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The Roman army was primarily based around heavy infantry. The reason was that, due to the rugged terrain of central Italy, horse breeding was a difficult and expensive endeavor. Thus, developing a strong cavalry component was difficult. Over time the military system changed its equipment and roles, but throughout the course of Roman history, it always remained a disciplined and professional war machine. In the first centuries of the Roman Republic, the legions were filled by a militia of part-time soldiers. But following a series of costly defeats in the Cimbrian War, the distinguished general and uncle of Julius Caesar, Gaius Marius, was given an unprecedented mandate to carry out sweeping military reforms. Afterwards, they became full-time professional forces in the service of Rome (although they would become increasingly in the service of their commanding generals).

From this period on, every Roman soldier could make a career in the army. The veterans could even aspire to become primus pilus (First Spear), the most senior Centurion of a legion equivalent to a modern Regimental Sergeant Major. The higher ranks, such as Tribunes, Prefects and Legates were still reserved for the equestrian and senatorial classes. Each soldier was granted a "stipendium" or salary, with free medical treatment and at the end of their service, which varied from 25 to 30 years, were granted a pension and a parcel of land. Retired Centurions were even given membership in the equestrian class (the equivalent of a knighthood).

The King's age and the early Republic

Since its founding, Rome faced multiple, simultaneous enemies which hastened the development of its military system. The first Roman soldiers were equipped and fought as Greek Hoplites and in the close order of a Phalanx. Soldiers provided their own weapons and equipment and only the richest person could afford the "panoplia" which included:

• A bronze corselet called Lorica
• A spear usually three meters long
• A large oval shield
• Greaves

The remainder of the army were equipped as Velites, light infantry skirmishers. During the reign of Servius Tullius , all Roman able-bodied, property-owning male citizens were first divided into five classes for military service based on wealth, since soldiers provided their own weapons and equipment. These classes were further organized into units of 100 called Centuries (from "centum", "a hundred"). The Equites, could afford horses and so made up the smallest, wealthiest class. The next wealthiest were the heavy infantry Triarii, below them were two classes of medium infantry the Principes and Hastati, with the poorest class serving as the Velites. The army "Legio", meaning levy in Latin, was comprised of 3,000 infantry pedites and 300 cavalry equites. Each of the three original tribes- the Titis, Ramnes and Luceres had to provide 1000 pedites and 100 equites.

The army was deployed with a strong infantry center and the equites on the wings. The infantry was commanded by a tribunus militum while the cavalry by tribunus celerum.

During the early Republic the Roman army changed its shape, the army abandoned the heavy and inflexible phalanx formation. Now recruitment was based on a census which took into account not only wealth but age and battle experience. The richest and the most experienced soldiers would serve as the Triarii, the middle class, somewhat less experienced and the small landowners as the principes and the remainder as the hastati and velites. The Romans developed a more flexible unit, called the Manipulus with 120 men in two "centuria", which despite the name were in fact composed of 60 men each and not 100. Each maniple had two centurions, with one being the senior or the prior acting as the commanding officer. The maniples would be further temporarily grouped into Cohortes of around 300 men. A typical Maniple cohort would consist of:

• 120 hastati;
• 120 principes;
• 60 triarii.

Ten cohorts would form a legion.

Each type of soldier had standard equipment which consisted of-

• For Triarii: Lorica hamata plus a bronze corselet, a large rectangular shield, called scutum, a long thrusting spear;
• For principes: Lorica hamata plus a scutum, two javelins (pila), and a gladius;
• For hastati: A bronze corselet, a scutum, two pila and a gladius.

They were deployed in a checker board pattern, with the hastati first to face the enemy, the principes in the second line and the triarii in the third line at the rear. The tactical objective was simple: The hastati would wear down the enemy by throwing their pila , then in the gaps left between each maniple, the principes would charge in to rout the enemy, if the principes failed to do so, they would fall back or the triarii would advance to attack and push back the enemy.

The battle signals were given by a cornicifer, which in Latin means Horn carrier, and by an Optio, who was the second in command of a centuria.

The late republic to the empire

Following the Punic wars, the Roman army entered into a period of crisis. The wars had become so frequent and far flung that the militia of citizen soldiers became effectively a regular army, with troops spending years away from their homes and families. The demands of military duty forced many farmers to abandon working their lands only to return impoverished. Most were then forced to sell their lands to or take out loans from wealthy Patrician landowners, who would end up owning their lands and working them with cheap slave labor. This created a huge shock to the economy, political and social orders as well as the army. These hearty farmers, who had been the backbone of the Republic's legions, now landless and in debt, migrated to the cities forming the plebs urbana. The urban centers were now full of unemployed or under employed and justly discontented citizens.

Attempted reforms by the Patrician brothers Gracchi, were met with resistance from their fellow nobles and ended ultimately with their own violent deaths. What finally brought the crisis to a head was not internal pressures, but external ones in the form of new and dangerous Proto-Germanic tribes, the Cimbri and the Teutons (Teutones). They appeared suddenly on the Roman frontier in 113 BC, and after defeating several Roman allied tribes and nearly destroying several Roman armies, finally destroying a huge Roman force at the Battle of Arausio in 105 BC.

It was to be a man who was, himself, the son of humble farmers, Gaius Marius, who would solve the crisis. An esteemed general, Marius had defeated king Jugurtha of Numidia and had previously been elected Consul. Now he was elected to an unprecedented second term as Consul and appointed Imperator, supreme commander of the army, with unprecedented powers which he would use to transform the military system. He introduced a voluntary levy for all citizens and non-citizens, alike, granting Roman citizenship to the last group. Soldiers were now to be full-time, professional volunteers, with wages paid by the state.

During this period the legions underwent various dramatic changes. Apart from recruitment, training and new battle gear, organizational and tactical changes were also made. The Cohort was to be the main operational subunit of each legion, instead of merely a temporary grouping of maniples. The size of a centuria was increased to 80 men, thus bringing the size of a maniple to 160, and the cohort, consisting of three maniples, to 480. These maniples were still called hastati, principes and triarii, with the less experienced Centuries under the junior Centurions forming the hastati and the more experienced and senior ones in the triarii maniple. In addition to being standing divisions manned by full-time soldiers, each legion would now have a permanent commander, a Legatus, appointed by the senate. The Tribunes, who had previously shared command duties, would now become primarily staff officers. Along with these new command arrangements would come new standards and symbols- most importantly the Aquila which Marius taught his troops to venerate and never allow to fall into enemy hands.

