive punishment") or removal of a pleasant stimulus ("negative punishment"). Extra chores or spanking are examples of positive punishment, while removing an offending student's recess or play privileges are examples of negative punishment. The definition requires that punishment is only determined after the fact by the reduction in behavior; if the offending behavior of the subject does not decrease, it is not considered punishment. There is some conflation of punishment and aversives, though an aversion that does not decrease behavior is not considered punishment in psychology. Additionally, "aversive stimulus" is a label behaviorists generally apply to negative reinforcers (as in avoidance learning), rather than the punishers.

In socio-biology

Punishment is sometimes called retaliatory or moralistic aggression; it has been observed in all species of social animals, leading evolutionary biologists to conclude that it is an evolutionarily stable strategy, selected because it favors cooperative behavior.

However, other evolutionary biologists have argued against punishment to favour cooperation. Dreber et al. demonstrate that while the availability of costly punishment can enhance cooperative behavior, it does not improve the group's average payoff. Additionally, there is a significant negative relationship between the overall payoff and the employment of costly punishment. Individuals who achieve the highest total payoffs generally avoid using costly punishment. This indicates that employing costly punishment in cooperative games may be disadvantageous and suggests that it may have evolved for purposes other than promoting cooperation.

Achieving a certain proportion of trust in the population can lead to self-governance without the need for punishment.

Examples against sociobiological use

There are also arguments against the notion of punishment requiring intelligence, based on studies of punishment in very small-brained animals such as insects. There is proof of honey bee workers with mutations that makes them fertile laying eggs only when other honey bees are not observing them, and that the few that are caught in the act are killed. This is corroborated by computer simulations proving that a few simple reactions well within mainstream views of the extremely limited intelligence of insects are sufficient to emulate the "political" behavior observed in great apes. The authors argue that this falsifies the claim that punishment evolved as a strategy to deal with individuals capable of knowing what they are doing.

In the case of more complex brains, the notion of evolution selecting for specific punishment of intentionally chosen breaches of rules and/or wrongdoers capable of intentional choices (for example, punishing humans for murder while not punishing lethal viruses) is subject to criticism from coevolution issues. That punishment of individuals with certain characteristics (including but, in principle, not restricted to mental abilities) selects against those characteristics, making evolution of any mental abilities considered to be the basis for penal responsibility impossible in populations subject to such selective punishment. Certain scientists argue that this disproves the notion of humans having a biological feeling of intentional transgressions deserving to be punished.

Scope of application

Punishments are applied for various purposes, most generally, to encourage and enforce proper behavior as defined by society or family. Criminals are punished judicially, by fines, corporal punishment or custodial sentences such as prison; detainees risk further punishments for breaches of internal rules. Children, pupils and other trainees may be punished by their educators or instructors (mainly parents, guardians, or teachers, tutors and coaches)—see Child discipline.

Slaves, domestic and other servants were subject to punishment by their masters. Employees can still be subject to a contractual form of fine or demotion. Most hierarchical organizations, such as military and police forces, or even churches, still apply quite rigid internal discipline, even with a judicial system of their own (court martial, canonical courts).

Punishment may also be applied on moral, especially religious, grounds, as in penance (which is voluntary) or imposed in a theocracy with a religious police (as in a strict Islamic state like Iran or under the Taliban) or (though not a true theocracy) by Inquisition.

Hell as punishment

Belief that an individual's ultimate punishment is being sent by God, the highest authority, to an existence in Hell, a place believed to exist in the after-life, typically corresponds to sins committed during their life. Sometimes these distinctions are specific, with damned souls suffering for each sin committed (see for example Plato's myth of Er or Dante's The Divine Comedy), but sometimes they are general, with condemned sinners relegated to one or more chamber of Hell or to a level of suffering.

History and rationale

Seriousness of a crime; punishment that fits the crime

A principle often mentioned with respect to the degree of punishment to be meted out is that the punishment should match the crime. One standard for measurement is the degree to which a crime affects others or society. Measurements of the degree of seriousness of a crime have been developed. A felony is generally considered to be a crime of "high seriousness", while a misdemeanor is not.

