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| Part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 United States |
 North Korea | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
 William B. Kean |
Pang Ho San | ||||||
The Battle of Battle Mountain was an engagement between United States and North Korean forces early in the Korean War from August, 1950 in the vicinity of Masan and the Naktong River in South Korea. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously. The battle ended in a victory for the United States after large numbers of US reinforcements destroyed an attacking North Korean division.
Background
Outbreak of war
Following the 25 June 1950 outbreak of the Korean War after the invasion of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) by its northern neighbor, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), the United Nations decided to commit troops to the conflict on behalf of South Korea. The United States, a member of the UN, subsequently committed ground forces to the Korean peninsula with the goal of fighting back the North Korean invasion and to prevent South Korea from collapsing. However, US forces in the Far East had been steadily decreasing since the end of World War II, five years earlier, and at the time the closest forces were the 24th Infantry Division, headquartered in Japan. The division was understrength, and most of its equipment was antiquated due to reductions in military spending. Regardless, the 24th was ordered to South Korea.
The 24th Infantry Division was the first US unit sent into Korea with the mission to take the initial "shock" of North Korean advances, delaying much larger North Korean units to buy time to allow reinforcements to arrive. The division was consequently alone for several weeks as it attempted to delay the North Koreans, making time for the 1st Cavalry and the 7th and 25th Infantry Divisions, along with other Eighth Army supporting units, to move into position. Advance elements of the 24th Infantry were badly defeated in the Battle of Osan on July 5, the first encounter between American and North Korean forces. For the first month after the defeat of Task Force Smith, 24th Infantry was repeatedly defeated and forced south by superior North Korean numbers and equipment. The regiments of the 24th Infantry were systematically pushed south in engagements around Chochiwon, Chonan, and Pyongtaek. The 24th made a final stand in the Battle of Taejon, where it was almost completely destroyed but delaying North Korean forces until July 20. By that time, the Eighth Army's force of combat troops were roughly equal to North Korean forces attacking the region, with new UN units arriving every day.
North Korean advance
With Taejon captured, North Korean forces began surrounding the Pusan Perimeter from all sides in an attempt to envelop it. The 4th and 6th North Korean Infantry Divisions advanced south in a wide flanking maneuver. The two divisions attempted to envelop the UN's left flank, but became extremely spread out in the process. They advanced on UN positions with armor and superior numbers, repeatedly pushing back U.S. and South Korean forces.
American forces were pushed back repeatedly before finally halting the North Korean advance in a series of engagements in the southern section of the country. Forces of the 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, newly arrived in the country, were wiped out at Hadong in a coordinated ambush by North Korean forces on July 27, opening a pass to the Pusan area. Soon after, North Korean forces took Chinju to the west, pushing back the US 19th Infantry Regiment and leaving routes to the Pusan open for more North Korean attacks. US formations were subsequently able to defeat and push back the North Koreans on the flank in the Battle of the Notch on August 2. Suffering mounting losses, the KPA force in the west withdrew for several days to re-equip and receive reinforcements. This granted both sides a reprieve to prepare for the attack on the Pusan Perimeter.
35th Infantry emplaces
Main article: Battle of MasanWalker then ordered the 25th Infantry Division to take up defensive positions on the army southern flank west of Masan. By August 15, the 25th Infantry Division had moved into these positions. Rough terrain west of Masan limited the choice of the positions. The mountain barrier west of Masan was the first readily defensible ground east of the Chinju pass. The 2,000 feet (610 m) mountain ridges of Sobuk-san and P'il-bong dominated the area and protected the Komam-ni-Haman-Chindong-ni road, the only means of north-south communication west of Masan.
Northwest of Komam-ni was the broken spur of P'il-bong, dominated by 900 feet (270 m) Sibidang-san, along the Nam. Sibidang provided excellent observation, and artillery emplaced in the Komam-ni area could interdict the road junction at Chungam-ni. The 35th Infantry Regiment emplaced at Sibidang-Komam-ni, in the northern part of the 25th Infantry Division defense line. The 35th Regiment line extended from a point two miles west of Komam-ni to the Nam River and then turned east along that stream to its confluence with the Naktong. It was a long regimental line-about 26,000 yards (24,000 m).
