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Revision as of 05:29, 5 April 2006

Operation Iraqi Freedom Documents refers to some 55,000 boxes of documents, audiotapes and videotapes produced by the government of Saddam Hussein and seized after the 2003 invasion of Iraq that the U.S. government is releasing on the internet. The documents date from the 1980s through the post-Saddam period. The U.S. government is requesting Arabic translators around the world to help in the translation. The documents can be found at the Foreign Military Studies Office Joint Reserve Intelligence Center website.

Accordingly, the website issues a warning that:

the US Government has made no determination regarding the authenticity of the documents, validity or factual accuracy of the information contained therein, or the quality of any translations, when available.

While the government has made an effort to keep known forgeries out of the set of documents posted to the web, a senior intelligence official observed that "the database included 'a fair amount of forgeries,' sold by Iraqi hustlers or concocted by Iraqis opposed to Mr. Hussein."

An article in Weekly Standard states that at the time the documents were seized, the priority was on learning about the Iraqi WMD program so documents that dealt with other matters such as Saddam's support for Islamic terrorism were less likely to be studied. Terrorism experts, however, have noted that the documents do not so far support a radical revision of the intelligence communities judgement that there was no substantial collaboration between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. Peter L. Bergen, for example, writes, " If there was a method to Saddam Hussein's madness, it was that he wanted to remain in power. Al Qaeda, however, wanted theocratic regime change across the Middle East. In the end, their goals and worldviews were diametrically opposed, and no number of sketchy intelligence documents is going to bring them closer." The documents have been reviewed by government officials, who have rejected the contention that there are major new revelations here. The New York Times reported that "All the documents, which are available on fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products-docex.htm, have received at least a quick review by Arabic linguists and do not alter the government's official stance, officials say. On some tapes already released, in fact, Mr. Hussein expressed frustration that he did not have unconventional weapons."

A "bold innovation"

Releasing the documents over the internet to gain the help of translators around the world is new idea that was pushed by Congressman Pete Hoekstra. The Associated Press quoted Steve Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists government secrecy project saying it's a "radical notion" that "members of the public could contribute to the intelligence analysis process. ... That is a bold innovation." The AP also quoted Glenn Reynolds, the blogger at Instapundit.com: "The secret of the 21st century is attract a lot of smart people to focus on problems that you think are important."

Other experts have suggested that the problem is that bloggers will cherry pick information from the documents to solidify their own perspectives without putting the tidbits they find in an overall historical context. Former CIA terrorism specialist Michael Scheuer pointed this out in an interview with the New York Times: "There's no quality control. You'll have guys out there with a smattering of Arabic drawing all kinds of crazy conclusions. Rush Limbaugh will cherry-pick from the right, and Al Franken will cherry-pick from the left."

Critics of the approach

John Prados, author of the book, "Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War" said "I would bet that the materials that they chose to post were the ones that were suggestive of a threat." Prados, an analyst with the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute, dismissed the documents: "The collection is good material for somebody who wants to do a biography of Saddam Hussein, but in terms of saying one thing or the other about weapons of mass destruction, it's not there."

Former CIA and State Department counterterrorism expert Larry C. Johnson said, "It's like putting firearms in the hands of children. The problem is that the documents without context aren't going to tell you a lot." Johnson also noted that "it's also an indictment of the intelligence community. They don't have the resources ... they haven't got the time to go through this stuff."

History of the documents

The Ba'athists were said to be "meticulous record-keepers." The documents were found in government offices in Iraq and Afghanistan. A debate ensued inside the government regarding whether these documents should be released to the public. Because the documents were not being made public through the normal channels, certain documents began to leak out through unconventional channels.

The first set of documents were released to an online media outlet called Cybercast News Service. A second set of documents generated greater media attention when they were released to The Intelligence Summit. The Intelligence Summit was holding an international intelligence conference and was able to get national television coverage of some of the audiotapes of Saddam Hussein talking to his top officials. A spokeswoman for John Negroponte, the Directorate of National Intelligence, noted that "Intelligence community analysts from the CIA and the DIA reviewed the translations and found that while fascinating from a historical perspective, the tapes do not reveal anything that changes their postwar analysis of Iraq's weapons programs, nor do they change the findings contained in the comprehensive Iraq Survey Group report."

