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Battle of the Nam River
Part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter
Troops of the US 35th Infantry display a North Korean flag captured along the Nam River
Date August 31 - November 19, 1950 Location Nam River, South Korea Result United Nations victory
Belligerents
United States	North Korea
Commanders and leaders
William B. Kean	Pang Ho San Paek Nak Chil
Units involved
25th Infantry Division 24th Infantry Regiment 27th Infantry Regiment 35th Infantry Regiment 5th Infantry RCT National Police	6th Division 7th Division
Strength
~15,000	20,000

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The Battle of the Nam River was an engagement between United Nations and North Korean forces early in the Korean War from August 31 to September 19, 1950 in the vicinity of the Nam River and the Naktong River in South Korea. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously. The battle ended in a victory for the United States after large numbers of US reinforcements destroyed an attacking North Korean division.

Background

Outbreak of war

Following the 25 June 1950 outbreak of the Korean War after the invasion of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) by its northern neighbor, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), the United Nations decided to commit troops to the conflict on behalf of South Korea. The United States, a member of the UN, subsequently committed ground forces to the Korean peninsula with the goal of fighting back the North Korean invasion and to prevent South Korea from collapsing. However, US forces in the Far East had been steadily decreasing since the end of World War II, five years earlier, and at the time the closest forces were the 24th Infantry Division, headquartered in Japan. The division was understrength, and most of its equipment was antiquated due to reductions in military spending. Regardless, the 24th was ordered to South Korea.

The 24th Infantry Division was the first US unit sent into Korea with the mission to take the initial "shock" of North Korean advances, delaying much larger North Korean units to buy time to allow reinforcements to arrive. The division was consequently alone for several weeks as it attempted to delay the North Koreans, making time for the 1st Cavalry and the 7th and 25th Infantry Divisions, along with other Eighth Army supporting units, to move into position. Advance elements of the 24th Infantry were badly defeated in the Battle of Osan on July 5, the first encounter between American and North Korean forces. For the first month after the defeat of Task Force Smith, 24th Infantry was repeatedly defeated and forced south by superior North Korean numbers and equipment. The regiments of the 24th Infantry were systematically pushed south in engagements around Chochiwon, Chonan, and Pyongtaek. The 24th made a final stand in the Battle of Taejon, where it was almost completely destroyed but delaying North Korean forces until July 20. By that time, the Eighth Army's force of combat troops were roughly equal to North Korean forces attacking the region, with new UN units arriving every day.

North Korean advance

With Taejon captured, North Korean forces began surrounding the Pusan Perimeter from all sides in an attempt to envelop it. The 4th and 6th North Korean Infantry Divisions advanced south in a wide flanking maneuver. The two divisions attempted to envelop the UN's left flank, but became extremely spread out in the process. They advanced on UN positions with armor and superior numbers, repeatedly pushing back U.S. and South Korean forces.

American forces were pushed back repeatedly before finally halting the North Korean advance in a series of engagements in the southern section of the country. Forces of the 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, newly arrived in the country, were wiped out at Hadong in a coordinated ambush by North Korean forces on July 27, opening a pass to the Pusan area. Soon after, North Korean forces took Chinju to the west, pushing back the US 19th Infantry Regiment and leaving routes to the Pusan open for more North Korean attacks. US formations were subsequently able to defeat and push back the North Koreans on the flank in the Battle of the Notch on August 2. Suffering mounting losses, the KPA force in the west withdrew for several days to re-equip and receive reinforcements. This granted both sides a reprieve to prepare for the attack on the Pusan Perimeter.

Attack on Masan

Walker ordered the 25th Infantry Division to take up defensive positions on the army southern flank west of Masan. By August 15, the 25th Infantry Division had moved into these positions. Rough terrain west of Masan limited the choice of the positions. The mountain barrier west of Masan was the first readily defensible ground east of the Chinju pass. The 2,000 feet (610 m) mountain ridges of Sobuk-san and P'il-bong dominated the area and protected the Komam-ni-Haman-Chindong-ni road, the only means of north-south communication west of Masan. To the north, from the Masan-Chinju highway to the Nam River there were several easily defendable positions. The best one was the Notch and adjacent high ground near Chungam-ni, which controlled the important road junction connecting the Masan road with the one over the Nam River to Uiryong. It was essential for the 25th Infantry Division's right flank connect with the left flank of the 24th Infantry Division at the confluence of the Nam and the Naktong Rivers. Therefore, the 25th Infantry Division also moved to protect the Komam-ni road intersection where the Chindong-ni-Haman road met the Masan-Chinju highway.

