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Sino-Burmese relations

China	Myanmar

China–Myanmar relations (Chinese: 中缅关系; Template:Lang-my) refers to the international relations between the People's Republic of China and Myanmar. China and Myanmar have active bilateral relations with each other. However, in recent times, the relations between China and Myanmar have faced some problems due to ongoing conflicts with ethnic Chinese rebels and Myanmar military near the border.

The relationship between China and Myanmar, while much closer and warmer than relations with China's other Southeast Asian neighbor, Vietnam; also faces difficulties due to the effects of alleged Chinese-sponsored debt-traps and Chinese-backed militants in northern Myanmar territories.

History

Both two countries and peoples, as well as both countries' official languages, share a close relationship and the same linguistic link, in which both the Burmese and Chinese are both parts of Sino-Tibetan language family and peoples.

The Yuan dynasty saw the First Mongol invasion of Burma and Second Mongol invasion of Burma. The Qing dynasty fought the Sino-Burmese War. Large numbers of Panthays from China settled in Myanmar.

The Burma Road was built to China during World War II.

Modern relations

Burma was the first non-Communist country to recognize the Communist-led People's Republic of China after its foundation in 1949. Burma and the People's Republic of China formally established diplomatic relations on June 8, 1950. China and Burma signed a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression and promulgated a Joint Declaration on June 29, 1954, officially basing their relations on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.The relationship with China was under the spirit of the term "pauk-phaw", meaning kinship in Burmese. However, Burma maintained a neutralist foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s. Anti-Chinese riots in 1967 and the expulsion of Chinese communities from Burma generated hostility in both countries. Relations began to improve significantly in the 1970s. Under the rule of Deng Xiaoping, China reduced support for the Communist Party of Burma ("CPB") and on August 5, 1988 China signed a major trade agreement, legalizing cross-border trading and began supplying considerably military aid. Following the violent repression of pro-democracy protests in 1988, the newly formed State Peace and Development Council, facing growing international condemnation and pressure, sought to cultivate a strong relationship with China to bolster itself; in turn, China's influence grew rapidly after the international community abandoned Burma.

Commercial relations

Bilateral trade between China and Myanmar exceeds $1.4 billion. Chinese exports to Myanmar typically focus around oil, steel and textile products, while Myanmar exports to China range from natural rubber to raw wood. China is providing extensive aid and helping to develop industries and infrastructure in Myanmar and aims to be the chief beneficiary from cultivating Myanmar's extensive oil and natural gas reserves. It is one of the chief partners of the Burmese regime in the project to renovate and expand the Sittwe seaport and has received rights to develop and exploit natural gas reserves in the Arakan region. China has offered loans and credit to the military regime, as well as economic aid and investments for the construction of dams, bridges, roads and ports as well as for industrial projects. China extensively aided the construction of strategic roads along the Irrawaddy River trade route linking Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal. Chinese firms have been involved in the construction of oil and gas pipelines stretching 2,380 km (1,480 mi) from Myanmar's Rakhine State to China's Yunnan Province. China National Offshore Oil Corporation and the China National Petroleum Corporation hold important contracts on upgrading Burmese oilfields and refineries and sharing of production. PetroChina is in process of building a major gas pipeline from the A-1 Shwe oil field off the coast of the Rakhine State leading to Yunnan, accessing and exploiting an estimated 2.88 to 3.56 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. A proposed Sino-Burmese oil pipeline off the western coast of Myanmar may permit China to import oil from the Middle East, bypassing the Strait of Malacca. There have been protest against Chinese oil projects.

China Power Investment Corporation's investment in the $3.6 billion Myitsone hydropower station on the Irrawaddy River has hit a snagged in early October 2011 as Burmese government suspended construction due to local residents' concern about the human, environmental impact and perceived benefits. Most of the power generated will be exported to Yunnan province in China and local residents claimed the lack of community feedback in the planning process. China's government is stating Myanmar will get US$54 billion in tax revenue, shared profits, free electricity. At stake is China's huge financial stake in the project and also risk to other big projects China has in the country. China Power Investment Corporation stated only five villages with a total of 2,146 needed to relocated. The firm has provided affected villagers with two storey houses, 21 inch televisions and a 100,000 Burmese kyat.