Possible reasons for punishment

There are many possible reasons that might be given to justify or explain why someone ought to be punished; here follows a broad outline of typical, possibly conflicting, justifications.

Deterrence

Two reasons given to justify punishment is that it is a measure to prevent people from committing an offense - deterring previous offenders from re-offending, and preventing those who may be contemplating an offence they have not committed from actually committing it. This punishment is intended to be sufficient that people would choose not to commit the crime rather than experience the punishment. The aim is to deter everyone in the community from committing offences.

Some criminologists state that the number of people convicted for crime does not decrease as a result of more severe punishment and conclude that deterrence is ineffective. Other criminologists object to said conclusion, citing that while most people do not know the exact severity of punishment such as whether the sentence for murder is 40 years or life, most people still know the rough outlines such as the punishments for armed robbery or forcible rape being more severe than the punishments for driving too fast or misparking a car. These criminologists therefore argue that lack of deterring effect of increasing the sentences for already severely punished crimes say nothing about the significance of the existence of punishment as a deterring factor.

Some criminologists argue that increasing the sentences for crimes can cause criminal investigators to give higher priority to said crimes so that a higher percentage of those committing them are convicted for them, causing statistics to give a false appearance of such crimes increasing. These criminologists argue that the use of statistics to gauge the efficiency of crime fighting methods are a danger of creating a reward hack that makes the least efficient criminal justice systems appear to be best at fighting crime, and that the appearance of deterrence being ineffective may be an example of this.

Rehabilitation

Some punishment includes work to reform and rehabilitate the culprit so that they will not commit the offence again. This is distinguished from deterrence, in that the goal here is to change the offender's attitude to what they have done, and make them come to see that their behavior was wrong.

Incapacitation

Incapacitation as a justification of punishment refers to the offender's ability to commit further offences being removed. Imprisonment separates offenders from the community, for example, Australia was a dumping ground for early British criminals. This was their way of removing or reducing the offenders ability to carry out certain crimes. The death penalty does this in a permanent (and irrevocable) way. In some societies, people who stole have been punished by having their hands amputated.

Crewe however, has pointed out that for incapacitation of an offender to work, it must be the case that the offender would have committed a crime had they not been restricted in this way. Should the putative offender not be going to commit further crimes, then they have not been incapacitated. The more heinous crimes such as murders have the lowest levels of recidivism and hence are the least likely offences to be subject to incapacitative effects. Antisocial behaviour and the like display high levels of recidivism and hence are the kind of crimes most susceptible to incapacitative effects. It is shown by life-course studies that long sentences for burglaries amongst offenders in their late teens and early twenties fail to incapacitate when the natural reduction in offending due to ageing is taken into account: the longer the sentence, in these cases, the less the incapacitative effect.

Retribution

Criminal activities typically give a benefit to the offender and a loss to the victim. Punishment has been justified as a measure of retributive justice, in which the goal is to try to rebalance any unjust advantage gained by ensuring that the offender also suffers a loss. Sometimes viewed as a way of "getting even" with a wrongdoer—the suffering of the wrongdoer is seen as a desired goal in itself, even if it has no restorative benefits for the victim. One reason societies have administered punishments is to diminish the perceived need for retaliatory "street justice", blood feud, and vigilantism.

Restoration

Especially applied to minor offenses, punishment may take the form of the offender "righting the wrong", or making restitution to the victim. Community service or compensation orders are examples of this sort of penalty. In models of restorative justice, victims take an active role in a process with their offenders who are encouraged to take responsibility for their actions, "to repair the harm they've done—by apologizing, returning stolen money, or community service." The restorative justice approach aims to help the offender want to avoid future offences.

Education and denunciation

Punishment can be explained by positive prevention theory to use the criminal justice system to teach people what are the social norms for what is correct, and acts as a reinforcement.

