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| In the field of ], the need to discuss and compare ] leads to the idea of a '''conceptualization''', a higher level abstraction for which a given ontology is a very particular ''realization'', possibly only one of many realizations of the 'conceptualization'. Each ontology based upon the same overarching conceptualization is then thought of as engendering a particular ']' that maps the conceptualization into specific |
In the field of ], the need to discuss and compare ] leads to the idea of a '''conceptualization''', a higher level abstraction for which a given ontology is a very particular ''realization'', possibly only one of many realizations of the 'conceptualization'. Each ontology based upon the same overarching conceptualization is then thought of as engendering a particular ']' that maps the conceptualization into specific elements, or ‘such-and-such’, and their relationships. The 'conceptualization' allows discussion of its various possible implementations. The question then arises as to how to describe the 'conceptualization' in terms that can encompass multiple 'ontological commitments'. This issue has been called the 'Tower of Babel' problem, that is, how can persons used to one ontology talk with others using a different ontology?<ref name=Smith/><ref name=Harmelen/> This problem is easily understood, but a general resolution is not at hand. It can be a 'bottom-up' or a 'top-down' approach, or something in between.<ref name=Alignment/> | ||
| An example of the problems encountered in comparing ontologies is found in translation between human languages. Ostensibly, as all humans live in the same world and have the same physical senses with which to see the world, one might expect to correlate human activity with language and thereby make rules for translation. However, that view is utopian because humans act upon cultural interpretation of their surroundings, and relating two cultures is an entirely different matter than understanding what term in both represents a 'rabbit'.<ref name=Quine/><ref name=Wright/> Some suggest that humans think in 'mentalese', but so far we don't have access to this level of conceptualization.<ref name=Aydede/> | An example of the problems encountered in comparing ontologies is found in translation between human languages. Ostensibly, as all humans live in the same world and have the same physical senses with which to see the world, one might expect to correlate human activity with language and thereby make rules for translation. However, that view is utopian because humans act upon cultural interpretation of their surroundings, and relating two cultures is an entirely different matter than understanding what term in both represents a 'rabbit'.<ref name=Quine/><ref name=Wright/> Some suggest that humans think in 'mentalese', but so far we don't have access to this level of conceptualization.<ref name=Aydede/> | ||
Revision as of 15:37, 2 August 2013
For 'concept', see Concept (disambiguation)
In the field of information systems, the need to discuss and compare ontologies leads to the idea of a conceptualization, a higher level abstraction for which a given ontology is a very particular realization, possibly only one of many realizations of the 'conceptualization'. Each ontology based upon the same overarching conceptualization is then thought of as engendering a particular 'ontological commitment' that maps the conceptualization into specific elements, or ‘such-and-such’, and their relationships. The 'conceptualization' allows discussion of its various possible implementations. The question then arises as to how to describe the 'conceptualization' in terms that can encompass multiple 'ontological commitments'. This issue has been called the 'Tower of Babel' problem, that is, how can persons used to one ontology talk with others using a different ontology? This problem is easily understood, but a general resolution is not at hand. It can be a 'bottom-up' or a 'top-down' approach, or something in between.
An example of the problems encountered in comparing ontologies is found in translation between human languages. Ostensibly, as all humans live in the same world and have the same physical senses with which to see the world, one might expect to correlate human activity with language and thereby make rules for translation. However, that view is utopian because humans act upon cultural interpretation of their surroundings, and relating two cultures is an entirely different matter than understanding what term in both represents a 'rabbit'. Some suggest that humans think in 'mentalese', but so far we don't have access to this level of conceptualization.
However, in more artificial situations, such as information systems, the idea of a 'conceptualization' and 'ontological commitment' to various ontologies that realize the 'conceptualization' is possible. A trivial example of moving conception into a language leading to a variety of ontologies is the expression of a process in pseudocode (a strictly structured form of ordinary language) leading to implementation in several different formal computer languages like Lisp or Fortran. The pseudocode makes it easier to understand the instructions and compare implementations, but the formal languages make possible the compilation of the ideas as computer instructions.
Another example is mathematics, where a very general formulation (the analog of a conceptualization) is illustrated with 'applications' that are more specialized examples. For instance, aspects of a function space can be illustrated using a vector space or a topological space that introduce interpretations of the 'elements' of the conceptualization and additional relationships between them but preserve the connections required in the function space.
References
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Barry Smith (2003). "Chapter 11: Ontology". In Luciano Floridi, ed (ed.). Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information (PDF). Blackwell. pp. 155–166. ISBN 0631229183.
{{cite book}}:|editor=has generic name (help) - Frank van Harmelen. "Ontology mapping: a way out of the medical tower of babel" (PDF).
- In information science, one approach to finding a conceptualization (or avoiding it and using an automated comparison) is called 'ontology alignment' or 'ontology matching'. See for example, Jérôme. Euzenat, Pavel Shvaiko (2007). Ontology Matching. Springer. ISBN 3540496122.
- Willard v. O. Quine (2013). Word and Object (PDF) (New ed.). MIT Press. ISBN 9780262518314. Quine raised the issue of translation and 'holophrastic' indeterminacy of translation in a series of books and papers.
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Crispin Wright (1999). "Chapter 16: The indeterminacy of translation". In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, eds (ed.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 397. ISBN 0631213260.
{{cite book}}:|editor=has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) "Quine's contention that translation is indeterminate has been among the most widely discussed and controversial theses in modern analytical philosophy." -
Murat Aydede (September 17, 2010). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "The language of thought hypothesis". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition).
{{cite web}}:|editor=has generic name (help) -
Nicola Guarino (1998). "Formal Ontology in Information Systems". In Nicola Guarino, ed (ed.). Formal Ontology in Information Systems (Proceedings of FOIS '98, Trento, Italy). IOS Press. pp. 3 ff. ISBN 978-90-5199-399-8.
{{cite book}}:|editor=has generic name (help) -
Nicola Guarino, Massimiliano Carrara, Pierdaniele Giaretta (1994). "Formalizing ontological commitments" (PDF). AAAI. 94: 560–567.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
This article incorporates material from the Citizendium article "Conceptualization", which is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License but not under the GFDL.
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