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Many people were recruited to the Ulster Defence Regiment. Some 40,000 people served in the UDR from 1970 to 1992, though only a small percentage of the male population of Northern Ireland ever served with the regiment. In 1972, Brigadier Ormerod complained that only 2.7% of eligible males had joined and, in 1981, Brigadier Ritchie noted that only 6% of eligible Protestant males were serving.

The role of ex-B-Specials in the UDR and the effect on Catholic recruitment

When asked in Parliament if there was an automatic right of transfer for B Specials, Denis Healey replied that there wasn't but that applications would be treated on the grounds of suitability .

In a debate in the lower house at Stormont, John Hume objected to the fact that Lt-Col Stephen Miskimmon, the commandant of the B Specials had, in his final letter to each individual member of the force, enclosed a form to be completed if the individual concerned wished to join the RUC Reserve or Ulster Defence Regiment. Sir Robert Porter replied that these forms were not application forms and had been to ascertain if members of the B Specials had any previous military experience and wished to join the new force. He also said that Hunt had expressed the hope the members of the B Specials would join "one of the two new forces". The Ministry of Defence issued a statement which said that Miskimmon's forms were to be ignored and only the official forms accepted as applications. It further stated that any future letters of such a nature must be cleared with the MoD. This was, however, only one of a number of errors which diluted Catholic confidence in the integrity of the new force.

In a debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on 12th November 1969, the possible role which the B Specials would play in the development of the proposed Ulster Defence Regiment was debated.

The then Secretary of State for Defence Roy Hattersley stated to the house:

Of necessity, the new force will draw substantially on the Ulster Special Constabulary for its initial recruitment, but there will be a campaign to enrol recruits from all sections of the Northern Ireland community. Apart from the formal qualifications of age, residence and nationality the sole criterion for acceptance will be suitability for service in a military force. There will be a strict security vetting.

Bernadette Devlin MP later in the debate was to ask, "Do you really expect me or any other member or anybody in Northern Ireland to accept one solitary word of the whitewash and eyewash you have produced? Can you give me one concrete statement that it the UDR is not the USC under the guise of the British Army?"

The Belfast Telegraph disagreed. In editorials several days apart its pages declared: "In no sense can the new Regiment be regarded like the old USC, as a vigilante force and a law unto itself. Inevitably the members of the new force will be provided by present B Specials and just as inevitably it is already being smeared in some quarters as simply the old force in new uniform. Every effort must be made to ensure that this is not so. No-one must be able to put a denominational tag on the UDR and if one of the senior officers in the force happened to be a Roman Catholic, so much the better ... The establishment of this new force should be regarded as a turning point in the life of the community."

Some politicians called for a full implementation of the Hunt Report which recommended a more neutral name, a reduction in the proposed size of the force and a ban on the recruitment of B Specials' county commanders as UDR battalion commanders.

In the event, the response from the B Specials was mixed. Some felt betrayed and resigned immediately, while others grasped the new opportunity and made application to join the UDR as soon as forms were available.

There was another option open to the men of the B-Specials: to join the newly-formed RUC Reserve. Many did so, especially in Belfast, where it has been noted that the B Specials had received more training as, and were more akin with, policemen, in contrast to the border districts where the B Specials had operated in a more military fashion. In Belfast, during the first month of recruiting, only 36 Specials applied to join the UDR compared to a national average of 29% - 2,424, one thousand of whom were rejected, mainly on the grounds of age and fitness. Around 75% of the men of the Tyrone B Specials applied and, as a result, the 6th Battalion started life as the only battalion more or less up to strength and remained so during its history. The border counties in general followed this pattern. It also meant that former B Specials dominated these battalions.

The story was different for Belfast, Londonderry, Down and Antrim, where the figures were markedly more balanced with a high proportion of Catholic recruits. The results at 3 UDR were best in this respect. The battalion commenced duty with 30% of its numbers as Catholic.

By the end of March 1970, the number of accepted recruits was 2,440 including 1,423 ex B Specials and 946 Catholics. The breakdown for each area was:

The table above shows the number of B Specials who joined the regiment before it began duties. By 1 April 1970, however, only 1,606 of the desired 4,000 men had been enlisted and the regiment began its duties much under strength.

