Revision as of 13:47, 2 April 2006 editSlimVirgin (talk | contribs)172,064 editsm Reverted edits by Mccready (talk) to last version by Savidan← Previous edit | Latest revision as of 20:13, 9 January 2025 edit undoPete unseth (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users10,901 edits varying degrees of animal rights | ||
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{{Short description|Rights belonging to animals}} | |||
], which is campaigning for a ]. ]] | |||
{{About|the philosophy of animal rights|current animal rights around the world|Animal rights by country or territory|a timeline of animal rights|Timeline of animal welfare and rights|other uses|Animal rights (disambiguation)}} | |||
] in ]]] | |||
] in a ]]] | |||
{{Animal rights sidebar}} | |||
{{Rights|By claimant}} | |||
], the 23rd ], revived ] and ] in the 9th century BCE, which led to a radical animal-rights movement in South Asia.<ref>{{cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=YAFPAQAAIAAJ&q=Parshwanatha+animal+rights|title= You are, therefore I am: A declaration of dependence|last1= Kumar|first1= Satish|date= September 2002|publisher= Bloomsbury USA|isbn= 9781903998182}}</ref>]] | |||
], in his '']'', taught ''ahimsa'' and ] as personal virtues. The plaque in this statue of Valluvar at an animal sanctuary in ] describes the Kural's teachings on ahimsa and ], summing them up with the definition of ].]] | |||
'''Animal rights''' is the ] according to which many or all ] have ] independent of their ] to humans, and that their most basic interests—such as avoiding ]—should be afforded the same consideration as similar interests of human beings.<ref>DeGrazia (2002), ch. 2; Taylor (2009), ch. 1.</ref> The ] is often used to reach this conclusion. This argument holds that if marginal human beings such as infants, senile people, and the ] disabled are granted moral status and negative rights, then nonhuman animals must be granted the same moral consideration, since animals do not lack any known morally relevant characteristic that marginal-case humans have. | |||
'''Animal rights''', or '''animal liberation''', is the movement to protect animals from being used or regarded as property by human beings. It is a ] ], insofar as it aims not merely to attain more ] treatment for animals, but also to include species other than ] within the moral community, by giving their basic interests — for example, the interest in avoiding suffering — the same consideration as our own. The claim, in other words, is that animals should no longer be regarded ] or ] as property, or treated merely as resources for human purposes, but should instead be regarded as ]. | |||
Broadly speaking, and particularly in popular discourse, the term "animal rights" is often used synonymously with "animal protection" or "animal liberation". More narrowly, "animal rights" refers to the idea that many animals have fundamental rights to be treated with respect as individuals—], ], and ] from torture—that may not be overridden by considerations of aggregate welfare.<ref>Taylor (2009), ch. 3.</ref> | |||
Some countries have passed legislation awarding recognition to the interests of animals. ] recognized animals as beings, not things, in 1992, and in 2002, the protection of animals was added to the ] constitution. The ]-based ], founded by ]n philosopher ], is campaigning for the ] to adopt its ], which would see ]s, ]s, ]s and ]s included in a "community of equals" with human beings, extending to them the protection of three basic interests: the ], the protection of individual ], and the prohibition of ]. | |||
Many animal rights advocates oppose assigning moral value and fundamental protections on the basis of species membership alone.<ref>Compare for example similar usage of the term in 1938: {{cite book | |||
Critics of the concept of animal ]s argue that, because animals do not have the capacity to enter into a ] or make ] choices, and cannot respect the rights of others or understand the concept of rights, they cannot be regarded as possessors of moral rights. The ] ] argues that only human beings have ] and that "he corollary is inescapable: we alone have rights." Critics holding this position argue that there is nothing inherently wrong with using animals for ], as entertainment, and in ], though human beings may nevertheless have an obligation to ensure they do not suffer unnecessarily (Frey 1980 and Scruton 2000). This position is generally called the ] position, and it is held by some of the oldest of the animal-protection agencies: for example, by the ] in the UK. | |||
| year = 1938 | |||
| title = The American Biology Teacher | |||
| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=gQbbAAAAMAAJ | |||
| publisher = National Association of Biology Teachers | |||
| volume = 53 | |||
| page = 211 | |||
| access-date = 16 April 2021 | |||
| quote = The foundation from which these behaviors spring is the ideology known as speciesism. Speciesism is deeply rooted in the widely-held belief that the human species is entitled to certain rights and privileges.}}</ref> They consider this idea, known as ], a prejudice as irrational as any other,<ref>Horta (2010).</ref> and hold that animals should not be considered property or used as food, clothing, entertainment, or ] merely because they are not human.<ref>That a central goal of animal rights is to eliminate the property status of animals, see Sunstein (2004), p. 11ff. | |||
* For speciesism and fundamental protections, see Waldau (2011). | |||
* For food, clothing, research subjects or entertainment, see Francione (1995), p. 17.</ref> Cultural traditions such as ], ], ], ], ], and ] also espouse varying forms of animal rights. | |||
In parallel to the debate about moral rights, North American law schools now often teach ],<ref name="Animal law courses">{{Cite web|title= Animal Law Courses|url= https://aldf.org/article/animal-law-courses/|website= ]|access-date= 2020-12-13|archive-date= 2020-12-04|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20201204203520/https://aldf.org/article/animal-law-courses/|url-status= live}}</ref> and several legal scholars, such as ] and ], support extending basic legal rights and ]hood to nonhuman animals. The animals most often considered in arguments for personhood are ]. Some animal-rights academics support this because it would break the species barrier, but others oppose it because it predicates moral value on mental complexity rather than ] alone.<ref>For animal-law courses in North America, see {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100613170018/http://aldf.org/article.php?id=445 |date=2010-06-13 }}, ]. Retrieved July 12, 2012. | |||
==Overview== | |||
* For a discussion of animals and personhood, see Wise (2000), pp. 4, 59, 248ff; Wise (2004); Posner (2004); {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080614152221/http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-257091/animal-rights |date=2008-06-14 }}. | |||
{{Template:Animal liberation movement}} | |||
* For the arguments and counter-arguments about awarding personhood only to great apes, see Garner (2005), p. 22. | |||
Animal rights is the concept that all or some animals are entitled to possess their own lives; that animals are deserving of, or already possess, certain ] rights; and that some basic rights for animals ought to be enshrined in law. The animal-rights view rejects the concept that animals are merely ] or ] intended for the benefit of humans. The concept is often confused with ], which is the philosophy that takes cruelty towards animals and animal suffering into account, but that does not necessarily assign specific moral rights to them. | |||
* Also see ] (February 20, 2000). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170501195553/https://www.nytimes.com/books/00/02/20/reviews/000220.20sunstet.html |date=2017-05-01 }}, ''The New York Times''.</ref> {{As of |2019 | November}}, 29 countries had enacted ]; ] granted captive ]s basic human rights in 2014.<ref>{{cite web|url= http://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/23/world/americas/feat-orangutan-rights-ruling/|title= Argentine orangutan granted unprecedented legal rights|last1= Giménez|first1= Emiliano|date= January 4, 2015|website= edition.cnn.com|publisher= ]|access-date= April 21, 2015|archive-date= April 3, 2021|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210403030759/https://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/23/world/americas/feat-orangutan-rights-ruling/|url-status= live}}</ref> Outside of ], animal-rights discussions most often address the status of ]s (compare ]). Other animals (considered less sentient) have gained less attention—] relatively little<ref> | |||
{{cite book | |||
| last1 = Cohen | |||
| first1 = Carl | |||
| author-link1 = Carl Cohen (philosopher) | |||
| last2 = Regan | |||
| first2 = Tom | |||
| author-link2 = Tom Regan | |||
| title = The Animal Rights Debate | |||
| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=JPHtAAAAMAAJ | |||
| series = Point/Counterpoint: Philosophers Debate Contemporary Issues Series | |||
| year = 2001 | |||
| location = Lanham, Maryland | |||
| publisher = Rowman & Littlefield Publishers | |||
| publication-date = 2001 | |||
| page = 47 | |||
| isbn = 9780847696628 | |||
| access-date = 16 April 2021 | |||
| quote = Too often overlooked in the animal world, according to Sapontzis, are insects that have interests, and therefore rights. | |||
}} | |||
</ref> (outside ]) and animal-like ] hardly any.<ref> | |||
The concept of "bacteria rights" can appear coupled with disdain or irony: | |||
{{cite book | |||
| last1 = Pluhar | |||
| first1 = Evelyn B. | |||
| author-link1 = Evelyn Pluhar | |||
| chapter = Human "superiority" and the argument from marginal cases | |||
| title = Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals | |||
| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=S4VyLcBzek0C | |||
| series = Book collections on Project MUSE | |||
| year = 1995 | |||
| location = Durham, North Carolina | |||
| publisher = Duke University Press | |||
| publication-date = 1995 | |||
| page = 9 | |||
| isbn = 9780822316480 | |||
| access-date = 16 April 2021 | |||
| quote = For example, in an editorial entitled 'Animal Rights Nonsense,' ... in the prestigious science journal ''Nature'', defenders of animal rights are accused of being committed to the absurdity of 'bacteria rights.' | |||
}} | |||
</ref> The vast majority of animals have no legally recognised rights.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Jakopovich|first=Daniel|date=2021|title=The UK's Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill Excludes the Vast Majority of Animals: Why We Must Expand Our Moral Circle to Include Invertebrates|url=https://onlineacademiccommunity.uvic.ca/asri/2021/10/17/the-uks-animal-welfare-sentience-bill-excludes-the-vast-majority-of-animals-why-we-should-expand-our-moral-circle-to-include-invertebrates|journal=Animals & Society Research Initiative, University of Victoria, Canada|access-date=2022-06-18|archive-date=2022-11-29|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221129010538/https://onlineacademiccommunity.uvic.ca/asri/2021/10/17/the-uks-animal-welfare-sentience-bill-excludes-the-vast-majority-of-animals-why-we-should-expand-our-moral-circle-to-include-invertebrates/|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
Critics of animal rights argue that nonhuman animals are unable to enter into a ], and thus cannot have rights, a view summarised by the philosopher ], who writes that only humans have duties, and therefore only humans have rights.<ref name=Scruton/> Another argument, associated with the ] tradition, maintains that animals may be used as resources so long as there is no unnecessary suffering;<ref name="Ethical">{{cite journal| author1= Liguori, G.| display-authors= etal| year= 2017| title= Ethical Issues in the Use of Animal Models for Tissue Engineering: Reflections on Legal Aspects, Moral Theory, 3Rs Strategies, and Harm-Benefit Analysis| journal= Tissue Engineering Part C: Methods| volume= 23| issue= 12| pages= 850–862| doi= 10.1089/ten.TEC.2017.0189| pmid= 28756735| s2cid= 206268293| url= https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/51950145/ten.tec.2017.0189.pdf| access-date= 2019-07-12| archive-date= 2020-09-15| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20200915060144/https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/51950145/ten.tec.2017.0189.pdf| url-status= live}}</ref> animals may have some moral standing, but any interests they have may be overridden in cases of comparatively greater gains to aggregate welfare made possible by their use, though what counts as "necessary" suffering or a legitimate sacrifice of interests can vary considerably.<ref>Garner (2005), pp. 11, 16. | |||
The animal-rights ] does not necessarily maintain that human and non-human animals are equal. For example, animal rights advocates do not call for ] for chickens. Some also would make a distinction between ] or self-aware animals and other life forms, with the belief that only sentient animals, or perhaps only animals who have a significant degree of self-awareness, should be afforded the right to possess their own lives and bodies, without regard to how they are valued by humans. Others would extend this right to all animals, even those without developed ]s or self-]. They maintain that any ] or human institution that commodifies animals for the purposes of ], ], ], ], ], or for any other reason, infringes upon their fundamental rights to possess themselves and to pursue their own ends. | |||
*Also see Frey (1980); and for a review of Frey, see {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160219072849/http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1154902/pdf/jmedeth00155-0044.pdf |date=2016-02-19 }}.</ref> Certain forms of animal-rights activism, such as the destruction of ] and of ] by the ], have attracted criticism, including from within the ] itself,<ref>Singer (2000), pp. 151–156.</ref> and prompted the ] to enact laws, including the ], allowing the prosecution of this sort of activity as ].<ref> | |||
{{Cite book | |||
|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=I_jh4VBi_HYC | |||
|title= The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Second Edition | |||
|first= Gus|last= Martin|date= 15 June 2011 | |||
|publisher= SAGE|via= Google Books|isbn= 9781412980166 | |||
}} | |||
</ref> | |||
==History== | |||
Few people would deny that other ] are highly intelligent animals who are aware of their own condition and goals, and can become frustrated when their freedoms are curtailed. In contrast, many other animals, like ], have only extremely simple nervous systems, and are little more than simple automata, capable only of simple reflexes but incapable of formulating any "ends to their actions" or "plans to pursue" them, and equally unable to notice whether they are in captivity or free. By the criteria that ] use, jelly fish are undeniably animals, while from an animal-rights perspective, it is questionable whether they should not rather be considered "vegetables". There is as yet no consensus with regard to which qualities make a living organism an animal in need of rights. The animal-rights debate (much like the ] debate) is therefore marred by the difficulty that its proponents search for simple, clear-cut distinctions on which to base moral and political judgements, even though the biological realities of the problem present no hard and fast boundaries on which such distinctions could be based. Rather, the biological realities are full of complex and diverse gradients. From a ] perspective, jellyfish, farmed chicken, laboratory mice, or pet cats would fall along different points on a (complex and high-dimensional) spectrum from the "nearly vegetable" to the "highly sentient". | |||