Punishment can serve as a means for society to publicly express denunciation of an action as being criminal. Besides educating people regarding what is not acceptable behavior, it serves the dual function of preventing vigilante justice by acknowledging public anger, while concurrently deterring future criminal activity by stigmatizing the offender. This is sometimes called the "Expressive Theory" of denunciation. The pillory was a method for carrying out public denunciation.

Some critics of the education and denunciation model cite evolutionary problems with the notion that a feeling for punishment as a social signal system evolved if punishment was not effective. The critics argue that some individuals spending time and energy and taking risks in punishing others, and the possible loss of the punished group members, would have been selected against if punishment served no function other than signals that could evolve to work by less risky means.

Unified theory

A unified theory of punishment brings together multiple penal purposes—such as retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation—in a single, coherent framework. Instead of punishment requiring we choose between them, unified theorists argue that they work together as part of some wider goal such as the protection of rights.

Criticism

Some people think that punishment as a whole is unhelpful and even harmful to the people that it is used against. Detractors argue that punishment is simply wrong, of the same design as "two wrongs make a right". Critics argue that punishment is simply revenge. Professor Deirdre Golash, author of The Case against Punishment: Retribution, Crime Prevention, and the Law, says:

We ought not to impose such harm on anyone unless we have a very good reason for doing so. This remark may seem trivially true, but the history of humankind is littered with examples of the deliberate infliction of harm by well-intentioned persons in the vain pursuit of ends which that harm did not further, or in the successful pursuit of questionable ends. These benefactors of humanity sacrificed their fellows to appease mythical gods and tortured them to save their souls from a mythical hell, broke and bound the feet of children to promote their eventual marriageability, beat slow schoolchildren to promote learning and respect for teachers, subjected the sick to leeches to rid them of excess blood, and put suspects to the rack and the thumbscrew in the service of truth. They schooled themselves to feel no pity—to renounce human compassion in the service of a higher end. The deliberate doing of harm in the mistaken belief that it promotes some greater good is the essence of tragedy. We would do well to ask whether the goods we seek in harming offenders are worthwhile, and whether the means we choose will indeed secure them.

Golash also writes about imprisonment:

Imprisonment means, at minimum, the loss of liberty and autonomy, as well as many material comforts, personal security, and access to heterosexual relations. These deprivations, according to Gresham Sykes (who first identified them) "together dealt 'a profound hurt' that went to 'the very foundations of the prisoner's being. But these are only the minimum harms, suffered by the least vulnerable inmates in the best-run prisons. Most prisons are run badly, and in some, conditions are more squalid than in the worst of slums. In the District of Columbia jail, for example, inmates must wash their clothes and sheets in cell toilets because the laundry machines are broken. Vermin and insects infest the building, in which air vents are clogged with decades' accumulation of dust and grime. But even inmates in prisons where conditions are sanitary must still face the numbing boredom and emptiness of prison life—a vast desert of wasted days in which little in the way of meaningful activity is possible.

Destructiveness to thinking and betterment

There are critics of punishment who argue that punishment aimed at intentional actions forces people to suppress their ability to act on intent. Advocates of this viewpoint argue that such suppression of intention causes the harmful behaviors to remain, making punishment counterproductive. These people suggest that the ability to make intentional choices should instead be treasured as a source of possibilities of betterment, citing that complex cognition would have been an evolutionarily useless waste of energy if it led to justifications of fixed actions and no change as simple inability to understand arguments would have been the most thrifty protection from being misled by them if arguments were for social manipulation, and reject condemnation of people who intentionally did bad things. Punishment can be effective in stopping undesirable employee behaviors such as tardiness, absenteeism or substandard work performance. However, punishment does not necessarily cause an employee to demonstrate a desirable behavior.