The 1st Battalion held the regiment's left flank west of Komam-ni, 2nd Battalion held the regimental right along the Nam River. 3rd Battalion, redesignated from the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry, was in reserve on the road south of Chirwon from where it could move quickly to any part of the line. To the south was the 24th Infantry Regiment and west of Chindong-ni, 5th Regimental Combat Team was on the division left. On division orders, 5th RCT at first held the ground above the Chindong-ni coastal road only as far as Fox Hill, or Yaban-san. General Kean soon decided, however, that the 5th Regimental Combat Team should close the gap northward between it and the 24th Infantry. When the 5th sent a South Korean unit of 100 men under American officers to the higher slope of Sobuk-san, North Korean troops already there drove them back. General Kean then ordered the 5th Regimental Combat Team to take this ground, but it was too late.
Prelude
At the same time that the North Koreans were trying to penetrate the 35th Infantry positions in the Sibidang-Komam-ni area, they also sent strong patrols and probing attacks against the mountainous middle part of the 25th Infantry Division line. When the division issued orders to its subordinate units to take up defensive positions west of Masan, the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry was still trying to seize Obong-san, the mountain ridge just west of Battle Mountain and P'il-bong, and across a gorgelike valley from them. At daybreak of 15 August, the 2d Battalion broke contact with the enemy and withdrew to Battle Mountain and the ridge west of Haman. The 3rd Battalion of the 24th Infantry now came to the Haman area to help in the regimental defense of this sector.
Battle Mountain
This high ground west of Haman on which the 24th Infantry established its defensive line was part of the Sobuk-san mountain mass. Sobuk-san reaches its 2,400 feet (730 m) peak at P'il-bong also called Hill 743, 8 miles (13 km) northwest of Chindong-ni and 3 miles (4.8 km) southwest of Haman. From P'il-bong the crest of the ridge line curves northwestward, to rise again 1 mile (1.6 km) away in the bald peak designated Hill 665, which became known as Battle Mountain. It also was variously known as "Napalm Hill," "Old Baldy," and "Bloody Knob." Between P'il-bong and Battle Mountain the ridge line narrows to a rocky ledge which the troops called the "Rocky Crags." Northward from Battle Mountain toward the Nam River, the ground drops sharply in two long spur ridges. Men who fought there called the eastern one Green Peak.
At the western, enemy-held base of Battle Mountain and P'il-bong were the villages of Ogok and Tundok, 1.25 miles (2.01 km) from the crest. A north-south mountain trail crossed a high saddle just north of these villages and up the west slope about halfway to the top of Battle Mountain. This road gave the North Koreans an advantage in mounting and supplying their attacks in the area. A trail system ran from Ogok and Tundok to the crests of Battle Mountain and P'il-bong. From the top of Battle Mountain an observer could look directly down into the North Korean-held valley. Conversely, from Battle Mountain the North Koreans could look down into the Haman valley eastward and observe the US 24th Infantry command post, supply road, artillery positions, and approach trails. Whichever side held the crest of Battle Mountain could see into the rear areas of the other. Both forces fully understood the advantages of holding the crest of Battle Mountain and each tried to do it in a 6-week-long battle.
Logistics
The approach to Battle Mountain and P'il-bong was much more difficult from the east, the American-held side, than from the west, the North Korean side. On the east side there was no road climbing halfway to the top; from the base of the mountain at the edge of the Haman valley the only way to make the ascent was by foot trail. Climbers took 2 to 3 hours to reach the top of P'il-bong from the reservoir area, and required from 3 to 4 hours to get on top of Battle Mountain from the valley floor. The turnaround time for trains to Battle Mountain was 6 hours. Often a dispatch runner required 8 hours to go up Battle Mountain and come back down. In some places the trail was so steep that men climbed with the help of ropes stretched at the side of the trail. Enemy night patrols constantly cut telephone lines. The wire men had a difficult and dangerous job trying to maintain wire communication with units on the mountain.