{{Main|History of animal rights}}The concept of ] dates to ],<ref>{{cite book | last = Tähtinen | first = Unto | title = Ahimsa. Non-Violence in Indian Tradition | date = 1976 | location = London | pages = 2–3 (English translation: Schmidt p. 631) | isbn = 0-09-123340-2 }}</ref> with roots in early ] and ] history,<ref name="Grant">{{cite book |last1=Grant |first1=Catharine |title=The No-nonsense Guide to Animal Rights |url=https://archive.org/details/nononsenseguidet0000gran |url-access=registration |date=2006 |location=New Internationalist |isbn=9781904456407 |page= |language=en|quote=These religions emphasize ''ahimsa'', which is the principle of non-violence towards all living things. The first precept is a prohibition against the killing of any creature. The Jain, Hindu and Buddhist injunctions against killing serve to teach that all creatures are spiritually equal.}}</ref><ref name="BBC2019">{{cite web |title=Animal rights |url=https://www.bbc.com/bitesize/guides/z3ygjxs/revision/5 |publisher=] |access-date=17 March 2019 |language=en |quote=The main reason for Hindu respect for animal rights is the principle of ahimsa. According to the principle of ahimsa, no living thing should be harmed. This applies to humans and animals. The Jains' belief system takes the principle of ahimsa regarding animals so seriously that as well as being strict vegetarians, some followers wear masks to prevent them breathing in insects. They may also sweep paths with a small broom to make sure they do not tread on any living creatures. |archive-date=8 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308062719/https://www.bbc.com/bitesize/guides/z3ygjxs/revision/5 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name="Mohitdagoat">{{cite book |last1=Owen |first1=Marna A. |title=Animal Rights: Noble Cause Or Needless Effort? |date=2009 |publisher=Twenty-First Century Books |isbn=9780761340829 |page= |language=en |url=https://archive.org/details/animalrightsnobl0000owen/page/12 }}</ref> while Eastern, African, and Indigenous peoples also have rich traditions of animal protection.{{cn|date=July 2024}} In the Western world, ] viewed animals as lacking reason<ref name=EB3>"." ''Encyclopædia Britannica''. 2007.</ref> and existing for human use, though other ancient philosophers believed animals deserved gentle treatment.{{cn|date=July 2024}} Major religious traditions, chiefly ], opposed animal cruelty. While scholars like ] saw animals as unconscious automata,<ref>Waddicor, M. H., ''Montesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law'' (]: ], 1970), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214230/https://books.google.com/books?id=sLooBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA63|date=16 August 2021}}.</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=23 December 1995 |title=''Animal Consciousness'', No. 2. Historical background |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/#hist |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080906181245/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/#hist |archive-date=6 September 2008 |access-date=16 December 2014 |publisher=Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy}}</ref><ref>Parker, J. V., ''Animal Minds, Animal Souls, Animal Rights'' (]: ], 2010), p. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214246/https://books.google.com/books?id=Sh2AQTDV5DQC&pg=PA16|date=16 August 2021}}, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214245/https://books.google.com/books?id=Sh2AQTDV5DQC&pg=PA88|date=16 August 2021}}, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214239/https://books.google.com/books?id=Sh2AQTDV5DQC&pg=PA99|date=16 August 2021}}.</ref> and ] denied direct duties to animals,<ref>] (1785). '']''</ref> ] emphasized their capacity to suffer.<ref name=":2">Bentham, Jeremy. 1780. "". pp. 307–335 in '']''. London: T. Payne and Sons.</ref>{{Rp|309n}} The publications of ] eventually eroded the Cartesian view of animals.<ref>Spencer, J., {{"'}}Love and Hatred are Common to the Whole Sensitive Creation': Animal Feeling in the Century before Darwin," in A. Richardson, ed., ''After Darwin: Animals, Emotions, and the Mind'' (Amsterdam and New York: ], 2013), | |||
{{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214237/https://books.google.com/books?id=3imLAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA37|date=16 August 2021}}.</ref>{{rp|37}} Darwin noted the mental and emotional continuity between humans and animals, suggesting the possibility of animal suffering.<ref>{{Cite book |author=Workman, L. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rz8dBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT177 |title=Charles Darwin: The Shaping of Evolutionary Thinking |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2013 |isbn=978-1-137-31323-2 |page=177 |author-link=Lance Workman |access-date=19 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214235/https://books.google.com/books?id=rz8dBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT177 |archive-date=16 August 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>{{rp|177}} The ] movement emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Franco|first=Nuno Henrique|date=2013-03-19|title=Animal Experiments in Biomedical Research: A Historical Perspective|journal=Animals|volume=3|issue=1|pages=238–273| doi=10.3390/ani3010238| issn=2076-2615| pmc=4495509| pmid=26487317| doi-access=free}}</ref> driven significantly by women.<ref name="Ross 2014">{{cite journal|author=Ross, Karen|year=2014|title=Winning Women's Votes: Defending Animal Experimentation and Women's Clubs in New York, 1920–1930|journal=New York History|volume=95|issue=1|pages=26–40|doi=10.1353/nyh.2014.0050 }}</ref> From the 1970s onward, growing scholarly and activist interest in animal treatment has aimed to raise awareness and reform laws to improve animal rights and human–animal relationships.{{cn|date=July 2024}} | |||
==In religion== | |||
== Animal rights in philosophy == | |||
{{See also|Animals in Islam|Christianity and animal rights|Animal rights in Jainism, Hinduism, and Buddhism}} | |||
] briefly alludes to the concept of animal rights in the preface of his ]. He argues that man starts as an animal, though not one "devoid of intellect and freedom" like others; however, as animals are sensitive beings, "they too ought to participate in natural right, and that man is subject to some sort of duties toward them," specifically "one the right not to be uselessly mistreated by the other." | |||
For some the basis of animal rights is in religion or ] (or in general ]), with some religions banning killing any animal. In other religions animals are considered ]. ] and ] societies abandoned animal sacrifice and embraced ] from the 3rd century BCE.<ref name="Garner 2005, pp. 21–22">Garner (2005), pp. 21–22.</ref> One of the most important sanctions of the ], Hindu, and Buddhist faiths is the concept of ], or refraining from the destruction of life<!-- (], p. 234)-->. According to Buddhism, humans do not deserve preferential treatment over other living beings.<ref name="Grant">{{cite book |last1=Grant |first1=Catharine |title=The No-nonsense Guide to Animal Rights |url=https://archive.org/details/nononsenseguidet0000gran |url-access=registration |date=2006 |location=New Internationalist |isbn=9781904456407 |page= |language=en|quote=These religions emphasize ''ahimsa'', which is the principle of non-violence towards all living things. The first precept is a prohibition against the killing of any creature. The Jain, Hindu and Buddhist injunctions against killing serve to teach that all creatures are spiritually equal.}}</ref> The ] interpretation of this doctrine prohibits the killing of any living being.<ref name="Grant" /> These Indian religions' dharmic beliefs are reflected in the ancient Indian works of the ] and ], which contain passages that extend the idea of nonviolence to all living beings.<ref>{{cite web | url = https://ivu.org/congress/wvc57/souvenir/tamil.html | title = Vegetarianism in Tamil Literature | last = Meenakshi Sundaram | first = T. P. | date = 1957 | website = 15th World Vegetarian Congress 1957 | publisher = International Vegetarian Union (IVU) | access-date = 17 April 2022 | quote = Ahimsa is the ruling principle of Indian life from the very earliest times. ... This positive spiritual attitude is easily explained to the common man in a negative way as "ahimsa" and hence this way of denoting it. Tiruvalluvar speaks of this as "kollaamai" or "non-killing." | archive-date = 22 January 2022 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220122033037/https://ivu.org/congress/wvc57/souvenir/tamil.html | url-status = live }}</ref> | |||
Contemporaneous with Rousseau was the Scottish writer ]. Oswald argued in "The Cry of Nature or an Appeal to Mercy and Justice on Behalf of the Persecuted Animals", that man is naturally equipped with feelings of mercy and compassion. If each man had to personally experience the death of the animals he ate, so argued Oswald, a vegetarian diet would be far more common. The division of labor, however, allows modern man to eat flesh without experiencing the prompting of man's natural sensitivities, while the brutalization of modern man made him inured to these sensitivities. Although Oswald gave compassion a central place in his philosophy, he was not a pacifist. Oswald was a radical republican and died in battle fighting in defence of the ]. | |||
In Islam, animal rights were recognized early by the ]. This recognition is based on both the ] and the ]. The Qur'an contains many references to animals, detailing that they have souls, form communities, communicate with God, and worship Him in their own way. ] forbade his followers to harm any animal and asked them to respect animals' rights.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/islamethics/animals_1.shtml|title=BBC - Religions - Islam: Animals|publisher=bbc.co.uk|access-date=2019-12-20|archive-date=2020-02-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200204062925/http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/islamethics/animals_1.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref> Nevertheless, Islam does allow eating of certain species of animals. | |||
One of the first philosophers to take animal liberation seriously was one of the founders of modern ], ], who wrote, speaking of the need to extend legal rights to animals: "The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny." Bentham also argued that an animal's apparent lack of rationality ought not to be held against it insofar as morality is concerned: | |||
According to ], all animals, from the smallest to the largest, are cared for and loved. According to the Bible, "All these animals waited for the Lord, that the Lord might give them food at the hour. The Lord gives them, they receive; The Lord opens his hand, and they are filled with good things."<ref>Proverbs 30:24 and NW; Psalm 104:24, 25, 27, 28</ref> It further says ] "gave food to the animals, and made the crows cry."<ref>Ps 147:9</ref> | |||
<blockquote>It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the ''os sacrum'' are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate.</blockquote> | |||
==Philosophical and legal approaches== | |||
<blockquote>What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being? The time will come when humanity will extend its mantle over everything which breathes ... (Bentham, 1789)</blockquote> | |||
===Overview=== | |||
] argued that animals have the same essence as humans, despite lacking the faculty of reason. Although he produced a utilitarian justification for eating animals, he argued for consideration to be given to animals in morality, and he opposed ]. His critique of ]ian ethics contained a lengthy and often furious polemic against the exclusion of animals in his moral system, which contained the famous line: "Cursed be any morality that does not see the essential unity in all eyes that see the sun." | |||
{{Further|Consequentialism|Deontological ethics}} | |||
], Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, is a proponent of the ] to animal rights.]] | |||
The two main philosophical approaches to animal ethics are utilitarian and rights-based. The former is exemplified by ], and the latter by ] and ]. Their differences reflect a distinction philosophers draw between ethical theories that judge the rightness of an act by its consequences (consequentialism/teleological ethics, or utilitarianism), and those that focus on the principle behind the act, almost regardless of consequences (deontological ethics). Deontologists argue that there are acts we should never perform, even if failing to do so entails a worse outcome.<ref>Craig (1988).</ref> | |||
There are a number of positions that can be defended from a consequentalist or deontologist perspective, including the ], represented by ], and the ], which has been examined by Ingmar Persson and ]. The capabilities approach focuses on what individuals require to fulfill their capabilities: Nussbaum (2006) argues that animals need a right to life, some control over their environment, company, play, and physical health.<ref>Nussbaum (2006), pp. 388ff, 393ff; also see Nussbaum (2004), p. 299ff.</ref> | |||
The concept of animal rights was the subject of an influential book — ''Animals' Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress'' — by ] social reformer ] in 1892. A year earlier, Salt had formed the Humanitarian League; its objectives included the banning of hunting as a sport. | |||
], ], and ] also discuss animal rights in terms of animals being permitted to lead a life appropriate for their kind.<ref>Weir (2009): see Clark (1977); Rollin (1981); Midgley (1984).</ref> Egalitarianism favors an equal distribution of happiness among all individuals, which makes the interests of the worse off more important than those of the better off.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160413170400/http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115834 |date=2016-04-13 }}; Vallentyne (2007).</ref> Another approach, ], holds that in considering how to act we should consider the character of the actor, and what kind of moral agents we should be. ] has suggested an approach to animal rights based on virtue ethics.<ref>Rowlands (2009), p. 98ff; Hursthouse (2000a); Hursthouse (2000b), p. 146ff.</ref> ] has proposed a ] approach.<ref name=Rowlands1998p118/><!--expand Clark, Nussbaum, virtue ethics--> | |||
In modern times, the idea of animal rights was re-introduced by S. and R. Godlovitch, and J. Harris, with their 1971 book ''Animals, Men and Morals''. This was a collection of articles which restated the case for animal rights in a powerful and philosophically sophisticated way. It could justly be said that it was this work that reinvigorated the animal rights movement, and it inspired later philosophers to develop their ideas. It was, for example, in a review of this book, that the Australian philosopher ], now Ira W. DeCamp Professor of ] in the University Center for Human Values at ], first coined the term 'animal liberation.' | |||
===Utilitarianism=== | |||
Peter Singer and ] are the best-known proponents of animal liberation, though they differ in their philosophical approaches to the issue. Another influential thinker is ], who presents an ] view that non-human animals should have the basic right not to be treated as the property of humans. Activists ] of ], and ] of ] have also presented philosophies of animal rights. | |||
{{Further|Equal consideration of interests|Utilitarianism}} | |||
Nussbaum (2004) writes that utilitarianism, starting with ] and ], has contributed more to the recognition of the moral status of animals than any other ethical theory.<ref>Nussbaum (2004), p. 302.</ref> The utilitarian philosopher most associated with animal rights is Peter Singer, professor of bioethics at ]. Singer is not a rights theorist, but {{Citation needed span|text=uses the language of rights to discuss how we ought to treat individuals.|date=October 2023}} He is a ],{{Needs update|date=October 2023|reason=Singer revealed in The Point of View of the Universe (2014) that he is no longer a preference utilitarian.}} meaning that he judges the rightness of an act by the extent to which it satisfies the preferences (interests) of those affected.<ref>For a discussion of preference utilitarianism, see Singer (2011), pp. 14ff, 94ff.</ref> | |||
His position is that there is no reason not to give equal consideration to the interests of human and nonhumans, though his principle of equality does not require identical treatment. A mouse and a man both have an interest in not being kicked, and there are no moral or logical grounds for failing to accord those interests equal weight. Interests are predicated on the ability to suffer, nothing more, and once it is established that a being has interests, those interests must be given equal consideration.<ref name=Singer7>Singer (1990), pp. 7–8.</ref> Singer quotes the English philosopher ] (1838–1900): "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other."<ref name="Singer5">Singer 1990, p. 5.</ref> | |||
Although Singer is the ideological founder of today's animal-rights movement, his approach to an animal's moral status is not based on the concept of rights, but on the ] principle of ]. His 1975 book '']'' argues that humans grant moral consideration to other humans not on the basis of intelligence (in the instance of children, or the mentally disabled), on the ability to moralize (criminals and the insane), or on any other attribute that is inherently human, but rather on their ability to experience ''suffering''. As animals also experience suffering, he argues, excluding animals from such consideration is a form of discrimination known as ']' — a term first coined by the British psychologist ]. | |||
]: interests are predicated on the ability to suffer.]] | |||
Tom Regan (''The Case for Animal Rights'' and '']''), on the other side, claims that non-human animals as "subjects-of-a-life" are bearers of rights like humans, although not necessarily of the same degree. This means that animals in this class have "inherent value" as individuals, and cannot merely be considered as the means to an end. This is also called the "direct duty" view. According to Regan, we should abolish the breeding of animals for food, animal experimentation, and commercial hunting. Regan's theory does not extend to all sentient animals but only to those that can be regarded as "subjects-of-a-life." Regan argues that all normal mammals of at least one year of age would qualify in this regard. | |||
Singer argues that equality of consideration is a prescription, not an assertion of fact: if the equality of the sexes were based only on the idea that men and women were equally intelligent, we would have to abandon the practice of equal consideration if this were later found to be false. But the moral idea of equality does not depend on matters of fact such as intelligence, physical strength, or moral capacity. Equality therefore cannot be grounded on the outcome of scientific investigations into the intelligence of nonhumans. All that matters is whether they can suffer.<ref name=Singer1990p4>Singer (1990), p. 4.</ref> | |||