See also

• Capital punishment
  • Capital and corporal punishment in Judaism
  • List of capital crimes in the Torah
  • List of methods of capital punishment
  • List of people burned as heretics
  • List of people executed for witchcraft
  • Religion and capital punishment
• Coercion
• Corporal punishment
• Devaluation
• Discipline
• Discipline (BDSM)
• Extrajudicial punishment
• Hudud
• Intimidation
• Nulla poena sine lege
• Preventive state
• Suffering
• Telishment

Citations

1. Edwards, Jonathan (1824), The salvation of all men strictly examined: and the endless punishment of those who die impenitent : argued and defended against the objections and reasonings of the late Rev. Doctor Chauncy, of Boston ; in his book entitled "The Salvation of all Men," &c, C. Ewer and T. Bedlington, 1824, p. 157
2. Bingham, Joseph (1712). "Volume 1 of A Scholastical History Of The Practice of the Church In Reference to the Administration of Baptism By Laymen". A Scholastical History of the Practice of the Church in Reference to the Administration of Baptism by Laymen. 1. Knaplock, 1712: 25.
3. Grotius, Hugo (1715). "H. Grotius of the Rights of War and Peace: In Three Volumes: in which are Explain'd the Laws and Claims of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points that Relate Either to Publick Government, Or the Conduct of Private Life: Together with the Author's Own Notes: Done Into English..., Volume 2". H. Grotius of the Rights of War and Peace: In Three Volumes: In Which Are Explain'd the Laws and Claims of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points That Relate Either to Publick Government, or the Conduct of Private Life: Together with the Author's Own Notes: Done into English by Several Hands: With the Addition of the Author's Life by the Translators: Dedicated to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, Hugo Grotius. 2. D. Brown..., T. Ward..., and W. Meares, 1715: 524.
4. Casper, Johann Ludwig (1864). "A Handbook of the practice of forensic medicine v. 3 1864". A Handbook of the Practice of Forensic Medicine. 3. New Sydenham Society: 2.
5. J, Lubbock (1882). "Laws". The origin of civilisation and the primitive condition of man: Mental and social condition of savages (4th ed.). pp. 443–480. doi:10.1037/13470-010.
6. Lee Hansen, Marcus (1918). "Old Fort Snelling, 1819-1858". Mid-America Series. State Historical Society of Iowa, 1918: 124.
7. ^ Gade, Christian B. N. (2020). "Is restorative justice punishment?". Conflict Resolution Quarterly. 38 (3): 127–155. doi:10.1002/crq.21293.
8. Navy Department, United States (1940). "Compilation of Court-martial Orders, 1916-1937, 1940-41". Compilation of Court-martial Orders, 1916-1937, 1940-41: 648.
9. ^ Hugo, Adam Bedau (February 19, 2010). "Punishment, Crime and the State". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2010-08-04. The search for a precise definition of punishment that exercised some philosophers (for discussion and references see Scheid 1980) is likely to prove futile: but we can say that legal punishment involves the imposition of something that is intended to be burdensome or painful, on a supposed offender for a supposed crime, by a person or body who claims the authority to do so.
10. ^ and violates the law or rules by which the group is governed. McAnany, Patrick D. (August 2010). "Punishment". Online. Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia. Archived from the original on 2017-10-19. Retrieved 2010-08-04. Punishment describes the imposition by some authority of a deprivation—usually painful—on a person who has violated a law, rule, or other norm. When the violation is of the criminal law of society there is a formal process of accusation and proof followed by imposition of a sentence by a designated official, usually a judge. Informally, any organized group—most typically the family, in rearing children—may punish perceived wrongdoers.
11. ^ Hugo, Adam Bedau (February 19, 2010). "Theory of Punishment". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2010-08-04. Punishment under law... is the authorized imposition of deprivations—of freedom or privacy or other goods to which the person otherwise has a right, or the imposition of special burdens—because the person has been found guilty of some criminal violation, typically (though not invariably) involving harm to the innocent. (The classical formulation, conspicuous in Hobbes, for example, defines punishment by reference to imposing pain rather than to deprivations.) This definition, although imperfect because of its brevity, does allow us to bring out several essential points.
12. ^ Peters, Richard Stanley (1966). "Ethics and Education". British Journal of Educational Studies. 20 (3): 267–68. JSTOR 3120772. Punishment... involves the intentional infliction of pain or of something unpleasant on someone who has committed a breach of rules... by someone who is in authority, who has a right to act in this way. Otherwise, it would be impossible to distinguish 'punishment' from 'revenge'. People in authority can, of course, inflict pain on people at whim. But this would be called 'spite' unless it were inflicted as a consequence of a breach of rules on the part of the sufferer. Similarly a person in authority might give a person £5 as a consequence of his breaking a rule. But unless this were regarded as painful or at least unpleasant for the recipient it could not be counted as a case of 'punishment'. In other words at least three criteria of (i) intentional infliction of pain (ii) by someone in authority (iii) on a person as a consequence of a breach of rules on his part, must be satisfied if we are to call something a case of 'punishment'. There are, as is usual in such cases, examples that can be produced which do not satisfy all criteria. For instance there is a colloquialism which is used about boxers taking a lot of punishment from their opponents, in which only the first condition is present. But this is a metaphorical use which is peripheral to the central use of the term.
    