Congressman Pete Hoekstra, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, described the rationale for the public disclosure of the documents as follows:

"We're hoping to unleash the power of the Internet, unleash the power of the blogosphere, to get through these documents and give us a better understanding of what was going on in Iraq before the war"

John Negroponte at first tried to delay the release of the documents, but softened his opposition to releasing after conversations with Rep. Hoekstra. President Bush directed Negroponte to release the documents and they are slowly being made available.

According to Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists, the release of the documents "looks like an effort to discover a retrospective justification for the war in Iraq." The Pentagon cautions that the government "has made no determination regarding the authenticity of the documents, validity or factual accuracy of the information contained therein, or the quality of any translations, when available." The Los Angeles Times notes that "the documents do not appear to offer any new evidence of illicit activity by Hussein, or hint at preparations for the insurgency that followed the invasion."

Iraqi Perspectives Project

An authoritative study of some of these documents by Pentagon analysts Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray entitled "Saddam's Delusions" argues that the documents studied all confirm that Saddam's overall strategic calculus was based on misinformation and faulty judgement regarding the country's confrontation with the United States. "As far as can be determined from the interviews and records reviewed so far," the authors wrote, for example, "there was no national plan to embark on a guerrilla war in the event of a military defeat. Nor did the regime appear to cobble together such a plan as its world crumbled around it. Buoyed by his earlier conviction that the Americans would never dare enter Baghdad, Saddam hoped to the very last minute that he could stay in power. And his military and civilian bureaucrats went through their daily routines until the very end."

The study also suggests that Saddam's government purposefully obfuscated on the issue of WMD until 2002 in order to deter Israel from aggressive actions: "According to Chemical Ali, Saddam was asked about the weapons during a meeting with members of the Revolutionary Command Council. He replied that Iraq did not have WMD but flatly rejected a suggestion that the regime remove all doubts to the contrary, going on to explain that such a declaration might encourage the Israelis to attack."

The study also cites documents demonstrating that key evidence presented by Colin Powell to the United Nations in February 2003 had been severely misinterpreted by the U.S. government. Audiotapes played by Powell during his presentation, cited by Powell as evidence of Iraqi attempts to circumvent U.N. regulations on WMD, were reexamined in light of the new documents. According to the authors of the study:

Ironically, it now appears that some of the actions resulting from Saddam's new policy of cooperation actually helped solidify the coalition's case for war. Over the years, Western intelligence services had obtained many internal Iraqi communications, among them a 1996 memorandum from the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service directing all subordinates to "insure that there is no equipment, materials, research, studies, or books related to manufacturing of the prohibited weapons (chemical, biological, nuclear, and missiles) in your site." And when UN inspectors went to these research and storage locations, they inevitably discovered lingering evidence of WMD-related programs. In 2002, therefore, when the United States intercepted a message between two Iraqi Republican Guard Corps commanders discussing the removal of the words "nerve agents" from "the wireless instructions," or learned of instructions to "search the area surrounding the headquarters camp and for any chemical agents, make sure the area is free of chemical containers, and write a report on it," U.S. analysts viewed this information through the prism of a decade of prior deceit. They had no way of knowing that this time the information reflected the regime's attempt to ensure it was in compliance with UN resolutions. What was meant to prevent suspicion thus ended up heightening it.

About the documents

Several news stories about the documents have been published recently. One Iraqi document purportedly details a meeting on February 19, 1995 in which a representative of Iraq met with Osama Bin Laden in Sudan, who suggested "carrying out joint operations against foreign forces" in Saudi Arabia. Just eight months later, al-Qaeda operatives killed five U.S. military advisors in Saudi Arabia. There has been no evidence or suggestion of Iraqi complicity in that attack or linkage to the February meeting. ABC News, who reported on this document, further notes that "The document does not establish that the two parties did in fact enter into an operational relationship." ABC also cautions that "this document is handwritten and has no official seal."