Bringing dead and seriously wounded down from the top was difficult. Litter bearing teams of six men to carry a wounded man on a stretcher down the mountain. A medical aide was also needed to administer medical care during the trip if the man was critically wounded, and riflemen often accompanied the party to protect it from snipers along the trail. Critically wounded men often died before reaching the bottom where full medical care could be administered. This possibility was one of the factors that lowered morale in the 24th Infantry units fighting on Battle Mountain. Many men were afraid that if they were wounded there they would die before reaching adequate medical care.
The 24th Infantry's supporting artillery emplaced in the valley south of Haman. On August 19, the artillery moved farther to the rear, except for C Battery, which remained in the creek bed north of Haman. Regimental engineers worked to improve a trail running from Haman northeast to the main Komam-ni-Masan road. He intended to use it for an evacuation road by the artillery, if that became necessary, and to improve the tactical and logistical road net of the regimental sector. This road became known as the Engineer Road.
On August 15, there was a gap 4,000 yards (3,700 m) wide in the P'il-bong area between the 24th Infantry and the US 5th Infantry Regimental Combat Team to the south. The 24th Infantry had not performed well during previous engagements, so General Kean sent 432 ROK National Police to Champney the next day and placed them in this gap.
Battle
US 24th Infantry repulsed
The first attack against the mountain line of the 24th Infantry came on the morning of August 18, when the North Koreans partly overran E Company on the northern spur of Battle Mountain and killed the company commander. During the day, Lt. Col. Paul F. Roberts succeeded Lt. Col. George R. Cole in command of the 2nd Battalion there. The next day, the North Koreans attacked C Company on Battle Mountain and routed it. Officers could collect only 40 men to bring them back into position. Many ROK police on P'il-bong also ran away-only 56 of them remained in their defensive positions. American officers used threats and physical force to get others back into position. A 1 mile (1.6 km) in the line north of P'il-bong existed in the 24th Infantry lines at the close of the day, and an unknown number of North Koreans were moving into it.
On August 20, all of C Company except the company commander and about 25 men abandoned their position on Battle Mountain. Upon reaching the bottom of the mountain those who had fled reported erroneously that the company commander had been killed and their position surrounded, then overrun by the enemy. On the basis of this misinformation, American artillery and mortars fired concentrations on C Company's former position, and fighter-bombers, in 38 sorties, attacked the crest of Battle Mountain, using napalm, fragmentation bombs, rockets, and strafing. This friendly action, based upon completely erroneous reports, forced the company commander and his remnant of 25 men off Battle Mountain after they had held it for nearly 20 hours. A platoon of E Company, except for about 10 men, also left its position on the mountain under similar circumstances. On the regimental left, a ROK patrol from K Company's position on Sobuk-san captured the commanding officer of the NK 15th Regiment but he was killed a few minutes later while trying to escape. The patrol removed important documents from his body. And on this day of general melee along Battle Mountain and P'il-bong, the North Koreans drove off the ROK police from the 24th Infantry's left flank on Sobuk-san.
US 5th RCT enters the fight
General Kean then alerted 5th RCT commander Colonel John L. Throckmorton to prepare a force from the 5th Infantry to attack Sobuk-san. On the morning of August 21, the 1st Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, attacked across the 24th Infantry boundary and secured Sobuk-san against light resistance. That evening a strong force of North Koreans counterattacked and drove the 1st Battalion off the mountain. At 1200 the next day, the 1st Battalion again attacked the heights, and 5 hours later B Company seized the peak. General Kean now changed the boundary line between the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 24th Infantry, giving the Sobuk-san peak to the 5th. During the night, the North Koreans launched counterattacks against the 1st Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, and prevented it from consolidating its position. On the morning of August 23, A Company tried to secure the high ground 1,000 yards (910 m) southwest of Sobuk and link up with B Company, but was unable to do so. The North Koreans considered this particular terrain feature so important that it committed substantial resourced to defending it, and attacked the nearby 5th Regimental Combat Team daily.