    In so far as the different 'theories' of punishment are answers to questions about the meaning of 'punishment', only the retributive theory is a possible one. There is no conceptual connection between 'punishment' and notions like those of 'deterrence', 'prevention' and 'reform'. For people can be punished without being prevented from repeating the offence, and without being made any better. It is also a further question whether they themselves or anyone else is deterred from committing the offence by punishment. But 'punishment' must involve 'retribution', for 'retribution' implies doing something to someone in return for what he has done.... Punishment, therefore, must be retributive—by definition.
13. ^ Kleining, John (October 1972). "R.S. Peters on Punishment". British Journal of Educational Studies. 20 (3): 259–69. doi:10.1080/00071005.1972.9973352. JSTOR 3120772. Unpleasantness inflicted without authority is revenge, and if whimsical, is spite.... There is no conceptual connection between punishment, or deterrence, or reform, for people can be punished without being prevented from repeating the offence, and without being made better. And it is also a further question whether they themselves, or anyone else is deterred from committing the offence by punishment.
14. Amis, S. (1773). "Association for the Prosecution of Felons (WEST BROMWICH)". The British Library: 5. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
15. Duff, Anthony (2001). Punishment, Communication, and Community. Switzerland: Oxford University Press. pp. xiii.
16. Mary Stohr; Anthony Walsh; Craig Hemmens (2008). Corrections: A Text/Reader. Sage. p. 2. ISBN 978-1-4129-3773-3.
17. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, United States. Committee on Financial Services. and Government Sponsored Enterprises (2003). H.R. 2179, the Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, June 5, 2003. Purdue University: Committee on Financial Services. p. 50. ISBN 978-0-16-070942-5.
18. ^ McAnany, Patrick D. (August 2010). "Justification for punishment (Punishment)". Online. Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia. Archived from the original on 2017-10-19. Retrieved 2010-09-16. Because punishment is both painful and guilt producing, its application calls for a justification. In Western culture, four basic justifications have been given: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. The history of formal punitive systems is one of a gradual transition from familial and tribal authority to the authority of organized society. Although parents today retain much basic authority to discipline their children, physical beatings and other severe deprivations—once widely tolerated—may now be called child abuse
19. J.M.,K.M, P.H., Darley, Catsman, Robinson (2000). "Incapacitation and just deserts as motives for punishment". Law and Human Behavior. 24 (6): 659–683. doi:10.1023/A:1005552203727. PMID 11105478.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
20. M., A, Frankenhaeuser, Rissler (1970). "Effects of punishment on catecholamine release and efficiency of performance". Psychopharmacologia. 17 (5): 378–390. doi:10.1007/BF00403809. PMID 5522998. S2CID 9187358.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
21. C., Mungan, Murat (2019). "Salience and the severity versus the certainty of punishment". International Review of Law and Economics. 57: 95–100. doi:10.1016/j.irle.2019.01.002. S2CID 147798726.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
22. Diana Kendall (2009). Sociology in Our Times: The Essentials (7th revised ed.). Cengage Learning. ISBN 978-0-495-59862-6.