Commentators on all sides of the debate now accept that animals suffer and feel pain, although it was not always so. ], professor of philosophy, animal sciences, and biomedical sciences at Colorado State University, writes that Descartes's influence continued to be felt until the 1980s. Veterinarians trained in the US before 1989 were taught to ignore pain, he writes, and at least one major veterinary hospital in the 1960s did not stock narcotic analgesics for animal pain control. In his interactions with scientists, he was often asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" evidence that they could feel pain.<ref name=Rollin117>Rollin (1989), pp. xii, pp. 117–118; {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200728054434/https://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v8/n6/full/7400996.html |date=2020-07-28 }}.</ref> | |||
While Singer is primarily concerned with improving the treatment of animals and accepts that, at least in some hypothetical scenarios, animals could be legitimately used for further (human or non-human) ends, Regan believes we ought to treat animals as we would persons, and he applies the strict ] idea that they ought never to be sacrificed as mere means to ends, and must be treated as ends unto themselves. Notably, Kant himself did not believe animals were subject to what he called the moral law; he believed we ought to show compassion, but primarily because not to do so brutalizes human beings, and not for the sake of animals themselves. | |||
Scientific publications have made it clear since the 1980s that the majority of researchers do believe animals suffer and feel pain, though it continues to be argued that their suffering may be reduced by an inability to experience the same dread of anticipation as humans or to remember the suffering as vividly.<ref>Singer (1990), pp. 10–17, citing Stamp Dawkins (1980), Walker (1983), and Griffin (1984); Garner (2005), pp. 13–14.</ref> The ability of animals to suffer, even it may vary in severity, is the basis for Singer's application of equal consideration. The problem of animal suffering, and animal consciousness in general, arose primarily because it was argued that animals ]. Singer writes that, if language were needed to communicate pain, it would often be impossible to know when humans are in pain, though we can observe pain behavior and make a calculated guess based on it. He argues that there is no reason to suppose that the pain behavior of nonhumans would have a different meaning from the pain behavior of humans.<ref>Singer (1990) p. 12ff.</ref> | |||
Despite these theoretical differences, both Singer and Regan agree about what to do in practice: for instance, they both agree that the adoption of a ] diet and the abolition of nearly all forms of ] are ethically mandatory. | |||
===Subjects-of-a-life=== | |||
]'s work (''Introduction to Animal Rights'', et.al.) is based on the premise that if non-human animals are considered to be property then any rights that they may be granted would be directly undermined by that property status. He points out that a call to equally consider the 'interests' of your property against your own interests is absurd. Without the basic right not to be treated as the property of humans, non-human animals have no rights whatsoever, he says. Francione posits that sentience is the only valid determinant for moral standing, unlike Regan who sees qualitative degrees in the subjective experiences of his "subjects-of-a-life" based upon a loose determination of who falls within that category. Francione claims that there is no actual animal-rights movement in the United States, but only an ] movement. In line with his philosophical position and his work in animal-rights law for the Animal Rights Law Project at ], he points out that any effort that does not advocate the abolition of the property status of animals is misguided, in that it inevitably results in the institutionalization of animal exploitation. It is logically inconsistent and doomed never to achieve its stated goal of improving the condition of animals, he argues. Francione holds that a society which regards dogs and cats as family members yet kills cows, chickens, and pigs for food exhibits what he calls "moral schizophrenia". | |||
{{Further|The Case for Animal Rights}} | |||
]: animals are subjects-of-a-life.]] | |||
Tom Regan, professor emeritus of philosophy at North Carolina State University, argues in ''The Case for Animal Rights'' (1983) that nonhuman animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life", and as such are bearers of rights.<ref name=Regan243>Regan (1983), p. 243.</ref> He writes that, because the moral rights of humans are based on their possession of certain ] abilities, and because these abilities are also possessed by at least some nonhuman animals, such animals must have the same moral rights as humans. Although only humans act as moral agents, both marginal-case humans, such as infants, and at least some nonhumans must have the status of "moral patients".<ref name=Regan243/> | |||
Moral patients are unable to formulate moral principles, and as such are unable to do right or wrong, even though what they do may be beneficial or harmful. Only moral agents are able to engage in moral action. Animals for Regan have "]" as subjects-of-a-life, and cannot be regarded as a means to an end, a view that places him firmly in the abolitionist camp. His theory does not extend to all animals, but only to those that can be regarded as subjects-of-a-life.<ref name=Regan243/> He argues that all normal mammals of at least one year of age would qualify: | |||
== Animal rights in ] == | |||
] in a ] branch, ], 2004-5 ]] | |||
{{Blockquote|... individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests.<ref name=Regan243/>}} | |||
Animals are protected under the ], though without having rights assigned to them. There are ]s against cruelty to animals, laws that regulate the keeping of animals in cities and on farms, the transit of animals internationally, as well as quarantine and inspection provisions. These laws are designed to protect animals from unnecessary physical harm and to regulate the use of animals as food. In the ], it is possible to create a ] and have the trust empowered to see to the care of a particular animal after the death of the benefactor of the trust. Some individuals create such trusts in their ]. Trusts of this kind can be upheld by the ]s if properly drafted and if the ] is of sound mind. There are several movements in the UK campaigning to require the ] to award greater protection to animals. The legislation, if passed, will introduce a ] of care, whereby a keeper of an animal would commit an offence if he or she fails to take reasonable steps to ensure an animal’s welfare. This concept of giving the animal keeper a duty towards the animal is equivalent to granting the animal a right to proper welfare. The draft bill is supported by an ] campaign. | |||
Whereas Singer is primarily concerned with improving the treatment of animals and accepts that, in some hypothetical scenarios, individual animals might be used legitimately to further human or nonhuman ends, Regan believes we ought to treat nonhuman animals as we would humans. He applies the strict ] ideal (which Kant himself applied only to humans) that they ought never to be sacrificed as a means to an end, and must be treated as ends in themselves.<ref>Regan (1983).</ref> | |||
] passed legislation in 1992 to recognize animals as beings, not things; and in 2002, the protection of animals was enshrined in the ] constitution when its upper house of parliament voted to add the words "and animals" to the clause in the constitution obliging the state to protect the "natural foundations of life ... in the interests of future generations." | |||
===Abolitionism=== | |||
The State of ], meanwhile, has banned dissections of animals in elementary and secondary schools; performances by trained animals in circuses; and ]. <!--banned the production, sale, or both, do we know?--> | |||
{{Further|Abolitionism (animal rights)|Animals, Property, and the Law}} | |||
]: animals need only the right not to be regarded as property.]] | |||
Gary Francione, professor of law and philosophy at ] in Newark, is a leading abolitionist writer, arguing that animals need only one right, the right not to be owned. Everything else would follow from that ]. He writes that, although most people would condemn the mistreatment of animals, and in many countries there are laws that seem to reflect those concerns, "in practice the legal system allows any use of animals, however abhorrent." The law only requires that any suffering not be "unnecessary". In deciding what counts as "unnecessary", an animal's interests are weighed against the interests of human beings, and the latter almost always prevail.<ref>Francione (1990), pp. 4, 17ff.</ref> | |||
Francione's ''Animals, Property, and the Law'' (1995) was the first extensive jurisprudential treatment of animal rights. In it, Francione compares the situation of animals to the treatment of ], where legislation existed that appeared to protect them while the courts ignored that the institution of slavery itself rendered the protection unenforceable.<ref>Francione (1995), pp. 4–5.</ref> He offers as an example the United States ], which he describes as an example of symbolic legislation, intended to assuage public concern about the treatment of animals, but difficult to implement.<ref>Francione (1995), p. 208ff.</ref> | |||
== Animal rights in practice == | |||
] (ALF)]] | |||
In practice, those who advocate animal rights usually boycott a number of industries that use animals. Foremost among these is ], | |||
which produces the majority of ], ]s, and ] in Western industrialized nations. The transportation of farm animals for slaughter, which often involves their ], has in recent years been a major issue of campaigning for animal-rights groups, particularly in the ]. | |||
He argues that a focus on animal welfare, rather than animal rights, may worsen the position of animals by making the public feel comfortable about using them and entrenching the view of them as property. He calls animal rights groups who pursue animal welfare issues, such as ], the "]", arguing that they have more in common with 19th-century animal protectionists than with the animal rights movement; indeed, the terms "animal protection" and "protectionism" are increasingly favored. His position in 1996 was that there is no animal rights movement in the United States.<ref> | |||
The vast majority of animal-rights advocates adopt ] or ] diets; they may also avoid clothes made of animal skins, such as ] shoes, and will not use products such as ], ] products, or certain ]s or ]s known to contain so-called animal ]s. Goods containing ingredients that have been tested on animals are also avoided where possible. Company-wide ]s are common. The ] corporation, for example, ] many of its products on animals, leading many animal-rights supporters to boycott all of their products, including food like peanut butter. | |||
*Francione and Garner (2010), pp. 1ff, 175ff. | |||
*Hall, Lee. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090508021512/http://www.friendsofanimals.org/programs/animal-rights/interview-with-gary-francione.html |date=May 8, 2009 }}, Friends of Animals. Retrieved February 3, 2011.</ref> | |||
===Contractarianism=== | |||
The vast majority of animal-rights advocates dedicate themselves to educating the public. Some organizations, like '']'', strive to do this by garnering media attention for animal-rights issues, often using outrageous stunts or advertisements to obtain media coverage for a more serious message. | |||
{{Further|Social contract}} | |||
], professor of philosophy at the University of Florida, has proposed a contractarian approach, based on the ] and the ]—a "state of nature" thought experiment that tests intuitions about justice and fairness—in ]'s '']'' (1971). In the original position, individuals choose principles of justice (what kind of society to form, and how primary social goods will be distributed), unaware of their individual characteristics—their race, sex, class, or intelligence, whether they are able-bodied or disabled, rich or poor—and therefore unaware of which role they will assume in the society they are about to form.<ref name=Rowlands1998p118>Rowlands (1998), p. 118ff, particularly pp. 147–152.</ref> | |||
The idea is that, operating behind the veil of ignorance, they will choose a social contract in which there is basic fairness and justice for them no matter the position they occupy. Rawls did not include species membership as one of the attributes hidden from the decision-makers in the original position. Rowlands proposes extending the veil of ignorance to include rationality, which he argues is an undeserved property similar to characteristics including race, sex and intelligence.<ref name="Rowlands1998p118"/> | |||
There is a growing trend in the American animal-rights movement towards devoting all resources to vegetarian outreach. The 9.8 billion animals killed there for food use every year far exceeds the number of animals being exploited in other ways. Groups such as '']'' and '']'' devote their time to exposing factory-farming practices by publishing information for consumers and by organizing undercover investigations. | |||
===''Prima facie'' rights theory=== | |||
A growing number of animal-rights activists engage in ]. This typically involves the removal of animals from facilities that use them or the damage of property at such facilities in order to cause financial loss. A few incidents have involved ] or the threat of violence toward animal ] or others involved in the use of animals. | |||
{{Further|Prima facie right}} | |||
<!--I'm making this paragraph invisible as it's problematic, as follows: The first sentence needs a reference for the FBI claim, and for the denouncing of direct action by many animal-rights groups: "As a result of "direct action" tactics, the following needs a reference: (the ] has announced that it considers the ] and ] the number one ] groups native to the ]) many animal-rights organizations denounce its use in advancing the animal rights cause." This sentence is okay: "Most animal-rights groups, including activists who work under the banner of the ], reject the use of violence by people acting in their name." This sentence needs references: "However, some radical animal-right activists in Canada, the UK and the US actively engage in harassment of family homes of individual workers of research facilities, related businesses and individual shareholders." It also needs clarification. Is harassment of individuals being counted as violence? Is SHAC, which does this, being counted as more radical than the ALF, which the previous sentence seems to suggest doesn't? --> | |||
American philosopher Timothy Garry has proposed an approach that deems nonhuman animals worthy of ''prima facie'' rights. In a philosophical context, a ''prima facie'' (Latin for "on the face of it" or "at first glance") right is one that appears to be applicable at first glance, but upon closer examination may be outweighed by other considerations. In his book '']'', ] characterizes such rights as "the right is real but leaves open the question of whether it is applicable and overriding in a particular situation".<ref name="Hinman1998p208">Hinman, Lawrence M. Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College, 1998. Print.</ref> The idea that nonhuman animals are worthy of ''prima facie'' rights is to say that, in a sense, animals have rights that can be overridden by many other considerations, especially those conflicting a human's right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Garry supports his view arguing: | |||
There are also a growing number of "]s," in which animal-rights advocates enter businesses to steal animals without trying to hide their identities. Open rescues tend to be carried out by committed individuals who are willing to go to jail if prosecuted, but so far no factory-farm owner has been willing to press charges, perhaps because of the negative publicity that would ensue. However some countries like Britain have proposed stricter laws to curb animal extremists. | |||
{{Blockquote|... if a nonhuman animal were to kill a human being in the U.S., it would have broken the laws of the land and would probably get rougher sanctions than if it were a human. My point is that like laws govern all who interact within a society, rights are to be applied to all beings who interact within that society. This is not to say these rights endowed by humans are equivalent to those held by nonhuman animals, but rather that if humans possess rights then so must all those who interact with humans.<ref name=Garry2012p6>Garry, Timothy J. Nonhuman Animals: Possessors of Prima Facie Rights (2012), p.6</ref>}} | |||
''See also: ]'' | |||
In sum, Garry suggests that humans have obligations to nonhuman animals; animals do not, and ought not to, have uninfringible rights against humans. | |||
== Criticism of animal rights == | |||