The Tetrarchy and late Roman empire

Since the reign of Diocletian, under the Tetrarchy as his major administrative reform -dividing the empire under four co-emperors, above 'diocesan' vicarii' and goernors of more, generally smaller provinces- was later called, the Roman army too underwent its most extensive modification since the time of Marius, in terms of organization, equipment and dispositions.

The old legions were divided into two types. The legions defending the frontiers or limes were kept at close to traditional, full strength (4,000-6,000 with an equal number of auxiliaries) and comprised of Limitanei. Should an enemy manage to get by them, the new mobile field legions of 1,000-1500 Comitatenses and cavalry would engage them. The Comitatenses, in turn, were backed up by the Palatini (Palace troops), elite guard troops of cavalry and heavy infantry under the direct command of an Emperor (Augustus or Caesar) or Magister militum. These units had 500-1000 men (chort-size). Originally about two-thirds of the army's strength was in frontier forces. The remainder were the mobile units which the Augusti and Caesars kept centrally located in their territories. Command of the field forces was under a magister peditum (Master of foot) and magister equitum (master of horse).

At first, the core of both types of legions remained the classical legiones. But as the empire declined and pressures on the frontiers increased, the size of the frontier legions were reduced to 3000 and eventually 1000 each. The limitanei became unreliable, lightly-armed conscripts, who were little better than border guards. Consequently, the importance of the mobile field forces, auxiliary troops, cavalry and barbarian allies increased. These included:

• Alae that were classic formations of auxiliary cavalry
• Vexillationes platinae et comitanenses autonomous Task forces of 500 cavalrymen.
• Laeti Allied barbarian (notably Germanic) cavalry, under a prefect
• Numeri Foederati cavalry.

A new type of auxiliary infantry soldier was developed- the lanciarii (lancers), to better repell barbarian cavalry.

Over time as the empire's finances were strained and standards of training and discipline declined, equipment changed as well. Traditional, ornate helmets were replaced by simple, one piece "casque" types which were easier and cheaper to produce. Likewise the lorica segmentata was replaced with the scale-mail hamata; the gladius sword with the longer spatha, and the scutum shield with the smaller, lighter, more oval-shaped parma. The pilum javelin was replaced by the short spear spiculum for throwing or stabbing and by plumbatae or throwing darts. Ranged, missile weapons came to be preferred over the older melée ones. Close quarters combat and shock tactics were left to the cavalry and a small number of elite heavy infantry in the Comitatenses and Palatini.

Types of infantry and their officers

Troop types

• Legionaries: The heavy infantry backbone of the imperial Roman armies, and the symbol of Roman military might. Following the Marian reforms, circa 102 BC, the three types of heavy infantry were replaced by this single type, who in armor and equipment was similar to the Principes. Their arms and equipment were standard-issue by the state (though the exact styles varied over time) and generally included- Lorica segmentata armor, a large rectangular shield (the scutum), and armed with two pila, and their main weapon the famous gladius short sword. The gladius was later replaced by a cavalry longsword version, the spatha.
• Auxilia: The standard light infantry served as support troops, providing long range missile fire and often as a building team. They were lightly armed, with round or oval shields, lorica hamata (chainmail armor), a gladius and a spear. The auxiliary archers had composite bows.

• Velites: Were the screening force used as skirmishers in the early republic although they were integrated with the Hastati by the time of the Marian reforms. They had a small shield, 5 javelins and wore leather armor. They would harass the enemy then run back and fight with the front lines.
• Lancearii: This type of infantry appeared in the late empire. Their arms and armor were similar to auxiliaries' except they had a long spear (Lancea) to fend off enemy cavalry.
• Funditores: The slingermen of the Roman army; they wore no armor and were armed with a sling and a small dagger called a pugio.

The officers

• The Army commander. The overall commander could control several legions on a campaign. Some like Caesar, combined both civilian (consuls, proconsuls) and military functions, although the difference was not always clearcut. Others held public office and were appointed by the Senate to lead a campaign.
• The Quaestor: Served as a type of quartermaster general, in charge of purchasing, finance, the collection and distribution of booty, etc. Again, these might perform similar functions on the civilian side.
• The Legati: senior commanders under the supremo. Generally they were of senatorial rank and were commissioned by the Senate.
• The Tribunes: These were usually young men of noble birth, but in some cases they owed their appointment to political influence or personal friendship. Some were experienced and capable officers, while others were green appointees. They looked after arms and equipment, supervised building of the field camps, controlled discipline etc.
• The Prefects: generally auxilary officers in charge of various units like slingers, archers, cavalry and infantry units. They were the lowest class of "commissioned" officers.
• The centurions: These were like the senior non-coms in modern armies in rank, who essentially ran day to day operations. Most were professional soldiers and expert swordsmen of renown bravery, loyalty and sobriety.

Training

As part of his reforms, Marius adapted the intensive training techniques used by the gladiators to the legionaries. The typical training regime consisted of gymnastics and swimming, to build physical strength and fitness. Fighting with armatura (which were wooden weapons), to learn and master combat techniques and long "Route" marches with full battle gear and equipment to build stamina, endurance and to accustom them to the hardships of campaigns. A legionary typically carried around 27 kilograms (60 pounds) of armor, weapons and equipment. This load consisted of armor, sword, shield, two pila (one heavy, one light) and 15 days' food rations. There were also tools for digging and constructing a castra, the legions' fortified base camp.

Combat training exercises consisted of thrusting with a wooden gladius into a "Quintin" (wooden dummy) while wearing full armor, and sparring with one another. Legionaries were trained to thrust with their gladii because they could defend themselves behind their large shields (scutums) while stabbing the enemy. The Romans were well aware that a wound of only 3 cm or 4 cm could cause death, so they emphasised quick, stabbing techniques to vital areas or between gaps in armor.