23. W, J.C, Furman, Masters (1980). "Affective consequences of social reinforcement, punishment, and neutral behavior". Developmental Psychology. 16 (2): 100–104. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.16.2.100.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
24. I, Lorge (1933). "The effect of the initial chances for right responses upon the efficacy of intensified reward and of intensified punishment". Journal of Experimental Psychology. 16 (3): 362–373. doi:10.1037/h0070228.
25. Church, R.M. (1963). "The varied effects of punishment on behavior". Psychological Review. 70 (5): 369–402. doi:10.1037/h0046499. PMID 14049776.
26. T.H., G.A., Clutton-brock, Parker (1995). "Punishment in animal societies". Nature. 373 (6511): 209–216. Bibcode:1995Natur.373..209C. doi:10.1038/373209a0. PMID 7816134. S2CID 21638607.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
27. Mary Stohr; Anthony Walsh; Craig Hemmens (2008). Corrections: A Text/Reader. Sage. p. 3. ISBN 978-1-4129-3773-3.
28. Fehr, Gätcher, Ernst, Simon (10 January 2002). "Altruistic punishment in humans". Nature. 415 (6868): 137–140. Bibcode:2002Natur.415..137F. doi:10.1038/415137a. PMID 11805825. S2CID 4310962.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
29. Dreber, Anna; Rand, David G.; Fudenberg, Drew; Nowak, Martin A. (March 2008). "Winners don't punish". Nature. 452 (7185): 348–351. Bibcode:2008Natur.452..348D. doi:10.1038/nature06723. ISSN 1476-4687. PMC 2292414. PMID 18354481.
30. Battu, Balaraju; Rahwan, Talal (2023-01-21). "Cooperation without punishment". Scientific Reports. 13 (1): 1213. Bibcode:2023NatSR..13.1213B. doi:10.1038/s41598-023-28372-y. ISSN 2045-2322. PMC 9867775. PMID 36681708.
31. How the Body Shapes the Way We Think: A New View of Intelligence, Rolf Pfeifer, Josh Bongard, foreword by Rodney Brooks. 2006
32. Friedrich Nietzsche (1886). Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future
33. Allen, Elizabeth, et al. (1975). "Against 'Sociobiology'". New York Review of Books 22 (Nov. 13).
34. Dawkins, Richard (1979). Twelve misunderstandings of kin selection
35. "Observational Learning in Octopus vulgaris." Graziano Fiorito, Pietro Scotto. 1992.
36. Aliens of the deep sea, documentary. 2011.
37. Lyman Julius Nash, Wisconsin (1919). "Wisconsin Statutes". Legislative Reference Bureau, 1919. 1: 2807–2808.
38. Doing Justice – The Choice of Punishments, A Vonhirsch, 1976, p. 220
39. Criminology, Larry J. Siegel
40. "An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as Preference-Shaping Policy", Duke Law Journal, Feb 1990, Vol. 1, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt
41. David, Wood (2002). "Retribution, Crime Reduction and the Justification of Punishment". Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 20 (2): 301–321. JSTOR 3600555.
42. Lynch, James P.; Danner, Mona J.E. (1993). "Offense Seriousness Scaling: An Alternative to Scenario Methods". Journal of Quantitative Criminology. 9 (3): 309–22. doi:10.1007/BF01064464. S2CID 144528020.
43. reference | J. Mitchell Miller | 2009 | 21st Century Criminology: A Reference Handbook
44. reference | Gennaro F. Vito, Jeffrey R. Maahs | 2015 | Criminology
45. reference | Frank E. Hagan | 2010 | Introduction to Criminology: Theories, Methods, and Criminal Behavior
46. reference | Anthony Walsh, Craig Hemmens | 2008 | Introduction to Criminology: A Text/Reader
47. Ronald L. Akers (2013). Criminological Theories: Introduction and Evaluation
48. "What's the Best Way to Discipline My Child?". 5 November 2018.
49. Crewe, D (2021). "Punitiveness and Resentment". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology (13): 64–91.