Meanwhile the NK 6th Division was ordered to await reinforcements before continuing the attack. From north to south, the division had its 13th, 15th, and 14th Regiments. The first replacements arrived at Chinju on or about 12 August. Approximately 2,000 unarmed South Koreans conscripted in the Seoul area joined the division by 15 August. At Chinju, the 6th Division issued them grenades and told the recruits they would have to pick up weapons from killed and wounded on the battlefield and to use captured ones. Another group of 2,500 replacements conscripted in the Seoul area joined the 6th Division on or about 21 August, bringing the division strength to approximately 8,500 men. In the last week of August and the first week of September, 3,000 more recruits conscripted in southwest Korea joined the division. The 6th Division used this last body of recruits in labor details at first and only later employed them as combat troops. As a part of the enemy build-up in the south, the untried NK 7th Division arrived with 10,000 men. The 7th Division occupied key ports to protect the 6th Division against possible landings in its rear.

On August 31, 1950 the 25th Division held a front of almost 30 miles (48 km), beginning in the north at the Namji-ri bridge over the Naktong River and extending west on the hills south of the river to the Nam's confluence with it. It then bent southwest up the south side of the Nam to where the Sobuk-san mountain mass tapered down in its northern extremity to the river. There the line turned south along rising ground to Sibidang-san, crossed the saddle on its south face through which passed the Chinju-Masan railroad and highway, and continued southward up to Battle Mountain and on to P'il-bong. From P'il-bong the line dropped down spur ridge lines to the southern coastal road near Chindong-ni. The US 35th Infantry held the northern 26,000 yards (24,000 m) of the division line, from the Namji-ri bridge to the Chinju-Masan highway. The regiment was responsible for the highway. The regiment's weakest and most vulnerable point was a 3 miles (4.8 km) gap along the Naktong River between most of F Company on the west and its 1st Platoon to the east. This platoon guarded the Namji-ri cantilever steel bridge on the division extreme right at the boundary with the US 2nd Infantry Division across the Naktong River. South of the highway, the 24th Infantry held the high country west of Haman up to and including Battle Mountain and P'il-bong. Colonel Throckmorton's 5th Infantry RCT held the southern spur of Sobuk-san to the coastal road at Chindong-ni. From Chindong-ni some ROK Marine units continued the line to the southern coast. General Kean's 25th Division command post was at Masan, the 35th Infantry command post was on the east side of the Chirwon-Chung-ni road, the 24th Infantry command post was at Haman and Colonel Throckmorton's command post was at Chindong-ni.

Battle

North Korean crossing

Meanwhile North Korean troops also attacked on the right side of the 25th Division line. At 2330 on August 31, a North Korean SU-76 self-propelled high-velocity gun from across the Nam fired shells into the position of G Company, 35th Infantry, overlooking the river. Within a few minutes, North Korean artillery was attacking all front-line rifle companies of the regiment from the Namji-ri bridge west. Under cover of this fire a reinforced regiment of the NK 7th Division crossed the Nam River and attacked F and G Companies, 35th Infantry. Other North Korean soldiers crossed the Nam on an underwater bridge in front of the paddy ground north of Komam-ni and near the boundary between the 2nd Battalion, led by Lt. Col. John L. Wilkins, Jr., holding the river front and Lt. Col. Bernard G. Teeter's 1st Battalion holding the hill line that stretched from the Nam River to Sibidang-san and the Chinju-Masan highway.

In the low ground between these two battalions at the river ferry crossing site, Fisher had placed 300 ROK police, expecting them to hold there long enough to serve as a warning for the rest of the forces. Guns from the flanking hills there could cover the low ground with fire. Back at Komam-ni he held the 3rd Battalion ready for use in counterattack to stop an enemy penetration should it occur. Unexpectedly, the ROK police companies near the ferry scattered at the first North Korean fire. At 0030, North Korean troops streamed through this hole in the line, some turning left to take G Company in flank and rear, and others turning right to attack C Company, which was on a spur of ground west of the Komam-ni road. The I&R Platoon and elements of C and D Companies formed a defense line along the dike at the north edge of Komam-ni where US tanks joined them at daybreak. But the North Koreans did not drive for the Komam-ni road fork 4 miles (6.4 km) south of the river as Colonel Fisher expected them to; instead, they turned east into the hills behind 2nd Battalion.

