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United States v. Antonio J. Morrison and Christy Brzonkala v. Antonio J. Morrison
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 11, 2000 Decided May 15, 2000
Full case name	United States v. Antonio J. Morrison et al. and Christy Brzonkala v. Antonio J. Morrison et al.
Docket nos.	99-5 99-29
Citations	529 U.S. 598 (more)
Case history
Prior	Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
Holding
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, is unconstitutional as exceeding congressional power under the Commerce Clause and under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Court membership
Chief Justice William Rehnquist Associate Justices John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy David Souter · Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg · Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
Majority	Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
Concurrence	Thomas
Dissent	Souter, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer
Dissent	Breyer, joined by Stevens, Souter (Points 1 and 2 only), Ginsburg (Points 1 and 2 only)
Laws applied
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 13981.

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) is a United States Supreme Court decision that examined the limits of Congress's power to make laws under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

History

In 1994, the United States Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which contained a provision at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 for a federal civil remedy to victims of gender-based violence, even when no criminal charges were filed.

That fall, at Virginia Tech, freshman student Christy Brzonkala was allegedly assaulted and repeatedly raped by Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, members of the school's football team. During the school-conducted hearing on her complaint, Morrison admitted having sexual contact with her despite the fact that she had twice told him "no." College proceedings failed to punish Crawford, but initially punished Morrison with a suspension (punishment later struck down by the administration). A state grand jury did not find sufficient evidence, in its opinion, to charge either man with a crime. Brzonkala then filed suit under the Violence Against Women Act.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia held Congress lacked authority to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13981. A three judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed 2-1. The Fourth Circuit reheard en banc and reversed the panel, upholding the district court.

The Supreme Court affirmed in a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that Congress lacked authority, under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact the law.

Rationale

See also: article about the Rehnquist Court for more about cases from this era.

United States v. Morrison invalidated a section of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 which gave victims of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court, although program funding remains unaffected. Congress enacted this private civil remedy because of statistical evidence that states did not prosecute crimes against women as often as crimes against men. The Court majority ruled that VAWA exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

Commerce Clause

In striking down VAWA as exceeding Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, the majority applied United States v. Lopez (1995), a case that invalidated a federal criminal statute enacted using the Commerce Clause power. There as in Morrison, the court stressed the "enumerated powers" that limit federal power. The Lopez court stated that Congress may regulate (1) use of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the "instrumentalities" (for example, vehicles) used in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Because VAWA's civil remedy concededly did not regulate the first or second categories, the Morrison court analyzed its validity under the third. The majority concluded that an act of violence such as those that VAWA was meant to remedy had only an "attenuated" effect, not a substantial one, on interstate commerce. The government, however, argued that in the aggregate, these acts did have a substantial effect; for this proposition it relied on Wickard v. Filburn, which held that Congress could regulate an individual act that lacked a substantial effect on interstate commerce if, when aggregated, acts of that sort had the required relation to interstate commerce. The majority, once again relying on Lopez, replied that the aggregation principle of Wickard applied only to "economic" activity. Because, the court claimed, the violence VAWA was meant to prevent was "noneconomic" activity in that the economic effect was indirect, rather than direct, it could not properly be federally regulated in the aggregate.

The Court explained that the need to distinguish between economic activities that directly and those that indirectly affect interstate commerce was due to "the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority." Referring to Lopez, the Court said: "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur." The majority further stated, "t is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign." Justice Thomas's concurring opinion also expressed the concern that "Congress appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce."

Equal Protection Clause

The Court discussed the government's view that there was a "pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated violence." This bias, the government argued, deprived women of the equal protection of the laws. The private civil remedy of VAWA was meant to redress "both the States' bias and deter future instances of discrimination in the state courts."

The Court responded that the Fourteenth Amendment "place certain limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct." Among these limitations, the "foremost," the Court said, was the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action – i.e., action by state governments – and not private conduct.

The majority then reaffirmed this state action doctrine, and specifically reaffirmed the results reached in United States v. Harris (1883) and the Civil Rights Cases (1883), both decided fifteen years after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in 1868. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court had held that the Equal Protection Clause applied only to acts done by states, not to those done by private individuals; because the Civil Rights Act of 1875 applied to racial discrimination in private establishments, the Court said, it exceeded congressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Harris, the Court had ruled that the Clause did not apply to a prison lynching, since the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit private criminal acts.

In response to the government's argument that VAWA was intended to correct the states' systemic gender bias in enforcing their own crime laws, the Court briefly intimated that such a correction of unequal enforcement of the laws might not qualify as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. It suggested that the Civil Rights Cases dealt with a situation similar to the one which faced the Court in Morrison. For the law which the Civil Rights Cases invalidated, the Morrison Court said, was meant to remedy a situation in which "here were state laws on the books bespeaking equality of treatment, but in the administration of these laws there was discrimination against newly freed slaves."

The Court, however, said that even if it accepted the government's argument that unequal enforcement of the laws constituted state action in Morrison but not in the Civil Rights Cases, VAWA was still unconstitutional. For this argument the Court relied on City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), which held that only congressional remedies which showed "congruence and proportionality" to the wrongs they sought to redress or deter were constitutional under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. VAWA's civil remedy, the Morrison Court said, was aimed at private actors who broke state laws, instead of at state actors who failed to enforce those laws. According to the majority, this fact made VAWA's civil remedy lacking in "congruence and proportionality" to the wrong it sought to correct.