Before charging, legionaries hurled their pila, so that the hard iron triangular points would either stick into enemy shields, bending their soft metal shafts, weighing down the shields and making them unusable, or, even better, hit the enemy and usually kill them. Other training exercises taught the legionary to obey commands and assume battle formations. Legionaries were trained to carry their shield as a "bag": when holding the shield, the arm was disposed vertically along the body, and the shield was wielded through a handle; in this position the shield was supported with the arm and the shoulder, and the soldier could apply more pressure, giving more defensive strength.

At the end of training the legionary had to swear an oath of loyalty to the SPQR (Senatus populusque Romanus, or the Senate and the Roman People) or later to the emperor. The soldier was then given a diploma and sent off to fight for his living and the glory and honor of Rome.

Formations and tactics

Pre-battle maneuver

The Romans generally followed the same basic methods in battle, although of course adjustments were made depending on the enemy, terrain, etc. The approach march was made in several columns, enhancing maneuver. As the enemy drew closer, movement became more careful and more tentative. The Romans typically established a strong field camp, complete with palisade and ditch, providing a basis for suppy storage, troop marshalling and defence. Camps were recreated each time the army moved. Several days might be spent in a location, studying the terrain and opposition, and a number of demonstrations might be undertaken to test enemy reaction as well as to build troop morale. Part of the army might be drawn up in battle array towards the enemy. If the enemy refused to come out and at least make a demonstration, the commander could claim a morale advantage for his men, contrasting the timidity of the opposition with the resolution of his fighting forces.

During this initial phase patrols might be sent out, raids mounted to probe for weaknesses, prisoners snatched, spies infiltrated, and local collaborators identified and cultivated. Nearby fields might also be stripped for grain and forage. Historian Adrian Goldsworthy notes that such tentative pre-battle maneuvering was typical of ancient armies as each side sought to gain maximum advantage before the encounter. During this period, some ancient writers paint a picture of meetings between opposing commanders for negotiation or general discussion, as with the famous pre-clash conversation between Hannibal and Scipio at Zama. But whatever the truth of these discussions, or the flowery speeches allegedly made, the only encounter that ultimately mattered was battle.

Deployment

Sooner or later the contending armies drew near for the contest. The initial flash point could be a commander's decision, or skirmishing that got out of hand, launching both main forces towards one another. Rivalry between Roman commanders for glory sometimes sparked a forward launch, as with the battle of the River Trebia.

Once the machinery was in motion however, the Roman infantry typically was deployed, as the main body, facing the enemy, in three lines, with the cavalry or equites on their wings. The less experienced cohorts - usually the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th - were in the front; the more experienced cohorts - 1st, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 10th - were placed behind.

They were deployed in a Quincunx checkered pattern, in Latin triplex acies, with archers and auxiliares in the spaces between the cohorts. Before each battle, the commander exhorted his troops with a speech, and after that speech each soldier screamed his war cry and clashed his own gladius on his shield, a psychological tactic to demoralize the enemy.

The Roman maneuver was a complex one, filled with the dust of thousands of men wheeling into place, and the shouting of officers moving to and fro as they attempted to maintain order. Several thousand men had to be positioned from column into line, with each unit taking its designated place, along with light troops and cavalry. The fortified camps were laid out and organized to facilitate deployment. It might take some time for the final array of the host, but when accomplished the legion represented a formidable fighting force, arranged in three lines with a frontage as long as one mile.

Field Combat

Hand to hand. The battle usually opened with light troops skirmishing with the opposition- archers, slingers, javelin-men etc. These light forces withdrew to the flanks or between the gaps in the central line as the hour of decision drew nigh. Cavalry might be launched against their opposing numbers or used to screen the central core from envelopment. As the gap between the contenders closed, the main Roman force went into action. The heavy infantry typically took the initiative, attacking on the double. The front ranks usually cast their pilum, and the following ranks hurled theirs over the heads of the front-line fighters. They then drew their swords and engaged the enemy. In the slogging match that ensued Roman discipline and training were to give them important advantages. Heavily armored, with a large shield and aggressive swordplay, the infantry over time would wear down the opposition. Fresh troops were fed in from the rear, through the "checkboard" arrangement, to relieve the injured and exhausted further ahead. Eventually one side or another broke under the pressure and it is then that the greatest slaughter began.

Use of covering fire. Many Roman battles, especially during the late empire, were fought with the preparatory fire from Ballistas and Onagers. These war machines, a form of ancient artillery, fired arrows and large stones towards the enemy (although many historians question the battlefield effectiveness of such weapons). Following this barrage, the Roman infantry advanced, in four lines, until they came within 30 meters of the enemy, then they halted, hurled their pila and charged. If the first line was repelled by the enemy, another line would rapidly resume the attack. Often this rapid sequence of deadly attacks proved the key of victory.

Another common tactic was to taunt the enemy with feigned charges and rapid arrow fire by the auxiliares equites (auxiliary cavalry), forcing the enemy into pursuing them, and then leading the enemy into an ambush where they would be counter attacked by Roman heavy infantry and cavalry.

Battle formations

The legionaries could assume different battle formations according to different tactical situations.

• Repellere equites ("repel horses") was the formation used to resist cavalry. The legionaries would assume a square formation, holding their pila as spears in the space between their shields and strung together shoulder to shoulder.
• At the command eicere pila, the legionaries hurled their pila at the enemy.
• At the command cuneum formate, the infantry formed a wedge to charge and break enemy lines. This formation was used as a shock tactic.
• At the command contendite vestra sponte, the legionaries assumed an aggressive stance and attacked every opponent they faced.
• At the command orbem formate, the legionaries assumed a circle-like formation with the archers placed in the midst of and behind the legionaries providing missile fire support. This tactic was used mainly when a small number of legionaries had to hold a position and were surrounded by enemies.
• At the command ciringite frontem, the legionaries held their position.
• At the command frontem allargate, a scattered formation was adopted.
• At the command testudinem formate, the legionaries assumed the testudo (tortoise) formation. This was slow moving but almost impenetrable to enemy fire, and thus very effective during sieges and/or when facing off against enemy archers.
• At the command Agmen formate, the legionaries assumed a square formation, which was also the typical shape of a century in battle.

Siege tactics

De oppido expugnando was a tactic used when besieging cities. It was divided into three phases:

.