A number of former members of the B Specials felt aggrieved at the loss of their force and were not prepared to join the UDR. In some cases they even booed and jeered passing UDR patrols. Most resistance was by the B Specials in County Down where the adjutant of the USC District actively campaigned in an effort to persuade B Specials not to apply for the new force.

Subsequent Catholic recruitment

Unless the numbers of recruits from both communities reflected the demographics of Northern Ireland, it would never become the model which Lord Hunt intended it to be. Whilst Catholics continued to join the regiment, the numbers were never sufficiently high enough, except in 3 UDR. The 3rd (Co. Down) Battalion was, and remained, the unit with the highest percentage of Catholic members throughout the troubles, beginning with 30%. In 3 UDR some sections were totally comprised of Catholics. This led to protests from the B Specials Association that in 3 UDR "preference for promotion and allocation of appointments was being given to Catholics"

3 UDR's C Company in Newry had the highest percentage of Catholics of any company in the UDR. This appears to be explained by the fact that the local Territorial Army company of Royal Irish Fusiliers had been disbanded in 1968 and the vast majority of its members had joined up en-masse. The new company commander of C Company was the former company commander of the TA unit and was amazed to see that virtually all of his TA soldiers were on parade, in the TA Centre, in the exact same drill hall as they had previously used, for the first night of the new regiment. He noted that there were some former B Specials in the room and made the observation that they did not initially associate with the others - not on the grounds of religion but because the former TA soldiers all knew each other socially and sat together on canteen breaks whereas the B Men kept to their group of comrades. Within a week however both groups had melded together.

Many Catholic recruits found themselves reporting for duty in B Specials drill halls. In some cases the new Catholic recruits were cold-shouldered or ignored and generally made to feel unwelcome to the point where they resigned. Despite this many Catholics stayed in the regiment but following Operation Demetrius there was a general outcry by nationalist politicians because no Protestant paramilitaries were interned: only Catholics suspected as members of the IRA. Austin Currie, the prominent SDLP MP (whose own brother was a member of the regiment) on 18 August 1971, publicly withdrew his support for the regiment.

For some time, the IRA had been discouraging Catholics from joining but after these events more serious intimidation began to emerge, such as:

• homes daubed with painted slogans;
• shotguns fired outside homes;
• being handed bullets or having them delivered through the post;
• threatening letters;
• threatening phone calls;
• arson attacks;
• children of members bullied at school;
• beatings and assault;
• refusal to give service in shops;
• being sent to Coventry in the local community.

The first Catholic soldier to be killed was 32-year-old part-time Private Sean Russell of 7 UDR, who was shot dead in 1970, in front of his wife and children, by a gunman who burst into his home in the predominantly Catholic area of New Barnsley, Belfast. The last was part-time Private William Megrath of 11 UDR who was shot dead in July 1987 as he drove through the Twinbrook area of west Belfast on his return home from his civilian job. The worst period was in the fourteen months following internment when seven Catholic soldiers were killed by the IRA. In that period, they numbered 7% of the regimental strength but in terms of the numbers of UDR soldiers killed by the IRA the percentage was 28%.

The Belfast Telegraph reported that, as a result of IRA pressure and disillusionment with the government's attitude towards the minority community over internment, 25% of Catholics in the regiment resigned in 1971, 50% of those in the months following internment. The Belfast Telegraph's comments were:

The threat of intimidation against members of the UDR is a serious matter. The UDR is more than an army regiment. It is an experiment in co-operation between Protestants and Catholics. If the Catholics leave, the UDR will become a purely Protestant force by default.

— 20px, 20px, The Belfast Telegraph

The regiment attempted to halt the exodus of Catholics in a number of ways, including allowing battalion commanders to appear on television (normally not permitted for the rank of Lieutenant Colonel at that time), appeals to religious and political leaders and the implementation of extra personal-security measures. Although the Ministry of Defence never admitted to any intent on the matter, when Brigadier Scott-Bowden's term as Commander UDR finished in 1972, his successor was Brigadier Denis Ormerod, a Catholic whose mother's family came from the Republic of Ireland. His second-in-command (Deputy Commander UDR), Colonel Kevin Hill, was also Catholic, as was his successor Colonel Paddy Ryan, whose father lived in Donaghadee, Co Down. Ormerod admitted in his memoirs that his religion and appointment as the senior Catholic Army officer in Northern Ireland helped him considerably in his rapport with Catholic religious leaders but that, conversely, these appointments also created unease with Protestants and he was visited by a number of concerned politicians including, notably, Ian Paisley.

