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The United States Army Military Government in France (in French: gouvernement militaire de l'armée des États-Unis en France, and in English: Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories or AMGOT), was an organization jointly created by the United States and the United Kingdom to administer France after the Liberation. This project was thwarted by the actions of the cabinet of Charles de Gaulle.

Context

Fragility of European States

The **Second World War** caused the collapse of several European and Asian governments. From the moment they joined the war, the United States initiated plans for military administrations in fallen nations. AMGOT was deployed at the end of the war in **Italy**, under the leadership of **Harold Alexander**. Military occupation there began following the **Armistice of September 29, 1943**. In **Korea**, a similar body, the **USAMGIK**, governed the southern half of the peninsula from **September 8, 1945** to **August 15, 1948**.

Aborted Plan for the Dismemberment of France

President **Franklin Delano Roosevelt** and his administration drafted several plans to reshape European politics after the war. Roosevelt proposed to **Anthony Eden** the creation of a new state called **Wallonia**, which involved removing **Alsace-Lorraine** and parts of **Hauts-de-France** from France to give them to **Belgium**. This plan was ultimately abandoned.

Plan for Military Occupation

A more ambitious plan for a pro-American military government in France was devised. Roosevelt believed that France controlled strategic points in **Europe**, **Africa**, and **China**, which the United States needed to secure. As **Dwight D. Eisenhower** noted in *Crusade in Europe*: " was very pessimistic about whether France would regain its former prestige and power in Europe. Consequently, he was concerned with ensuring control over certain strategic points of the French Empire, which he thought the French might no longer be able to maintain."

In **November 1942**, Roosevelt had **Mark Wayne Clark** sign the **Clark-Darlan Agreements**, which placed territories of the **French colonial empire** under American occupation. When **Charles de Gaulle** sent **André Philip** to **Washington** to declare that **Free France** would not tolerate U.S. administration of French territories, Roosevelt revealed the military occupation plan for mainland France: "When we enter France, we will exercise the rights of an occupying power... The Americans will remain in France until free elections are organized... I will speak to the French people on the radio, and they will do what I want." Philip warned Roosevelt that de Gaulle would oppose this plan.

In a memorandum dated **May 8, 1943**, Roosevelt wrote to **Winston Churchill**: "I am inclined to think that when we get into France, we will have to regard our action as that of a military occupation run by British and American generals... The most important positions, the national administration, must remain in the hands of the British or American commander-in-chief. This will be necessary, I think, for six months or even a year, the time needed to organize elections and a new form of government."

Preparations

Roosevelt proposed an action plan in which Anglo-Saxon generals would rely on French **préfets** and **departments**. The United States and the United Kingdom established specialized training schools, such as at **Columbia University**, to prepare those who would govern the military occupations. Training materials and courses were prepared not only for **Germany** and **Japan** but also for France, including its political and administrative structure.

Franc notes were printed by the **Federal Reserve of the United States**. They were distributed beginning with the **Normandy landings** and were well received by the population. According to **Claude Hettier de Boislambert**, the American operation aimed to place France under complete dependency: officers would have replaced mayors, municipal budgets would have been managed by the liberators, as well as communication and railway systems. Historian **Charles-Louis Foulon**, who worked for de Gaulle, asserted that the Americans would have implemented Allied tribunals in France.

Opposition

French Opposition

Charles de Gaulle wrote in his *War Memoirs* that he was aware of AMGOT’s plans to fully administer the state and embed a lasting American influence, and opposed it accordingly. He was reportedly informed through intelligence provided by **Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoli**, sourced from **North Africa**. **André Gros**, a member of de Gaulle’s cabinet and negotiator with the Americans, wrote that the AMGOT plan was halted by de Gaulle within ten days, between **June 4 and June 14, 1944**.

• • Michel Debré** played a key role in organizing, during **June 1944**, the replacement of Vichy-appointed **préfets** with **Commissaires de la République**, who had legitimacy from the Resistance. This allowed the Resistance to take control and prevented the United States from appointing individuals outside the Resistance.

According to **Diane de Bellescize**, the creation of the **Provisional Government of the French Republic** was specifically aimed at forming a legally recognized entity to oppose AMGOT. Its creation was driven by a dual objective: preventing anarchy—perceived as benefiting communists—and blocking AMGOT. Thus, before the **Normandy landings**, President Roosevelt ordered General Eisenhower to avoid any actions suggesting that the administration officially recognized the provisional government as legitimate.

British Opposition

Broadly, the British obtained assurances from the Americans that AMGOT would not apply to "liberated countries with recognized governments." The United Kingdom had recognized de Gaulle as the leader of France since **July 1940**. Americans and British disagreed on whether it was necessary to recognize a legitimate French government under de Gaulle.

The British government at times opposed the project. **Anthony Eden**, the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary, visited Roosevelt in **March 1943** and opposed the AMGOT project. He later wrote: "I could not agree with a new American proposal, which was that the Allied forces landing in France should administer the country. It seemed to me that Roosevelt wanted to hold France’s future in his hands to decide the country’s fate. I didn’t like that, and preferred that we work with a French civil authority as soon as possible." In his journal entry of **March 4, 1944**, Eden noted that the British would be "foolish to follow Roosevelt, blinded by his absurd and petty aversion to de Gaulle."

American Opposition

The plans to dismember France and then occupy the country also faced opposition in the United States. American media, for instance, were pro-Gaullist and, although unaware of Roosevelt’s plan, regarded de Gaulle as the legitimate leader of France.

• • Dwight D. Eisenhower** opposed the president’s project, unable to comprehend Roosevelt’s animosity and pettiness toward the French general. He influenced Roosevelt in 1944 through telegrams encouraging recognition of de Gaulle as the sole legitimate leader. On June 3, he wrote: "All our intelligence leads us to believe that the only authority resistance groups wish to recognize is that of De Gaulle and his committee... He controls the only military forces capable of participating in the operation. Consequently, from a purely military perspective... we are obliged to deal with him if we want to ensure maximum support from the French, both within and outside the country."

Legacy

As the first **President of the Fifth Republic**, Charles de Gaulle refused to commemorate the **Normandy landings**. He explained this decision to **Alain Peyrefitte**, referencing the planned military occupation: "The June 6 landing was an Anglo-Saxon affair, from which France was excluded. They were determined to occupy France as enemy territory! Just as they had done in Italy and planned to do in Germany! They had prepared their AMGOT, which was to govern France sovereignly as their armies advanced. They had printed their counterfeit money, which would have been legal tender. They would have acted as in a conquered country... And you want me to commemorate this landing, which was the prelude to a second occupation of the country?"

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• France–United States relations
• History of France during World War II
• United States military history