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In ], '''Cartesian materialism''' is the idea that, somewhere in the ], there is a preferred set of data that corresponds to our view of the world. | In ], '''Cartesian materialism''' is the idea that, somewhere in the ], there is a preferred set of data that corresponds to our view of the world. It was first defined in contrast to ], from which it inititially differed by rejecting the notion of a non-physical soul as the place where consciousness occurs. | ||
⚫ | Cartesian materialism can refer to the general idea that consciousness is "realized in the physical materials of the brain". (O'Brien and Opie (1999), see also W. Teed Rockwell (2005)) It can also refer to the more specific idea that conscious exists in a limited area of the brain, much as in Descartes' original conception. By this definition, Cartesian materialism is "the view that there is a crucial finish line or boundary somewhere in the brain, marking a place where the order of arrival equals the order of "presentation" in experience because what happens there is what you are conscious of". (Dennett 1991, p.107) | ||
Originally Cartesian materialism was defined in the context of ], being the Cartesian concept of the mind without the non-physical soul, Marx and Engels (1845) consider the early history of Cartesian materialism: | |||
===Controversies and criticisms=== | |||
⚫ | |||
In addition to disagreement over how the term should be defined, the extent to which philosophers and scientists are committed to the "limited area" version is contested, with some saying this view is "held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind" (O'Brien & Opie), while others say it "informs virtually all research on mind and brain, explicitly and implicitly" (Antonio Damasio). | |||
⚫ | Cartesian materialism is associated with ] and is generally attacked by ], although it should be noted that ] and other proposals that consciousness arises from reflexes in the brain might be encompassed by Cartesian materialism. | ||
⚫ | :This school begins with the physician Le Roy, reaches its zenith with the physician Cabanis, and the physician La Mettrie is its centre. Descartes was still living when Le Roy, like La Mettrie in the eighteenth century, transposed the Cartesian structure of the animal to the human soul and declared that the soul is a modus of the body and ideas are mechanical motions. Le Roy even thought Descartes had kept his real opinion secret. Descartes protested. At the end of the eighteenth century Cabanis perfected Cartesian materialism in his treatise: Rapport du physique et du moral de 1'homme. |
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Many ], such as ] and ], are opposed to Cartesian materialism. In '']'' (1991), Dennett proposes a ] model of ] as an alternative to the "limited-area" version, focusing on what he sees as its critical weakness through his metaphor of the "]". | |||
Cartesian materialism can apply to the idea that only a limited area of the brain is the conscious mind or to the general idea that the mind is "realized in the physical materials of the brain" (O'Brien and Opie (1999), see also W. Teed Rockwell (2005), Dennett (1993)). | |||
⚫ | Rockwell also rejects Cartesian materialism, proposing that the mind should be identified not only with the brain but the rest of the body as it acts in its environment. ] also tend to adopt this viewpoint as do proponents of the ] strand of ]. | ||
⚫ | Cartesian materialism is associated with ] and is generally attacked by ], although it should be noted that ] and other proposals that consciousness arises from reflexes in the brain might be encompassed by Cartesian materialism. | ||
⚫ | Cartesian materialists such as O'Brien and Opie (1999) argue that Dennett's characterization of the concept is incorrect and that his analysis of the ] can be accommodated in the Cartesian materialist paradigm. | ||
Many ] such as ] and ] are opposed to Cartesian materialism. In '']'' (1991), Dennett concentrates on the timing of mental events and offers this definition: | |||
===History=== | |||
⚫ | |||
⚫ | According to Marx and Engels (1845), "''Mechanical'' French materialism adopted ''Descartes''' physics in opposition to his metaphysics. His followers were by profession ''anti-metaphysicians'', i.e., ''physicists''." | ||
They further trace the history thus: | |||
⚫ | |||
⚫ | :This school begins with the ''physician Le Roy'', reaches its zenith with the physician ''Cabanis'', and the physician ''La Mettrie'' is its centre. Descartes was still living when Le Roy, like ''La Mettrie'' in the eighteenth century, transposed the Cartesian structure of the animal to the human soul and declared that the soul is a ''modus of the body'' and ''ideas are mechanical motions''. Le Roy even thought Descartes had kept his real opinion secret. Descartes protested. At the end of the eighteenth century ''Cabanis'' perfected Cartesian materialism in his treatise: ''Rapport du physique et du moral de 1'homme''. | ||
Intriguingly Dennett (1991b) agrees with Rosenthal's Direct Realist idea that our intuitions reflect how things "really are". An insight into Dennett's idea of the mind is to be found on pages 407-408 of ''Consciousness Explained'': | |||
:"It seemed to him, according to the text, as if his mind - his visual field - were filled with intricate details of gold-green buds and wiggling branches, but although this is how it seemed this was an illusion. No such "plenum" ever came into his mind; the plenum remained out in the world where it it didn't have to be ''represented'', but could just ''be''. When we marvel, in those moments of heightened self-consciousness, at the glorious richness of our conscious experience, the richness we marvel at is actually the richness of the world outside, in all its ravishing detail. It does not "enter" our conscious minds, but is simply available" | |||