Criticism against the concept of animal rights include philosophical arguments that to have rights requires moral judgements, that animal rights actually turns humans into second-class citizens under animals, and that humans have a responsibility to promote ] instead of animal rights. Criticism against the animal right movement include statements that the animal rights movement is actually anti-human. Each crticism is detailed below. | |||
=== |
===Feminism and animal rights=== | ||
{{Further|Women and animal advocacy|Ethics of care|Feminist ethics}} | |||
Critics such as Carl Cohen, professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan and the University of Michigan Medical School, oppose the granting of "personhood" to animals. Cohen wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine in October, 1986: | |||
] ] has written extensively about the link between feminism and animal rights, starting with ''The Sexual Politics of Meat'' (1990).]] | |||
<blockquote>The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, the holders of rights must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked." </blockquote> | |||
Women have played a central role in animal advocacy since the 19th century.<ref name="Lansbury et al">Lansbury (1985); Adams (1990); Donovan (1993); Gruen (1993); Adams (1994); Adams and Donovan (1995); Adams (2004); MacKinnon (2004).</ref> The anti-vivisection movement in the 19th and early 20th century in England and the United States was largely run by women, including ], ], ] and ] (1833–1916).<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200413040407/https://www.jstor.org/stable/4289385 |date=2020-04-13 }}.</ref> Garner writes that 70 per cent of the membership of the Victoria Street Society (one of the anti-vivisection groups founded by Cobbe) were women, as were 70 per cent of the membership of the British RSPCA in 1900.<ref>Garner (2005), p. 141, citing Elston (1990), p. 276.</ref> | |||
The modern animal advocacy movement has a similar representation of women. They are not invariably in leadership positions: during the March for Animals in Washington, D.C., in 1990—the largest animal rights demonstration held until then in the United States—most of the participants were women, but most of the platform speakers were men.<ref name=Garner2005p142>Garner (2005), pp. 142–143.</ref> Nevertheless, several influential animal advocacy groups have been founded by women, including the ] by Cobbe in London in 1898; the ] by ] in 1962; and ], co-founded by ] in 1980. In the Netherlands, ] and ] were elected to parliament in 2006 representing the Parliamentary group for Animals. | |||
Cohen rejects Peter Singer's argument that since a brain-damaged human could not exhibit the ability to make moral judgements, that moral judgements cannot be used as the distinguishing characteristic for determining who is awarded rights. Cohen states that the test for moral judgement "is not a test to be administered to humans one by one." | |||
The preponderance of women in the movement has led to a body of academic literature exploring feminism and animal rights, such as feminism and vegetarianism or ], the oppression of women and animals, and the male association of women and animals with nature and emotion, rather than reason—an association that several feminist writers have embraced.<ref name="Lansbury et al"/> ] writes that women and animals serve the same symbolic function in a patriarchal society: both are "the used"; the dominated, submissive "]".<ref>Gruen (1993), p. 60ff.</ref> When the British feminist ] (1759–1797) published '']'' (1792), ] (1758–1835), a Cambridge philosopher, responded with an anonymous parody, ''A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes'' (1792), saying that Wollstonecraft's arguments for women's rights could be applied equally to animals, a position he intended as '']''.<ref>Singer (1990), p. 1.</ref><!--add something about language; treatment of female animals; feminist care ethic; suffragettes--> In her works '']'' (1990) and ''The Pornography of Meat'' (2004), ] focuses in particular on what she argues are the links between the oppression of women and that of non-human animals.<ref name="green2003">{{cite magazine|author-last=Green |author-first=Elizabeth W. |url=http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2003/10/2/fifteen-questions-for-carol-j-adams/ |title=Fifteen Questions For Carol J. Adams |magazine=The Harvard Crimson |date=10 October 2003 |access-date=22 November 2008}}</ref> | |||
The Foundation for Animal Use and Education states: | |||
<blockquote>Our recognition of the rights of others stems from our unique human character as moral agents--that is, beings capable of making moral judgments and comprehending moral duty. Only human beings are capable of exercising moral judgment and recognizing the rights of one another. </blockquote> | |||
===Transhumanism=== | |||
<blockquote>Animals do not exercise responsibility as moral agents. They do not recognize the rights of other animals. They kill and eat one another instinctively, as a matter of survival. They act from a combination of conditioning, fear, instinct and intelligence, but they do not exercise moral judgment in the process.</blockquote> | |||
Some ] argue for animal rights, liberation, and "uplift" of animal consciousness into machines.<ref>{{cite web|title=The Ethics of Animal Enhancement|author=George Dvorsky|author-link=George Dvorsky|url=https://ieet.org/index.php/IEET2/more/dvorsky20110729|access-date=2017-04-24|archive-date=2017-04-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170425030415/https://ieet.org/index.php/IEET2/more/dvorsky20110729|url-status=live}}</ref> Transhumanism also understands animal rights on a gradation or spectrum with other types of sentient rights, including human rights and the rights of conscious artificial intelligences (posthuman rights).<ref Name="Evans 2015">{{cite journal | last = Evans | first = Woody | author-link = Woody Evans | title = Posthuman Rights: Dimensions of Transhuman Worlds | journal = Teknokultura | volume = 12 | issue = 2 | date = 2015 | doi = 10.5209/rev_TK.2015.v12.n2.49072 | doi-access = free }}</ref> | |||
=== |
===Socialism and anti-capitalism=== | ||
Some critics of "animal rights" say that it may turn humans into "second-class citizens". Robert Bidinotto, nationally recognized writer on environmental issues, said in a 1992 speech to the Northeastern Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies: | |||
<blockquote>Strict observance of animal rights forbids even direct protection of people and their values against nature's many predators. Losses to people are acceptable...losses to animals are not. Logically then, beavers may change the flow of streams, but Man must not. Locusts may denude hundreds of miles of plant life...but Man must not. Cougars may eat sheep and chickens, but Man must not.</blockquote> | |||
Chris DeRose, Director of Last Chance for Animals, stated "If the death of one rat cured all disease, it wouldn't make any difference to me." When given the choice between rescuing a human baby or a dog after a lifeboat capsized, Susan Rich, PeTA Outreach Coordinator, answered, "I wouldn't know for sure... I might choose the human baby or I might choose the dog." Tom Regan, animal rights philosopher, answered "If it were a retarded baby and a bright dog, I'd save the dog." Critics opposed to animal rights generally support ]. | |||
According to sociologist ] of ], the struggle for animal liberation must happen in tandem with a more generalized struggle against human oppression and exploitation under global ]. He says that under a more egalitarian ] system, one that would "allow a more just and peaceful order to emerge" and be "characterized by ] and a democratically controlled state and mass media", there would be "much greater potential to inform the public about vital global issues—and the potential for "campaigns to improve the lives of other animals" to be "more abolitionist in nature."{{sfn|Nibert|2013|p=270}} Philosopher ] of the ] states that the animal liberation movement, as characterized by the ] and its various offshoots, "is a significant threat to global capital." {{Blockquote|... Animal liberation challenges large sectors of the capitalist economy by assailing corporate agriculture and pharmaceutical companies and their suppliers. Far from being irrelevant to social movements, animal rights can form the basis for a broad coalition of progressive social groups and drive changes that strike at the heart of capitalist exploitation of animals, people and the earth.{{sfn|Best|2014|p=103}}}} | |||
Critics of animal rights have pointed to the support for animal rights by the ] regime in ], and its anti-vivisection legislation. ], founder of "Putting People First" and author of ''Animal Scam, The Beastly Abuse of Human Rights'', writes that "By pretending to extend rights to animals, which by nature are incapable of moral cognition, the Nazis ultimately annihilated the very concept of “rights.” And just as the dogma of animal rights led to the destruction of human rights under Nazism, it leads to the destruction of human rights today." | |||
===Critics=== | |||
===Animal welfare as a responsiblity=== | |||
The American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) has defined animal welfare as human responsibility that encompasses all aspects of animal well-being, including proper housing, management, nutrition, disease prevention and treatment, responsible care, human handling, and, when necessary, humane euthanasia. | |||
====R. G. Frey==== | |||
The ''Foundation for Animal Use Education'' supports ] as opposed to animal rights, arguing that: "Even if we believe that animals cannot have rights, it does not mean we can treat animals any way we please. As moral agents, we recognize our own obligation to treat animals humanely — not because it is their right, but because it is our responsibility." | |||
], professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University, is a preference utilitarian. In his early work, ''Interests and Rights'' (1980), Frey disagreed with Singer—who wrote in ''Animal Liberation'' (1975) that the interests of nonhuman animals must be given equal consideration when judging the consequences of an act—on the grounds that animals have no interests. Frey argues that interests are dependent on desire, and that no desire can exist without a corresponding belief. Animals have no beliefs, because a belief state requires the ability to hold a second-order belief—a belief about the belief—which he argues requires language: "If someone were to say, e.g. 'The cat believes that the door is locked,' then that person is holding, as I see it, that the cat holds the declarative sentence 'The door is locked' to be true; and I can see no reason whatever for crediting the cat or any other creature which lacks language, including human infants, with entertaining declarative sentences."<ref>Frey (1989), p. 40.</ref> | |||
=== |
====Carl Cohen==== | ||
], professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan, argues that rights holders must be able to distinguish between their own interests and what is right. "The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked." Cohen rejects Singer's argument that, since a brain-damaged human could not make moral judgments, moral judgments cannot be used as the distinguishing characteristic for determining who is awarded rights. Cohen writes that the test for moral judgment "is not a test to be administered to humans one by one", but should be applied to the capacity of members of the species in general.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111127200740/http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf |date=2011-11-27 }}. Cohen and Regan (2001).</ref> | |||
British physicist ] has criticized activists for failing to concentrate on what he sees as more worthwhile causes: "I suspect that extremists turn to animal rights from a lack of the more worthwhile causes of the past, like nuclear disarmament.” | |||
====Richard Posner==== | |||
Some critics, such as Alan Herscovici, of the Fur Council of Canada, claim that "Virtually none of the money they collect is used to fund humane shelters, develop better animal husbandry methods, or find cures for diseases. Instead, donations pay the salaries of professional organizers, subsidize more fund-raising, and fuel sensationalist campaigns against animal-use industries." | |||
]: "facts will drive equality."<ref name=Posner/>]] | |||
Judge ] of the ] debated the issue of animal rights in 2001 with Peter Singer.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170914200057/http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/dialogues/features/2001/animal_rights/_2.html |date=September 14, 2017 }}.</ref> Posner posits that his ] tells him "that human beings prefer their own. If a dog threatens a human infant, even if it requires causing more pain to the dog to stop it, than the dog would have caused to the infant, then we favour the child. It would be monstrous to spare the dog."<ref name=Posner> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110821030817/http://www.slate.com/id/110101/entry/110129/ |date=August 21, 2011 }}; {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150509122917/http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/interviews-debates/200106--.htm |date=2015-05-09 }}, courtesy link on utilitarian.net. | |||
*Also see Posner (2004).</ref> | |||
Singer challenges this by arguing that formerly unequal rights for gays, women, and certain races were justified using the same set of intuitions. Posner replies that equality in civil rights did not occur because of ethical arguments, but because facts mounted that there were no morally significant differences between humans based on race, sex, or sexual orientation that would support inequality. If and when similar facts emerge about humans and animals, the differences in rights will erode too. But facts will drive equality, not ethical arguments that run contrary to instinct, he argues. Posner calls his approach "soft utilitarianism", in contrast to Singer's "hard utilitarianism". He argues: | |||
The animal-rights position is also criticized by some who favour animal liberation. Although he is often called the father of the modern animal-rights movement, Peter Singer actually rejects the notion of moral rights. As a utilitarian, he prefers to talk in terms of the equal consideration of interests. | |||
{{Blockquote|The "soft" utilitarian position on animal rights is a moral intuition of many, probably most, Americans. We realize that animals feel pain, and we think that to inflict pain without a reason is bad. Nothing of practical value is added by dressing up this intuition in the language of philosophy; much is lost when the intuition is made a stage in a logical argument. When kindness toward animals is levered into a duty of weighting the pains of animals and of people equally, bizarre vistas of social engineering are opened up.<ref name=Posner/>}} | |||
Some criticisms of the animal rights movement take the form of ], positing a "vegetable rights" movement. ] has adopted part of this philosophy. | |||
]: rights imply obligations.]] | |||
==See also== | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ], ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ], ] | |||
* ] Information of injection of dye (cosmetic ]) of fish for the tropical aquarium trade. | |||
*] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ], ] | |||
* ] | |||
* ], ], ], ] | |||
====Roger Scruton==== | |||
==References== | |||
], the British philosopher, argued that rights imply obligations. Every legal privilege, he wrote, imposes a burden on the one who does not possess that privilege: that is, "your right may be my duty." Scruton therefore regarded the emergence of the animal rights movement as "the strangest cultural shift within the liberal worldview", because the idea of rights and responsibilities is, he argued, distinctive to the human condition, and it makes no sense to spread them beyond our own species.<ref name=Scruton/> | |||
*{{cite book | last = Bentham | first = Jeremy | authorlink = Jeremy Bentham | others = ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart | title = | origyear = 1789 | year = 1970 | publisher = Athlone Press | location = London | id = ISBN 0485132117}} | |||
*{{cite book | last = Frey | first = R. G. | year = 1980 | title = Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals | publisher = Clarendon Press | location = Oxford | id = ISBN 0198244215}} | |||
*{{cite book | last = George | first = Kathryn Paxton | year = 2000 | title = Animal, Vegetable, or Woman?: A Feminist Critique of Ethical Vegetarianism | publisher = State University of New York Press | location = Albany, N.Y. | id = ISBN 0791446875}} | |||
*{{cite journal | first = Hugh | last = LaFollette | coauthors = and Niall Shanks | year = 1996 | month = January | title = The origin of speciesism | journal = Philosophy | volume = 71 | issue = 275 | pages = 41-60 | id = ISSN 0031-8191 | url = http://www.stpt.usf.edu/hhl/papers/origin.of.speciesism.pdf}} | |||
*{{cite book | last = Regan | first = Tom | authorlink = Tom Regan | year = 1983 | title = The Case for Animal Rights | publisher = University of California Press | location = Berkeley | id = ISBN 0520049047}} | |||