North of B Company's position on Sobuk, the battle situation was similar. North Korean troops in the Rocky Crags, which extended from Sobuk-san toward P'il-bong, took cover during air strikes, and napalm, 500 pounds (230 kg) bombs, and strafing had little effect. As soon as the planes departed they reoccupied their battle positions. Elements of the 24th Infantry were not able to extend southward and join with B Company of the 5th Regimental Combat Team.
August 21–26 attack
Still farther north along the mountain ridge, in the Old Baldy area, the battle was going poorly for the 24th Infantry. After C Company lost Old Baldy, air and artillery worked over its crest in preparation for an infantry attack planned to regain the mountain. The hot and sultry weather made climbing the steep slope difficult, but L Company was on top by 1200 on August 21. North Korean troops had left the summit under fire from UN air, artillery, and mortar weapons. They placed their own mortar fire on the crest and prevented L Company from consolidating its position. This situation continued until mid afternoon when a North Korean platoon came out of zigzag trenches a short distance down the reverse slope of the mountain and surprised L Company. The other two platoons of the company, upon hearing firing, started to leave their positions and drift down the hill. The North Koreans swiftly reoccupied the peak while officers tried to assemble L and I Companies on the eastern slope. Elements of E Company also left their position during the day.
American air, artillery, mortar, and tank fire now concentrated on Battle Mountain, and I and L Companies prepared to counterattack. This attack made slow progress and at midnight it halted to wait for daylight. Shortly after dawn on August 22, I and L Companies resumed the attack. L Company moved up the mountain, with I Company supplying a base of fire. Three enemy grenades wounded six of the troops, causing the rest to retreat. They were eventually returned to the hill with some coercion. A few hours later, when a small North Korean force worked around its right flank, the company withdrew back down the hill to I Company's position.
Fighting continued on Battle Mountain the next day, 23 August, with ROK police units arriving to reinforce I and L Companies. The American and South Korean troops finally secured precarious possession of Old Baldy, mainly because the supporting fire of the 81-mm. and 4.2-inch mortars covering the North Korean avenues of approach on the western slope. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry units continued to come apart under fire, so much that the battalion commander complained to Kean he needed more officers to keep the men in line. The situation in the Haman area caused General Walker to alert the Marine brigade for possible movement to this part of the front.
On August 25 and 26, C Company beat off a number of North Korean thrusts on Battle Mountain coming along the long finger ridge extending from Tundok. At one point in these fights, a flight of US Air Force planes caught about 100 North Korean soldiers in the open and immediately napalmed, bombed, and strafed them. There were few survivors. Task Force Baker, comprising C Company and a platoon of E Company, 24th Infantry with an ROK police company, defended Battle Mountain at this time. The special command was established because of the isolated Battle Mountain area and the extended regimental battle front.
August 28–29 attack
The 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion in the Battle Mountain-P'il-bong area on August 27, except for C Company which, as part of Task Force Baker, remained on Old Baldy. The next day, North Korean attacks continued. On the August 28, an enemy company-sized attack struck between C and I Companies before dawn. That night, mortar fire fell on C Company on Old Baldy. After midnight, a North Korean infantry force appeared in the rear area and captured the command post. Some men of C Company left their positions on Battle Mountain when the attack began at 0245 the next morning, August 29. The North Koreans swung their attack toward E Company and overran part of its positions. Airdrops after daylight kept C Company supplied with ammunition, and a curtain of artillery fire, sealing off approaches from the North Koreans' main positions prevented substantial reinforcements from entering the gith. All day artillery fire and air strikes pounded the North Koreans occupying E Company's old positions. Then, in the evening, E Company counterattacked and reoccupied the lost ground.