50. Carlson, C.; Sarnecki, J (2015). An Introduction to Life-Course Criminology. London: Sage.
51. Crewe, D. (2021). "Punitiveness and Resentment". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology (13): 64–91.
52. Sir William Draper, Junius (1772). "Lettres". Letters of Junius: 303–305.
53. D, Wittman (1974). "Punishment as retribution". Theory and Decision. 4 (3–4): 209–237. doi:10.1007/BF00136647. S2CID 153961464.
54. Blackwood, William (1830). "The Southern Review. Vol. V. February and May, 1830". The Southern Review. 5. Michigan State University: William Blackwood: 871.
55. Raworth, John (1644). Buchanan, David (ed.). "The Historie of the Reformation of the Church of Scotland Containing Five Books, Together with Some Treatises Conducing to the History": 358. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
56. Falls, Margaret (April 1987). "Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons". Law and Philosophy. 6 (1): 25–51. doi:10.1007/BF00142639. JSTOR 3504678. S2CID 144282576.
57. K. M., Carlsmith (2006). "The roles of retribution and utility in determining punishment". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 42 (4): 437–451. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.06.007.
58. Popping, S. (1710). True Passive Obedience Restor'd in 1710. In a Dialogue Between a Country-man and a True Patriot. The British Library: S. Popping. p. 8.
59. "restitution". La-articles.org.uk. Retrieved 2012-08-27.
60. "A New Kind of Criminal Justice", Parade, October 25, 2009, p. 6.
61. "Theory, Sources, and Limitations of Criminal Law". Retrieved 2011-09-26.
62. J. Robert Lilly, Francis T. Cullen, Richard A. Ball (2014). Criminological Theory: Context and Consequences
63. Tim Newburn 2017 Criminology
64. "Thom Brooks on Unified Theory of Punishment". Retrieved 2014-09-03.
65. G.T, Gwinn (1949). "The effects of punishment on acts motivated by fear". Journal of Experimental Psychology. 39 (2): 260–69. doi:10.1037/h0062431. PMID 18125723.
66. Edgeworth, Edgeworth, Maria, Richard Lovell (1825). Works of Maria Edgeworth: Practical education. 1825. the University of California: S. H. Parker. p. 149.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
67. ^ "The Case against Punishment: Retribution, Crime Prevention, and the Law - 2004, Page III by Deirdre Golash". Archived from the original on 2019-05-18. Retrieved 2017-09-10.
68. Mind, Brain and Education, Kurt Fischer, Christina Hinton
69. Milbourn, Gene Jr. (November 1996). "Punishment in the workplace creates undesirable side effects". Retrieved November 21, 2018.

References

• "Punishment" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 22 (11th ed.). 1911. p. 653.
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – Legal Punishment
• Etymology Online
• Brooks, Thom (2012). Punishment. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-85051-3.
• Gade, Christian (2020). "Is restorative justice punishment?". Conflict Resolution Quarterly. 38 (3): 127–155. doi:10.1002/crq.21293.
• Lippke, Richard (2001). "Criminal Offenders and Right Forfeiture". Journal of Social Philosophy. 32 (1): 78–89. doi:10.1111/0047-2786.00080.
• Mack, Eric (2008). "Retribution for Crime". In Hamowy, Ronald (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Cato Institute. pp. 429–431. doi:10.4135/9781412965811.n263. ISBN 978-1412965804. OCLC 750831024.
• Zaibert, Leo (2006). Punishment and retribution. Hants, England: Ashgate. ISBN 978-0754623892.

External links

• "Punishment". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• "The Moral Permissibility of Punishment". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

• Punishment
• Punishments
• Social philosophy
• Criminal justice