*{{cite book | last = Singer | first = Peter | authorlink = Peter Singer | year = 1990 | title = Animal Liberation | edition = 2nd ed. | publisher = New York Review of Books | location = New York | id = ISBN 0940322005}} | |||
*{{cite book | last = Scruton | first = Roger | authorlink = Roger Scruton | year = 2000 | title = Animal Rights and Wrongs | edition = 3rd ed. | publisher = Metro | location = London | id = ISBN 1900512815}} | |||
*{{cite journal | first = Roger | last = Scruton | year = 2000 | month = Summer | title = Animal rights | journal = City Journal | volume = 10 | issue = 3 | pages = 100-107 | id = ISSN 1060-8540 | url = http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_3_urbanities-animal.html}} | |||
* | |||
*, a ]-produced slaughterhouse tour narrated by ] | |||
He accused animal rights advocates of "pre-scientific" ], attributing traits to animals that are, he says, ]-like, where "only man is vile." It is within this fiction that the appeal of animal rights lies, he argued. The world of animals is non-judgmental, filled with dogs who return our affection almost no matter what we do to them, and cats who pretend to be affectionate when, in fact, they care only about themselves. It is, he argued, a fantasy, a world of escape.<ref name=Scruton>{{cite magazine |last=Scruton |first=Roger |author-link=Roger Scruton |date=Summer 2000 |title=Animal Rights |url=http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_3_urbanities-animal.html |magazine=City Journal |location=New York |publisher=Manhattan Institute for Policy Research |access-date=2005-12-04 |archive-date=2016-03-03 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303191520/http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_3_urbanities-animal.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> | |||
== Further reading == | |||
* Adams, Carol. ''The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory.'' New York: Continuum, 1996. | |||
* Adams, Carol. ''The Pornography of Meat.'' New York: Continuum, 2004. | |||
* Adams, Carol, & Donovan, Josephine. (eds). ''Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations.'' London: Duke University Press, 1995. | |||
*Adams, Carol J. ''The Social Construction of Edible Bodies'' | |||
*]. ''Meeting a Gorilla''. | |||
*Anstötz, Christopher. ''Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans'' | |||
*Auxter, Thomas. ''The Right Not to Be Eaten'' | |||
*Barnes, Donald J. ''A Matter of Change'' | |||
*Barry, Brian. ''Why Not Noah's Ark?'' | |||
*Bekoff, Marc. ''Common Sense, Cognitive Ethology and Evolution''. | |||
*Cantor, David. ''Items of Property''. | |||
*Cate, Dexter L. ''The Island of the Dragon'' | |||
*Cavalieri, Paola. ''The Great Ape Project — and Beyond'' | |||
*Carwardine, Mark. ''Meeting a Gorilla'' | |||
*] ''Apes and the Idea of Kindred''. | |||
*__________________ ''Good Dogs and Other Animals'' | |||
*__________________ ''The Pretext of "Necessary Suffering"'' | |||
* Clark, Ward M. ''Misplaced Compassion: The Animal Rights Movement Exposed'', Writer's Club Press, 2001 | |||
*]. ''Gaps in the mind''. | |||
* Dunayer, Joan. "Animal Equality, Language and Liberation" 2001 | |||
* Francione, Gary. ''Introduction to Animal Rights, Your child or the dog?'', Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000 | |||
* Nibert, David. ''Animal Rights, Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation'', New York: Rowman and Litterfield, 2002 | |||
* Patterson, Charles "Eternal Treblinka" 2002 | |||
*]. ''Animal Rights and Wrongs'' Claridge Press, 2000 | |||
*], "Animal Liberation". | |||
* Spiegal, Marjorie. ''The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery'', New York: Mirror Books, 1996. | |||
* Steeve, Peter H. (ed.) ''Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life.'' New York: SUNY Press, 1999. | |||
* ]. ''Animals and Ethics''. Broadview Press, 2003 | |||
* Weil, Zoe. ''The Power and Promise of Humane Education.'' British Columbia: New Society Publishers, 2004. | |||
* Wolfe, Cary. ''Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory'', Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 2003. | |||
* Wolch, Jennifer, & Emel, Jody. ''Animal Geographies: Place, Politics, and Identity in the Nature-Culture Borderlands.'' New York: Verso, 1998. | |||
<!--books to add | |||
Ambiguous Apes | |||
Contextual Moral Vegetarianism | |||
The Third Chimpanzee | |||
What's in a Classification? | |||
The Rights of Animals and Future Generations | |||
Chimpanzees’ Use of Sign Language | |||
Chimpanzees’ Use of Sign Language | |||
Personhood, Property and Legal Competence | |||
The Silver Spring Monkeys | |||
Chimpanzees - Bridging the Gap | |||
The Case for the Personhood of Gorillas | |||
Fit to Be Tamed | |||
From Property to Person | |||
Who's Like Us? | |||
Who's Like Us? | |||
Animal Rights in the Political Arena | |||
Against Zoos | |||
Great Apes and the Human Resistance to Equality | |||
Ask No Questions | |||
Spirits Dressed in Furs? | |||
Like Driving a Cadillac | |||
Brave New Farm? | |||
Apes, Humans, Aliens, Vampires and Robots | |||
Persons and Non-Persons | |||
The Concept of Beastliness | |||
The Wahokies | |||
Humans, Nonhumans and Personhood | |||
Constraints and Animals | |||
The Silver Spring Monkeys | |||
The Case for the Personhood of Gorillas | |||
The Post-Darwinian Transition | |||
A Basis for (Interspecies) Equality | |||
A Reply to VanDeVeer | |||
Do Animals Have a Right to Liberty? | |||
Why Darwinians Should Support Equal Treatment | |||
Do Animals Have a Right to Life? | |||
Ill-gotten Gains | |||
The Case for Animal Rights | |||
Animal Rights, Endangered Species and Human Survival | |||
The Ascent of Apes — Broadening the Moral Community | |||
Experiments on Animals | |||
Sentientism | |||
Speciesism in the Laboratory | |||
Aping Persons — Pro and Con | |||
Images of Death and Life | |||
Ethics and the New Animal Liberation Movement | |||
All Animals Are Equal | |||
Do Animals Feel Pain? | |||
Animal Liberation at 30 | |||
A Vegetarian Philosophy | |||
The Forgotten Animal Issue | |||
Fighting to Win | |||
The Scientific Basis for Assessing Suffering in Animals | |||
The Limits of Trooghaft | |||
The Chimp Farm | |||
They Are Us | |||
Defending Animals by Appeal to Rights | |||
From Property to Person | |||
An Ecological Argument for Vegetarianism | |||
Language and the Orang-utan | |||
'They Clearly Now See the Link': Militant Voices | |||
Dietethics: Its Influence on Future Farming Patterns | |||
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Scruton singled out ], a prominent Australian philosopher and animal-rights activist, for criticism. He wrote that Singer's works, including '']'', "contain little or no philosophical argument. They derive their radical moral conclusions from a vacuous utilitarianism that counts the pain and pleasure of all living things as equally significant and that ignores just about everything that has been said in our philosophical tradition about the real distinction between persons and animals."<ref name=Scruton/> | |||
==External links== | |||
{{wikiquote}} | |||
;Animal rights in philosophy and law | |||
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] countered this view of rights by distinguishing moral agents and moral patients.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.thevegetariansite.com/ethics_regan.htm|title=Tom Regan: The Case For Animal Rights|website=The Vegetarian Site|access-date=November 2, 2019|archive-date=November 2, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191102054417/https://www.thevegetariansite.com/ethics_regan.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>{{unreliable source?|WP:QUESTIONABLE|date=March 2021}} | |||
;Animal rights resources | |||
* Animal Rights News, Commentary, Podcasting, Links & Other Resources | |||
* Animal protection news and investigative reporting | |||
* (Northern California and beyond) | |||
* | |||
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* A Canadian based radio program with full archieves of past shows on their website for free download. Show features interviews with prominent organizations, authors, and activists from across the globe. Show also covers topics relating to social justice (for example, feminism, anti-racism, and critiques of capitalism) as well as critical environmental theory and praxis as they relate to animal issues. | |||
* A Magazine of Vegetarianism, Animal Rights and Social Justice | |||
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* poems about animal rights | |||
==Public attitudes== | |||
;Animal rights organizations | |||
According to a 2000 paper by Harold Herzog and Lorna Dorr, previous academic surveys of attitudes toward animal rights tended to have small sample sizes and non-representative groups.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Herzog |first1=Harold |last2=Dorr |first2=Lorna |date=2000 |title=Electronically Available Surveys of Attitudes Toward Animals |journal=Society & Animals |volume=10 |issue=2}}</ref> But a number of factors appear to correlate with people's attitudes about the treatment of animals and animal rights. These include gender, age, occupation, religion, and level of education. There is also evidence suggesting that experience with ] may be a factor in people's attitudes.<ref name="SignalAndTaylor2006">{{cite journal |last1=Apostol |first1=L. |last2=Rebega |first2=O.L. |last3=Miclea |first3=M. |date=2013 |title=Psychological and Socio-Demographic Predictors of Attitudes towards Animals |journal=Social and Behavioural Sciences |issue=78 |pages=521–525}}</ref> | |||
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According to some studies, women are more likely to empathize with the cause of animal rights than men.<ref name="SignalAndTaylor2006" /><ref>{{cite journal |last=Herzog |first=Harold |date=2007 |title=Gender Differences in Human-Animal Interactions: A Review |journal=Anthrozoös|volume=20 |issue=1 |pages=7–21|doi=10.2752/089279307780216687 |s2cid=14988443 }}</ref> A 1996 study suggested that factors that may partially explain this discrepancy include attitudes towards ] and science, scientific literacy, and the presence of a greater emphasis on "nurturance or compassion" among women.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Pifer |first=Linda |date=1996 |title=Exploring the Gender Gap in Young Adults' Attitudes about Animal Research |journal=Society and Animals |volume=4 |issue=1 |pages=37–52 |doi=10.1163/156853096X00034 |pmid=11654528 |url=http://www.animalsandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/pifer1.pdf |access-date=2021-06-04 |archive-date=2021-09-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210917222336/https://www.animalsandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/pifer1.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
;Animal rights online community | |||
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A common misconception about animal rights is that its proponents want to grant nonhuman animals the same legal rights as humans, such as the ]. This is false. Rather, the idea is that animals should have rights that accord with their interests (for example, cats have no interest in voting, and so should not have the right to vote).<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/animals/rights/rights_1.shtml|title=Ethics - Animal ethics: Animal rights|website=BBC Online|access-date=February 10, 2022|df=mdy-all|archive-date=March 24, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220324011846/https://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/animals/rights/rights_1.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref> A 2016 study found that support for ] may not be based on cogent philosophical rationales and that more open debate is warranted.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Joffe |first1=Ari R. |last2=Bara |first2=Meredith |last3=Anton |first3=Natalie |last4=Nobis |first4=Nathan |date=2016-03-29 |title=The ethics of animal research: a survey of the public and scientists in North America |journal=BMC Medical Ethics |volume=17 |page=17 |doi=10.1186/s12910-016-0100-x |issn=1472-6939 |pmc=4812627 |pmid=27025215 |df=mdy-all |doi-access=free }}</ref> | |||
;Animal rights directories | |||
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A 2007 survey that examined whether people who believe in ] are more likely to support animal rights than ] and believers in ] found that this was largely the case; according to the researchers, strong ] and believers in ] were less likely to advocate for animal rights than those who were less fundamentalist in their beliefs. The findings extended previous research, such as a 1992 study that found that 48% of animal rights activists were ] or ].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=DeLeeuwa |first1=Jamie |last2=Galen |first2=Luke |last3=Aebersold |first3=Cassandra |last4=Stanton |first4=Victoria |date=2007 |url=http://www.animalsandsociety.org/assets/library/745_s3.pdf |title=Support for Animal Rights as a Function of Belief in Evolution, Religious Fundamentalism, and Religious Denomination |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130620141651/http://www.animalsandsociety.org/assets/library/745_s3.pdf |archive-date=2013-06-20 |df=mdy-all |journal=Society and Animals |issue=15 |pages=353–363}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Galvin |first1=Shelley L. |last2=Herzog |first2=Harold A. Jr. |date=1992 |title=Ethical Ideology, Animal Rights Activism, And Attitudes Toward The Treatment Of Animals |journal=Ethics & Behavior |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=141–149 |doi=10.1207/s15327019eb0203_1 |pmid=11651362 |url=https://animalstudiesrepository.org/acwp_sata/23 |access-date=2020-08-29 |archive-date=2020-05-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200531171029/https://animalstudiesrepository.org/acwp_sata/23/ |url-status=live }}</ref> A 2019 '']'' study found that those with favorable attitudes toward animal rights also tend to have favorable views of universal healthcare; reducing discrimination against African Americans, the LGBT community, and undocumented immigrants; and expanding welfare to aid the poor.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Park|first1=Yon Soo|last2=Valentino|first2=Benjamin|date=July 26, 2019|title=Who supports animal rights? Here's what we found.|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/26/who-supports-animal-rights-heres-what-we-found/|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=July 26, 2019|df=mdy-all|archive-date=July 26, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190726122439/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/26/who-supports-animal-rights-heres-what-we-found/|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
;Animal rights critics | |||
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* From the National Animal Interest Alliance | |||
* A petition to have PETA's Tax-exempt status revoked | |||
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* Parody site | |||
Two surveys found that attitudes toward animal rights tactics, such as ], are very diverse within the animal rights communities. Near half (50% and 39% in two surveys) of activists do not support direct action. One survey concluded, "it would be a mistake to portray animal rights activists as homogeneous."<ref name="SignalAndTaylor2006"/><ref>{{cite journal |title=An attitude survey of animal rights activists |journal=Psychological Science |year=1991 |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=194–196 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9280.1991.tb00131.x |s2cid=145549994 |df=mdy-all|last1=Plous |first1=S. }}</ref> | |||
;Dealing with animal rights critics | |||
*This site could help to allay some concerns/ideas about animal advocacy. It is a starting point. | |||
* A website that aims to expose the owner of sites like “Peta kills animals”. | |||