The position of B Company, 35th Infantry, on the 1,100 feet (340 m) Sibidang-san, flanking the Masan road 2 miles (3.2 km) west of Komam-ni and giving observation over all the surrounding country, was certain to figure prominently in the North Korean attack. It was a key position in the 25th Division line. The North Korean preparatory barrage there lasted from 1130 to midnight. Under cover of it two battalions of the NK 13th Regiment, 6th Division, moved up within 150 yards (140 m) of the American foxholes. At the same time, North Korean T-34 tanks, SU-76 self-propelled guns, and antitank guns moved toward Komam-ni on the road at the foot of Sibidang-san. An American Sherman tank there destroyed a T-34 just after midnight, and a 3.5-inch bazooka team destroyed a self-propelled gun and several 45mm antitank guns.

On the crest of Sibidang-san, an antipersonnel mine field stopped the first North Korean infantry assault. Others followed in quick succession. They were met and turned back with the fire of all weapons. By 0230 the B Company riflemen were stripping machine gun ammunition belts for their rifles. The 1st Platoon of C Company, at the base of the mountain behind B Company, climbed Sibidang-san in 45 minutes with an ammunition resupply for the company. Just before dawn the North Korean attack subsided. Daylight revealed a great amount of abandoned North Korean equipment scattered on the slope just below the crest, including 33 machine guns. Among the North Korean dead was the commanding officer of the NK 13th Regiment.

At daybreak, 1 September, a tank-led relief force of C Company headquarters troops cleared the road to Sibidang-san and resupplied the 2nd Platoon, B Company, with ammunition just in time for it to repel a final North Korean assault, killing 77 and capturing 21 North Koreans. Although Colonel Fisher's 35th Infantry held all its original positions, except that of the forward platoon of G Company, 3,000 North Korean soldiers were behind its lines. The farthest eastern penetration reached the high ground just south of Chirwon overlooking the north-south road there.

North Korean infiltration

In a counterattack after daylight, K Company and tanks had partially regained control of this area, but not completely. Large numbers of North Koreans, by this time, however, were behind the battle positions of the 35th Infantry as far as the Chirwon-ni and Chung-ni areas, 6 miles (9.7 km) east of Komam-ni and the front positions. The North Koreans continued to cross the Nam River after daylight on September 1 in the general area of the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions. Aerial observers saw an estimated four companies crossing there and directed fire of the 64th Field Artillery Battalion on the crossing force, which destroyed an estimated three-fourths of it. Fighter planes then strafed the survivors. Aerial observers saw another large group in the open at the river later in the day and directed artillery fire on it with an estimated 200 North Korean casualties.

The NK I Corps plan of attack below the Nam River was for its 6th Division to push east along the main Chinju-Komam-ni-Masan highway through the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, and at the same time for major elements of its 7th Division to swing southeast behind the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, and cut the Chirwon road. This road crossed the Naktong River over the cantilever steel bridge at Namji-ri from the US 2nd Infantry Division zone and ran south through Chirwon to join the main Masan highway eight miles east of Komam-ni near the village of Chung-ni, 4 miles (6.4 km) northwest of Masan. These two avenues of approach-the Komam-ni-Masan highway and the Chirwon road converging at Chung-ni-formed the axes of their attack plan.

US Engineer troops counterattacking up the secondary road toward Chirwon during September 1 made slow progress, and North Koreans stopped in the early afternoon. The 35th Infantry was now surrounded by enemy forces of the NK 6th and 7th Divisions, with an estimated three battalions of them behind its lines. Speaking later of the situation, Fisher, said, "I never intended to withdraw. There was no place to go. I planned to go into a regimental perimeter and hold." The 35th Infantry Regiment won a Distinguished Unit Citation for its performance at the battle.

US 2-27th Infantry counterattack

By midafternoon, Kean felt that the situation was so dire that he ordered the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, to attack behind the 35th Infantry. A large part of the division artillery was under direct infantry attack. During the predawn hours of September 1, when the NK 7th Division troops had attacked, the first American unit they encountered was G Company, 35th Infantry, at the north shoulder of the gap. While some North Korean units peeled off to attack G Company, others continued on and engaged E Company, 2 miles (3.2 km) downstream from it, and still others attacked scattered units of F Company all the way to its 1st Platoon, which guarded the Namji-ri bridge. There, at the extreme right flank of the 25th Division, this platoon drove off a North Korean force after a sharp fight. By September 2, E Company in a heavy battle had destroyed most of a North Korean battalion.