Myanmar is China's key supplier not only for copper but also for rare earth metals required for high tech devices. More than 70% of China's production quota (35.5 t) is sourced from Myanmar (2020). While mining production continued steadily after the military coup in early 2021 (many mines are owned by members of the junta), logistics issues have hindered exports to China, creating decreasing supplies (particularly of dysprosium and terbium), and higher prices globally as a result.

Human rights violations and other issues

There have been multiple reports and complaints from locals related to human rights violations, accusations of land grab and environmental damage due to land acquisition and industrial activities by Chinese companies.

In 2010, nearly 8000 acres of land was confiscated from residents to expand a Chinese-backed copper mining project.

In November 2012, peaceful villagers protesting against the Letpadaung Copper Mine were attacked by police and Chinese workers. In the attacks, police used white phosphorus military munitions, resulting in burns and injuries to dozens of protesters including monks. The protests were due to coercion and intimidation of villagers to sign contracts the contents of which they were not allowed to read and misrepresentation of essential terms of the contract by falsely promising villagers that the land would be returned to them in three years, undamaged and in the same condition.

In 2015, Amnesty International discovered that a waste leak from the Letpadaung Copper Mine had run into nearby fields, severely contaminating it. A farmer interviewed by Amnesty International describing the effects said "Every crop perished. Everything died. Every place where the water got the crops perished. They perished steadily, taking around ten days. First the crops wilted and then died." Soil samples taken by Amnesty International were found to be contaminated with various metals, in particular Arsenic, Copper and lead.

In February 2018, about 800 villagers in Kachin State protested to the Chief Minister's office against environmental damage caused by Chinese companies planting tissue culture bananas. In February 2019, two reporters were physically assaulted and forcibly detained by employees of a Chinese joint venture company "Tha Khin Sit Mining Company", for a previously published article about locals in Kachin objecting to tissue-culture banana plantations.

A report by human rights group Burma Campaign UK in December 2018 stated that Chinese companies make up the bulk of corporations named for involvement in human rights and environmental violations in Myanmar.

In June 2020, Myanmar was one of 53 countries that backed the Hong Kong national security law at the United Nations.

Human trafficking

There have been reports of over 7000 Burmese women and girls being sold for sexual slavery in China, where they are sold as "brides". Women were also reported to have been sold multiple times for the purpose of forced childbirth.

Strategic relations

China is the most important supplier of military aid and maintains extensive strategic and military cooperation. Since 1989, China has supplied Myanmar with jet fighters, armored vehicles and naval vessels and has trained Burmese army, air force and naval personnel. Access to Myanmar's ports and naval installations provide China with strategic influence in the Bay of Bengal, in the wider Indian Ocean region and in Southeast Asia. China has developed a deep-water port on Kyaukpyu in the Bay of Bengal. It has also built an 85-metre jetty, naval facilities and major reconnaissance and electronic intelligence systems on the Great Coco Island, located 18 kilometres from India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands, giving China capabilities to monitor India's military activities, including missile tests. However the building of intelligence systems on the island is widely regarded as a myth today and the Indian forces recently denied their existence China assists in constructing a naval base in Sittwe, a strategically important sea port close to eastern India's largest city and port, Kolkata. Beijing also funds road construction linking Yangon and Sittwe, providing the shortest route to the Indian Ocean from southern China.

China and Russia once vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution designed to punish Myanmar. In recent years, China has shown a lack of willingness to back the Burmese government and has attempted to stabilize the political situation in Myanmar.

In recent years, Myanmar has moved to develop strategic and commercial relations with India, with which it shares a long land border and the Bay of Bengal. Increasing trade and military cooperation with India and developing bilateral relations with Japan and within the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) shows a shift in Myanmar's foreign policy to avoid excessive dependence on China. However, by 2018 India's involvement in Myanmar was still limited compared to China's political and economic influence in the country.

After the Kokang incident in August 2009 which gained international media interest, some experts questioned its impact on China–Myanmar relations, which were considered to be strong. Bertil Lintner stated that Myanmar was prioritizing internal conflicts over its ties with China, however some Chinese analysts, such as Shi Yinhong, played down the relationship between Myanmar and China, saying "They're not great friends. They don't listen to what China says." China had urged Myanmar to ensure the stability of the border area and protect the interests of its citizens in Myanmar. The Burmese Foreign Ministry later apologised to China about the incident, but also ran a story on the Dalai Lama in the government newspaper the Myanmar Times, the first mention of him in the state controlled Burmese media for 20 years. Chinese officials were said to be "furious" and "extremely upset" over not being forewarned about the offensive on the border.