So Dennett defines "mind" as a thing that does not contain the direct objects of perception. He is a Direct Realist. For Dennett "mind" is solely the processes in conscious experience. Dennett's objection is to a particular sort of Cartesian materialism that he himself has defined. Dennett objects to a form of ], especially indirect realism where the contents of conscious perceptual experience are held to be in the brain as some form of virtual reality that is instantaneously apprehended. | |||
⚫ | Rockwell also rejects Cartesian materialism, proposing that the mind should be identified not only with the brain but the rest of the body as it acts in its environment. ] also tend to adopt this viewpoint as do proponents of the ] strand of ]. | ||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
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==References== | ==References== | ||
*Daniel C Dennett. (1991), ''Consciousness Explained'', Little, Brown & Co. USA (ISBN 0316180653) | *Daniel C Dennett. (1991), ''Consciousness Explained'', Little, Brown & Co. USA (ISBN 0316180653) | ||
⚫ | * Dennett, D.C. (1993). , Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 53, (4), 889-931, Dec. 1993. | ||
* Dennett, D.C. (1991b). Lovely and suspect qualities. Commentary on David Rosenthal, "The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality" in E. Villanueva, ed., Consciousness, (SOFIA Conference, Buenos Aires), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview 1991 | |||
⚫ | * Dennett, D.C. (1993). The Message is: There is no Medium (reply to Jackson, Rosenthal, Shoemaker & Tye), Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 53, (4), 889-931, Dec. 1993. | ||
*O'Brien, G. & Opie, J. (1999), "A Defence of Cartesian Materialism", ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'' 59:939-63. | *O'Brien, G. & Opie, J. (1999), "A Defence of Cartesian Materialism", ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'' 59:939-63. | ||
*Rockwell, W. Teed. (2005), ''Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory'', MIT Press (ISBN 0262182475) | *Rockwell, W. Teed. (2005), ''Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory'', MIT Press (ISBN 0262182475) |
Revision as of 23:01, 21 January 2006
In philosophy, Cartesian materialism is the idea that, somewhere in the brain, there is a preferred set of data that corresponds to our view of the world. It was first defined in contrast to Cartesian dualism, from which it inititially differed by rejecting the notion of a non-physical soul as the place where consciousness occurs.
Cartesian materialism can refer to the general idea that consciousness is "realized in the physical materials of the brain". (O'Brien and Opie (1999), see also W. Teed Rockwell (2005)) It can also refer to the more specific idea that conscious exists in a limited area of the brain, much as in Descartes' original conception. By this definition, Cartesian materialism is "the view that there is a crucial finish line or boundary somewhere in the brain, marking a place where the order of arrival equals the order of "presentation" in experience because what happens there is what you are conscious of". (Dennett 1991, p.107)
Controversies and criticisms
In addition to disagreement over how the term should be defined, the extent to which philosophers and scientists are committed to the "limited area" version is contested, with some saying this view is "held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind" (O'Brien & Opie), while others say it "informs virtually all research on mind and brain, explicitly and implicitly" (Antonio Damasio).
Cartesian materialism is associated with indirect realism and is generally attacked by direct realists, although it should be noted that Vygotskian behaviourism and other proposals that consciousness arises from reflexes in the brain might be encompassed by Cartesian materialism.
Many eliminativists, such as Paul Churchland and Daniel Dennett, are opposed to Cartesian materialism. In Consciousness Explained (1991), Dennett proposes a multiple drafts model of consciousness as an alternative to the "limited-area" version, focusing on what he sees as its critical weakness through his metaphor of the "Cartesian theater".
Rockwell also rejects Cartesian materialism, proposing that the mind should be identified not only with the brain but the rest of the body as it acts in its environment. Radical behaviourists also tend to adopt this viewpoint as do proponents of the Gibsonian strand of ecological psychology.
Cartesian materialists such as O'Brien and Opie (1999) argue that Dennett's characterization of the concept is incorrect and that his analysis of the Phi phenomenon can be accommodated in the Cartesian materialist paradigm.
History
According to Marx and Engels (1845), "Mechanical French materialism adopted Descartes' physics in opposition to his metaphysics. His followers were by profession anti-metaphysicians, i.e., physicists."
They further trace the history thus:
- This school begins with the physician Le Roy, reaches its zenith with the physician Cabanis, and the physician La Mettrie is its centre. Descartes was still living when Le Roy, like La Mettrie in the eighteenth century, transposed the Cartesian structure of the animal to the human soul and declared that the soul is a modus of the body and ideas are mechanical motions. Le Roy even thought Descartes had kept his real opinion secret. Descartes protested. At the end of the eighteenth century Cabanis perfected Cartesian materialism in his treatise: Rapport du physique et du moral de 1'homme.
See also
References
- Daniel C Dennett. (1991), Consciousness Explained, Little, Brown & Co. USA (ISBN 0316180653)
- Dennett, D.C. (1993). The Message is: There is no Medium (reply to Jackson, Rosenthal, Shoemaker & Tye), Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 53, (4), 889-931, Dec. 1993.
- O'Brien, G. & Opie, J. (1999), "A Defence of Cartesian Materialism", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:939-63.
- Rockwell, W. Teed. (2005), Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory, MIT Press (ISBN 0262182475)
- Engels, F and Marx, K. (1845). The Holy Family. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_3_d.htm