Of all the 2nd Battalion units, G Company received the hardest blows. Before dawn of September 1, North Korean troops had G Company platoons on separate hills under heavy assault. Shortly after 0300 they overran the 3rd Platoon, Heavy Mortar Company, and drove it from its position. These mortarmen climbed Hill 179 and on its crest joined the 2nd Platoon of G Company.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Platoon of G Company, on a low hill along the Nam 4 miles (6.4 km) from its juncture with the Naktong, was also under close quarters attack. After daylight, Captain LeRoy E. Majeske, G Company commander, requested artillery concentrations and air strikes, but they were slow to come. At 1145, the enemy had almost reached the crest of the hill, and only a narrow space separated the two forces. A few minutes later Majeske was killed, and 2nd Lieutenant George Roach, commanding the 3rd Platoon, again reported the desperate situation and asked for an air strike. The US Air Force delivered the strike on the North Korean-held side of the hill, and this checked the assaults. But by this time many enemy troops had captured and occupied foxholes in the platoon position and from them they threw grenades into other parts of the position. One of the grenades killed Lieutenant Roach early in the afternoon. Sergeant First Class Junius Poovey, a squad leader, now assumed command. By 1800, Sergeant Poovey had only 12 effective troops left in the platoon, 17 of the 29 men still living were wounded. With ammunition almost gone, Poovey requested and received authority to withdraw into the main G Company position. After dark, the 29 men, three of them carried on stretchers, withdrew, covered by the arrival of US tanks. The group reached the G Company position on Hill 179 at 2330.

Stalemate

While G Company held its positions on Hill 179 on 2 September against North Korean attack, Murch's 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, started an attack northwest toward it at 1700 from the Chung-ni area. The battalion made slow progress against formidable North Korean forces. The night was extremely dark and the terrain along the Kuhe-ri ferry road was mountainous. After fighting all that night the battalion, the next day at 1500, reached a position south of the original defensive positions of G Company, 35th Infantry. A coordinated attack by armor, artillery, air, and infantry got under way and by 1800 the battalion had re-established the battle line. In this attack the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, killed 275 North Koreans and recovered a large part of the equipment G Company had lost earlier.

Murch's battalion remained on the regained positions during the night of September 3. At 0800 the next morning, G Company, 35th Infantry, relieved Murch on the regained positions and he started his attack back up the supply road. While this was in progress, word came that North Koreans had again driven G Company from its newly reestablished position. Murch turned around, attacked, and once more restored the G Company positions. By 1200 of 4 September, Murch again turned over these positions to G Company and resumed his attack to the rear along the road in the gap between the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 35th Infantry. Almost immediately he was in contact with North Korean forces. Soon North Korean machine guns were firing on Murch's men from three directions. Torrential rains fell and observation became poor. By this time, Murch's battalion was running short of ammunition. Murch ordered the battalion to withdraw 500 yards (460 m) to favorable terrain so that he could resupply.

But this was not easy to do. He had cleared the supply route two days previously in his attack to the G Company position but now it was closed again. Murch requested air supply and the next morning, September 5, eight transport planes accomplished the resupply and the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, was ready to resume its attack to the rear. By evening that day it had cleared the supply road and adjacent terrain of North Korean penetration for a distance of 8,000 yards (7,300 m) to the rear of G Company's front-line positions. There Murch received orders to halt and prepare to attack northeast to link up with Check's 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry.

US 3-27th Infantry moves up

After Murch had left the Chung-ni area on September 2 in his attack toward G Company, North Koreans attacked the 24th Infantry command post and several artillery positions. To meet this new situation, General Kean ordered the remaining battalion of the 27th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George H. DeChow, to attack and destroy the North Koreans operating there.

After an early morning struggle on September 3 against several hundred North Koreans in the vicinity of the artillery positions, DeChow's battalion launched its attack at 1500 over the high, rugged terrain west of the "Horseshoe," as the deep curve in the Masan road was called, 4 miles (6.4 km) east of Komam-ni. Its mission was to seize and secure the high ground dominating the Horseshoe, and then relieve the pressure on the 24th Infantry rear. Initially only one artillery piece was in position to support the attack. After the battalion advanced some distance, a North Korean force, estimated at the time to number more than 1,000 men, counterattacked it and inflicted heavy casualties, which included thirteen officers. Additional US tanks moved up to help secure the exposed right flank and rear, and air strikes helped to contain the North Korean force. The battalion finally succeeded in taking the high ground.