Even though around 90% of U.S. adults regularly consume meat,<ref>{{Cite web|last1=Berg|first1=Jennifer|last2=Jackson|first2=Chris|date=May 12, 2021|title=Nearly nine in ten Americans consume meat as part of their diet|url=https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/nearly-nine-ten-americans-consume-meat-part-their-diet|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210720111314/https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/nearly-nine-ten-americans-consume-meat-part-their-diet|archive-date=July 20, 2021|access-date=February 13, 2022|website=Ipsos}}</ref> almost half of them appear to support a ban on slaughterhouses: in ]'s 2017 survey of 1,094 U.S. adults' attitudes toward animal farming, 49% "support a ban on factory farming, 47% support a ban on slaughterhouses, and 33% support a ban on animal farming".<ref name="Ettinger">{{cite news |last=Ettinger |first=Jill |date=November 21, 2017 |title=70% of Americans Want Better Treatment for Farm Animals, Poll Finds |url=http://www.organicauthority.com/70-of-americans-want-better-treatment-for-farm-animals-poll-finds/ |newspaper=Organic Authority |access-date=13 February 2022 |archive-date=29 September 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180929115534/http://www.organicauthority.com/70-of-americans-want-better-treatment-for-farm-animals-poll-finds/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="vox 2">{{cite web |last=Piper |first=Kelsey |date=November 5, 2018 |title=California and Florida voters could change the lives of millions of animals on Election Day |url=https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955642/california-florida-voters-animal-welfare-election-day |publisher=] |access-date=13 February 2022 |archive-date=13 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220213174934/https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955642/california-florida-voters-animal-welfare-election-day |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Reese Anthis|first=Jacy|date=November 20, 2017|title=Animals, Food, and Technology (AFT) Survey 2017|url=https://www.sentienceinstitute.org/animal-farming-attitudes-survey-2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220104070248/https://www.sentienceinstitute.org/animal-farming-attitudes-survey-2017|archive-date=January 4, 2022|access-date=February 13, 2022|website=Sentience Institute|series=Surveys}}</ref> The 2017 survey was replicated by researchers at ], who found similar results: 73% of respondents answered "yes" to the question "Were you aware that slaughterhouses are where livestock are killed and processed into meat, such that, without them, you would not be able to consume meat?"<ref name="food dive">{{cite web|last=Siegner|first=Cathy|date=January 25, 2018|title=Survey: Most consumers like meat, slaughterhouses not so much|url=https://www.fooddive.com/news/survey-most-consumers-like-meat-slaughterhouses-not-so-much/515301/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211102193320/https://www.fooddive.com/news/survey-most-consumers-like-meat-slaughterhouses-not-so-much/515301/|archive-date=November 2, 2021|access-date=February 13, 2022|publisher=Food Dive}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Norwood |first1=Bailey |last2=Murray |first2=Susan |title=FooDS Food Deman Survey, Volume 5, Issue 9: January 18, 2018 |url=http://agecon.okstate.edu/files/january%202018.pdf |access-date=February 13, 2022 |website=Oklahoma State University |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190806000018/http://agecon.okstate.edu/files/january%202018.pdf |archive-date=6 August 2019 |url-status=dead}}</ref> | |||
;Humane-education organizations | |||
* Building Bridges Between Humans, Animals and Environment | |||
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* Exploring Peaceable Choices for the Planet and All those that Share | |||
* Inspiring Empathy for Humans, Animals, and the Planet | |||
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* Interrelating people, nonhuman animals, and the earth through education | |||
* Formerly known as the Center for Compassionate Living | |||
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In the U.S., the ] held many public protest slaughters in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Protesting low prices for meat, farmers killed their animals in front of media representatives. The carcasses were wasted and not eaten. This effort backfired because it angered people to see animals needlessly and wastefully killed.<ref>{{cite thesis |page=19 |url=http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami1050951369 |title=Growing a new agrarian myth: the american agriculture movement, identity, and the call to save the family farm |first=Ryan J. |last=Stockwell |access-date=11 May 2020 |archive-date=15 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230415153833/https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_olink/r/1501/10?clear=10&p10_accession_num=miami1050951369 |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
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==References== | |||
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==Bibliography== | |||
] | |||
Books and papers are cited in short form in the footnotes, with full citations here. News and other sources are cited in full in the footnotes. | |||
] | |||
{{Refbegin|30em}} | |||
] | |||
*{{cite book |author-link=Carol Adams (feminist) |last=Adams |first=Carol J. |date=1996 |title=The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory |publisher=Continuum}} {{ISBN|1501312839}} | |||
] | |||
*{{cite book |editor-last=Adams |editor1-first=Carol J. |editor2-first=Josephine |editor-link1=Carol Adams (feminist) |editor2-last=Donovan |editor-link2=Josephine Donovan |date=1995 |title=Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations |publisher=Duke University Press}} {{ISBN|0822316552}} | |||
*{{cite book |author-link=Carol Adams (feminist) |last=Adams |first=Carol J. |date=2004 |title=The Pornography of Meat |publisher=Continuum}} {{ISBN|9781590565100}} | |||
*Benthall, Jonathan (2007). , ''Anthropology Today'', volume 23, issue 2, April. | |||
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*Francione, Gary and Garner, Robert (2010). ''The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition Or Regulation?'' Columbia University Press. | |||
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*] (1980). ''Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals''. Clarendon Press. | |||
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*] (2004). ''Animals, Politics and Morality''. Manchester University Press. | |||
*] (2005). ''The Political Theory of Animals Rights''. Manchester University Press. | |||
*Giannelli, Michael A. (1985). "Three Blind Mice, See How They Run: A Critique of Behavioral Research With Animals". In M.W. Fox & L.D. Mickley (eds.), Advances in Animal Welfare Science 1985/1986 (pp. 109–164). Washington, DC: The Humane Society of the United States | |||
*] (1993). "Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of the Connection Between Women and Animals", in ]. ''Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature''. Temple University Press. | |||
*Griffin, Donald (1984). ''Animal Thinking''. Harvard University Press. | |||
* Horta, Oscar (2010). "What Is Speciesism?", ''The Journal of Environmental and Agricultural Ethics'', Vol. 23, No. 3, June, pp. 243–266. | |||
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*] (2000b). ''Ethics, Humans and Other Animals''. Routledge. | |||
*Jakopovich, Daniel (2021). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221129010538/https://onlineacademiccommunity.uvic.ca/asri/2021/10/17/the-uks-animal-welfare-sentience-bill-excludes-the-vast-majority-of-animals-why-we-should-expand-our-moral-circle-to-include-invertebrates/ |date=2022-11-29 }}, ''Animals & Society Research Initiative, University of Victoria'', Canada. | |||
*] (1785). '']''. | |||
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*{{cite book |last=Kelch |first=Thomas G. |date=2011 |title=Globalization and Animal Law |publisher=Kluwer Law International}} | |||
*] (1985). ''The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardian England''. University of Wisconsin Press. | |||
*Legge, Debbi and Brooman, Simon (1997). ''Law Relating to Animals''. Cavendish Publishing. {{ISBN|1859412386}} | |||
*Leneman, Leah (1999). "No Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in Britain, 1909–1944," ''Society and Animals'', 7, 1–5. | |||
*] (1693). ''Some Thoughts Concerning Education''. | |||
*] (2004). "Of Mice and Men," in Nussbaum and Sunstein, ''op cit''. | |||
*Mason, Peter (1997). ''The Brown Dog Affair''. Two Sevens Publishing. | |||
*] (1984). ''Animals and Why They Matter''. University of Georgia Press. {{ISBN|0820320412}} | |||
*Molland, Neil (2004). "Thirty Years of Direct Action" in Best and Nocella, ''op cit''. | |||
*Monaghan, Rachael (2000). "Terrorism in the Name of Animal Rights," in Taylor, Maxwell and Horgan, John. ''The Future of Terrorism''. Routledge. | |||
*Murray, L. (2006). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110726021231/http://advocacy.britannica.com/blog/advocacy/2006/11/the-aspca-pioneers-in-animal-welfare/ |date=2011-07-26 }}, ''Encyclopædia Britannica's Advocacy for Animals''. | |||
*] (1989). ''The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics''. University of Wisconsin Press. | |||
*] (2004). "The ALF: Who, Why, and What?", in ] and Anthony Nocella. (eds).''Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals''. Lantern 2004. | |||
*{{cite book |last=Nibert |first=David |date=2013 |title=Animal Oppression and Human Violence: Domesecration, Capitalism, and Global Conflict |url=http://cup.columbia.edu/book/animal-oppression-and-human-violence/9780231151894 |location= |publisher=] |isbn=978-0231151894 |access-date=2022-09-14 |archive-date=2022-11-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221104123609/http://cup.columbia.edu/book/animal-oppression-and-human-violence/9780231151894 |url-status=live }} | |||
*] (2004). "Beyond Compassion and Humanity: Justice for Nonhuman Animals", in ] and Martha Nussbaum (eds.). ''Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions''. Oxford University Press. | |||
*] (2006). ''Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership''. Belknap Press. | |||
*] and ] (June 15, 2001). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170914200057/http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/dialogues/features/2001/animal_rights/_2.html |date=2017-09-14 }}, ''Slate''. | |||
*] and ] (2004). "Animal rights" in Sunstein and Nussbaum, ''op cit''. | |||
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*Redclift, Michael R. (2010). ''The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology''. Edward Elgar Publishing. | |||
*] (1983). '']''. University of California Press. | |||
*] (2001). ''Defending Animal Rights''. University of Illinois Press. | |||
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*] (April 5, 1973). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100224090339/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article_id=9900 |date=2010-02-24 }}, '']'', Volume 20, Number 5. | |||
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*Stucki, Saskia (2020) {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210109121601/https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article/40/3/533/5862901 |date=2021-01-09 }}, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 40:533-560. | |||
*] (2004). "Introduction: What are Animal Rights?" in Sunstein and Nussbaum, ''op cit''. | |||
*] and ] (2005). ''Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions''. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0195305108}} | |||
*Taylor, Angus (2009). ''Animals and Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate''. Broadview Press. | |||
*] (1792). "A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes," in Craciun, Adriana (2002). ''A Routledge Literary Sourcebook on Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman''. Routledge. | |||
*] (2005). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160413170400/http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115834 |date=2016-04-13 }}, ''The Journal of Ethics'', Vol. 9, No. 3/4, pp. 403–433. | |||
*] (2007). "Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals" in Nils Holtug, and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.) (2007). ''Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality''. Oxford University Press. | |||
*{{cite book |author-link=Paul Waldau |last=Waldau |first=Paul |date=2011 |title=Animal Rights: What Everyone Needs to Know |publisher=Oxford University Press}} | |||
*Walker, Stephen (1983). ''Animal Thoughts''. Routledge. | |||
*Weir, Jack (2009). "Virtue Ethics," in ]. ''Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare''. Greenwood. {{ISBN|0313352593}} | |||
*Williams, Erin E. and DeMello, Margo (2007). ''Why Animals Matter''. Prometheus Books. | |||
*] (2000). ''Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals''. Da Capo Press. | |||
*] (2002). ''Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights''. Perseus. | |||
*] (2004). "Animal Rights, One Step at a Time," in Sunstein and Nussbaum, ''op cit''. | |||
*] (2007). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081118132310/https://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9007642/animal-rights |date=2008-11-18 }}, ''Encyclopædia Britannica''. | |||
{{refend}} | |||
==Further reading== | |||
] | |||
{{Wikiquote}} | |||
] | |||
{{Refbegin|30em}} | |||
] | |||
*] (2002). , The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law. | |||
] | |||
*, The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law. | |||
] | |||
*] (ed.) (2009). ''The Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare''. Greenwood. | |||
] | |||
*] and Nocella II, Anthony J. (eds). (2004). ''Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals.'' ] | |||
] | |||
*] and Nouët, Jean-Claude (eds.) (1998). ''The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights''. Ligue Française des Droits de l'Animal. | |||
] | |||
*] (1993). , in Cavalieri, Paola and Singer, Peter (eds.). ''The Great Ape Project''. St. Martin's Griffin. | |||
] | |||
*] (1997). ''Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases''. University of Illinois Press. | |||
] | |||
*{{cite book|title=Respecting Animals: A Balanced Approach to Our Relationship with Pets, Food, and Wildlife |year=2018 |first=David S. |last=Favre |publisher=Prometheus |isbn=978-1633884250}} | |||
] | |||
*], "Let them eat oysters" (review of ], ''Animal Liberation Now'', Penguin, 2023, {{ISBN|978 1 84792 776 7}}, 368 pp; and ], ''Justice for Animals'', Simon & Schuster, 2023, {{ISBN|978 1 982102 50 0}}, 372 pp.), '']'', vol. 45, no.19 (5 October 2023), pp. 3, 5–8. The question of animal rights has been approached from a variety of theoretical orientations, including ] and ] ("CA") – none of them satisfactory to reviewer Lorna Finlayson, who teaches philosophy at England's ] and ends up (p. 8) suggesting "think politically about animals: "It ought to be – it is – possible to arrange society differently." (p. 8.) | |||
*] (2006). ''Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim Cultures''. ]. | |||
*Franklin, Julian H. (2005). ''Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy''. University of Columbia Press. | |||
*] (2003). , ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', July 1, 2003. | |||
*] (2011). ''Ethics and Animals''. Cambridge University Press. | |||
*Hall, Lee (2006). ''Capers in the Churchyard: Animal Rights Advocacy in the Age of Terror''. Nectar Bat Press. | |||
*] and Clarke, Paul A. B.(eds.) (1990). ''Animal Rights: A Historic Anthology''. Columbia University Press. | |||
*] (2007). ''From Dusk 'til Dawn: An Insider's View of the Growth of the Animal Liberation Movement''. Puppy Pincher Press. | |||
*] and Wilson, Keith (eds). (2020). ''''. Lantern Publishing & Media. | |||
*] (2012). "The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights or the Creation of a New Equilibrium between Species". Animal Law Review volume 19–1. | |||
*] (2002). ''Animal Rights, Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation''. Rowman and Litterfield. | |||
*{{cite book | editor-last = Nibert | editor-first = David | date = 2017 | title = Animal Oppression and Capitalism | publisher = Praeger Publishing | isbn = 978-1440850738}} | |||
*Patterson, Charles (2002). ''Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust''. Lantern. | |||
*] (1990). ''Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism''. Oxford University Press. | |||
*Regan, Tom and Singer, Peter (eds.) (1976). ''Animal Rights and Human Obligations''. Prentice-Hall. | |||
*Spiegel, Marjorie (1996). ''The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery''. Mirror Books. | |||
*] (2006). "Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust?" ''Ethics and the Environment'' 11 (Spring): 97–132. | |||
*] (2000). ''Life Force: The World of Jainism''. Asian Humanities Press. | |||
*Wilson, Scott (2010). "" ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. | |||
*Kymlicka, W., Donaldson, S. (2011) ''Zoopolis. A Political Theory of Animal Rights''. Oxford University Press. | |||
{{Refend}} | |||
{{Animal rights|state=expanded}} | |||
{{Vegetarianism}} | |||
{{Authority control}} | |||
{{Law country lists}} | |||
] | |||
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Latest revision as of 20:13, 9 January 2025
Rights belonging to animals This article is about the philosophy of animal rights. For current animal rights around the world, see Animal rights by country or territory. For a timeline of animal rights, see Timeline of animal welfare and rights. For other uses, see Animal rights (disambiguation).Part of a series on |
Animal rights |
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Overview |
Movement |
Animal abuse |
Ideas |
Related topics |
Rights |
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Theoretical distinctions |
Human rights |
Rights by beneficiary |
Other groups of rights |
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Animal rights is the philosophy according to which many or all sentient animals have moral worth independent of their utility to humans, and that their most basic interests—such as avoiding suffering—should be afforded the same consideration as similar interests of human beings. The argument from marginal cases is often used to reach this conclusion. This argument holds that if marginal human beings such as infants, senile people, and the cognitively disabled are granted moral status and negative rights, then nonhuman animals must be granted the same moral consideration, since animals do not lack any known morally relevant characteristic that marginal-case humans have.