At 2300 August 29, the North Koreans attacked C Company. Men on the left flank of the company position quickly abandoned their positions and soon the entire company was retreating, leaving the North Koreans in possession of the mountain again. US Captain Lawrence M. Corcoran, the company commander, was left with only the 17 men in his command post, which included several wounded. After daylight on August 30, air strikes again came in on Battle Mountain, and US artillery, mortar, and tank fire from the valley concentrated on the North Korean-held peak. A wounded man came down off the mountain where, cut off, he had hidden for several hours. He reported that the main body of the North Koreans had withdrawn to the wooded ridges west of the peak for better cover, leaving only a small covering force on the mountain itself. At 1100, B Company, with the 3rd Battalion in support, attacked toward the heights and retook top by 1300.
The 24th Infantry consistently captured Battle Mountain in the same way. Artillery, mortar, and tank fire raked the crest and air strikes employing napalm blanketed the top. Then the infantry attacked from the hill beneath Old Baldy on the east slope, where supporting mortars set up a base of fire and kept the heights under barrage until the infantry had arrived at a point just short of the crest. The mortar fire then lifted and the infantry moved rapidly up the last stretch to the top, usually to find it deserted by the North Koreans.
Stalemate
Battle Mountain changed hands so often during August that there is no agreement on the exact number of times. The intelligence sergeant of the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry estimated the peak changed hands 19 times. From August 18 to the end of the month, North Korean troops attacked the mountain every night. The peak often changed hands two or three times in a 24-hour period. The usual pattern was for the North Koreans to take it at night and the US 24th Infantry to recapture it the next day. This type of fluctuating battle resulted in relatively high losses among artillery forward observers and their equipment. During the period of August 15–31, seven forward observers and eight other members of the Observer and Liaison Section of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the 24th Infantry, were casualties, and they lost 8 radios, 11 telephones, and 2 vehicles in the process.
In its defense of that part of Sobuk-san south of Battle Mountain and P'ilbong, the 1st Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, also had nearly continuous action in the last week of the month. During this time, Master Sergeant Melvin O. Handrich of C Company, 5th Regimental Combat Team won the Medal of Honor posthumously for actions on August 25 and 26. From a forward position he directed artillery fire on an attacking North Korean force and at one point personally kept part of the company from abandoning its positions. Although wounded, Sergeant Handrich returned to his forward position, to continue directing artillery fire, and engaged North Korean troops alone until he was killed. When the 5th Regimental Combat Team regained the area, it counted over 70 dead North Koreans in the vicinity. The month of August ended with the fighting in the mountain's on the southern front, west of Masan, a stalemate. Neither side had secured a definite advantage.
September push
Notes
- Varhola 2000, p. 3
- ^ Alexander 2003, p. 52
- Catchpole 2001, p. 15
- ^ Varhola 2000, p. 4
- Alexander 2003, p. 90
- Alexander 2003, p. 105
- Fehrenbach 2001, p. 103
- Appleman 1998, p. 222
- Appleman 1998, p. 221
- Alexander 2003, p. 114
- Catchpole 2001, p. 24
- Catchpole 2001, p. 25
- Appleman 1998, p. 247
- Appleman 1998, p. 365
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 366
- Appleman 1998, p. 368
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 369
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 370
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 371
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 372
- Appleman 1998, p. 373
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 374
- ^ Appleman 1998, p. 375
References
- Alexander, Bevin (2003), Korea: The First War we Lost, Hippocrene Books, ISBN 978-0781810197
- Appleman, Roy E. (1998), South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: United States Army in the Korean War, Department of the Army, ISBN 978-0160019180
- Catchpole, Brian (2001), The Korean War, Robinson Publishing, ISBN 978-1841194134
- Ecker, Richard E. (2004), Battles of the Korean War: A Chronology, with Unit-by-Unit United States Causality Figures & Medal of Honor Citations, McFarland & Company, ISBN 978-0786419807
- Fehrenbach, T.R. (2001), This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History – Fiftieth Anniversary Edition, Potomac Books Inc., ISBN 978-1574883343
- Gugeler, Russell A. (2005), Combat Actions in Korea, University Press of the Pacific, ISBN 978-1410224514
- Varhola, Michael J. (2000), Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950–1953, Da Capo Press, ISBN 978-1882810444