1. In the first phase, engineers (the cohors fabrorum) built a fortified camp near the city with walls of Contravallation and at the command 'turres extruere' (watch towers) in order to prevent enemies from bringing in reinforcements. Siege towers were built, trenches were dug and traps set all around the city. Also sometimes walls of Circumvallation were built around the city's perimeter, as Caesar did at the Battle of Alesia. Sometimes the Romans would dig tunnels or mines to sap enemy's walls.
2. The second phase began with onager and ballista fire to cover the approach of the siege towers, full of legionaries ready to assault the wall's defenders. Meanwhile, other cohorts approached the city's wall in testudo formation, bringing up battering rams and ladders to breach the gates and scale the walls.
3. The third phase included opening of the city's main gate by the cohorts which had managed to break through or scale the walls, provided the rams had not knocked the gate open. Once the main gate was opened or the walls breached, the cavalry and other cohorts entered the city to finish off the remaining defenders.

Roman infantry versus Hellenic phalanx

Strengths of the phalanx. Prior to the rise of Rome, the Hellenic phalanx was the premiere infantry force in the Western World. It had proven itself on the battlefields of southern Europe- from Sparta to Macedonia, and had met and overcome several strong non-European armies beyond - from Persia to India. Packed into a dense armored mass, and equipped with massive pikes up to 21 feet in length, the phalanx was a formidable force. While defensive configurations were sometimes used, phalanx was most effective when it was moving forward in attack, either in a frontal charge or in "oblique" or echeloned order against an opposing flank, as the victories of Alexander the Great and Theban innovator Epaminondas attest. When working with other formations - light infantry and cavalry, it was, at its height under Alexander, without peer.

Weaknesses of the phalanx. Nevertheless the phalanx had key weaknesses- it was slow and could not manuever well, particularly on rough ground. Its "dense pack" approach also made it rigid, since its troops could only primarily fight facing forward. Screened by enough effective cavalry and light troops, and led by a capable commander, these weaknesses could be compensated for. Nevertheless such compensation relied on a mix of units that was complicated to control and position. These included not only cavalry and light infantry, but shock units of war-elephants. Adrian Goldsworthy argues that Hannibal's army, while not based on a classic infantry phalanx, was Hellenic in nature, with a polyglot of multi-national contingents and fighting styles, including use of war-elephants. Such "mixed" forces presented additional command and control problems. If fighting together a long time under solid leaders, they could be extremely proficient, as the campaigns of Alexander and Hannibal show. Without such long term cohesion however, their performance was uneven, as the "scratch" force Hannibal fought with at Zama illustrates.

Advantages of Roman infantry. The Romans themselves had retained some aspects of the phalanx in their early legions, most notably the final line of fighters in the classic "tripe line", the spearmen of the triarri. The long pikes of the triarri were to eventually disappear, and all hands were uniformly equipped with short sword, shield and pilum, and deployed in the distinctive Roman tactical system, which provided more standardization and cohesion in the long run over the Hellenic type formations.

Phalanxes facing the legion were vulnerable to the more flexible Roman "checkerboard" deployment, which provided each fighting man a good chunk of personal space to engage in close order fighting. The manipular system also allowed entire Roman sub-units to maneuver more widely, freed from the need to always remain tightly packed in rigid formation. The legions drilled and trained together over a more extended time, and were more uniform and streamlined, enabling even less than brilliant army commanders to maneuver and position their forces more proficiently. This quality, among others, made them more than a match for the phalanx, when they met in combat.

Infantry defeats: Rome versus Pyrrhus

See detailed article Pyrrhus of Epirus

The Greek king Pyrrhus' phalangical system was to prove a tough trial for the Romans. But despite several setbacks they inflicted such losses that the phrase "Pyrrhic victory" has become a byword for an unworthwhile victory. A skillful and experienced commander, Pyrrhus deployed a typically mixed phalanx system, including shock units of war-elephants, and formations of light infantry (peltasts) and cavalry to support his infantry. Using these he was able to defeat the Romans twice, with a third battle deemed inconclusive or a limited Roman tactical success by many scholars. The battles below (see individual articles for detailed accounts) illustrate the difficulties of fighting against phalanx forces. If well led and deployed (compare Pyrrhus to the fleeing Perseus at Pydna below), they presented a credible infantry alternative to the heavy legion. The Romans however were to learn from their mistakes. In subsequent battles after the Pyrrhic wars, they showed themselves masters of the Hellenic phalanx.

• Battle of Heraclea
• Battle of Asculum
• The Battle of Beneventum

Infantry triumphs: Cynoscephalae and Pydna

Battle of Cynoscephalae (See more detailed article)

In this battle the Macedonian phalanx originally held the high ground but all of its units had not been properly positioned due to earlier skirmishing. Nevertheless, an advance by its left wing drove back the Romans, who counterattacked on the right flank and made some progress against a somewhat disorganized Macedonian left. However the issue was still in doubt, until an unknown tribune (officer) detached 20 maniples from the Roman line and made an encircling attack against the Macedonian rear. This caused the enemy phalanx to collapse, securing a rout for the Romans. The more flexible, streamlined legionary organization had exploited the weaknesses of the densely packed phalanx. Such triumphs secured Roman hegemony in Greece and adjoining lands.

Battle of Pydna (See more detailed article)

At Pydna the contenders deployed on a relatively flat plain, and the Macedonians had augmented the infantry with a sizeable cavalry contingent. At the hour of decision, the enemy phalanx advanced in formidable array against the Roman line, and made some intial progress. However, the ground they had to advance over was rough, and the powerful phalangial formation lost its tight cohesion. The Romans absorbed the initial shock and came on into the fray, where their more spacious formation and freer movement proved decisive in hand to hand combat on the rough ground. Shield and sword at close quarters on such terrain neutralized the long pike, and supplementary Macedonian weapons (lighter armor and a dagger-like short sword) made an indifferent showing against the skillful and aggressive assault of the heavy Roman infantrymen. The opposition also failed to deploy supporting forces effectively to help the phalanx at its time of dire need. Indeed the Macedonia commander, Perseus, seeing the situation deteriorating, is said to have fled without even bringing his cavalry into the engagement. The affair was decided in less than two hours, with a comprehensive defeat for the Macedonians.