Broadly speaking, and particularly in popular discourse, the term "animal rights" is often used synonymously with "animal protection" or "animal liberation". More narrowly, "animal rights" refers to the idea that many animals have fundamental rights to be treated with respect as individuals—rights to life, liberty, and freedom from torture—that may not be overridden by considerations of aggregate welfare.
Many animal rights advocates oppose assigning moral value and fundamental protections on the basis of species membership alone. They consider this idea, known as speciesism, a prejudice as irrational as any other, and hold that animals should not be considered property or used as food, clothing, entertainment, or beasts of burden merely because they are not human. Cultural traditions such as Jainism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto, and animism also espouse varying forms of animal rights.
In parallel to the debate about moral rights, North American law schools now often teach animal law, and several legal scholars, such as Steven M. Wise and Gary L. Francione, support extending basic legal rights and personhood to nonhuman animals. The animals most often considered in arguments for personhood are hominids. Some animal-rights academics support this because it would break the species barrier, but others oppose it because it predicates moral value on mental complexity rather than sentience alone. As of November 2019, 29 countries had enacted bans on hominoid experimentation; Argentina granted captive orangutans basic human rights in 2014. Outside of primates, animal-rights discussions most often address the status of mammals (compare charismatic megafauna). Other animals (considered less sentient) have gained less attention—insects relatively little (outside Jainism) and animal-like bacteria hardly any. The vast majority of animals have no legally recognised rights.
Critics of animal rights argue that nonhuman animals are unable to enter into a social contract, and thus cannot have rights, a view summarised by the philosopher Roger Scruton, who writes that only humans have duties, and therefore only humans have rights. Another argument, associated with the utilitarian tradition, maintains that animals may be used as resources so long as there is no unnecessary suffering; animals may have some moral standing, but any interests they have may be overridden in cases of comparatively greater gains to aggregate welfare made possible by their use, though what counts as "necessary" suffering or a legitimate sacrifice of interests can vary considerably. Certain forms of animal-rights activism, such as the destruction of fur farms and of animal laboratories by the Animal Liberation Front, have attracted criticism, including from within the animal-rights movement itself, and prompted the U.S. Congress to enact laws, including the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, allowing the prosecution of this sort of activity as terrorism.
History
Main article: History of animal rightsThe concept of moral rights for animals dates to Ancient India, with roots in early Jain and Hindu history, while Eastern, African, and Indigenous peoples also have rich traditions of animal protection. In the Western world, Aristotle viewed animals as lacking reason and existing for human use, though other ancient philosophers believed animals deserved gentle treatment. Major religious traditions, chiefly Indian or Dharmic religions, opposed animal cruelty. While scholars like Descartes saw animals as unconscious automata, and Kant denied direct duties to animals, Jeremy Bentham emphasized their capacity to suffer. The publications of Charles Darwin eventually eroded the Cartesian view of animals. Darwin noted the mental and emotional continuity between humans and animals, suggesting the possibility of animal suffering. The anti-vivisection movement emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, driven significantly by women. From the 1970s onward, growing scholarly and activist interest in animal treatment has aimed to raise awareness and reform laws to improve animal rights and human–animal relationships.
In religion
See also: Animals in Islam; Christianity and animal rights; and Animal rights in Jainism, Hinduism, and BuddhismFor some the basis of animal rights is in religion or animal worship (or in general nature worship), with some religions banning killing any animal. In other religions animals are considered unclean. Hindu and Buddhist societies abandoned animal sacrifice and embraced vegetarianism from the 3rd century BCE. One of the most important sanctions of the Jain, Hindu, and Buddhist faiths is the concept of ahimsa, or refraining from the destruction of life. According to Buddhism, humans do not deserve preferential treatment over other living beings. The Dharmic interpretation of this doctrine prohibits the killing of any living being. These Indian religions' dharmic beliefs are reflected in the ancient Indian works of the Tolkāppiyam and Tirukkural, which contain passages that extend the idea of nonviolence to all living beings.
In Islam, animal rights were recognized early by the Sharia. This recognition is based on both the Qur'an and the Hadith. The Qur'an contains many references to animals, detailing that they have souls, form communities, communicate with God, and worship Him in their own way. Muhammad forbade his followers to harm any animal and asked them to respect animals' rights. Nevertheless, Islam does allow eating of certain species of animals.
According to Christianity, all animals, from the smallest to the largest, are cared for and loved. According to the Bible, "All these animals waited for the Lord, that the Lord might give them food at the hour. The Lord gives them, they receive; The Lord opens his hand, and they are filled with good things." It further says God "gave food to the animals, and made the crows cry."
Philosophical and legal approaches
Overview
Further information: Consequentialism and Deontological ethicsThe two main philosophical approaches to animal ethics are utilitarian and rights-based. The former is exemplified by Peter Singer, and the latter by Tom Regan and Gary Francione. Their differences reflect a distinction philosophers draw between ethical theories that judge the rightness of an act by its consequences (consequentialism/teleological ethics, or utilitarianism), and those that focus on the principle behind the act, almost regardless of consequences (deontological ethics). Deontologists argue that there are acts we should never perform, even if failing to do so entails a worse outcome.
There are a number of positions that can be defended from a consequentalist or deontologist perspective, including the capabilities approach, represented by Martha Nussbaum, and the egalitarian approach, which has been examined by Ingmar Persson and Peter Vallentyne. The capabilities approach focuses on what individuals require to fulfill their capabilities: Nussbaum (2006) argues that animals need a right to life, some control over their environment, company, play, and physical health.
Stephen R. L. Clark, Mary Midgley, and Bernard Rollin also discuss animal rights in terms of animals being permitted to lead a life appropriate for their kind. Egalitarianism favors an equal distribution of happiness among all individuals, which makes the interests of the worse off more important than those of the better off. Another approach, virtue ethics, holds that in considering how to act we should consider the character of the actor, and what kind of moral agents we should be. Rosalind Hursthouse has suggested an approach to animal rights based on virtue ethics. Mark Rowlands has proposed a contractarian approach.
Utilitarianism
Further information: Equal consideration of interests and UtilitarianismNussbaum (2004) writes that utilitarianism, starting with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, has contributed more to the recognition of the moral status of animals than any other ethical theory. The utilitarian philosopher most associated with animal rights is Peter Singer, professor of bioethics at Princeton University. Singer is not a rights theorist, but uses the language of rights to discuss how we ought to treat individuals. He is a preference utilitarian, meaning that he judges the rightness of an act by the extent to which it satisfies the preferences (interests) of those affected.
His position is that there is no reason not to give equal consideration to the interests of human and nonhumans, though his principle of equality does not require identical treatment. A mouse and a man both have an interest in not being kicked, and there are no moral or logical grounds for failing to accord those interests equal weight. Interests are predicated on the ability to suffer, nothing more, and once it is established that a being has interests, those interests must be given equal consideration. Singer quotes the English philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900): "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other."
Singer argues that equality of consideration is a prescription, not an assertion of fact: if the equality of the sexes were based only on the idea that men and women were equally intelligent, we would have to abandon the practice of equal consideration if this were later found to be false. But the moral idea of equality does not depend on matters of fact such as intelligence, physical strength, or moral capacity. Equality therefore cannot be grounded on the outcome of scientific investigations into the intelligence of nonhumans. All that matters is whether they can suffer.
Commentators on all sides of the debate now accept that animals suffer and feel pain, although it was not always so. Bernard Rollin, professor of philosophy, animal sciences, and biomedical sciences at Colorado State University, writes that Descartes's influence continued to be felt until the 1980s. Veterinarians trained in the US before 1989 were taught to ignore pain, he writes, and at least one major veterinary hospital in the 1960s did not stock narcotic analgesics for animal pain control. In his interactions with scientists, he was often asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" evidence that they could feel pain.
Scientific publications have made it clear since the 1980s that the majority of researchers do believe animals suffer and feel pain, though it continues to be argued that their suffering may be reduced by an inability to experience the same dread of anticipation as humans or to remember the suffering as vividly. The ability of animals to suffer, even it may vary in severity, is the basis for Singer's application of equal consideration. The problem of animal suffering, and animal consciousness in general, arose primarily because it was argued that animals have no language. Singer writes that, if language were needed to communicate pain, it would often be impossible to know when humans are in pain, though we can observe pain behavior and make a calculated guess based on it. He argues that there is no reason to suppose that the pain behavior of nonhumans would have a different meaning from the pain behavior of humans.
Subjects-of-a-life
Further information: The Case for Animal RightsTom Regan, professor emeritus of philosophy at North Carolina State University, argues in The Case for Animal Rights (1983) that nonhuman animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life", and as such are bearers of rights. He writes that, because the moral rights of humans are based on their possession of certain cognitive abilities, and because these abilities are also possessed by at least some nonhuman animals, such animals must have the same moral rights as humans. Although only humans act as moral agents, both marginal-case humans, such as infants, and at least some nonhumans must have the status of "moral patients".
Moral patients are unable to formulate moral principles, and as such are unable to do right or wrong, even though what they do may be beneficial or harmful. Only moral agents are able to engage in moral action. Animals for Regan have "intrinsic value" as subjects-of-a-life, and cannot be regarded as a means to an end, a view that places him firmly in the abolitionist camp. His theory does not extend to all animals, but only to those that can be regarded as subjects-of-a-life. He argues that all normal mammals of at least one year of age would qualify:
... individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests.
Whereas Singer is primarily concerned with improving the treatment of animals and accepts that, in some hypothetical scenarios, individual animals might be used legitimately to further human or nonhuman ends, Regan believes we ought to treat nonhuman animals as we would humans. He applies the strict Kantian ideal (which Kant himself applied only to humans) that they ought never to be sacrificed as a means to an end, and must be treated as ends in themselves.
Abolitionism
Further information: Abolitionism (animal rights) and Animals, Property, and the LawGary Francione, professor of law and philosophy at Rutgers Law School in Newark, is a leading abolitionist writer, arguing that animals need only one right, the right not to be owned. Everything else would follow from that paradigm shift. He writes that, although most people would condemn the mistreatment of animals, and in many countries there are laws that seem to reflect those concerns, "in practice the legal system allows any use of animals, however abhorrent." The law only requires that any suffering not be "unnecessary". In deciding what counts as "unnecessary", an animal's interests are weighed against the interests of human beings, and the latter almost always prevail.
Francione's Animals, Property, and the Law (1995) was the first extensive jurisprudential treatment of animal rights. In it, Francione compares the situation of animals to the treatment of slaves in the United States, where legislation existed that appeared to protect them while the courts ignored that the institution of slavery itself rendered the protection unenforceable. He offers as an example the United States Animal Welfare Act, which he describes as an example of symbolic legislation, intended to assuage public concern about the treatment of animals, but difficult to implement.
He argues that a focus on animal welfare, rather than animal rights, may worsen the position of animals by making the public feel comfortable about using them and entrenching the view of them as property. He calls animal rights groups who pursue animal welfare issues, such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the "new welfarists", arguing that they have more in common with 19th-century animal protectionists than with the animal rights movement; indeed, the terms "animal protection" and "protectionism" are increasingly favored. His position in 1996 was that there is no animal rights movement in the United States.
Contractarianism
Further information: Social contractMark Rowlands, professor of philosophy at the University of Florida, has proposed a contractarian approach, based on the original position and the veil of ignorance—a "state of nature" thought experiment that tests intuitions about justice and fairness—in John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971). In the original position, individuals choose principles of justice (what kind of society to form, and how primary social goods will be distributed), unaware of their individual characteristics—their race, sex, class, or intelligence, whether they are able-bodied or disabled, rich or poor—and therefore unaware of which role they will assume in the society they are about to form.
The idea is that, operating behind the veil of ignorance, they will choose a social contract in which there is basic fairness and justice for them no matter the position they occupy. Rawls did not include species membership as one of the attributes hidden from the decision-makers in the original position. Rowlands proposes extending the veil of ignorance to include rationality, which he argues is an undeserved property similar to characteristics including race, sex and intelligence.
Prima facie rights theory
Further information: Prima facie rightAmerican philosopher Timothy Garry has proposed an approach that deems nonhuman animals worthy of prima facie rights. In a philosophical context, a prima facie (Latin for "on the face of it" or "at first glance") right is one that appears to be applicable at first glance, but upon closer examination may be outweighed by other considerations. In his book Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, Lawrence Hinman characterizes such rights as "the right is real but leaves open the question of whether it is applicable and overriding in a particular situation". The idea that nonhuman animals are worthy of prima facie rights is to say that, in a sense, animals have rights that can be overridden by many other considerations, especially those conflicting a human's right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Garry supports his view arguing:
... if a nonhuman animal were to kill a human being in the U.S., it would have broken the laws of the land and would probably get rougher sanctions than if it were a human. My point is that like laws govern all who interact within a society, rights are to be applied to all beings who interact within that society. This is not to say these rights endowed by humans are equivalent to those held by nonhuman animals, but rather that if humans possess rights then so must all those who interact with humans.
In sum, Garry suggests that humans have obligations to nonhuman animals; animals do not, and ought not to, have uninfringible rights against humans.
Feminism and animal rights
Further information: Women and animal advocacy, Ethics of care, and Feminist ethicsWomen have played a central role in animal advocacy since the 19th century. The anti-vivisection movement in the 19th and early 20th century in England and the United States was largely run by women, including Frances Power Cobbe, Anna Kingsford, Lizzy Lind af Hageby and Caroline Earle White (1833–1916). Garner writes that 70 per cent of the membership of the Victoria Street Society (one of the anti-vivisection groups founded by Cobbe) were women, as were 70 per cent of the membership of the British RSPCA in 1900.
The modern animal advocacy movement has a similar representation of women. They are not invariably in leadership positions: during the March for Animals in Washington, D.C., in 1990—the largest animal rights demonstration held until then in the United States—most of the participants were women, but most of the platform speakers were men. Nevertheless, several influential animal advocacy groups have been founded by women, including the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection by Cobbe in London in 1898; the Animal Welfare Board of India by Rukmini Devi Arundale in 1962; and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, co-founded by Ingrid Newkirk in 1980. In the Netherlands, Marianne Thieme and Esther Ouwehand were elected to parliament in 2006 representing the Parliamentary group for Animals.