Document 2RAD-2004-601189-ELC , is given the synopsis: "Abu-Zubaydah Statement on the Capability of al-Qaidah to Manufacture and Deliver Nuclear Weapons to the U.S." Abu Zubaydah was captured in Pakistan in March 2002 and is believed to be the highest ranking member of al-Qaeda to be held. There is no indication that this document links Abu Zubaydah to Iraq in any way.

Document CMPC-2004-002219(PDF) records Saddam Hussein ordering the use of chemical weapons in the "Balisan Basin."

Another document claims that Russia had a mole inside the U.S. military who gave the Russians information regarding U.S. troop movements, information that was then forwarded to the Iraqi military. The Russians deny the story and some of the information the Russians reportedly passed to the Iraqis was incorrect. According to ABC, "A Pentagon study released today concludes, however, that the information didn't do Saddam Hussein any good because he never acted it on though it proved to be accurate."

Another document suggests that the Iraqi government planned to respond to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq with "camels of mass destruction" -- camels fitted with suicide bombs that would meet the invading army. In another document, Saddam's son Qusay orders captured Kuwaitis to be used as "human shields" against the invaders.

Translations on the Internet

Translations of the documents are beginning to be posted on the Internet. Translators are usually done by bloggers who also speak Arabic or they are posted by bloggers who are working with Arabic translators. The following documents have been translated by an "acquaintance" of blogger Ray Robison:

• Document ISGP-2003-00014127 appears to be the diary of a man named Khaled Abd El Majid. The diary is 76 pages long and "difficult to read" because it is handwritten. Two portions of the diary have been translated so far. Notes of the first meeting between the Vice President of Iraq and a Pakistani Islamic cleric is called Saddam's Vice President meeting with a Taliban representative. Notes from the second meeting is called Iraq VP and Taliban representative meeting II. The notes contain the following comments by the Pakistani cleric: "A representative from the US embassy came and told me 'You said that America was your enemy, how can you say that we are your enemy and the enemy of Islam?' So I told them that you took Russia’s role in bombing Afghanistan and you are bombing Muslims. Then they said that they wanted Ossama so I told them that Ossama is in Sudan and that he was in Afghanistan during the rule of Rabbani and I added that they do not have a treaty to hand over criminals, as they pretend, with Afghanistan. And they are proposing to form a council of Muslim scholars from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other Islamic countries to study the issue of handing over Ben laden and what is the Islamic position about it.... The issue here is not Ossama Ben Laden but your interests require you to find a submissive government in Afghanistan to transform it into a trade zone in Central Asia."

• Document 2RAD-2004-600760-ELC appears to be about security precautions for Iraqi personnel living and working in Afghanistan with their families. They are told that their wives and children are not to know what their work is about. A full translation can be found at Iraqi memo about intelligence precautions for a secret arab group in Afghanistan. The document is not dated, there are no names on it, and the translator notes that "There is no official letterhead."

• The al-quds document is translated as saying Palestinians living in Iraq were concerned because they had been ordered by Saddam to deliver an Anthrax attack on Iraqi citizens and make it look like the Americans did it. The document suggests that the Palestinians were afraid of something going wrong and having Palestine blamed for the attack. They were also afraid to disobey Saddam. Both document IZSP-2003-00003336 and document IZSP-2003-00000859 were discussed on this translation page. Other translaters have pointed out that "the document is recording information passed on by an army division which it qualifies as 'open source' and 'impaired broadcast', suggesting it could be based on a half-heard radio transmission." Scott Shane notes that the document "appears to be a memorandum from Iraq's Al Quds Army, a regional militia created by Saddam, to Iraqi military intelligence. It passes on reports picked up by U.S. troops, possibly from the radio."

External links

• Foreign Military Studies Office Joint Reserve Intelligence Center
• Jihad TV: Newly released documents identify the man bin Laden wanted on Iraqi television Weekly Standard by Dan Darling (03/24/2006).
• Saddam, Al Qaeda Did Collaborate, Documents Show NY Sun by Eli Luke (March 24, 2006).
• Peter L. Bergen, "Enemy of Our Enemy," New York Times (28 March 2006).

• Causes and prelude of the 2003 Iraq conflict
• Foreign relations of Iraq