The next morning, September 4, instead of continuing the attack toward the 24th Infantry command post, DeChow was ordered to attack straight ahead into the Komam-ni area where North Korean troops were fighting in the artillery positions. This attack got under way at 0900 in the face of severe small arms fire. In the afternoon, heavy rains slowed the attack, but after an all-day battle, I and K Companies, with the help of numerous air strikes, captured the high ground dominating the Komam-ni crossroads. Numerous casualties in the battalion had led General Kean to attach C Company, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion, to it. The next day, September 5, the 3d Battalion turned its attack across rugged terrain toward Haman and drove through to the vicinity of the 24th Infantry command post. In its attack, the 3rd Battalion counted more than 300 enemy dead in the area it traversed.

Artillery attacked

The series of events that caused General Kean to change the direction of DeChow's attack toward Komam-ni began at 0100, September 3. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, protruded farther westward at this time than any other unit of the UN forces in Korea. Behind its positions on Sibidang-san the main supply route and rear areas were in North Korean hands, and only in daylight and under escort could vehicles travel the road. On Sibidang-san the battalion had held its original positions after the heavy fighting of pre-dawn September 1, completely surrounded by barbed wire, booby traps, and flares, with all supporting weapons inside its tight perimeters. The battalion had the advantage of calling for previously zeroed protective fires covering all approaches. An hour after midnight a North Korean assault struck the battalion. The fight there continued until dawn September 3, when the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, counted 143 North Korean dead in front of its positions, and on that basis estimated that the total enemy casualties must have been about 500 men.

In this night battle the 64th Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the 1st Battalion, became directly involved in the fighting. About 50 North Koreans infiltrated before dawn to A Battery's position and assaulted it. North Koreans employing submachine guns overran two artillery-machine gun perimeter positions, penetrating to the artillery pieces at 0300. There, Captain Andrew C. Anderson and his men fought hand-to-hand with the North Koreans. Some of the guns fell temporarily into North Korean hands but the artillerymen repulsed the attack, aided by the concentrations of fire from C Battery, 90th Field Artillery Battalion nearby, which sealed off North Korean reinforcements. In defending its guns in this night battle, A Battery lost seven men killed and twelve wounded.

Fighting in support of the Nam River front in the northern part of the 25th Division sector were five batteries of the 159th and 64th Field Artillery Battalions (105-mm. howitzers) and one battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzers), for a total of thirty-six guns. One 155-mm. howitzer fired from Komam-ni on the Notch behind Chungam-ni, the route for the NK 6th Division's supplies. Another forward artillery piece kept the Iryong-ni bridge over the Nam under fire. The 25th Division artillery estimated it killed approximately 1,825 North Korean soldiers during the first three days of September.

In this critical time, the Fifth Air Force added its tremendous fire power to that of the division artillery in support of the ground force. General Walker attributed the UN victory in this sector directly to the air support.

North Koreans repulsed

Bitter, confused fighting continued behind the 35th Infantry's line. Battalions, companies, and platoons, cut off and isolated, fought independently of higher control and help except for airdrops which supplied many of them. Airdrops also supplied relief forces trying to reach the front-line units. Tanks and armored cars drove to the isolated units with supplies of food and ammunition and carried back critically wounded on the return trips. In general, the 35th Infantry fought in its original battle line positions, while at first one battalion, and later two battalions, of the 27th Infantry fought toward it through the estimated 3,000 North Koreans operating in its rear areas.

Although the 25th Division generally was under much less enemy pressure after 5 September, there were still severe local attacks. On September 6, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, moved north from the Haman area to join 2nd Battalion in the cleanup of North Korean troops behind the 35th Infantry and below the Nam River. Caught between the 35th Infantry on its hill positions along the river and the attacking 27th Infantry units, large numbers of North Koreans were killed. Sixteen different groups reportedly were dispersed with heavy casualties during the day. By morning of September 7 there was clear evidence that survivors of the NK 7th Division were trying to escape across the Nam River. The 25th Infantry Division buried more than 2,000 North Korean dead, killed between 1 and 7 September behind its lines. This number did not include those killed in front of its positions.

