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Revision as of 02:06, 27 April 2014 by Machine Elf 1735 (talk | contribs) (→See also: merged)(diff) ← Previous revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff) Not to be confused with Enaction or Enactivism. | The topic of this article may not meet Misplaced Pages's general notability guideline. Please help to demonstrate the notability of the topic by citing reliable secondary sources that are independent of the topic and provide significant coverage of it beyond a mere trivial mention. If notability cannot be shown, the article is likely to be merged, redirected, or deleted. Find sources: "Enaction" philosophy – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (April 2014) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
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Enaction is seen as central to our cognition and perception It is one of a wider set of post-cartesian, anti-dualist theories of the mind. It opposes the separation of the mind from the body, holding that consciousness is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artefacts, their environment, and their interactions. The theory also sees an essential role for feelings, emotions and affect: "perceiving requires not only the ability to probe and explore the world...it also requires exercise of the ability" making motivation intrinsic to our cognitive processes.
References
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Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525.
{{cite book}}:|editor=has generic name (help) On-line version here. - Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. p. 79. ISBN 0262014556.
Further reading
- Robert A. Wilson, and Lucia Foglia (July 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Embodied cognition". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition).
{{cite web}}:|editor=has generic name (help) - Monica Cowart. "Embodied cognition". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Joe Lau, Max Deutsch (Jan 22, 2014). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Externalism About Mental Content". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition).
{{cite web}}:|editor=has generic name (help) - Basil Smith. "Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embodied, enacted and extended". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.
External links
- Pietro Morasso (2005). "Consciousness as the emergent property of the interaction between brain, body, & environment: the crucial role of haptic perception" (PDF). Slides related to a chapter on haptic perception (recognition through touch): Pietro Morasso (2007). "Chapter 14: The crucial role of haptic perception". In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti, eds (ed.). Artificial Consciousness. Academic. pp. 234–255. ISBN 978-1845400705.
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