Other flexible anti-phalanx tactics

"Breaking phalanxes" illustrates more of the Roman army's flexibility. When the Romans faced phalangite armies, the legions often deployed the velites in front of the enemy with the command to contendite vestra sponte, to cause confusion and panic into the solid blocks of the phalanxes. Meanwhile, auxilia archers were deployed on the wings of the legion in front of the cavalry, in order to defend their withdrawal. These archers were ordered to ejaculare flammas, fire incendiary arrows into the enemy. The cohorts then advanced in a wedge formation, supported by the velites' and auxiliaries' fire, and charged into the phalanx at a single point, breaking it, then flanking it with the cavalry to seal the victory. See *The Battle of Beneventum for evidence of fire-arrows being used.

Roman infantry versus the fighting hordes of Gaul and the Germanic tribes

Who were the 'barbarian hordes'?

Views of the Gallic enemies of Rome have varied widely. Some older histories consider them to be backward savages, ruthlessly destroying the civilization and "grandeur that was Rome." Some modernist views see them in a proto-nationalist light, ancient freedom fighters resisting the iron boot of empire. Others celebrate their bravery as worthy adversaries of Rome. See Wiki article the Dying Gaul for example. The Gallic opposition was also composed of a large number of different peoples and tribes, geographically ranging from the mountains of Switzerland, to the lowlands of France, to the forests of the Rhineland, and thus are not easy to categorize. The term "Gaul" has also been used interchangeably to describe Celtic peoples farther afield in Britain and Scotland, adding even more to the diversity of peoples lumped together under this name. From a military standpoint however, they seem to have shared certain general characteristics: tribal polities with a relatively small and lesser elaborated state structure, light weaponry, fairly unsophiscated tactics and organization, a high degree of mobility, and inability to sustain combat power in their field forces over a lengthy period.

Whatever their particular culture, the Gauls generally proved themselves to be tough opponents, racking up several victories over Rome. The film "Gladiator" (2000) presents a typical picture of Roman invincibility, complete with wild Germanic hordes that were quickly crushed. Though true in many cases, such as defeats under Julius Caesar, Rome suffered a number of embarrassing setbacks against such barbarians. As early as the Republican period (circa 387-390 B.C.), they had sacked Rome under Brennus. In the early imperial period, the hordes inflicted one of Rome's greatest military defeats, (the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest) which saw the liquidation of three imperial legions to Germanic warbands, and was to spark a limit on Roman expansion in the West. And it was these Germanic hordes in part (most having some familiarity with Rome and its culture, and becoming more Romanized themselves) that were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final demise in the West. Ironically, in the final days, the bulk of the fighting was between forces composed mostly of barbarians on either side.

Tactical problems in facing the Gauls and the Germanic tribes

Against the fighting men from the Tiber, the Gauls faced a daunting task. Individually, in single combat, the fierce Gallic warrior could probably more than hold his own against a Roman. In massed fighting however, the Gauls' rudimentary organization and tactics fared poorly against the well oiled machinery that was the Legion. Gallic cavalry was at times superior to that of Rome, but effective coordination with the tribal infantry was lacking. Some historians argue that the Gauls used a triangular "wedge" style formation in attack, and that the fierceness of their charges could overwhelm Roman lines. Gaps in the Roman checkerboard deployment it is held, could be exploited by fast-moving swarms of warriors charging hard within and around the legionaire line. Scholar Adrian Goldsworthy however points out that the notion of speedy Gauls zipping in and out of the Roman squares is misleading. Men charging over a typical battlefield did not have the luxury of neatly aiming for gaps, but had to deal with advancing opponents directy in front of them, who were also hurling swarms of deadly pilum. In addition, even if a gap was penetrated, the Roman "checkerboard" deployment could always introduce fresh units from farther back, quickly plugging any significant holes that developed. Flank attacks were always possible, but the legion was flexible enough to pivot to meet this, either through sub-unit manuever or through deployment of the triarri farther back. The cavalry screen on the flanks also added another layer of security.

The Gauls and Germanics also fought with little or no armor, and with weaker shields, putting them at a disadvantage against the legion. And yet the Gauls won several victories most notably at the Battle of Noreia, the Battle of Arausio, and the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest. Their greatest hope of success lay in 4 factors: (a) numerical superiority, (b) surprising the Romans (via an ambush for example) or in (c) advancing quickly to the fight, or (d) engaging the Romans over heavily covered or difficult terrain where units of the fighting horde could shelter within striking distance until the hour of decision, or if possible, withdraw and regroup between successive charges.

Generally speaking, the Gauls and Germanics needed to get into good position against the Romans and to overwhelm them in the early phases of the battle. An extended set-piece slogging match between the lightly armed tribesmen and the well organized heavy legionaires usually spelt doom for the Gauls. Most significant Gallic victories show two or more of these characteristics. The classic Teuotoburger Wald battle contains all four: surprise (a treacherous defection by Arminius and his contingent), numerical superiority, quick charges to close rapidly, and favorable terrain and environmental conditions (thick forest and pounding rainstorms) that hindered Roman movement and gave the warriors enough cover to conceal their movements and mount successive attacks against the Roman line.

Superior Roman discipline and cohesion brings success

Superior Gallic mobility and numbers often troubled Roman arms. The near defeat of Caesar in his Gallic campaign confirms this pattern, but also shows the strengths of Roman tactical organization and discipline. At the "Sambre/Sabi River", contingents of the Nervii, Atrebates, Veromandui and Aduatuci tribes massed secretly in the surrounding forests as the main Roman force was busy making camp on the opposite side of the river. Some distance away behind them, slogged two slow moving legions with the baggage train. Unaware of the danger, Caesar sent his cavalry forward under Titus Labienus across the river to scout the situation. The Gallic forces whereupon promptly commenced a ferocious attack, streaming across the shallow water and quickly assaulting the unsuspecting Romans.

So far all looked good for the warrior horde. The 4 conditions above were in their favor: (a) numerical superiority, (b) the element of surprise, (c) a quick advance/assault, and (d) favorable terrain that masked their movements until the last minute. Initial progress was spectacular as the legionaries were driven back. A rout looked possible. Caesar himself rallied his endangered army, impressing resolve upon the troops. They held out long enough against the furious tribal assault for the final two legions to appear, and the Roman cavalry to return. With these reinforcements, the Romans mounted a counterattack, led by the 10th Legion, that broke the back of the Gallic advance and sent the tribesmen reeling in retreat. It was a close run thing, illustrating both the fighting prowess of the tribal forces, and the steady, disciplined cohesion of the Romans. Ultimately, the latter was to prove decisive in Rome's long fought war which ended in the conquest of Gaul.