Loyalist Intimidation

Unlike soldiers from the regular Army, the UDR did not live in barracks. As members of a "citizens' army", they returned to their own homes at the end of duty. Many lived in Protestant or Catholic enclaves which put them within easy reach of paramilitary or community groups within those areas.

The years 1972-73 saw the emergence of paramilitary threats from loyalists. Of 288 incidents of intimidation reported, all but twelve were from Protestants who had been threatened from within their own community. Sometimes this was to gain information, or to persuade members of the regiment to join (or remain within) Protestant organisations. The intimidation included incidents of threatening letters and phone calls, abduction, shots fired from passing cars and off-duty soldiers being assaulted.

References

1. Ryder 1991, p. 63
2. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1969/nov/12/ulster-defence-regiment
3. Potter 2001, p. 21.
4. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1969/nov/12/ulster-defence-regiment
5. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1969/nov/12/ulster-defence-regiment
6. Potter 2001, p. 20.
7. Ellison 2000 pp.65-138
8. Ellison 2000, pp.66-67.
9. ^ Potter 2001, p. 29.
10. Hansard, 23 March 1970, reproduced in millbanksystems.com
11. Potter 2001, p. 31.
12. Potter 2001, p. 376.
13. Potter 2001, pp. 57-58.
14. Potter 2001, p. 35.
15. Potter 2001, p. 35.
16. ^ Ryder 1991, p. 46.
17. Potter 2001, pp. 58-60.
18. ^ Potter 2001, p. 60.
19. Potter 2001, ISBN p. 303.
20. Potter 2001, p. 61.
21. Potter 2001, p. 63.
22. ^ Potter 2001, p. 94
23. Potter 2001, pp. 89-98.

Bibliography

• The Irish Militia, 1793-1802: Ireland's Forgotten Army Four Courts Press (April 15, 2007) ISBN-10: 1846820375
• Bardon, Jonathan, A History of Ulster, Blackstaff Press, 2001, ISBN 0856407038
• Dillon, Martin, The Dirty War, Arrow, 1991, ISBN 0 09 984520 2
• Ellison, Graham & Smyth, Jim, The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland, Pluto Press, 2000, ISBN 0745313930
• Gamble, Ronnie Echo Company, The History of E Company 5th Battalion of the Ulster Defence Regiment, 2007. ISBN 978-0-9558069-0-2
• McCormack, W. J., The Blackwell Companion to Modern Irish Culture, Blackwell Publishing, 1999
• McGarry, John & O'Leary, Brendan, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images, Blackwell Publishing, 1995, ISBN 0631183493
• McKittrick, David & McVea, David, Making Sense of the Troubles, Penguin Books, 2001, ISBN 0 14 100305 7
• O'Brien, Justin, Killing Finucane, Gill & Macmillan, 2005, ISBN 0 7171 3543 8
• Potter, John, A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194
• Ripley, Tim & Chappell, Mike, Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969-92, ISBN10:1855322781
• Ryder, Chris, The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace, 1991, ISBN-10: 0413648001
• Taylor, Peter, Provos - the IRA and Sinn Féin, Bloomsbury Publishing, 1997, ISBN 0-7475-3818-2
• Urban, Mark, Big Boy's Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA, faber & faber, 1992, ISBN 0 571 16809 4
• Wood, Ian S., Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA, Edinburgh University Press, 2006, ISBN 0748624279

External links

• Palace Barracks Memorial Garden
• Regimental Association of the Ulster Defence Regiment CGC
• Murder, Collusion & Lies: The murder of Seamus Ludlow
• Seamus Ludlow by Ed Moloney, Sunday Tribune
• The Last Coleraine Militia - Echo Company 5 UDR

• History of Northern Ireland
• The Troubles in Northern Ireland
• Infantry regiments of the British Army