The preponderance of women in the movement has led to a body of academic literature exploring feminism and animal rights, such as feminism and vegetarianism or veganism, the oppression of women and animals, and the male association of women and animals with nature and emotion, rather than reason—an association that several feminist writers have embraced. Lori Gruen writes that women and animals serve the same symbolic function in a patriarchal society: both are "the used"; the dominated, submissive "Other". When the British feminist Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) published A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), Thomas Taylor (1758–1835), a Cambridge philosopher, responded with an anonymous parody, A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes (1792), saying that Wollstonecraft's arguments for women's rights could be applied equally to animals, a position he intended as reductio ad absurdum. In her works The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (1990) and The Pornography of Meat (2004), Carol J. Adams focuses in particular on what she argues are the links between the oppression of women and that of non-human animals.
Transhumanism
Some transhumanists argue for animal rights, liberation, and "uplift" of animal consciousness into machines. Transhumanism also understands animal rights on a gradation or spectrum with other types of sentient rights, including human rights and the rights of conscious artificial intelligences (posthuman rights).
Socialism and anti-capitalism
According to sociologist David Nibert of Wittenberg University, the struggle for animal liberation must happen in tandem with a more generalized struggle against human oppression and exploitation under global capitalism. He says that under a more egalitarian democratic socialist system, one that would "allow a more just and peaceful order to emerge" and be "characterized by economic democracy and a democratically controlled state and mass media", there would be "much greater potential to inform the public about vital global issues—and the potential for "campaigns to improve the lives of other animals" to be "more abolitionist in nature." Philosopher Steven Best of the University of Texas at El Paso states that the animal liberation movement, as characterized by the Animal Liberation Front and its various offshoots, "is a significant threat to global capital."
... Animal liberation challenges large sectors of the capitalist economy by assailing corporate agriculture and pharmaceutical companies and their suppliers. Far from being irrelevant to social movements, animal rights can form the basis for a broad coalition of progressive social groups and drive changes that strike at the heart of capitalist exploitation of animals, people and the earth.
Critics
R. G. Frey
R. G. Frey, professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University, is a preference utilitarian. In his early work, Interests and Rights (1980), Frey disagreed with Singer—who wrote in Animal Liberation (1975) that the interests of nonhuman animals must be given equal consideration when judging the consequences of an act—on the grounds that animals have no interests. Frey argues that interests are dependent on desire, and that no desire can exist without a corresponding belief. Animals have no beliefs, because a belief state requires the ability to hold a second-order belief—a belief about the belief—which he argues requires language: "If someone were to say, e.g. 'The cat believes that the door is locked,' then that person is holding, as I see it, that the cat holds the declarative sentence 'The door is locked' to be true; and I can see no reason whatever for crediting the cat or any other creature which lacks language, including human infants, with entertaining declarative sentences."
Carl Cohen
Carl Cohen, professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan, argues that rights holders must be able to distinguish between their own interests and what is right. "The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked." Cohen rejects Singer's argument that, since a brain-damaged human could not make moral judgments, moral judgments cannot be used as the distinguishing characteristic for determining who is awarded rights. Cohen writes that the test for moral judgment "is not a test to be administered to humans one by one", but should be applied to the capacity of members of the species in general.
Richard Posner
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit debated the issue of animal rights in 2001 with Peter Singer. Posner posits that his moral intuition tells him "that human beings prefer their own. If a dog threatens a human infant, even if it requires causing more pain to the dog to stop it, than the dog would have caused to the infant, then we favour the child. It would be monstrous to spare the dog."
Singer challenges this by arguing that formerly unequal rights for gays, women, and certain races were justified using the same set of intuitions. Posner replies that equality in civil rights did not occur because of ethical arguments, but because facts mounted that there were no morally significant differences between humans based on race, sex, or sexual orientation that would support inequality. If and when similar facts emerge about humans and animals, the differences in rights will erode too. But facts will drive equality, not ethical arguments that run contrary to instinct, he argues. Posner calls his approach "soft utilitarianism", in contrast to Singer's "hard utilitarianism". He argues:
The "soft" utilitarian position on animal rights is a moral intuition of many, probably most, Americans. We realize that animals feel pain, and we think that to inflict pain without a reason is bad. Nothing of practical value is added by dressing up this intuition in the language of philosophy; much is lost when the intuition is made a stage in a logical argument. When kindness toward animals is levered into a duty of weighting the pains of animals and of people equally, bizarre vistas of social engineering are opened up.
Roger Scruton
Roger Scruton, the British philosopher, argued that rights imply obligations. Every legal privilege, he wrote, imposes a burden on the one who does not possess that privilege: that is, "your right may be my duty." Scruton therefore regarded the emergence of the animal rights movement as "the strangest cultural shift within the liberal worldview", because the idea of rights and responsibilities is, he argued, distinctive to the human condition, and it makes no sense to spread them beyond our own species.
He accused animal rights advocates of "pre-scientific" anthropomorphism, attributing traits to animals that are, he says, Beatrix Potter-like, where "only man is vile." It is within this fiction that the appeal of animal rights lies, he argued. The world of animals is non-judgmental, filled with dogs who return our affection almost no matter what we do to them, and cats who pretend to be affectionate when, in fact, they care only about themselves. It is, he argued, a fantasy, a world of escape.
Scruton singled out Peter Singer, a prominent Australian philosopher and animal-rights activist, for criticism. He wrote that Singer's works, including Animal Liberation, "contain little or no philosophical argument. They derive their radical moral conclusions from a vacuous utilitarianism that counts the pain and pleasure of all living things as equally significant and that ignores just about everything that has been said in our philosophical tradition about the real distinction between persons and animals."
Tom Regan countered this view of rights by distinguishing moral agents and moral patients.
Public attitudes
According to a 2000 paper by Harold Herzog and Lorna Dorr, previous academic surveys of attitudes toward animal rights tended to have small sample sizes and non-representative groups. But a number of factors appear to correlate with people's attitudes about the treatment of animals and animal rights. These include gender, age, occupation, religion, and level of education. There is also evidence suggesting that experience with pets may be a factor in people's attitudes.
According to some studies, women are more likely to empathize with the cause of animal rights than men. A 1996 study suggested that factors that may partially explain this discrepancy include attitudes towards feminism and science, scientific literacy, and the presence of a greater emphasis on "nurturance or compassion" among women.
A common misconception about animal rights is that its proponents want to grant nonhuman animals the same legal rights as humans, such as the right to vote. This is false. Rather, the idea is that animals should have rights that accord with their interests (for example, cats have no interest in voting, and so should not have the right to vote). A 2016 study found that support for animal testing may not be based on cogent philosophical rationales and that more open debate is warranted.
A 2007 survey that examined whether people who believe in evolution are more likely to support animal rights than creationists and believers in intelligent design found that this was largely the case; according to the researchers, strong Christian fundamentalists and believers in creationism were less likely to advocate for animal rights than those who were less fundamentalist in their beliefs. The findings extended previous research, such as a 1992 study that found that 48% of animal rights activists were atheists or agnostic. A 2019 Washington Post study found that those with favorable attitudes toward animal rights also tend to have favorable views of universal healthcare; reducing discrimination against African Americans, the LGBT community, and undocumented immigrants; and expanding welfare to aid the poor.
Two surveys found that attitudes toward animal rights tactics, such as direct action, are very diverse within the animal rights communities. Near half (50% and 39% in two surveys) of activists do not support direct action. One survey concluded, "it would be a mistake to portray animal rights activists as homogeneous."
Even though around 90% of U.S. adults regularly consume meat, almost half of them appear to support a ban on slaughterhouses: in Sentience Institute's 2017 survey of 1,094 U.S. adults' attitudes toward animal farming, 49% "support a ban on factory farming, 47% support a ban on slaughterhouses, and 33% support a ban on animal farming". The 2017 survey was replicated by researchers at Oklahoma State University, who found similar results: 73% of respondents answered "yes" to the question "Were you aware that slaughterhouses are where livestock are killed and processed into meat, such that, without them, you would not be able to consume meat?"
In the U.S., the National Farmers Organization held many public protest slaughters in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Protesting low prices for meat, farmers killed their animals in front of media representatives. The carcasses were wasted and not eaten. This effort backfired because it angered people to see animals needlessly and wastefully killed.
See also
- Animals portal
- Animal cognition
- Animal consciousness
- Animal–industrial complex
- Animal liberation
- Animal liberation movement
- Animal liberationist
- Animal rights by country or territory
- Animal studies
- Animal suffering
- Animal trial
- Animal Welfare Institute
- Antinaturalism (politics)
- Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
- Chick culling
- Cruelty to animals
- Critical animal studies
- Deep ecology
- Do Animals Have Rights? (book)
- List of animal rights advocates
- List of songs about animal rights
- Moral circle expansion
- Non-human electoral candidate
- Open rescue
- Plant rights
- Sentientism
- Timeline of animal welfare and rights
- Wild animal suffering
- World Animal Day
References
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- Compare for example similar usage of the term in 1938: The American Biology Teacher. Vol. 53. National Association of Biology Teachers. 1938. p. 211. Retrieved 16 April 2021.
The foundation from which these behaviors spring is the ideology known as speciesism. Speciesism is deeply rooted in the widely-held belief that the human species is entitled to certain rights and privileges.
- Horta (2010).
- That a central goal of animal rights is to eliminate the property status of animals, see Sunstein (2004), p. 11ff.
- For speciesism and fundamental protections, see Waldau (2011).
- For food, clothing, research subjects or entertainment, see Francione (1995), p. 17.
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Cohen, Carl; Regan, Tom (2001). The Animal Rights Debate. Point/Counterpoint: Philosophers Debate Contemporary Issues Series. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 47. ISBN 9780847696628. Retrieved 16 April 2021.
Too often overlooked in the animal world, according to Sapontzis, are insects that have interests, and therefore rights.
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The concept of "bacteria rights" can appear coupled with disdain or irony:
Pluhar, Evelyn B. (1995). "Human "superiority" and the argument from marginal cases". Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Book collections on Project MUSE. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. p. 9. ISBN 9780822316480. Retrieved 16 April 2021.
For example, in an editorial entitled 'Animal Rights Nonsense,' ... in the prestigious science journal Nature, defenders of animal rights are accused of being committed to the absurdity of 'bacteria rights.'
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: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ Grant, Catharine (2006). The No-nonsense Guide to Animal Rights. New Internationalist. p. 24. ISBN 9781904456407.
These religions emphasize ahimsa, which is the principle of non-violence towards all living things. The first precept is a prohibition against the killing of any creature. The Jain, Hindu and Buddhist injunctions against killing serve to teach that all creatures are spiritually equal.
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: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - "Animal rights". BBC. Archived from the original on 8 March 2021. Retrieved 17 March 2019.
The main reason for Hindu respect for animal rights is the principle of ahimsa. According to the principle of ahimsa, no living thing should be harmed. This applies to humans and animals. The Jains' belief system takes the principle of ahimsa regarding animals so seriously that as well as being strict vegetarians, some followers wear masks to prevent them breathing in insects. They may also sweep paths with a small broom to make sure they do not tread on any living creatures.
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Ahimsa is the ruling principle of Indian life from the very earliest times. ... This positive spiritual attitude is easily explained to the common man in a negative way as "ahimsa" and hence this way of denoting it. Tiruvalluvar speaks of this as "kollaamai" or "non-killing."
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Further reading
- Lubinski, Joseph (2002). "Overview Summary of Animal Rights", The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law.
- "Great Apes and the Law", The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law.
- Bekoff, Marc (ed.) (2009). The Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare. Greenwood.
- Best, Steven and Nocella II, Anthony J. (eds). (2004). Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals. Lantern Books
- Chapouthier, Georges and Nouët, Jean-Claude (eds.) (1998). The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights. Ligue Française des Droits de l'Animal.
- Dawkins, Richard (1993). Gaps in the mind, in Cavalieri, Paola and Singer, Peter (eds.). The Great Ape Project. St. Martin's Griffin.
- Dombrowski, Daniel (1997). Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases. University of Illinois Press.
- Favre, David S. (2018). Respecting Animals: A Balanced Approach to Our Relationship with Pets, Food, and Wildlife. Prometheus. ISBN 978-1633884250.
- Finlayson, Lorna, "Let them eat oysters" (review of Peter Singer, Animal Liberation Now, Penguin, 2023, ISBN 978 1 84792 776 7, 368 pp; and Martha Nussbaum, Justice for Animals, Simon & Schuster, 2023, ISBN 978 1 982102 50 0, 372 pp.), London Review of Books, vol. 45, no.19 (5 October 2023), pp. 3, 5–8. The question of animal rights has been approached from a variety of theoretical orientations, including utilitarianism and capabilities approach ("CA") – none of them satisfactory to reviewer Lorna Finlayson, who teaches philosophy at England's University of Essex and ends up (p. 8) suggesting "think politically about animals: "It ought to be – it is – possible to arrange society differently." (p. 8.)
- Foltz, Richard (2006). Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim Cultures. Oneworld Publications.
- Franklin, Julian H. (2005). Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy. University of Columbia Press.
- Gruen, Lori (2003). "The Moral Status of Animals", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 1, 2003.
- Gruen, Lori (2011). Ethics and Animals. Cambridge University Press.
- Hall, Lee (2006). Capers in the Churchyard: Animal Rights Advocacy in the Age of Terror. Nectar Bat Press.
- Linzey, Andrew and Clarke, Paul A. B.(eds.) (1990). Animal Rights: A Historic Anthology. Columbia University Press.
- Mann, Keith (2007). From Dusk 'til Dawn: An Insider's View of the Growth of the Animal Liberation Movement. Puppy Pincher Press.
- McArthur, Jo-Anne and Wilson, Keith (eds). (2020). Hidden: Animals in the Anthropocene. Lantern Publishing & Media.
- Neumann, Jean-Marc (2012). "The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights or the Creation of a New Equilibrium between Species". Animal Law Review volume 19–1.
- Nibert, David (2002). Animal Rights, Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation. Rowman and Litterfield.
- Nibert, David, ed. (2017). Animal Oppression and Capitalism. Praeger Publishing. ISBN 978-1440850738.
- Patterson, Charles (2002). Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. Lantern.
- Rachels, James (1990). Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism. Oxford University Press.
- Regan, Tom and Singer, Peter (eds.) (1976). Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Prentice-Hall.
- Spiegel, Marjorie (1996). The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery. Mirror Books.
- Sztybel, David (2006). "Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust?" Ethics and the Environment 11 (Spring): 97–132.
- Tobias, Michael (2000). Life Force: The World of Jainism. Asian Humanities Press.
- Wilson, Scott (2010). "Animals and Ethics" Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Kymlicka, W., Donaldson, S. (2011) Zoopolis. A Political Theory of Animal Rights. Oxford University Press.
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