Roman infantry versus cavalry opponents

Problems in fighting cavalry

Cavalry opponents were one of the toughest challenges faced by the Roman infantry. Combining both missile and shock capability with extensive mobility, cavalry exploited the inherent weakness of the legion- its relatively slow movement and deployment. Defeat by strong cavalry forces is a recurring event in Roman military history. The camapigns of Hannibal illustrate this well, as Numidian and Spanish/Gallic horsemen repeatedly outflanked Roman formations, dealing devastating blows in the sides and rear. Hannibal's great victory at Cannae was primarily an infantry struggle, but the key role was played by his cavalry, as in his other victories.

An even more dramatic demonstration of Roman vulnerability is shown in the numerous wars against the cavalry heavy Parthians. The Parthians and their successors used large numbers of fast-moving light riders to harass and skirmish, and delivered the coup de grace with heavily armed and armored lancers called "cataphracts. Both types of troops used powerful composite bows that fired arrows of sufficient strength to penetrate Roman armor. The cataphracts extended combat power by serving as shock troops, engaging opposing forces with their heavy lances in thundering charges after they had been "softened up" by swarms of arrows. The Parthians also conducted a "scorched earth" policy against the Romans, refusing major set-piece encounters, while luring them deeper on to unfavorable ground. The debacle of Carrhae, saw a devastating defeat of Roman arms by the Parthian cavalry. Against such foes the Romans faced a difficult task.

Use of combined arms to successfully fight cavalry

Clues exist in the earlier campaigns of Alexander the Great against mounted Asiatic warriors - engaging the horsemen with strong detachments of light infantry and missile troops, and driving them off with charges by Alexander's heavy cavalry units. The Roman variant continued the same "combined arms" approach, with a larger role for infantry, although in later years the cavalry component grew. The Eastern half of the Roman Empire particularly, was ultimately to rely mostly on cavalry forces. Still in the heyday of the foot soldier, strong units of light missile troops were deployed with the legions to engage the swift horsemen at stand off distances. Roman cavalry also played an important role in screening the main force and cutting off detachments of maurading riders. Using this assistance, the heavy legions themselves learned how to engage horsemen using 2 general methods.

1. One tactic was to form a hollow square which furnished all-round defence, while providing a pivot for offensive action. In the square, troops could huddle against the arrow swarm using their large shields. This of course slowed their progress and opened them up to charges by the cataphracts. The legions met such assaults resolutely, using their pilum as pikes, presenting the heavy lancers with a solid hedge of steel. Inside the square, missile troops could be massed for counter-fire, and cavalry units positioned for counterattack. Such tactics could assure survival until the legions could get into the enemy's heartland and commence sieges against his cities, and plunder and pillage against his countryside. Improperly applied however, they could backfire, leaving the legions a sluggish target, huddled for protection in square, while the enemy horsemen ran rampant around them and wore them down over time.
2. The second method used by the infantry was dispersed (but mutually suppporting) maneuver and a quick advance. Carelessly done, such maneuver could lead to detatchments being fatally cut off at happened at Carrhae. The campaign of Julian the Apostate against the Persians, is instructive in this regard, although Julian's force was not primarily heavy infantry as in the old legion days. Against Julian, the Persians refused to give battle- scorching the earth ahead of the Romans and wearing them down in a struggle of attrition. Soon Julian's advance towards the enemy capital slowed. Reluctant to go back the way he came, he was forced to abandon the huge baggage train and massive number of supporting ships (almost 1000) that had floated supplies and material down the Euphrates. Julian had also divided his army, leaving some 30,000 troops behind, before his advance towards the enemy capital. On June 22, 363 AD a large-scale clash finally occurred near the town of Maranga. Facing a cavalry force that threatened to blanket his troops with a hail of arrows, and in danger of envelopment, Julian deployed his force in a crescent formation, and ordered an advance on the double, thwarting both dangers by closing quickly. The gambit was successful. After a long battle, the Persians withdrew- a tactical victory (albeit a costly one) for the Romans. See Arthur Ferrill's "The Fall of Rome" for a discussion of the battle.

Although Julian would fail and indeed die in this campaign, and though the Roman force itself had substantial numbers of cavalry, his methods, and the record of Rome's other early victories in the East under leaders like Trajan, show that the infantry, when properly handled, and when working in conjunction with other supporting arms, could meet the challenge of the cavalryman. It should be noted that the Roman force at Julian's time contained a number of different types of infantry units- from elite shock troops of the imperial guard- the Ioviani and Herculiani- to lesser known levies. Whatever the name and status of these unit mixes however, they still remained infantry, although the dominant days of the "classic" legion were long gone.

Assessment of the Roman infantry

Roman infantry effectiveness

Several of Rome's military campaigns hardly show sustained invincibility or dazzling genius. Indeed Roman performance in many battles was unimpressive or disastrous. As far as ambushes for example, (such as the debacle in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest) Roman forces seemed to have a penchant for falling into them repeatedly, as proved centuries earlier at Lake Trasimene. Over the course of the empire, they were out-generaled by Pyrrhus, Hannibal (during the early years of the Second Punic War) and a number of other enemy leaders. Against cavalry opponents like the Parthians, they also suffered several severe defeats. And yet, over time, the Romans not only bounced back, but for the most part eventually crushed or neutralized their enemies. How then did they do it against a variety of enemies that were, at various times and places, more numerous, more skilled or better led?

Central factors in Roman success

Some elements that made the Romans an effective military force, both tactically and at higher levels, were:

• The Romans were able to copy and adapt the weapons and methods of its opponents more effectively. Some weapons, such as the gladius, were adopted outright by the legionaries. In other cases, especially formidable enemies units of their forces were invited to serve in the Roman army as auxiliaries after peace was made. In the naval sphere, the Romans followed some of the same methods they used with the infantry, dropping their ineffective designs and copying, adapting and improving on Punic warships, and introducing heavier marine contingents (infantry fighters) on to their ships. (See "The Punic Wars", Adrian Goldsworthy.)