In June 2015, Kokang rebels announced a unilateral ceasefire citing "the Chinese government's strong calls for restoring peace in the China-Myanmar border region" among other interests. The announcement coincided with Aung San Suu Kyi's meeting with Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing. Following international condemnation of the Rohingya genocide, observers have noted that Myanmar has tightened its relations with China.

In May 2018, China condemned Myanmar's government after violence in northern Myanmar erupted. The violence was started by a China-backed militia, rebelling against Myanmar. The militia, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, sought to get more autonomy from the Burmese central government. In October 2018, militias backed by China against Myanmar expelled numerous clergies in northern Myanmar, sparking outrage throughout Myanmar. The Chinese-backed militia also threatened northern Myanmar residents from expressing their religious beliefs, even inside their homes.

In August 2018, various international organizations found a staggering rise in Chinese projects in Myanmar, which may cause ‘debt traps’ against Myanmar, the same way it was perceived as causing a debt-trap against Sri Lanka. Despite these reports, Myanmar's government continued with the Chinese loans and programs in November 2018, causing wide public concern. In February 2019, Myanmar pursued more Chinese-sponsored loans and programs.

In July 2019, UN ambassadors from 50 countries, including Myanmar, have signed a joint letter to the UNHRC defending China's treatment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang region.

In January 2020, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Nay Pyi Taw. Xi promoted the practical cooperation under the framework of the One Belt One Road to achieve results at an early date and benefit Myanmar's people.

2021 military coup

In February 2021, the Myanmar coup d'état removed a number of democratically elected members of parliament from power, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. On February 3, China and Russia blocked the United Nations Security Council from issuing a statement condemning the military for fear of additional economic sanctions. While the PRC initially downplayed the military coup as "a major cabinet reshuffle", it later expressed concern over the 12-month emergency declared by military leader Min Aung Hlaing, demanding the release of Aung San Suu Kyi.

On 16 February 2021, in reaction to protesters outside the Chinese embassy in Yangon, blaming China for the coup d'état, the Chinese ambassador Chen Hai said “the current development in Myanmar is absolutely not what China wants to see”. He dismissed the claim that China supports military rule in Myanmar as a “ridiculous rumour”. Nonetheless, Chinese factories in the country were set ablaze as Burmese protesters did not trust China's response, leaving 39 people dead on March 15; the Chinese embassy in Myanmar later responded by condemning the arson attacks, but was ridiculed by the protesters for not offering any sympathy to the protest movement. China also continued to supply food to Myanmar, which was seen by some as supportive of the military junta.

In mid-March of 2021, it became clear that China-Myanmar relations had seriously frayed due to ongoing civil unrest and military rule, jeopardizing Chinese investments in the country. In another report, it was stated that Myanmar’s junta is trying to improve relations with the United States through the employment of a former Israeli military intelligence official. According to the source, Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s de facto leader since 2016, had grown too close to China for the generals’ liking. China has not supported military rule in Myanmar and attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully without foreign interference. Despite these statements, China has been, alongside Russia, frequently vetoing any UN resolutions condemning the increasing brutality of the Burmese military junta for fear of additional sanctions that would hurt the region economically. China is the second largest investor in Myanmar.

On 3 May 2021, China sent over 500.000 vaccines made by Chinese firms Sinovac and Sinopharm to Myanmar in order to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and to demonstrate the friendship (Paukphaw). The vaccines were previously approved by the WHO and represent a significant step to protect all citizens of Myanmar from the deadly disease. Anti-vaccine protesters considered it a sham, and distributed misinformation about Chinese vaccines on social media.

See also

• BCIM Forum
• China-Myanmar border
• Chinese people in Myanmar
• China and the Kachin State
• Foreign relations of Myanmar
• Internal conflict in Myanmar
• Kuomintang in Burma

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Bibliography

• Resources in your library
• Resources in other libraries

• Cardenal, Juan Pablo; Araújo, Heriberto (2011). La silenciosa conquista china (in Spanish). Barcelona: Crítica. pp. 95–107, 230–232. ISBN 9788498922578.
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• Yian, Goh Geok. 2010. “The Question of 'china' in Burmese Chronicles”. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 41 (1): 125–52. The Question of 'China' in Burmese Chronicles.

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