Boerne was a precedent of major importance to the outcome of Morrison with regard to interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Boerne Court had sought to "limit congressional power" to make a "substantive change" to the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, on the theory that Congress "has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." Because of the Boerne "congruence and proportionality" requirement, Congress could not exceed the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.

The Court never claimed that Boerne overruled Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966), but mentioned a difference in interpretation. The Katzenbach Court said that the Equal Protection Clause is "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for and nature of legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees." Before the 1997 Boerne decision, Katzenbach v. Morgan was widely interpreted as allowing Congress to go beyond, but not fall short of, the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. However, the Boerne Court said. "This is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one."

The holding of Boerne said that only the Court could interprete the Constitution in order to maintain the "traditional separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary." Also, Boerne relied on states' rights arguments based on "enumerated powers." The intent of Boerne was to prevent "a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority."

Critiques of Morrison

The United States v. Morrison decision was seen by both the Court and the press as part of the Rehnquist Court's series of federalism or states' rights decisions. Feminist Wendy Kaminer agreed with the courts that Congress had overstepped its bounds by invoking the Commerce Clause: "The price of upholding VAWA's civil rights remedy is an unconstitutional grant of unlimited power to Congress, power that will not always be used wisely or with regard to individual rights. We need to combat sexual violence without making a federal case of it."

Law Professor Peter Shane said that the attorneys general of 36 states had endorsed the VAWA, and Shane argued that the endorsement "exposes one of the more bizarre aspects of the Supreme Court's recent activism on behalf of state sovereignty: From the states' point of view, this campaign is often pointless and sometimes counterproductive." According to Shane, the 36 attorneys general called the Violence Against Women Act "a particularly appropriate remedy for the harm caused by gender-motivated violence."

The Washington Post came out in favor of the Morrison decision: "The court got it right. If Congress could federalize rape and assault, it's hard to think of anything it couldn't." An editorial by columnist Ann Coulter agreed with the Court's arguments, and said of Congress: "their theory was that they could usurp the traditional police powers of the states."

Notes

1. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
2. Taylor, Stuart. "Court to Congress: You can't regulate everything by Stuart Taylor Jr.," National Journal (1999-03-13). Retrieved 2007-02-13.
3. Quotes in the rest of this subsection are from Boerne unless otherwise indicated.
4. Chen, Jim. Come back to the Nickel and Five: Tracing the Warren Court's pursuit of equal justice under law, Washington and Lee Law Review (Fall 2002). Retrieved 2007-02-13.
5. Kennedy's opinion for the Court, City of Boerne v. Flores
6. Democrats and conservative Republicans argued that the proposed Amendment would give Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas of state responsibility, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the Constitution. Typifying these views, Republican Representative Robert Hale of New York labeled the Amendment “an utter departure from every principle ever dreamed of by the men who framed our Constitution,” id., at 1063, and warned that under it “all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedures … may be overridden, may be repealed or abolished, and the law of Congress established instead.” Ibid. Senator William Stewart of Nevada likewise stated the Amendment would permit “Congress to legislate fully upon all subjects affecting life, liberty, and property,” such that “there would not be much left for the State Legislatures,” and would thereby “work an entire change in our form of government.” - City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court - These opinions were remarks by 19th century "Democrats and conservative Republicans" with reference to an early draft of the Fourteenth Amendment that were quoted by Kennedy
7. Rehnquist's opinion, United States v. Morrison; No Winners in Rape Lawsuit, Brooke A. Masters, The Washington Post, May 19, 2000; Violence Against Coherence, Ann Coulter, Townhall.com, May 19, 2000; In Who's Best Interests? Not the States, Peter M. Shane, The Washington Post, May 21, 2000
8. Kaminer, Wendy. "Sexual Congress," American Prospect (2000-02-14). Retrieved 2007-02-13. Kaminer's article also stated:

   "Try the common sense test: When you think of a rape in a college dormitory, do you think about interstate commerce? As the Fourth Circuit noted in Brzonkala, the relationship between sexual violence and interstate commerce is rather attenuated....Do you want Congress to enjoy unrestricted regulatory power over you? (Do you want your divorce in federal court? Do you want Congress making local zoning decisions for your town?) The Supreme Court in Lopez rightly held that the Commerce Clause is not a grant of general police power....This standard does not unduly limit congressional power, including the power to prohibit discrimination. It does not invalidate the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Segregation in hotels and restaurants, on transportation systems, and in the workplace involved commercial activities with clear and substantial effects upon interstate commerce."

9. Shane, Peter. "In Who's Best Interests? Not the States," Washington Post (2000-05-21). Also see Mauro, Tony. "States' Rights Triumph in Supreme Court Kimel Decision, Oral VAWA Argument," Legal Intelligencer (2000-01-12); Greenhouse, Linda. "Justices Cool to Law Protecting Women," New York Times, (2000-01-12)
10. Washington Post, Editorial: States’ Business, (2000-05-16). Retrieved 2007-02-13.
11. Coulter, Ann. "Violence against coherence," Townhall.com (2000-05-19). Retrieved 2007-02-13.

See also

• Congressional power of enforcement
• List of United States Supreme Court cases

External links

• Full text at Cornell.edu
• Text at DOJ

• Commerce Clause cases
• 2000 in law
• United States Supreme Court cases
• United States Fourteenth Amendment case law