• Roman organization was more flexible than those of many opponents. Tribal peoples for example often attacked en-masse with little coordination, using standard tactics traditional to their culture that varied relatively little. There were exceptions, notably by leaders who had previously been extensively exposed to Roman military methods, but this was the general rule. By contrast, the heavy infantry, through their training and discipline, and operating in conjunction with light foot and cavalry, could more quickly adopt a number of methods and formations depending on the situation. These range from the testudo during siege warfare, to a hollow square against cavalry attack, to mixed units of heavy foot, horse and light infantry against guerrillas in Spain, to the classic "triple line" or checkboard patterns. Against more sophiscated opponents the Romans also showed great flexibility at times, such as the brilliant adjustments Scipio made against Hannibal at Zama. These included leaving huge gaps in the ranks to trap the charging elephants, and the recall, reposition and consolidation of a single battle line that advanced to the final death struggle against the Carthaginian veterans of Italy.

• Roman discipline, organization and logistical systemization sustained combat effectiveness over a longer period. Notably, the Roman system of castra, or fortified camps, allowed the army to stay in the field on favorable ground and be rested and resupplied for battle. Well organized Roman logistics also sustained combat power, from routine resupply and storage, to the construction of military roads, to state run arsenals and weapons factories, to well organized naval convoys that helped stave off defeat by Carthage. The death of a leader generally did not cause the legions to lose heart in battle. Others stepped to the fore and carried on. In the defeat by Hannibal at the River Trebia, 10,000 Romans cut their way through the debacle to safety, maintaining unit cohesion when all around was rout, a testimony to their tactical organization and discipline. (See "The Punic Wars", Adrian Goldsworthy.)

• The Romans were more persistent and more willing to absorb and replace losses over time than their opponents. Unlike other civilizations, the Romans kept going relentlessly until typically their enemies had been completely crushed or neutralized. The army acted to implement policy and were not allowed to stop unless they received a command from the emperor or a decree from the senate.

Against the tribal polities of Europe Roman tenacity eventually wore down most opposition. The tribes of Europe did not have a state or economic structure able to support lengthy campaigns and therefore could often (but not always) be made to change their minds about opposing Roman hegemony. The defeat in the Teutoburg Forest might seem like an exception, but even here, the Romans were back on the warpath 5 years later with major forces against their Germanic opponents. That there is an obvious limit to endless persistence does not negate the general pattern.

Where the Romans faced another large state structure, such as the Persian Empire, they found the military road rocky indeed and were sometimes forced to an impasse. Nevertheless the distinct pattern of Roman tenacity holds. Rome suffered its greatest defeats against sophiscated Carthage, notably at Cannae, and was forced to avoid battle for a lengthy period. Yet in time, it rebuilt its forces on land and at sea, and persisted in the struggle, astonishing the Punics who expected it to sue for peace. Against the Parthians, crushing defeats did not stop the Romans, for they invaded Parthian territory several times afterwards, and though Parthia proper was never totally conquered, Rome ultimately secured a rough hegemony in the area. See Wiki article "Parthia."

• Roman leadership was mixed, but over time it was often effective in securing Roman military success. Leadership debacles are common in Roman military history, from the routs against Hannibal, to the demise of the unlucky Crassus against the Parthians. The Roman polity's structuring however produced a steady supply of men willing and able to lead troops in battle- men that were held accountable for defeat or malfeasance. It was not unusual for a losing general to be prosecuted by political enemies in Rome, with some having their property confiscated and barely escaping death. The senatorial oligarchy, for all its political maneuvering, interference and other faults, provided the functions of oversight and audit over military matters, that over the course of time, shaped final results. The record is a mixed one, but whether under boisterous Republic or Imperial emperor, Rome produced enough competent leaders to secure its military dominance for over a millennium. Some of the best leaders come from both eras, including Scipio, Caesar and others.

Note should be taken here of the large number of junior officers the Romans typically used to assure coordination and guidance. The initiative of such men played a key part in Roman success, as the actions of the unknown tribune at Cynoscephalae (see above) demonstrates. Effective leadership was also bound up with the famous Roman centurions, the backbone of the legionary organization. While all such men could not be considered models of perfection, they commanded substantial respect. Such respect is evident even in the Biblical narrative, where Jesus of Nazareth and a Roman centurion touch on the topics of leadership and discipline among other things, during their brief interaction. (Luke 7: vs 8).

• The influence of Roman military and civic culture, as embodied particularly in the heavy infantry legion, gave the Roman military consistent motivation and cohesion. Such culture included but was not limited to: (a) the valuing of Roman citizenship, (b) the broad-based muster of free males into mass infantry units (as opposed to widespread use of foreign contingents, slaves or mercenaries), and (c) loyalty to those fighting units (the Legion) which remained characteristically Roman in outlook and discipline.

Decline of the infantry: the controversies

Any history of the Roman infantry must grapple with the factors that led to the decline of the heavy legions that once dominated the Western world. Such decline of course is closely linked with the decay of other facets of Rome's economy, society and political scene. Nevertheless it must be emphasized that the final demise of Rome was due to military defeat, however plausible (or implausible) the plethora of theories advanced by some scholars, ranging from declining tax bases, to class struggle, to lead poisioning. Two of the major factors that have occupied scholars of the military will be discussed here: barbarization and the adaptation of a "mobile reserve" strategy. There are a number of controversies in this area with dueling scholars advancing competing theories.

"Barbarization" of the heavy infantry

"Barbarization" is a common theme in many works on Rome (See Gibbons, Mommsen, Delbruck, et al), and thus cannot be excluded from any analysis of its infantry forces. Essentially it is argued that the increasing barbarization of the heavy legions weakened weaponry, training, morale and military effectiveness in the long run. The weapons changes described above are but one example.

It could be argued that the use of barbarian personnel was nothing new. This is accurate, however such use was clearly governed by "the Roman way." It was the barbarian personnel who had to adapt to Roman standards and organization, not the other way around. In the twilight of the empire, this was not the case. Such practices as permitting the settlement of massive, armed barbarian populations on Roman territory, the watering down of the privilege of citizenship, increasing use of alien contingents, and relaxation or removal of traditionally thorough and severe Roman discipline, organization and control, contributed to the decline of the heavy infantry.