Heavy rains caused the Nam and Naktong Rivers to rise on 8 and 9 September, reducing the danger of new crossings. On the 8th, American F-82's mistakenly bombed the Namji-ri bridge over the Naktong and with one 500-pound bomb destroyed the 80-foot center span. Only the bridges north of the juncture of the Nam with the Naktong were supposed to be subject to aerial attack at this time. Some of the local commanders thought that had the North Koreans bypassed this bridge and crossed the Naktong farther east there would have been nothing between them and Pusan. However, North Korean attacks against 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry occured nightly. The approaches to the bridge on the north side were mined. At one time there were about 100 North Korean dead lying in that area.

North Korean withdrawal

The UN counterattack at Inchon collapsed the North Korean line and forced them back on all fronts. On 16 September, however, 25th Infantry Division was still fighting North Korean forces behind its lines, and North Korean strong points existed on the heights of Battle Mountain, P'il-bong, and Sobuk-san. Kean felt that the division could advance along the roads toward Chinju only when the mountainous center of the division front was clear. They therefore believed that the key to the advance of the 25th Division lay in its center where the North Koreans held the heights and kept the 24th Infantry Regiment under daily attack. The 27th Infantry on the left and the 35th Infantry on the right, astride the roads between Chinju and Masan held until the situation in front of the 24th Infantry improved.

On September 19 the UN discovered the North Koreans had abandoned of Battle Mountain during the night, and the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, moved up and occupied it. On the right, the 35th Infantry began moving forward. There was only light resistance until it reached the high ground in front of Chungam-ni where hidden soldiers in spider holes shot at 1st Battalion soldiers from the rear. The next day the 1st Battalion captured Chungam-ni, and the 2nd Battalion captured the long ridge line running northwest from it to the Nam River. Meanwhile, the North Koreans still held strongly against the division left where the 27th Infantry had heavy fighting in trying to move forward. The North Koreans withdrew from the Masan area the night of 18-19 September. The NK 7th Division withdrew from south of the Nam River while the 6th Division sideslipped elements to cover the entire front. Covered by the 6th Division, the 7th had crossed to the north side of the Nam River by the morning of September 19. Then the NK 6th Division had withdrewfrom its positions on Sobuk-san.

Notes

1. Varhola 2000, p. 3
2. ^ Alexander 2003, p. 52
3. Catchpole 2001, p. 15
4. ^ Varhola 2000, p. 4
5. Alexander 2003, p. 90
6. Alexander 2003, p. 105
7. Fehrenbach 2001, p. 103
8. Appleman 1998, p. 222
9. Appleman 1998, p. 221
10. Alexander 2003, p. 114
11. Catchpole 2001, p. 24
12. Catchpole 2001, p. 25
13. Appleman 1998, p. 247
14. Hastings 1988, p. 82
15. ^ Appleman 1998, p. 365
16. Hastings 1988, p. 97
17. Appleman 1998, p. 366
18. ^ Appleman 1998, p. 439
19. ^ Appleman 1998, p. 442
20. ^ Appleman 1998, p. 443
21. Appleman 1998, p. 470
22. Appleman 1998, p. 471
23. ^ Appleman 1998, p. 472
24. ^ Appleman 1998, p. 473
25. ^ Appleman 1998, p. 474
26. ^ Appleman 1998, p. 475
27. ^ Appleman 1998, p. 476
28. ^ Appleman 1998, p. 477
29. Appleman 1998, p. 478
30. Appleman 1998, p. 479
31. Appleman 1998, p. 568
32. Appleman 1998, p. 569
33. Appleman 1998, p. 570

References

• Alexander, Bevin (2003), Korea: The First War we Lost, Hippocrene Books, ISBN 978-0781810197
• Appleman, Roy E. (1998), South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: United States Army in the Korean War, Department of the Army, ISBN 978-0160019180
• Catchpole, Brian (2001), The Korean War, Robinson Publishing, ISBN 978-1841194134
• Ecker, Richard E. (2004), Battles of the Korean War: A Chronology, with Unit-by-Unit United States Causality Figures & Medal of Honor Citations, McFarland & Company, ISBN 978-0786419807
• Fehrenbach, T.R. (2001), This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History – Fiftieth Anniversary Edition, Potomac Books Inc., ISBN 978-1574883343
• Hastings, Max (1988), The Korean War, New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, ISBN 978-0671668341
• Gugeler, Russell A. (2005), Combat Actions in Korea, University Press of the Pacific, ISBN 978-1410224514
• Varhola, Michael J. (2000), Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950–1953, Da Capo Press, ISBN 978-1882810444

• Conflicts in 1950
• 1950 in Korea
• Battles of the Korean War
• Battles involving Korea
• Gyeongsangbuk-do
• Battles of the Korean War involving the United States