The settlement of the foederati for example, saw large barbarian contingents ushered on to Roman territory, with their own organization, under their own leaders. Such groupings showed a tendency to neglect "the Roman way" in organization, training, logistics etc., in favor of their own ideas, practices and agendas. These settlements may have bought short term political peace for imperial elites, but their long term effect was negative, weakening the traditional strengths of the heavy infantry in discipline, training and deployment. They also seemed to have lessened the incentive for remaining "old Guard" troops to adhere to such strengths, since the barbarians received equal or more favor with less effort. Indeed such "allied" barbarian contingents were at times to turn on Roman, devastating wide areas with sack and pillage and even attacking imperial army formations.

Did the "mobile reserve" strategy weaken combat power?

Some scholars challenge the notion that a "mobile reserve" in the modern military sense existed in the Roman Empire, and instead argue that the shifts in organization represent a series of field armies deployed in various areas as needed, particularly in the East. Others point to the heavy fiscal difficulties and political turmoil of the later Empire that made it difficult to continue traditional policy. Controversy on the topic is lively.

Advantages of the mobile reserve strategy

The "mobile reserve" strategy, traditionally identified with Constantine, saw reversal of the traditional "forward" policy of strong frontier fortifications backed by legions stationed near likely zones of conflict. Instead, it is argued that the best troops were pulled back into a type of "mobile reserve" closer to the center that could be deployed to trouble areas throughout the empire. Some scholars claim this was a positive development, (Luttwak, Delbruck, et al) given growing difficulties with governing the vast empire, where political turmoil and severe financial difficulties had made the old pre-clusive security system untenable. Some writers such as Luttwak condemn the old style "forward" policy as indicating a "Maginot Line" mentality in the troubled latter centuries of the Empire.

Disadvantages of the mobile reserve strategy versus the "forward" policy

Ancient writers like Zosimus in the 5th century AD condemned the "reserve" policy as a major weakening of the military force. Other modern scholars (Ferrill et al) also see the pullback as a strategic mistake, arguing that it left lower quality "second string" limitanei forces to stop an enemy, until the distant mobile reserve arrived. While the drop in quality did not happen immediately, it is argued that over time, the limitanei declined into lightly armed, static watchman type troops that were of dubious value against increasing barbarian marauders on the frontiers. The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons (shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites) rather than on military reality. In addition it is claimed, the "forward" policy was not at all a static "Maginot" approach, but that traditional heavy legions and suporting cavalry, could still move to a trouble spot by redeploying them from fortifications elsewhere along a particular frontier.

Twilight of the hard-core infantry

There are numerous other facets to the controversy, but whatever the school of thought, all agree that the traditional strengths and weaponry of the heavy infantry legion declined from the standards of earlier eras. The 4th century writer Vegetius, in one of the most influential Western military works, highlighted this decline as the key factor in military weakness, noting that the core legions always fought as part of an integrated team of cavalry and light foot. In the latter years, this formula that had brought so much success petered out. Caught between the growth of lighter armed/less organized foot soldiers, and the increasing cavalry formations of the mobile forces, the "heavies" as the dominant force, withered on the vine. This does not mean that heavy units disappeared entirely, but that their mass recruitment, formation, organization and deployment as the dominant part of the Roman military was greatly reduced. Ironically, in Rome's final battles (the Western half of the empire) the defeats suffered were substantially inflicted by INFANTRY forces (many fighting dismounted).

Historian Arther Ferril notes that even towards the end, some of the old infantry formations were still in use. Such grouping was increasingly ineffective however, without the severe close order discipline, drill and organization of olden times. At the Battle of Chalons (circa 451 AD) Attila the Hun rallied his troops by mocking the once vaunted Roman infantry, alleging that they merely huddled under a screen of protective shields in close formation. He ordered his troops to ignore them and to attack the powerful Alans and Visigoths instead. It was a sad commentary on the force that had once dominated Europe, the Mediterrean and much of the Middle East. It is true that at Chalons, the Roman infantry contributed to the victory by seizing part of the battlefield's high ground. Nevertheless its day had already passed in favor of the mass levies of the barbarian foderates.

See also

• List of Ancient Rome-related topics
• Roman legion
• Military history of ancient Rome
• Castra
• Roman military tactics

Sources and references

• Caesar's De Bello Gallico
• Vegetius's De Re Militari
• Notitia Dignitatum

References

• "The Punic Wars", Adrian Goldsworthy.

A detailed breakdown of Roman strategy, methods, tactics and those of their opponents. Analyzes strengths and weaknesses of the Roman military and how they were able to beat a sophiscated Carthage.

• "The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation", by Arther Ferrill, 1988

Focuses on military issues leading to the fall of Rome as opposed to a plethora of theories such as overpopulation, shrinking tax bases, "class struggle," etc.... Reemphasizes the military factors in Rome's final demise. Compares the "mobile reserve" strategy of later decades to the earlier "forward" policy of keeping the heavy fighting legions near likely combat zones. Ferrill also tackles the weakening effect of "barbarization", particularly on the core heavy infantry legions. Quote:

"Many historians have argued .... that the fall of Rome was not primarily a military phenomenon. In fact, it was exactly that. After 410 the emperor in the West could no longer project military power to the frontiers." (p. 164)

• "The Complete Roman Army", by Adrian Goldsworthy

One volume history covering the Roman Army, which was the biggest most important part of its military. Goldsworthy covers the early Republican days down to the final Imperial era demise, tracing changes in tactics, equipment, strategy, organization etc. He notes the details of the military system such as training and battlefield tactics, as well as bigger picture strategy, and changes that impacted Roman arms. He assesses what made the Romans effective, and ineffective in each of the various eras.

• "The Roman Army: Legions, Wars and Campaigns: A Military History of the World's First Superpower: From the Rise of the Republic and the Might of the Empire to the Fall of the West", by Nigel Rodgers

• "Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire", Edward Luttwak

Prominent advocate of the mobile or central reserve theory.

• Hans Delbrück; Warfare in Antiquity; 1920; ISBN 0-8032-9199-X

• Ancient warfare
• Roman military history
• Tactical formations